Perhaps I should reformulate P1 as the following (sorry, I'm not actually an antinatalist just trying to play devil's advocate to get a good response):

P1: Taking a course of action that results in more net suffering in the world than there would be without taking that course of action is immoral.

So in this case punching me is okay because it resulted in the least net suffering. Me killing you would have been much more painful. However, on the other hand, giving birth is NOT okay because it increases net suffering in the world as now there are THREE lives capable of suffering instead of two so in all likelihood, they will suffer more. You should also consider the long-term effect of giving birth. I predict that you are going to give the argument that giving birth IS the least painful way to live because it increases our survival rate, however, let's do some math.

A little bit of suffering X infinity = infinite amounts of suffering
A LOT of suffering X a relatively short time frame = less than infinite amounts of suffering

The first case is the current state of the world in which people keep reproducing and the second case is the case of if everyone today decides not to give birth and "bites the bullet" suffering all of the inconveniences and pain of not having a working force.

if i kill a person without family and firends, without him noticing it, i'm doing something good? — Nicolás Navia

Yes as long as there are no repercussions (disclaimer: None of these are my actual opinions I'm playing devil's advocate). You tell me why it WOULDN'T be moral.

is like if the earth just dissapear without anybody noticing it would be good — Nicolás Navia

That is actually the "best scenario" for most antinatalists

probably killing myself would be moral — Nicolás Navia

Conveniently, they tend to ban people who show them that this is the logical conclusion to their philosophy although I agree with you on that point. Or they give some lame excuse such as "killing myself results in the suffering of my family as well as myself and that suffering outweighs the suffering I will experience in life"

I reformulated it to:
P1: Taking a course of action that results in more net suffering in the world than there would be without taking that course of action is immoral.

That's pretty much the central premise of negative utilitarian thinking. Accepting this premise, how might you refute the position of antinatalism?

Ooo an actual antinatalist that doesn't seem to yell insults at me or think he's right by default because I disagree with him. Wow. Those are rare in my experience. So, Mr antinatalist, how do you address this:

If giving birth is immoral how come eating is moral when:

1- Both of them are necessary for survival

2- Both of them have the potential of causing involuntary suffering on another being (it is involuntary in the case of eating because many who work in food production and distribution are there because they can't find another job and dangerous because of the risks associated with the job. Way more people get disfigured in the food and clothing industries than there are disfigured children)

My main problem with antinatalism is that I see no set of reasonable premises (reasonable as in not fine-tuned to reach the conclusion of antinatalism without any intuitive backing) that could reach antinatalism. All I see as conclusions to antinatalism's premises is either promortalism, suicide, or giving birth and living normally as we do today. I don't understand how you can stop at antinatalism without going to those extremes

That's pretty much the central premise of negative utilitarian thinking. Accepting this premise, how might you refute the position of antinatalism? — khaled

If we're not allowed to try to pin down just what we're referring to with "suffering" or just how we're attempting some overarching calculus of it, it would be difficult to address anything about it pro or con.

suffering is any form of mental or physical pain

And pain is "physical suffering or discomfort caused by illness or injury"?

"Suffering" being in that definition is problematic if we're wondering what suffering is supposed to refer to, exactly.

"Discomfort" seems intuitively dubious if we're suggesting not moral commandments based on it, doesn't it?

And we didn't bother with our calculus.

Some things, such as pain, are undefinable. They are USED in definitions. Define: run

I'm pretty sure you know what pain is. Whatever gets the least amount of that is the most moral thing and whatever increases that is immoral. I don't understand why you are pretending that pain needs a definition.

If you REALLY want a definition: highly unpleasant physical sensation caused by illness or injury.

It's not difficult to define "run": "Move at a speed faster than a walk, never having both or all the feet on the ground at the same time."

The reason we'd be requesting a definition is that "suffering" is extremely vague, and it's used in a very wide range of senses, and we're attempting to suggest moral commandments based on it. We'd better know just what we're referring to and why.

Re "highly" unpleasant, are we then claiming that everyone or close to it experiences highly unpleasant sensations, and are we claiming that everyone or close to it has highly unpleasant sensations outweigh pleasant sensations?

The antinatalist argument as I understand it assumes the following:

1. if someone exists he will unavoidably experience bad things (and possibly good things)
2. avoiding that someone experiences something bad, is a good thing
3. avoiding that someone experiences something good, is a neutral thing because he doesn't experience anything bad as a result
4. therefore avoiding that all future persons have any experiences is a good thing

Ways of waylaying antinatalism:

1. Reject utilitarian ethics.
2. Even if it were true that all existing people have suffered at some point, it does not follow that suffering is part of existence.
3. No people means there aren't any people experiencing something so the comparison between "what is" and "what ought to be" for antinatalists is between something and nothing. Since the latter cannot have any qualities the comparison is in fact nonsensical.
4. The antinatalist position is hyperrational but people aren't hyperrational.
5. The antinatalist position argues there's a difference between the "true" estimate of pain we experience and the one we estimate in retrospect (e.g. forgetfullness, romanticism), it thereby ignores natural processes of dealing with suffering and would also like to ignore simple optimism.
6. Memory improves through reinforcement. Most people are positive about their lives, therefore on average positive experiences outweigh negative experiences.
7. While existence is a conditio sine qua non for suffering it isn't the proximate cause. If you have an abusive father, then it isn't existence causing your suffering it's your asshole dad, who is the proximate cause. The solution is to put him in jail.

1- too easy, that's what I'm trying to avoid
2- impossible to claim otherwise as there is no evidence of suffering ever being removable from existence and even if it is removable it most certainly hasn't been removed yet so antinatalism would work for the present
3-

Since the latter cannot have any qualities t — Benkei

incorrect. It has the quality of there being no pain. That's the whole point. An empty bucket has the quality of having no water in it. It doesn't have "no qualities"
4- this is not a refutation. Just because people are not rational does not make the position wrong. Also this can be used to refute almost any moral code and that's not the goal here
5- yes it ignores optimism because it uses negative utilitarian logic, that's established and is not a refutation
6- yes but as long as you know that there is a risk of severe suffering or even just any suffering associated with birth you are not allowed to take the risk with someone else's life when you don't have to. Claiming that the risk is small is true but is not a refutation. It's like saying that it's okay to kidnap a child if the child learns later to enjoy his captivity. Even it WAS THE CASE that most children learn to enjoy their captivity, that does not permit the kidnapping of children as long as there is the slightest chance of a child not enjoying the captivity
7- this is the same as 2

suffering: unpleasant sensations.

I don't think we can simplify it further than that nor do I think you can define "unpleasant" without making a circular definition

Well, so if we're just going with "unpleasant sensation" isn't that ridiculously broad?

For example, I find it an unpleasant sensation to smell someone's fart. But is it immoral for them to fart in my vicinity, so that it suggests that we should have a moral commandment against it?

That strikes me as ridiculous, even if it doesn't strike you as ridiculous.

P1: One has no right to inflict undue suffering on another
P2: Giving birth is equivalent to inflicting undue suffering on another as it results in the creation of a creature that will definitely suffer as opposed to the absence of such a creature in which case there will be nothing to suffer
C: Giving birth is immoral — khaled

P1 is confusing. I don't have the right to eat pizza everyday, but eating pizza everyday is not a bad just because I don't have a right to it. From the perspective of good health it may be bad, but not because of lacking a right.

If we were negative utilitarians, as you present it, we may say something more along the lines of "Inflicting undue suffering on another is bad, and furthermore, the only morally significant value" -- since the former statement, without the qualification, I think most people would agree to. But most people would not go so far as to say that inflicting undue suffering is the only morally significant value.

P2 is closer to what I take an anti-natalist to believe, but it also reveals why their arguments do not get very far with a lot of people -- and this is related to the restatement of P1 above. In particular the equivalence relation is just not how people look at birth. Everyone has a pretty good notion that their child will suffer. But they also think that their child can thrive. They have more values than the rather narrow interest of our purported negative utilitarian.


For myself I have a hard time accepting that I'm inflicting anything on someone who does not exist. Birth will result in a life that will include suffering in it. But without birth there isn't anyone at all -- and hence nothing to consider within a moral light. It is only after birth that someone becomes a morally significant being worth consideration. Else, it's just an imaginary character.

For myself I have a hard time accepting that I'm inflicting anything on someone who does not exist. Birth will result in a life that will include suffering in it. But without birth there isn't anyone at all -- and hence nothing to consider within a moral light. It is only after birth that someone becomes a morally significant being worth consideration. Else, it's just an imaginary character. — Moliere

I don’t think this argument holds up. We understand the idea that things are possible all the time. The more likely the possibility, the more real it is taken. So a stampede of unicorns goring a crowd of thousands is impossible. A hurricane in the Sahara very unlikely. However the likelihood someone can be born, and as a consequence suffer, is so high that it’s taken as a given.

It's not the possibility of things that I'm attacking. In fact in the part you're quoting I even say that birth will result in a life that will include suffering -- so I'm not questioning the possibility at all, I'm saying that it will be necessary.

I'm making a statement about what is right to reason about morally. Stones, for instance, are not the sorts of things we reason morally about. Human beings are. Animals are. The environment is.

But something else we do not reason morally about are either things or beings which do not exist. So Harry Potter, for instance, is not the sort of thing which we should reason morally about. So far I don't think this is controversial.


I'd just take this one step further and say that persons who do not exist, even those who may possibly exist, are not worth moral consideration. They are more like fictional characters than they are people. Not identical -- and there is some tension in the way I'm saying this here and the belief that future generations, for instance, should be cared for (which I do think they should).

But the anti-natalist is making a mistake in treating what is possible as if it were already actual, when the game of talking about pain-prevention already presupposes, I'd say, someone who is alive -- which an unborn somebody isn't.

But something else we do not reason morally about are either things or beings which do not exist. So Harry Potter, for instance, is not the sort of thing which we should reason morally about. So far I don't think this is controversial. — Moliere

But that is where possibility does factor into this. The very thing that is in question is whether to create a new person, where there was not that unique individual before. The very thing in question is the very real possibility of a person being born from real actions that take place in the real world. Whether or not the person exists already is irrelevant when the very question being asked is SHOULD that person exist in the first place.

So the question is, is it moral to create a new person if creating a new person leads to that individual experiencing harm? This pertains to two alternatives: 1) A person is not created or 2) A person is created.

In scenario 1, no new person is created, and thus no person exists to experience harm. In scenario 2, a person is created, and thus a person exists to experience harm. These are very real alternatives and possibilities thus, it is not the same as a fictional character and very relevant for consideration.

1 is too easy? There aren't any other moral systems out there? Wtf?

In your scenario 1, though, there simply is no person to reason about. What's so different about a child you decided not to have and a fictional character?

They aren't identical. But a child you do not have has about all the moral weight as a fictional character -- something not worth considering.

In your scenario 1, though, there simply is no person to reason about. What's so different about a child you decided not to have and a fictional character? — Moliere

The child need not exist, only the possibility that a child would exist. In this case, the harm and the person the harm is happening to comes together in the same package as a consequence of the action.

But as a consequence of not having a child there simply is no person that is either harmed or saved -- and that's my point.

So what would be appropriate would be to tend to the needs of children that are actual -- but if there aren't any children, then what's all the fuss about anyway? You're thinking of what is not actual as if it were actual.

But as a consequence of not having a child there simply is no person that is either harmed or saved -- and that's my point. — Moliere

That's fine.. The AN in this case would say that no harm, no foul. In other words, it is only good that a person did not exist to experience the harm.

So what would be appropriate would be to tend to the needs of children that are actual -- but if there aren't any children, then what's all the fuss about anyway? You're thinking of what is not actual as if it were actual. — Moliere

But that is precisely the argument. There are two alternatives. It is binary. One is off (don't exist), one is on (exist). The better option is to be left off. Being left off means a person won't exist (who will experience harm). If a person exists, then harm will ensue. Thus, any consideration about how to prevent harm for the child after this decision is irrelevant in the AN argument which is just about whether or not to bring in a person (and thus harm) or to prevent a person's birth (and thus prevent harm). The person does not need to be born to know that it is being prevented from harm. If they are negative utilitarian, then it was only good that harm didn't occur.

The person does not need to be born to know that it is being prevented from harm. If they are negative utilitarian, then it was only good that harm didn't occur. — schopenhauer1

I understand that this is what the AN thinks, but this is the very point that I would say is the most unconvincing part for myself. The language of harm needs an actual person. As we cannot harm someone who does not exist, there is no equation between preventing a person's birth and preventing harm. It would be like saying that we should not harm Harry Potter.

I redid P1 again if you didn't read (sorry about that)
Now as for your argument:

no antinatalist that I know of wants to bite the bullet of the complete extinction of life through lots of suffering in a short period of time. — Πετροκότσυφας

You don't know enough of them then lol. I know plenty that want that

yes that is exactly what that implies. Or rather, it implies that it would be better to fart AWAY from you than I'm your vicinity which makes perfect sense to me. I don't know why it sounds so absurd to you

Most people want to keep living.

Most people (even those in relatively worse circumstances) seem to enjoy life.

Creating a new human will indeed entail some suffering to for them, but statistically it will also create enough joy/pleasure/good to make the whole experience worthwhile for them.

Therefore, the creation of new humans is usually an ethically justifiable action...

I restated P1 as: Taking a course of action that results in more net suffering in the world than there would be without taking that course of action is immoral.

But without birth there isn't anyone at all -- and hence nothing to consider within a moral light — Moliere

This is unexplained. It's like saying "murder is ok because after the guy is dead there is nothing to consider within a moral light". Of course there is something to consider within a moral light. Your choice to give birth results in more suffering in the world than there was previously

you can't take that risk with someone else is the point. That's like saying "kidnapping is ok if the kid later enjoys his captivity". Well what if he doesn't? That's what makes it immoral. Just because you believe life is worth living does not give you permission to impose it on others when you know you would be risking their disapproval

yeah there are lol. Libertarianism for example. Or normal utilitraianism not negative utilitarianism

Except Harry Potter can never be harmed. However, a potential person can be harmed in real life, if it is born. The birth is intricately related to the harm that will ensue in this case. Think of it this way, birth is the platform for which all harm ensues. ANs believe at least some harm will ensue (usually more harm than good), thus by preventing the platform, you are preventing the very basis for harm to a person. Harm is the sole aspect of morality in this case.