Thanks for the comment on the relation of neutral monism to the philosophy of being. I have two questions:
(1) Do you have an example of a self-proclaimed neutral monist who is a Scottist in ontology?
(2) Given than Descartes calls both his substances "res," wouldn't he by classed as a monist by this definition? — Dfpolis

I don't see why neutral monists would need to be self-proclaimed Scottists. The only one who I can think of who might be ( although this is really a question for the Deleuze scholars) is Deleuze. What I will say is that I was simply pointing out that it is logically consistent to think of being as substance, in which case a monist would be one who thinks there is only one kind of being (although there are obviously many kinds of beings). Heidegger speaks to this need to distinguish between being and beings with his ontological distinction (although it is not clear that he thought that being is univocal as, for example, Deleuze avowedly did).

As to your question about Descartes, I would say 'no'; Descartes himself acknowledged the 'interaction" problem his substance dualism produced, and tried to 'solve' it with a 'theory' about the pineal gland. Spinoza corrected Descartes' metaphysics by doing just what your question suggests; treating extensa and cogitans as expressions of one fundamental substance. He may thus well have been the first neutral monist.

Also 'res' does not mean substance as I have no doubt you know, but something like "thing, matter or object". So, res extensa would mean something like "thing extended" and res cogitans something like "mental object" or "mental matter". Spinoza understood extensa and cogitans to be modes or attributes.

I'm not playing sophist. I want you to tell the problem you apprehend, with two substances interacting, so that I can address this problem directly. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have already said that we have no model for any interaction between the mental and the physical. If these are considered to be different substances then we must suppose that they must interact, even though we cannot form any idea of how that would be possible.

If we, on the other hand, take something like Spinoza's way to solve this; we will be able to understand that 'mental' and ' physical' are not different substances but different descriptions, and since descriptions do not need to interact, we can conclude that the two descriptions are merely incommensurable; problem solved.

But that's not what you said, you said "self-caused", not "uncaused". One implies a cause, the other does not, so they refer to completely different things. — Metaphysician Undercover

If not sophistry, then pedantry? Actually some philosophers who think in terms of sufficient reason, for example Spinoza say that everything even god must have sufficient reason for its existence, the difference between god and everything else being that god finds its sufficient reason for its existence in itself; which is to say that it is self-caused. In any case my point was not intending to argue that uncaused and self-caused are synonymous, but to ask why we cannot think the universe as a whole is uncaused, just as well as we might think that god is uncaused. And you have so far failed to answer that question.

I don't see why neutral monists would need to be self-proclaimed Scottists — Janus

That was not what I was asking. I was asking for a philosopher who calls himself a "neutral monist" and, as you suggested, follows Scotus in ontology. I don't know Deleuze's work, but I intend to read abut him.

My question with regard to Descartes was based on taking res (thing) as possibly convertible with "being" with "thinking" and extended" as modifiers. Personally, I don't see being as a prior substrate that can be modified.

None of this tells us that Aristotle thought hyle in natural processes was purely passive, gives a reference supporting that claim, or says how a purely passive matter can solve the problem of Physics i, 9 — Dfpolis

Look then, at Physics i,9, 192a, 28 -35, what he says of matter:

But as potentiality it does not cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be. For if it came to be, something must have existed as a primary substratum from which it should come and which should persist in it; but this is its own special nature so that it will be before coming to be (For my definition of matter is just this -- the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result). And if it ceases to be it will cease to be in the last, so it will cease to be before ceasing to be.

Notice, how matter is defined as outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be, such that to speak of it in these terms causes the contradictions indicated. It is an underlying substratum which does not change between before and after..

This is a non sequitur. Another way to be different is to be potential, but potential need not mean passive. To make your case, you need to show that potential (dynamis) implies passivity -- a difficult case to make given that the primary meaning of dynamis is "power." — Dfpolis

Potential is the capacity to act. As such it is not itself active. If it were active it would not be the capacity for action, but action itself. This is why potential and actual are categorically different. And, since it is other than active, we can say that potential is passive.

What makes you think that "power" implies action necessarily. It is the capacity to act, not action itself. So something with power may or may not carry out the action it has the power to do. "Energy" for example is the capacity to do work, it is the power to do work, but not the work actually being done. If the work is actually done the energy is spent.

One is defined as a kind of physis (nature = "an intrinsic principle of activity") and the other is not. Aristotle distinguishes artifacts by their lack of an intrinsic principle of activity. — Dfpolis

Living things have an intrinsic principle of activity, the soul, and it is clearly a form. This is explained in On the Soul. Therefore the intrinsic principle of activity of a living thing, in Aristotelian biology, is not material it is formal, just like the principle of activity in his physics is formal. The difference being that the living thing has a special type of form, the soul.

I believe that discussion is about artifacts. That is why I want the specific reference. — Dfpolis

Read the section I referred, Bk.7 ch.7-8. even the entire Bk.7. It will give you enough information to see that the difference between natural and artificial things, is not "material" as you say. The difference is in relation to final cause. Here's a piecemeal:

1032a
-12 Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously. Now everything that comes to be comes to be by the agency of something and from something and comes to be something.
-20 --all things produced either by nature or by art have matter; for each of them is capable both of being and of not being, and this capacity is the matter in each--and, in general both that from which they are produced is nature, and the type according to which they are produced is nature (for that which is produced, e.g.a plant or an animal, has a nature), and so it is by which they are produced --the so-called 'formal' nature, which is specifically the same (though this is in another individual); for man begets man.
33 --but from art proceed the things from which the form of the thing is in the soul of the artist.
1033b
5-10 Obviously then the form also, or whatever we ought to call the shape present in the sensible thing, is not produced nor is there any production of it; for this is that which is made to be in something, else either by art or by nature or by some faculty. But that there is a brazen sphere, this we make, For we make it out of brass and the sphere: we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a brazen sphere.
Ch.9, 1034a, 33,
Things which are formed by nature are in the same case as these products of art...

Notice he starts out ch.7 by saying all coming to be is the same, there is "agency", there is "comes from something", and "comes to be something". The difference between natural and artificial is the source of the form, and the agency, being natural. Natural things have the source of the form in nature, and artificial things have the source of the form in the soul of the artist. He then describes artistic production, and how the form is put into the matter. The form isn't actually produced in the matter, it comes from the mind and is put into the matter. After providing an in depth description of how things are produced in art, he reemphasizes what is stated at the beginning, that natural things come to be in the same way.

Strictly speaking, form does not change. It is replaced by a new form. In Physics i, 9 Aristotle is asking, "where does the new form come from?" Your view does not provide a satisfactory answer. — Dfpolis

So, as described in Bk.7, in the case of art, the form comes from the soul of the artist, and in the case of nature, the form comes from nature.

In the discussion of Physics i, 9 there are precisely three principles, and hyle is the only one we have left after eliminating the original and contrary form. — Dfpolis

It appears you haven't read i 9 very well if you missed the part I quoted where he says this is my definition of matter, and "matter" is clearly stated as outside the sphere of becoming. Perhaps your question is left unanswered at that point, until he proceeds to discuss efficient cause and final cause.

I have already said that we have no model for any interaction between the mental and the physical. If these are considered to be different substances then we must suppose that they must interact, even though we cannot form any idea of how that would be possible. — Janus

Read some Aristotle, there's a very good model for interaction between the mental and the physical. To deny this just indicates that you haven't read, or understood it. So your premise, that we have no model for the interaction between the mental and the physical is clearly false.

And you have so far failed to answer that question. — Janus

I answered that. To position the universe as uncaused would imply an infinite regress of temporal activity, an infinity of time before now. And infinite regress is repugnant to the intellect because it fails as an explanation. Since God is placed outside of time, being the cause of temporal existence, it is unreasonable to ask about the cause of God, "cause" being a temporal concept. I guess you didn't read my brief discussion of time.

Notice, how matter is defined as outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be, such that to speak of it in these terms causes the contradictions indicated. It is an underlying substratum which does not change between before and after. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, hyle is a principle of continuity that helps us understand change. It does not, itself, change. All of this fits my account. How does it support your idea that it is passive and devoid of anything analogous to desire?

Potential is the capacity to act. As such it is not itself active. If it were active it would not be the capacity for action, but action itself. This is why potential and actual are categorically different. And, since it is other than active, we can say that potential is passive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me clarify. A potency can be passive -- like clay waiting to have a form impressed on it. Or, it can be active -- like an acorn able to become an oak tree. In neither case does the potency actualize itself. Each kind of potency needs an efficient cause to actualize it (a potter in the first case, moisture and other environmental conditions in the second). One important difference between them is that, while clay receives its new form from an extrinsic source (the potter) and so is an artifact, the form of the oak is immanent in the acorn and so its germination and growth into an oak is a natural process.

Living things have an intrinsic principle of activity, the soul, and it is clearly a form — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, so organisms are natural. Still, we aren't analyzing beings, but substantial change.

Again, what a thing is now is based on its form. Its tendency to cease to be what it is now, to become something else, (e.g. to germinate or to die), is not explained by being what it is now (its form), but by an intrinsic tendency (hyle) to become the new thing (e.g., an oak or decaying matter).

"Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously."

Here Aristotle points out that natural substantial changes are not artistic ones -- alerting us to watch for the difference between active tendencies and passive receptiveness. He again contrasts nature and art in 20 and 33.

.

Ch.9, 1034a, 33,
Things which are formed by nature are in the same case as these products of art...

This is in ch. 7, not 9. If you read chapter 7 from the beginning, you'll find Aristotle explicitly rejecting your view that matter is always passive: "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ..."

Now, let's look at 1034a33 in context.

.

Therefore as essence is the starting-point of everything in syllogisms (because syllogisms start from the "what" of a thing), so too generation proceeds from it.

And it is the same with natural formations as it is with the products of art..

The similarity between substantial changes in nature and in art is not the matter, as you suggest, but that "generation proceeds from [essence]."

So, as described in Bk.7, in the case of art, the form comes from the soul of the artist, and in the case of nature, the form comes from nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, and hyle is a kind of nature (physis).

Perhaps your question is left unanswered at that point, until he proceeds to discuss efficient cause and final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, my question is addressed when he says that "in some cases the matter .. can initiate its own motion."

Yes, hyle is a principle of continuity that helps us understand change. It does not, itself, change. All of this fits my account. How does it support your idea that it is passive and devoid of anything analogous to desire? — Dfpolis

"Passive" means not active, inert, it can also mean that which is acted upon.. This is consistent with "it does not, itself, change". However, "it does not, itself, change", is not consistent with emotions such as desire, which you assign to matter. These are activities of the soul which involve change. Desires change.

Let me clarify. A potency can be passive -- like clay waiting to have a form impressed on it. Or, it can be active -- like an acorn able to become an oak tree. In neither case does the potency actualize itself. — Dfpolis

An acorn, able to become an acorn, is not active. It is waiting to have that form, just like the clay, so it is not active. When it starts to grow it has a form, the soul, active within it. The matter, or potency is not active, the form is.

Each kind of potency needs an efficient cause to actualize it (a potter in the first case, moisture and other environmental conditions in the second). One important difference between them is that, while clay receives its new form from an extrinsic source (the potter) and so is an artifact, the form of the oak is immanent in the acorn and so its germination and growth into an oak is a natural process. — Dfpolis

This is why Aristotle's principles are supportive of dualism, we have two distinct sources of form. A form may be imposed on matter from an external source, as in the case of art, or a form may be imposed on matter from an internal source, which is the case in living things, "the soul" being that internal source of form in the living body.

Yes, so organisms are natural. Still, we aren't analyzing beings, but substantial change. — Dfpolis

Notice, that in this part of the book when he refers to "natural" things, his examples are living things.

Again, what a thing is now is based on its form. Its tendency to cease to be what it is now, to become something else, (e.g. to germinate or to die), is not explained by being what it is now (its form), but by an intrinsic tendency (hyle) to become the new thing (e.g., an oak or decaying matter). — Dfpolis

No, there is no such intrinsic tendency to matter, it is inert. These living thing have a source of form within, called "the soul". The tendency for the thing to become the new thing, is the soul acting with final cause, the matter provides the potential for the new thing to be an oak tree. But the matter is not acing, it has no tendency, it is potency only, passive, inert.

This is in ch. 7, not 9. If you read chapter 7 from the beginning, you'll find Aristotle explicitly rejecting your view that matter is always passive: "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ..." — Dfpolis

Your quote is at Ch 9. It says "some matter is such as to be set in motion by itself..". These are the things which have the form, "the soul" within the matter. He gives "dancing" as an example, and proceeds to say that a stone does not have this capacity. He concludes that the material things which have the source of motion within the matter, having the form called "the soul", cannot exist apart from the soul. "Therefore some things will not exist apart from some one who has the art of making them, while others will; for motion will be started by these things which have not the art but can themselves be moved by other things which have not the art or with a motion starting from a part of the product.

It is quite clear, that even with things that have a principle of self-movement, it is not the matter which is the cause of motion, but the "art" within. This is the soul. If you read Aristotle's On the Soul, this is essential to his biology. There is a principle of motion within the living being, "the soul", which is a form, and this animates the matter. It's vitalism plain and simple. The soul then, as the principle of activity, has powers, potencies, which are a function of how it utilizes matter. These powers are such as self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. Here's the primary definition of "soul", On the soul Bk. 2 ch.1 412a, 20-30

Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized.
...
That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.

If you really believe that my other quote is out of context, coming at the end of that section on coming to be, you still need to address this quote, which is at the middle of the section.

1033b
5-10 Obviously then the form also, or whatever we ought to call the shape present in the sensible thing, is not produced nor is there any production of it; for this is that which is made to be in something, else either by art or by nature or by some faculty. But that there is a brazen sphere, this we make, For we make it out of brass and the sphere: we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a brazen sphere.

Notice how he clearly classifies all together, "by art, or by nature, or by some faculty". There is no such distinction between things of art and things of nature, as you are claiming. I've given you three quotes which indicate this, one at the beginning of the section, one at the middle of the section, and on at the end of the section.

The similarity between substantial changes in nature and in art is not the matter, as you suggest, but that "generation proceeds from [essence]." — Dfpolis

Right, "essence" is formal. So the similarity between changes in nature and in art, is that the principle of activity, actuality, is formal. There is no such principle of activity within matter. That is where you misunderstand Aristotle, matter is inert.

The reason why I referred to Newton, is that this definition of matter, Aristotle's, was the only accepted definition of matter, and universally accepted, until relativity theory gained dominance, so it was the basis for Newton's laws. But under relativity theory, physical bodies are necessarily active, so there is no need for the concept of matter, except to understand inertia. Now there is inconsistency between energy based theories and inertia based theories. However, notice how Newton's laws of motion exclude the possibility of internally sourced motion, which you attribute to matter, and I attribute to final cause. This makes Newton's laws inherently inapplicable to living things.

No, my question is addressed when he says that "in some cases the matter .. can initiate its own motion." — Dfpolis

Think again, and you really ought to read "On the Soul", it makes very clear how this principle of activity which appears to inhere within matter is really a form itself, the soul. This is why Aristotle's, system is so complete, and consistent. Activity, actuality, is always associated with "form" throughout the various disciplines, while passivity, potency, possibility, is always associated with matter. This is the key to understanding his complete works, do not stray from this categorization.

Well, we seem to be going in circles again. I see no point in continuing.

Not going in circles, we're delving deeper into the same issues. It seems to be that our principal difference on this issue is the following. I think that "matter" as used and defined by Aristotle signifies something completely passive, and that is potential, or potency. You think that Aristotle uses matter to allow that there is activity inherent within matter. My argument is that in all the cases where he uses "matter" in this way, it is in reference to living things, and he has clearly attributed this activity which appears to inhere within matter, to a form, the soul. So I think you misunderstand his concept of matter.

That was not what I was asking. I was asking for a philosopher who calls himself a "neutral monist" and, as you suggested, follows Scotus in ontology. — Dfpolis

Well, as I said I don't know of any, but my answer was meant to convey the message that I don't think that was particularly germane to my original point, which was more to do with what I think is the common logic of the terms and ideas than with how other philosophers have defined their positions.

My question with regard to Descartes was based on taking res (thing) as possibly convertible with "being" with "thinking" and extended" as modifiers. Personally, I don't see being as a prior substrate that can be modified. — Dfpolis

OK, so you don't see 'being' as a suitable synonym for 'substance'. I don't either unless being is thought of as synonymous with becoming or process. So I agree that being is not a "prior substrate" and would say that the very notion of a prior substrate, or passive substance, is really incoherent.

Read some Aristotle, — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd rather you explained it to me in your own words.

I answered that. To position the universe as uncaused would imply an infinite regress of temporal activity, an infinity of time before now. And infinite regress is repugnant to the intellect because it fails as an explanation. Since God is placed outside of time, being the cause of temporal existence, it is unreasonable to ask about the cause of God, "cause" being a temporal concept. I guess you didn't read my brief discussion of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think an infinite regress of temporal activity is necessarily implied and even if it were, I don't see why that should be ruled out tout court.

So, the alternative would be to think of the universe as being not in time, but as holding the spacetime continuum in toto, within itself; as being the eternal "provider" of the temporal, so to speak. So, it would be equally unreasonable to ask about the cause of the universe, understood this way, as it would be to ask about the cause of God. And this was my original point.

So, the alternative would be to think of the universe as being not in time, but as holding the spacetime continuum in toto, within itself; as being the eternal "provider" of the temporal, so to speak. — Janus

I don't see how "universe" could be conceived of in this way. "Universe" generally signifies the collective existence of all physical things. These things clearly exist in time. Now you want to hand to "the universe" some type of existence outside of time. So all you are doing is taking the thing which we normally refer to as "God", the provider of temporal existence, and giving it the name "universe". Sure, this, what we call "God", which you now call "the universe", is uncaused, that's what I was saying. But it's not "the universe" as the word is commonly used, it is something outside the universe, which I would rather, according to convention, call God. What would be the point in defining "universe" in this way, such that it is outside the universe (as per common usage)?

I don't see how "universe" could be conceived of in this way. "Universe" generally signifies the collective existence of all physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, "universe" signifies all things that have ever been or will be. The universe is not exhausted by any particular collection of things at a time, otherwise it would be meaningless to talk about the origin of the universe or the infinity or eternality of the universe.

No, "universe" signifies all things that have ever been or will be. The universe is not any particular collection of things at a time, otherwise it would be meaningless to talk about the origin of the universe or the infinity or eternality of the universe. — Janus

This is a faulty representation. Things which "will be" cannot be represented as part of the universe, because possibilities and choice will dictate many of these things. So we can represent the future in terms of possibilities but we cannot properly represent it in terms of what "will be". A determinist might try to do such, but will inevitably fail for not accounting for the real, and substantial difference between future and past.

Your objection is without substance; the totality of the universe must consist in all that has ever been or will be. Are you saying that the things which will be will not be part of the universe? Obviously I am not speaking about the totality of the universe at any particular time, but rather the totality of the universe, logically speaking. So, of course what will be is not a part of the universe now, but what the universe is now is not the whole of the universe. What will be will be regardless of whether determinism is the case.

Note also that for clarity I added the words "exhausted by" after you had quoted the passage and responded to it.

In [a] new paper, three scientists argue that including “potential” things on the list of “real” things can avoid the counterintuitive conundrums that quantum physics poses. ...At its root, the new idea holds that the common conception of “reality” is too limited. By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence.

“This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extraspatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility,” write Ruth Kastner, Stuart Kauffman and Michael Epperson.

Considering potential things to be real is not exactly a new idea, as it was a central aspect of the philosophy of Aristotle, 24 centuries ago. An acorn has the potential to become a tree; a tree has the potential to become a wooden table. Even applying this idea to quantum physics isn’t new. Werner Heisenberg, the quantum pioneer famous for his uncertainty principle, considered his quantum math to describe potential outcomes of measurements of which one would become the actual result. The quantum concept of a “probability wave,” describing the likelihood of different possible outcomes of a measurement, was a quantitative version of Aristotle’s potential, Heisenberg wrote in his well-known 1958 book Physics and Philosophy. “It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.”

Source
This idea bears intriguing similarities to the philosophical conception of 'the unmanifest'.

I don't see a problem with the idea that there are parts of the universe that are not manifest to us. In fact I would say this obviously must be so.

What interests me about that article, however, is the idea of 'potentia' as 'real but not actually existing'. 'The unmanifest' was tacked on by me at the end, it might be misleading - that's not the main point of the article.

I think you could reasonably define "existent' as being synonymous with 'manifest'.

But, yeah, potentia is a different notion.

Are you saying that the things which will be will not be part of the universe? — Janus

No, I am saying that things which will be are not part of the universe. I am not saying that they "will not be part of the universe" when they come to be, I am saying that they are not part of the universe now.

Since things of the future must be represented in terms of possibility, what may or may not be, we cannot represent them in terms of what is. "The universe" represents all that is, and therefore does not represent things of the future.

Obviously I am not speaking about the totality of the universe at any particular time, but rather the totality of the universe, logically speaking. So, of course what will be is not a part of the universe now, but what the universe is now is not the whole of the universe. — Janus

Now you are implying contradiction. What the universe is, is what the universe is. But you want to say that this "is not the whole of the universe", (contradiction), because the universe is changing, and will consist of different things in the future. So instead of analyzing the nature of "change", as Aristotle did, you want to play logical games, sophistry, to make your contradiction, that the universe is more than what it is, appear true.

The point, as I said earlier is that we presently, and most commonly, employ, an inadequate concept of time. We do not recognize within commonly employed concepts of time, the substantial difference between future and past, a difference which is recognized and fundamental to the dualist "two substances", allowing that the soul has freewill. The consequences of this failure in the conception of time, are far reaching, beginning with the assumption of determinism, reaching deep into all branches of science, right down to the issue which wayfarer indicated, quantum uncertainty.

All the various problems which arise from this failure to account for what is most evident to us, as the most fundamental principle of reality, that the past is substantially different from the future, ought to be taken as evidence that our concept of time is sorely inadequate. Instead, extremely intelligent scientists try to explain away these problems with irrational solutions like "many worlds interpretation", refusing to look at the true problem, which is the inadequate representation of time, clinging to such rationalizations which are used to support the faulty concept of time. However, the guidelines for resolving these problems are right there, recognized and produced thousands of years ago as fundamental to reality, by dualist metaphysicians, who recognized this dual nature of reality, past and future being separated by the present. These principles which recognize this most evident and fundamental aspect of reality, are commonly rejected off hand as "theist", by the atheist prejudice which abounds.

I think that "matter" as used and defined by Aristotle signifies something completely passive, and that is potential, or potency. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ..."[/quote]. Until you can explain this statement on your theory, the case is closed.

My argument is that in all the cases where he uses "matter" in this way, it is in reference to living things, and he has clearly attributed this activity which appears to inhere within matter, to a form, the soul. — Metaphysician Undercover

He uses living things as his primary source of examples of natural (as opposed to artificial) processes. I've already said that matter passively receives form in the creation of artifacts -- just not in natural substantial changes.

So I agree that being is not a "prior substrate" and would say that the very notion of a prior substrate, or passive substance, is really incoherent. — Janus

I think we pretty much agree

You are arguing against a qualified version of what I said that I have already acknowledged, and ignoring the unqualified version, so nothing to respond to.

So do I. :cool:

Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ...".

Until you can explain this statement on your theory, the case is closed. — Dfpolis

I already explained this. In these cases there is a form inherent within the material body, a source of activity called the soul. It's quite well explained in "On the Soul".

He uses living things as his primary source of examples of natural (as opposed to artificial) processes. I've already said that matter passively receives form in the creation of artifacts -- just not in natural substantial changes. — Dfpolis

Where he makes the statement you quoted above, he goes on to compare this type of movement with that of a stone. Clearly, under Aristotle's system the difference is that the living material thing has an active form within, the soul, while the stone does not.

Since Aristotle considers living things to be natural, and he describes them as being active according to having a form within, the soul, then it is clear that even natural changes are due to matter passively receiving forms.

Also, don't forget the numerous quotes I gave you, three in total, in which he says that coming to be is the same in cases of art and natural cases.

You have taken one passage which you misunderstand, and have built a complete misrepresentation of Aristotelian metaphysics around this simple misunderstanding

Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ...".

Until you can explain this statement on your theory, the case is closed. — Dfpolis

I already explained this. In these cases there is a form inherent within the material body, a source of activity called the soul. It's quite well explained in "On the Soul". — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, that doesn't explain the text. He does not say that an associated form acts, but "matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion."

Where he makes the statement you quoted above, he goes on to compare this type of movement with that of a stone. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, stones are natural objects, not artifacts. They fall as a result of their intrinsic nature.

My understanding is consistent with the whole Aristotelian corpus and its historical context. I think we've exhausted this subject.

Sorry, that doesn't explain the text. He does not say that an associated form acts, but "matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion." — Dfpolis

Not at that point in the book, but in many other places, especially in On the Soul as I've already told you, he describes this associated form as the soul. Reread that passage, it's Bk7 ch9. He is distinguishing those things which move themselves (like in the case of dancing), from those things which do not have this capacity, like stones. He finds some ambiguity with things like "fire".

So he is not at this point describing how these material things are capable of moving themselves (i.e. the soul), he is just distinguishing them from those things which cannot, so that he can class them separately. When he does talks about how these living material things are capable of moving themselves, in On the Soul, he explains that it is due to a form, an actuality called the soul.

My understanding is consistent with the whole Aristotelian corpus and its historical context. I think we've exhausted this subject. — Dfpolis

It appears like you have not read "On the Soul", if you think that the movement of living things is due to the activity of matter, and not the form which is called "the soul". Therefore your understanding is clearly not consistent with the whole Aristotelian corpus, because you neglect a very important part, and that is the soul. How can you claim to be consistent with Aristotle when you insist that the activity of living matter is due to something inherent within matter itself, and not this form which he calls "the soul"? Sorry, but until you grasp the meaning of "soul", your understanding will not be consistent.

On the other thread you claimed to be theist. How can you be theist and not believe in the soul?

Right, strictly speaking, "movement" cannot be attributed to the soul. Movement is what is attributed to material bodies. But what is at issue here is whether or not the soul is a form, or actuality, which accounts for (as cause of it) the movement of the matter of living body.

Several things are at issue here. You made the claim that what changes is the form. The quoted passage from On the Soul shows that this is false. — Πετροκότσυφας

No it doesn't show this as false. It says that the soul is not in motion. As a general principle for Aristotle, forms are actual, and as such they are what changes as time passes. This does not mean that all forms change though. Even if we equate change with motion, which Aristotle does not do, he distinguishes locomotion from change, the fact that some forms change does not mean that all forms change. So when a living body is described as a material body with a form, and that form is changing, then that form described is not the same form as the form called "the soul". Therefore if the form of the material body is changing. it does not mean that the soul, as a form is changing. So your quoted passage does not show what I said to be false.

Also, anwering to Yanus, you wrote that the universe as uncaused and the idea of an infinite time is repugnant. Yet, Aristotle held that time didn't have a beginning and the universe and motion were eternal. — Πετροκότσυφας

I don't agree with this aspect of Aristotle's metaphysics, the idea of an eternal circular motion, it is clearly an unreasonable idea, so it, like the idea of infinite time, has been demonstrated by later thinkers, like Aquinas to be repugnant.

What interests me about that article, however, is the idea of 'potentia' as 'real but not actually existing'. 'The unmanifest' was tacked on by me at the end, it might be misleading - that's not the main point of the article. — Wayfarer

It is to be applauded that some physicists will grant existence to pure potentialities, but it seems to rub against the spirit of Aristotelian metaphysics to suggest that what is actual takes place in spacetime (or in the phenomenal world of ordinary experience) whereas what exists as pure potential is outside of spacetime (or in some Platonic intelligible world). This idea doesn't mesh with Aristotle's idea of there being first and second actualities, since first actualities, themselves being kinds of potentialities, would have to exist both within spacetime and outside of it. Some person's property of being sighted, or of being able to speak French, for instance, are first actualities, while the exercise of sight, or the act of speaking French, are second actualities. When a doctor restores the ability of sight in a formerly blind person, it would be weird to say that this restored ability is something that exists both outside of spacetime (qua potentiality to see) and inside of it (qua first actuality).

Maybe those physicists would hold that only very special and fundamental sorts of potentials, namely, quantum potentials, exist outside of spacetime. But now the objectionable dualism is being replaced by a crude reductionism. What are we to make of the ontological status of the unactualized potentialities of ordinary things, and of the unactualized powers of objects of sciences other than those of fundamental particle physics?