Two poached eggs; not my own, but free range forma local farm. Still runny. Salt and olive oil, not butter. I find it more flavoursome.

Mediterranean coffee, pot-boiled. String and sweet, just like me.

Now these are issues of taste. They are about what I chose for me. — Banno

That's trivial and irrelevant with regard to morality because of the context, not because it's about you. It's trivial and irrelevant because it's about foodstuffs and your taste in relation to foodstuffs.

This tactic clearly doesn't work if you switch to a moral context:

Two decapitated heads; not those of my own children, but those of children from the local school. Still bloody. Red heads and blondes, not brunettes. I find the former more erotic.

Black coffee mixed with the intestinal contents of a fresh corpse. Dark, twisted, and revolting, just like me.

Now these are issues of taste. They are about what I chose for me. Nothing at all to do with morality, right? Wrong. Obviously.

But morality, you see, is about what I, and others, ought do; indeed, about what every and each of us ought do. — Banno

It doesn't have to be collective or universal to be morally relevant, and it must be relative in order to be warranted. Or perhaps I'm wrong, but you'd have to successfully argue for that.

Everywhere else, if you say one thing, and I say the other, one of us is wrong. — Banno

You mean in other contexts? If that's what you mean, there's a rather obvious difference between, say, maths and science on the one hand, and ethics on the other.

You agree with me that one ought not kick the puppy, but apparently lack the intestinal fortitude to apply this to those who come from some other moral background. — Banno

What are you talking about? That's not the case. In accordance with my moral standard, those who come from some other moral background ought not kick the puppy. I expect I'm no different than you in this regard. You seem to have some peculiar expectations about me, and I suspect that these stem from your very basic misunderstandings of my position.

If folk ought not kick the pup, then folk ought not kick the pup, even if they think they ought. — Banno

Yes, obviously. A tautology is a tautology. I say that folk ought not kick the pup, even if they think they ought, but significantly, I add that I am judging this in accordance with my moral standard. Are you trying to sweep the subjectively relative moral standard under the rug? Without it, then what you're saying is unwarranted, or worse: doesn't even make sense!

Yet you deny this obvious bit of consistency. — Banno

You'll have to successfully demonstrate that I'm obviously being internally inconsistent. You haven't done so thus far, but I wish you luck. You're going to need it.

That's a curious sort of logical yoga you are doing there. — Banno

Ah, the typical unhelpful Banno one-liner for which you've gained notoriety. — S

Whatever the meaning of "good", a moral subjectivist who is a moral relativist avoids contradiction by having relative standards of judgement which correspond to separate and distinguishable statements, such that, for example, it's good in accordance with Banno's standard but not good in accordance with my standard. Those statements can both be true without contradition. It's about the standard of judgement, not the meaning of "good", hence why you bringing this up in the other discussion about moral feeling missed the point. — S

"Giving 5 dollars to a homeless man is good" is true -- we might judge such a statement to be true because we believe that it is always good to give to those in need, or something like that.

"Giving 5 dollars to a homeless man is good" is false -- we might judge such a statement to be false in light of the fact that we are enabling them to hurt themselves, and it would be better to give said 5 dollars to some organization which helps the homeless, or something like that.

Two standards. Two different judgments.

But I don't think that the standards make the statement true or false. They are our means of judging something true or false, but that is not what true or false mean. Except in a superficial sense It's not the ruler which makes the bolt 20 millimeters long -- the bolt is 20 millimeters long regardless of the device we use to measure said bolt. It is also, rounding up, 0.8 inches long. And though we can be more precise if needs be and specify the exact length in inches, we can say roughly 0.8 inches if all that is required is an example for philosophy.

Now if the ruler -- the standard -- does not make the bolt such and such a length, but is rather a property of the bolt, then statements about the bolt are true or false regardless of the standard we happen to use in judging it.

Of course this is an analogy, and our means of judging ethical statements are not exactly identical to rulers and what-not. But I hope that I at least communicated what I mean when I say that standards do not dictate truth or falsity, though they do dictate our judgments about the truth or falsity of such and such statements.

What is it about ethics that makes statements true or false in accord with such and such standards?

"Giving 5 dollars to a homeless man is good" is true -- we might judge such a statement to be true because we believe that it is always good to give to those in need, or something.

"Giving 5 dollars to a homeless man is good" is false -- we might judge such a statement to be false in light of the fact that we are enabling them to hurt themselves, and it would be better to give said 5 dollars to some organization which helps the homeless.

Two standards. Two different judgments.

But I don't think that the standards make the statement true or false. — Moliere

The standards obviously do not make the statement true or false in an absolutist sense, only in a relative or conditional sense. But this absolutist sense which you're suggesting seems like a misguided way of looking at it. How can you justify an absolute truth or falsity in relation to morality?

They are our means of judging something true or false, but that is not what true or false mean. — Moliere

I didn't say that that's what true or false means.

It's not the ruler which makes the bolt 20 millimeters long -- the bolt is 20 millimeters long regardless of the device we use to measure said bolt. — Moliere

What makes you think that that's an appropriate analogy in the context of meta-ethics? My feelings about the size in millimetres of the bolt are irrelevant. That's not the case with morality. Or, if it is, then the burden lies with you to successfully argue in support of an objective standard of morality, where our feelings are completely irrelevant.

It is also, rounding up, 0.8 inches long. And though we can be more precise if needs be and specify the exact length in inches, we can say roughly 0.8 inches if all that is required is an example for philosophy. — Moliere

Sure, I don't disagree. Now you just have to successfully argue that this analogy of yours is appropriate in relation to the topic here.

Now if the ruler -- the standard -- does not make the bolt such and such a length, but is rather a property of the bolt, then statements about the bolt are true or false regardless of the standard we happen to use in judging it. — Moliere

Is that what you're going to argue in relation to morality? That there are independent properties of rightness and wrongness out there in the world? :brow:

Of course this is an analogy, and our means of judging ethical statements are not exactly identical to rulers and what-not. But I hope that I at least communicated what I mean when I say that standards do not dictate truth or falsity, though they do dictate our judgments about the truth or falsity of such and such statements. — Moliere

It's not like I haven't thought about this. I've arrived at my meta-ethical position because I have considered alternative approaches, but ultimately rejected them because I judged them to be inferior. If you go down the absolutist route, then that carries a burden which I doubt can be met. Looking at it in terms of relative standards of judgement, and focusing on statements reflective of that, seems like a much better approach.

What is it about ethics that makes statements true in accord with such and such standards? — Moliere

I suspect you'll be going on a wild goose chase if you look at statements of the sort like, "Giving 5 dollars to a homeless man is good", and seek some sort of transcendent truthmaker for them. I have yet to find an argument good enough to sufficiently support that position. On the other hand, I have seen plenty of bad arguments and dogmatism. So this standards approach seems like a better alternative, since it avoids these big problems you get with the absolutist approach.

The standards obviously do not make the statement true or false in an absolutist sense, only in a relative or conditional sense. But this absolutist sense which you're suggesting seems like a misguided way of looking at it. How can you justify an absolute truth or falsity in relation to morality? — S

Well, I don't know if I'd use the word absolutist, but let's just say that absolutist is any position which believes that truth is not relative to standards, except in a trivial sense where, say, two different standards express the very same length.

My line of reasoning so far has been to say that moral statements are true or false, thereby making them propositions, and what makes a statement true is some fact or state of affairs. "Fact" can be a funny word, but let's just say for purposes of this discussion we just settle on something that can, at least in principle, be checked empirically.

Now in the case of moral propositions there are no facts that can be checked empirically. So regardless of the standard we might use to judge a moral statement true or false, they are all false -- thereby making mine a sort of absolutist position, by the above definition.

What makes you think that that's an appropriate analogy in the context of meta-ethics? My feelings about the size in millimetres of the bolt are irrelevant. That's not the case with morality. Or, if it is, then the burden lies with you to successfully argue in support of an objective standard of morality, where our feelings are completely irrelevant. — S

Namely because moral propositions are not special with respect to the fact that they are propositions -- so, among other components of meaning, one of their shades of meaning is their truth-aptness. They are either true or false.

Deciding which moral propositions I treat as true is certainly dependent upon feelings. But my feelings don't change whether such a proposition is true or false.

Is that what you're going to argue in relation to morality? That there are independent properties of rightness and wrongness out there in the world? — S

A little bit different from that -- only that we state things, in a moral context, in the exact same way that we state things in the context of matters of fact. Not always, of course -- we can use a sentence about moral matters as a means to express some emotion about an action. But there are times that we also state a matter descriptively. And so the best interpretation, absent some other reason to do differently, is to say that such statements are truth-apt, in the exact same way that statements of fact are truth-apt.

We speak as if there are moral facts, even if we believe there are none.

It's not like I haven't thought about this — S

I hope I'm not coming across as condescending or like I am treating you like someone who hasn't thought about the issue. But to be sure let me say here I believe you have thought about it.

Though it might be interesting to pursue further the rest of what you say with respect to the denial of absolutism leading you to believe that emotivism is the best meta-ethical position, I kind of want to hear your response to me here first.

Yes. Quality in this sense, any judgment whatsoever that anything is better or worse than something else, is about persons' preferences. The world outside of minds couldn't care less what the ingredients are, how old the ingredients are, whether the ingredients are going to make us sick or not, it has no "proper" versus "improper," etc. — Terrapin Station

Whether the ingredients are going to make us sick or not is not a matter of personal preference. It's a real state of affairs.

Whatever else someone thinks about it, color is not at all similar to assessments/judgments like good/bad, better/worse, proper/improper, high quality/low quality, etc. — Terrapin Station

But what you said above would seem to apply here as well. The world outside minds couldn't care less how you perceive color. Yet the way in which you perceive an object is nonetheless real, and not a matter of personal preference.

A property (whether color or toxicity) need not be universal to be real.

Tim Maudlin's comment reflected my concerns about this 'experiment':

What the philosophical debate is about is whether moral claims have objective truth conditions. What “the folk” think about the matter is neither here nor there. If one is interested in that sociological question, that’s fine, but presenting this issue as pertinent to the “long and complex philosophical debate” obscures the nature of the research being done.
— Tim Maudlin — ChrisH

I see language (including moral language) as serving a pragmatic purpose for humans. Understanding that purpose (or purposes) can shed light on what a natural and empirical version of moral realism might look like.

In that sense, it can parallel or extend the evolving understanding of realism in science generally. For example, physicists and philosophers of science are almost universally realists about quantum mechanics, but the many different and varied interpretations provide philosophical insight into how realism should best be understood.

Well, I don't know if I'd use the word absolutist, but let's just say that absolutist is any position which believes that truth is not relative to standards, except in a trivial sense where, say, two different standards express the very same length.

My line of reasoning so far has been to say that moral statements are true or false, thereby making them propositions, and what makes a statement true is some fact or state of affairs. "Fact" can be a funny word, but let's just say for purposes of this discussion we just settle on something that can, at least in principle, be checked empirically.

Now in the case of moral propositions there are no facts that can be checked empirically. So regardless of the standard we might use to judge a moral statement true or false, they are all false -- thereby making mine a sort of absolutist position, by the above definition. — Moliere

Ah, so you're an error theorist? But that's a pretty useless outcome, isn't it? Don't you think that it would be better to move on to better ways of getting truth and falsity out of morality?

Namely because moral propositions are not special with respect to the fact that they are propositions -- so, among other components of meaning, one of their shades of meaning is their truth-aptness. They are either true or false. — Moliere

I don't deny that they're truth-apt. And other statements are truth-apt, too. So they're not special in that one respect. But they might well be special in other respects.

Deciding which moral propositions I treat as true is certainly dependent upon feelings. But my feelings don't change whether such a proposition is true or false. — Moliere

Because you're working under a malfunctioning model. These results that you're getting should be a sign that you need to switch to a model which works better.

A little bit different from that -- only that we state things, in a moral context, in the exact same way that we state things in the context of matters of fact. — Moliere

No, not always, as you yourself accept; nor in general; nor ever, if we're genuine in our moral judgement. Moral statements are reflections of moral judgement, and moral judgement has a necessary foundation in moral feeling. There's always that emotional connection which is manifest to some degree in - or in accompaniment with - the expression. That's not necessarily the case with other kinds of statement, so these kinds of statement are not exactly the same as other kinds of statement.

Not always, of course -- we can use a sentence about moral matters as a means to express some emotion about an action. But there are times that we also state a matter descriptively. — Moliere

It's a mixture of the two. It's both. If it's purely descriptive with no foundation in moral feeling, then it's just empty words, a mere imitation. It would be like frowning and clenching your fists, even though you're not angry.

And so the best interpretation, absent some other reason to do differently, is to say that such statements are truth-apt, in the exact same way that statements of fact are truth-apt. — Moliere

Truth-apt? Sure. At least in some cases. But I think I've given good enough reason to treat the one and the other in a manner which is not exactly the same.

We speak as if there are moral facts, even if we believe there are none. — Moliere

Then we either change the way we speak or we interpret the way we speak in a way which results in a more sensible outcome.

I hope I'm not coming across as condescending or like I am treating you like someone who hasn't thought about the issue. But to be sure let me say here I believe you have thought about it.

Though it might be interesting to pursue further the rest of what you say with respect to the denial of absolutism leading you to believe that emotivism is the best meta-ethical position, I kind of want to hear your response to me here first. — Moliere

No worries. But I'm not an emotivist if an emotivist does not accept that any moral statements are truth-apt.

If it is not objectively wrong to kick the puppy I don't see why it wold be subjectively wrong either.

I would rather base a moral system around objective facts about harm then peoples feelings.

I don't think a subjective system is more tenable than an objective one.

If it is not objectively wrong to kick the puppy I don't see why it wold be subjectively wrong either. — Andrew4Handel

But that's not a valid argument. I've tried with you, but you're hard work. You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink.

I would rather base a moral system around objective facts about harm then peoples feelings. — Andrew4Handel

That's not a valid argument either, not in the context of meta-ethics, which is what this context is. It's known to be an informal fallacy. It has a name and everything.

I don't think a subjective system is more tenable than an objective one. — Andrew4Handel

Good for you? Look, if you're just going to revert back to your comfort zone each time without ever making any progress, then what's the point of engaging people in debate?

Ah, so you're an error theorist? But that's a pretty useless outcome, isn't it? Don't you think that it would be better to move on to better ways of getting truth and falsity out of morality? — S

It's the idea I keep coming back to and I'm playing with in this thread, at least. It makes a lot of sense.

But what would a better way of getting truth mean? Truth is truth, as far as I see it -- at least of this plain sort where I'm talking about truth-aptness, and what-not. It's not something we squeeze out of the fruit of knowledge. And if the statements be false, then that's the end of it.

I don't deny that they're truth-apt. And other statements are truth-apt, too. So they're not special in that one respect. But they might well be special in other respects. — S

Cool.

Because you're working under a malfunctioning model. These results that you're getting should be a sign that you need to switch to a model which works bette — S

What's malfunctioning, precisely? I don't see anything malfunctioning.

One of the results of there being no moral truths is that what we care about is up to us.

The downside, of course, is that the language just looks like something which we actually do treat as if it were true, so the theory seems a little outlandish. But at least it accounts for the semantics of moral statements.

Then we either change the way we speak or we interpret the way we speak in a way which results in a more sensible outcome. — S

I guess I'd have to see what it is that's more sensible, and under what basis.

No worries. But I'm not an emotivist if an emotivist does not accept that any moral statements are truth-apt. — S

That's my understanding of the position at least -- emotivism is one end of the pole of the cognitivist/non-cognitivist debate on meta-ethics. Moral error theory, at least as I understand it right now, is a cognitivist account which denies the reality of moral facts.

"There ought be a rose garden" is true if one promised to plant a rose garden.
— creativesoul

That conditional is not true in and of itself. It would require one or more additional premises, premises which others might well have good reason to reject... — S

I have no clue what you're trying to establish as a valid objection. Actually, I have no clue what you think that that string of words means. There's a bit of a gap here in shared meaning.

Good to see you, by the way!

On my view conditionals are not truth apt. Truth conditions are not the sort of thing that it makes sense to say are "truth-apt" for they are a vital part, and elemental constituent, an ingredient - as it were - of what makes "truth-aptness" possible.

I have no idea what being true 'in and of itself' even means. No thing is true in and of itself. That reflects a gross lack of understanding regarding what sorts of things can be true/false and what makes them so.

Being true requires meeting truth conditions. Being called "true" requires meeting only belief conditions(personal warrant). Being logically true requires meeting only validity conditions. Being sound requires meeting both truth conditions and validity conditions, but does not require belief conditions.

Being true and being believed does not require language. Being believed to be true does. Being sound does. Being believed to be sound does.

Moral statements are truth-apt for the same reasons that other truth-apt statements are. They have truth conditions that can be met.





Furthermore, and well worth arguing over...

Pay closer attention.


Here's a report of what has actually happened more times than we can possibly know. We can know that it has nonetheless.

A sincere speaker says "I promise to plant you a rose garden on Sunday".

It only follows by virtue of what the statement means(in addition to having a sincere speaker), that there ought be a rose garden on Monday. This is irrefutable.

"There ought be a rose garden on Monday" is true each and every time someone voluntarily enters into a moral obligation to plant a rose garden on the day before.

That's what it means. Promises are moral statements, as a result of being about behaviour. Moral judgments are made about promise makers. Making a promise is voluntarily obligating yourself to actually perform certain behaviours(to make the world match your words).

Morality is all about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Making a promise is a moral state of affairs as a result of being something that happened that is morally germane/relevant.

Our ability to imagine that which has not happened has no bearing upon what has. The promise has been made by a sincere speaker. The world ought be changed in whatever way it takes to match their words because that's precisely what they mean when spoken sincerely.


Of course we can imagine unforeseen possible situations/circumstances arising that would no longer allow the speaker to keep their word. Reasonable people would not hold the speaker accountable in such cases. That does not change the meaning of making a promise when having a sincere speaker.

The truth conditions of "There ought be a rose garden on Monday" are that it was promised to be planted the day before.

If Shady Shim the Loan Shark promises to murder your family if you don't pay 50 percent interest, though . . .

The promise happened. The statement corresponds to what happened - in part, and just like every other true statement - by virtue of what it means.

Then "There there ought be a dead family" is true if you don't.

Well, I did say previously that you can always bite the bullet. :D

For myself, at least, any theory which would say "There ought to be a dead family because the head of household did not pay a debt back to a loneshark" is true -- is a theory which is false.

A thought, though -- it's interesting to contrast Moore with moral error theory. If I remember correctly, at least, he argued in favor of non-natural moral facts, which would seem to undermine my objection that facts are empirical, at least on its surface.

For myself, at least, any theory which would say "There ought to be a dead family because the head of household did not pay a debt back to a loneshark" is true -- is a theory which is false. — Moliere

You'd base this rejection on the idea that that statement is somehow reflective of the speaker's notion of what's moral/immoral, but it's not.

Moral facts don't bear moral judgment. Rather they consist of morally relevent content/events. In that example, I'm not using the term "ought" as moral value judgment. It's an utterance based upon what has been promised to happen. The utterance of ought is true - just like every other truth-apt claim - by virtue of matching the relevant facts, not by virtue of being met with my approval.

"There ought be a dead family" is true because that's what was promised. It's about what makes the promise itself meaningful, and thus the utterance of ought based upon it true. We all know this much. Why else, if we were actually in that situation, would we fear for our lives? When sincere promises are kept, the world changes to match the words. That's why.

We can know that our family ought be dead if the loan shark keeps their promise, without saying that that would be good.

Well, I did say previously that you can always bite the bullet. — Moliere

The bullet is misplaced.

Good post. That belief and truth are distinct is something that ought be maintained in ethics as elsewhere.

Belief and truth are distinct. That has no bearing upon that example.

Which?

The truth conditions of "There ought be a rose garden on Monday" are that it was promised to be planted the day before. — creativesoul

:chin: Sure. I wasn't paying that any attention. Ought I?

I don't know what mental things are made of but I have compared them with things that are spatial temporal and have energy. — Andrew4Handel

When I say, "You'd need to try to make any sense whatsoever of what nonphysical things are supposed to be ontologically, what their properties are in general, etc." I'm not referring specifically to mental phenomena, unless you think that's the only thing that's nonphysical.

"Spatio-temporal" and "energy" are physical properties/phenomena, by the way. So that wouldn't do anything to make sense of the idea of nonphysical entities or phenomena.

You could also say things that are measurable directly. Just because someone cannot explain an experience to someone else does not mean it doesn't exist. The problem with the mental is that it defies our current methodologies of explanation and causality.

I wasn't doing the old "this is unexplainable" argument. I'm saying that the idea, the concept of nonphysical things is literally incoherent. So if we're going to posit them and take the notion seriously, we need to be able to characterize what nonphysical things would even be, in terms of any positive properties, so that we could make some sense out of them, in general ontological terms.

But indeterminism does not imply free will. — Andrew4Handel

I don't want to get into a big free will tangent, too, but indeterminism in conjunction with will phenomena, at least where the indeterminism can be biased by will, is sufficient for free will in the sense that I use the term. At any rate, that's irrelevant to the fact that physics hasn't forwarded determinism for over 100 years.

I don't now what you mean then, because I have offered a framework for the explanation which is that if mental states are physical brain states then brain states explanations usurp subjective ones. — Andrew4Handel

Demarcation criteria for explanations in general, not just about one topic. I gave the basic requirements for setting out such demarcation criteria.

This just means correlated with the brain because they are clearly not identical. — Andrew4Handel

In my view they clearly are identical.

Whether the ingredients are going to make us sick or not is not a matter of personal preference. It's a real state of affairs. — Andrew M

Correct. What's not an objective state of affairs is if it's better or worse, proper or improper, etc. to use ingredients that will make us sick, or kill us or whatever.

But what you said above would seem to apply here as well. The world outside minds couldn't care less how you perceive color. Yet the way in which you perceive an object is nonetheless real, and not a matter of personal preference. — Andrew M

It doesn't care how you perceive color, correct. Good/bad, proper/improper etc. have nothing whatsoever to do with perception. That's just the point.

A property (whether color or toxicity) need not be universal to be real. — Andrew M

I'm not sure how you're using "universal" there, and I haven't at all been saying anything about that. I wasn't making a point about whether anything is "universal" or not.

Re the rest of the post, if you have a suggestion about how how we could have a "realist" ethics, I'll take a critical look at it and comment.

It's the idea I keep coming back to and I'm playing with in this thread, at least. It makes a lot of sense.

But what would a better way of getting truth mean? Truth is truth, as far as I see it -- at least of this plain sort where I'm talking about truth-aptness, and what-not. It's not something we squeeze out of the fruit of knowledge. And if the statements be false, then that's the end of it. — Moliere

The best outcome is the one which best reflects reality. It's counterintuitive that all of our moral statements are false. That doesn't seem to best reflect reality. So I think that reaching the conclusion of an error theorist is a sign that we need to go back and change something or construct something new. It's like the error theorist only does half a job. He stops before the project has been completed and throws his hands up in the air, saying "This is just how it is". But it doesn't have to be that way. We don't have to live in a state of disrepair, stuck under a malfunctioning model. This is a decision that's for us to make.

What's malfunctioning, precisely? I don't see anything malfunctioning. — Moliere

It's called error theory for a reason, right? That sounds like a malfunction to me.

One of the results of there being no moral truths is that what we care about is up to us. — Moliere

What we care about is never completely within our control, and your position is no different than mine or that of a moral objectivist in terms of what we care about or "need" to care about. I think that you're just under the illusion that it's somehow different under your model, and funnily enough, some moral objectivists seem to be under the same illusion, only they go in the opposite direction. Whether or not there are moral truths, or if so, in what sense, makes no difference to my normative ethics: I will continue to stand by my judgement irrespective of what people say about truth-values in relation to moral statements. The meta-ethics is just about what best reflects reality, what makes the most sense.

The downside, of course, is that the language just looks like something which we actually do treat as if it were true, so the theory seems a little outlandish. But at least it accounts for the semantics of moral statements. — Moliere

But my position acknowledges your account. I accept that, under that interpretation, all moral statements are false. However, that conclusion is absurd, so I offer up a different interpretation which has greater explanatory power. I'm not faced with the problem of struggling to explain why our moral statements seem to reflect truths in some way. They do reflect truths if you look at it in the right way. It seems fallacious to set the bar impossibly high for moral truth when you don't have to.

I guess I'd have to see what it is that's more sensible, and under what basis. — Moliere

There is truth in our moral judgement, and that seems to be good enough to make morality work. It also sits better with people than trying to persuade them that it's all a sham and we just have to act as though it were otherwise. Throw 'em a bone! So there's no objective morality, that doesn't have to mean that there's no morality, and it doesn't have to mean that there's no truth in it.

Can you cut that down, please? I don't believe you would've needed to use so many words in response to such a simple point about logic. I'm not reading a post that long. It's an eyesore.

To reiterate the point, the conditional, p implies q, is false only when the front is true but the back is false. It's possible that this is the case with your conditional. And it isn't difficult to think of plausible hypothetical scenarios where this would be the case. Only a moron would believe that a promise should always be kept, no matter what. And you're not a moron. Are you?

I await your succinct reply.

Good to see you, too, by the way. :wink:

If it is not objectively wrong to kick the puppy I don't see why it wold be subjectively wrong either. — Andrew4Handel

The world outside of minds isn't the sort of thing that feels that it's okay or not to kick puppies. Creatures with minds are the sorts of things that have feelings about this.

I would rather base a moral system around objective facts about harm then peoples feelings. — Andrew4Handel

You don't want an ethical system that is concerned with people and what they like or dislike, enjoy or not enjoy, desire or don't desire? You just want to base it on facts, where you pretend that you're not making personal evaluative judgments about whether one fact or the other should be the goal, and where you couldn't care less about anyone else's evaluative judgments about that?

That would be a weird ethics.

That would be a weird ethics. — Terrapin Station

Yes, but it's his coping mechanism. He is human, all too human.