• Asphodelus
    3
    How could it be that mathematics formulated in a priori necessity in the armchairs and heads of mathematicians, applies to the messy, far-off, contingent, natural world?

    Here's an analogy that I think suggests an explanation.

    Have you ever played a rules-enforced online game? A rules-enforced online game is great for learning if you don't know the rules of a game. That's because if you make an illegal move, the game reacts by pushing your piece back to the starting point, and making a rude noise. Now perhaps we're given a game like chess, but with different rules. We want to figure out what those rules are. We can try to find out by testing sequences of moves (let's suppose we're playing against a computer). And as the game goes on, we'll see that some moves are allowed while others are not.

    Now imagine that we have a book of games. In this book are all the kinds of games that are like chess, only different. The book not only lists the rules of each game, but also the ways that it's possible for the board to look given those rules, and all sorts of other true things about the game as defined by those rules. For instance, some of those games will be winnable within five moves. Others will not. And of course, the fact about which ones will is dependent on the initial rules. The fact about which ones will is implied by those rules. This book will have that information about each game.

    We may imagine that this book was written by some obsessed monk, with no gaming experience, hard-set on cataloging as many possible chess-like games as she could. Or, better yet, an old-fashioned computational device (with no experience at all) put to the task. Either way, the process is: define a set of rules for each game, and work out as many truths as possible about the game (trying one's best to focus on the general ones) by asking what those rules imply about possible game states and how to move from one possible game state to other possible game states.

    Consider just how helpful this book will be to our project. We want to find out which game we're playing. We want to find out all the rules exactly. We can bump around and use trial and error. Perhaps we discover, in our bumping around, that the game is winnable in under five moves. That means that the mystery game may be described in the part of the book that chronicles those games that are winnable in under five moves, and it isn't in that part of the book that deals with those not winnable that way. Now it seems we've got some knowledge for free. We've learned to test the other kinds of general properties that our book tells us we should expect from any game winnable in five moves.

    Now we try something else. We list all the possible first moves, as given to us by trial and error against the rule enforcing game engine. We then look up all those games that allow that collection of first moves in our book. And when we do, we'll most likely find some knowledge about the game that we didn't before. Perhaps all games that have this set of allowable first moves include a rule in their rulebook that states "you may move at most 10 squares on your first turn." Notice that this is not necessarily an implication of our discovery about possible first moves, a property that all games that have these rules share. Instead, the book, and its catalog of games and truths about those games, allows us to make this deduction. It gives us more knowledge.

    And as we play around with our game and our book, we get a sharper and sharper idea of what the rules might be.

    Now let's talk about the analogy. The mystery game plays the role of our cosmos. The game's rules are the laws of nature. The book of games is mathematics. The games within are mathematical structures. The rules of each game are the axioms and rules that, taken together, entail those mathematical structures.

    Notice that there isn't really a problem of application in the case of games. There isn't a problem of unreasonable effectiveness of our gamebook in helping us explain how our mystery game works. The explanation for application is that whatever the mystery game is, it operates like any other game: there are rules, and the possible board states arise from those rules. And the book of games is simply full of explorations of the implications of possible sets of rules. Assuming it's lengthy enough, or we're lucky enough, it wouldn’t be such an unexplainable event that the book tells us some things about the game we're trying to figure out. Even though the author of that book never had any experience or prior knowledge of the mystery game.

    This is easy to see in a simplified situation of games, but harder to see in the situation of mathematics and the natural world. Surely the analogy comes apart from the reality in two places. First, the natural world, and structures within it, tend to be far more complex than any chess-like game. And second, there is no great book of mathematics that has come close to anything like completion.

    And yet, these differences need not nullify the analogy. Increase the complexity of the game, and perhaps the book of games does not talk about games, but types of games that share certain qualities as defined by a set of rules. Now, these rules may be approximations of the actual rules, but they may still yield implications about what is possible in terms of moves and game states: implications that we can go out and test in our very complex mystery game. And it may be that the book of games in the case of mathematics is not only approximate but also (to put it mildly) incomplete. That's ok for our analogy too. We'd still prefer to have the book alongside, and we'd use it in much the same way. We'd use it as a kind of library of implications. A partial library of how partial structures arise from rules.

    Now here's a point that would, if it weren't true of our cosmos, absolutely scuttle this analogy. The mystery game, no matter how complex it turns out to be, is regular. That is, the rules don't change and always apply. This is especially important when we attempt a wrong move, and the game pushes our piece back and makes a rude noise, every time. If our game didn't do that, our book would be useless. But then our task would be meaningless as well--for there wouldn't be any rules to discover. And it seems that our cosmos is this way too. It appears to be regular in imposing its rules. If it weren't, the big book of mathematics would useless to science. But then again, the task of science would be meaningless as well--for there wouldn't be any rules to discover (much less any scientists to discover them).

    So here's a kind of anthropological explanation for the effectiveness of mathematics to the natural sciences. Of course our cosmos yields to the great book of mathematics, because a cosmos that didn't wouldn’t have us in it. In short, only a regular universe can harbor intelligence, and a regular universe is mathematically describable.
  • SophistiCat
    2.2k
    This is easy to see in a simplified situation of games, but harder to see in the situation of mathematics and the natural world.Asphodelus

    To be honest, I thought it was rather the opposite: the game analogy is overly complicated for the point it is making, which is that the world has a certain structure and we, being part of the world, are constrained by that structure. And that the world being structured is what explains the effectiveness of (some) mathematics in describing it, since mathematics is a way to build or describe abstract structures.

    Of course, that's one possible explanation. Another is that we expect to find structure, are constrained by our mental constitution to find structure, and that is why we find it. This isn't as neatly self-contained as the first explanation, since it doesn't explain why we are constituted this way and how it is that we exist at all, in contrast to this:

    So here's a kind of anthropological explanation for the effectiveness of mathematics to the natural sciences. Of course our cosmos yields to the great book of mathematics, because a cosmos that didn't wouldn’t have us in it. In short, only a regular universe can harbor intelligence, and a regular universe is mathematically describable.Asphodelus

    But what if there is some truth to the second possibility? What if the world is not quite as regular as our science implies, but we are biased against noticing this fact, because we have evolved to seek out and take advantage of regular structures?
  • Joshs
    5.3k


    How could it be that mathematics formulated in a priori necessity in the armchairs and heads of mathematicians, applies to the messy, far-off, contingent, natural world?Asphodelus

    Because a large part of our empirical models of the messy, far-off, contingent, natural world are also formulated in the armchairs and heads of scientists.
    Modern science was crystallized in conjunction with that of mathematics and formal logic, on the basis of the mathematizable object. As a result , the world is carved into units that presuppose the mathematical.
  • Banno
    23.4k
    How could it be that mathematics formulated in a priori necessity in the armchairs and heads of mathematicians, applies to the messy, far-off, contingent, natural world?Asphodelus

    It isn't "formulated in a priori necessity in the armchairs and heads of mathematicians".

    That's a relatively recent image of mathematics, a consequence of the advent of modern academia.

    Mathematics is embedded in the world. We make use of it, and have always done so; and what we do with maths feeds back into the way we do maths.

    But further, the rules in your book are re-written as a matter of course. Mathematicians prosper as mathematicians by undermining previous mathematics, by thinking of new things to do. Consider instantaneous velocity and i for example.

    The game analog breaks down, because any move can be made to fit into the rules of a game in which part of the game is to re-write the rules.

    Following that point, if the world worked differently, we would use a different maths.

    "What's the square root of negative one? Buggerd if I know - let's call it 'i' and see what happens... "
  • Banno
    23.4k
    For most practical purposes abstracts of academia math are used and only rarely truly new math is developed for practical situations.Goldyluck

    Then there are far more variations in mathematics than the few that are used. We select the mathematics that suits our purpose. Hence it would be odd to think it problematic that the mathematics we use suits our purposes.
  • jgill
    3.6k
    Mathematicians prosper as mathematicians by undermining previous mathematics, by thinking of new things to doBanno

    It's more likely new math extends, generalizes, abstracts what is known, and/or connects what had been thought of as disparate results.

    Most math is embedded in academia mindsGoldyluck

    That's been my experience. That's where it usually starts. But mathematical physics is academic as well.
  • SophistiCat
    2.2k
    It isn't "formulated in a priori necessity in the armchairs and heads of mathematicians".

    That's a relatively recent image of mathematics, a consequence of the advent of modern academia.

    Mathematics is embedded in the world.
    Banno

    You make like you are objecting to the OP, but here you are just restating the same thesis. Yes, the game analogy is a bit awkward, but the idea is the same: mathematics fits the world so well because the world just is "mathematical."

    The game analog breaks down, because any move can be made to fit into the rules of a game in which part of the game is to re-write the rules.Banno

    Not any move, surely. The world is rich enough to exhibit multiple regularities, depending on how you look at it, and those regularities can be modeled in multiple ways. Still, when you get into the nitty-gritty of said modeling, you will quickly discover just how tightly nature constrains our efforts - ask any working scientist! For better or for worse, scientists aren't free to make any moves they wish.

    Which, of course, forms the essence of the OP question. When people wonder at how well mathematics fits the world, there are two seemingly opposing aspects to this observation. On the one hand, yes, we've had a lot of success with mathematical modeling. On the other hand, you can't just make up anything and apply it anything equally successfully. It's a very tight fit, especially at the most basic (aka fundamental) level. This is what makes the fit seem to remarkable.

    Still, there's this nagging doubt that I referred to earlier and that perhaps you had in mind as well: how much of that fit is down to our desires, prejudices and biases?
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    I remember a question from Khan Academy that was on inequalities and the answer was the minimum number of people required for get a job done. Assuming p is the variable name for people, the answer was, for argument sakes,

    The answer (at the back) was p = 4 (rounding up since 3 won't do).

    There can't be 3.4 people is the (accepted) explanation.

    Reminds me of cipher, negative numbers, , you get the idea. People refused to accept them in the beginning - for thousands of years - and it was only after they were, let's just say, forced into a corner, they warmed up to these mathematical objects.

    My point is that the math, using relevant formulae/techniques, gives a result (3.4 people in the above case) that, in a sense, doesn't compute!. There's an element of human, common-sense, interpretation required to get the actual answer (4 people)...assuming of course 4 is the right answer.


    Relevant? Perhaps...
  • Joshs
    5.3k

    The world is rich enough to exhibit multiple regularities, depending on how you look at it, and those regularities can be modeled in multiple ways. Still, when you get into the nitty-gritty of said modeling, you will quickly discover just how tightly nature constrains our efforts - ask any working scientist! For better or for worse, scientists aren't free to make any moves they wish.SophistiCat

    I agree that with the above, but that does t necessarily mean the below follows from it.

    mathematics fits the world so well because the world just is "mathematical."SophistiCat

    Saying the world is mathematical is like saying that it consists of propositional statements. We would first have to remind ourselves that it is our relation to it that is mathematical. We certainly do render it that way empirically , with very useful results, but it has been asserted by a number of philosophers that the predicational logic underlying mathematics is not irreducible. There may be more ‘precise’ ways to render
    the world than via a mathematical language.
  • Asphodelus
    3
    Thank you all for this great discussion!

    Here's an initial response to SophistiCat's interesting observation:



    Of course, that's one possible explanation. Another is that we expect to find structure, are constrained by our mental constitution to find structure, and that is why we find it. This isn't as neatly self-contained as the first explanation, since it doesn't explain why we are constituted this way and how it is that we exist at all, in contrast to this:SophistiCat

    But what if there is some truth to the second possibility? What if the world is not quite as regular as our science implies, but we are biased against noticing this fact, because we have evolved to seek out and take advantage of regular structures?SophistiCat

    I can think of two arguments against this possibility.

    1. Consider just how implausible it would be for the development of structure in the world--any structure, never mind galaxies, solar systems, complex molecules, life, or intelligent life--without regularity. I'm not sure what a non-regular cosmos would be like, but I think it would be very messy and without much ordered complexity. The fact that we do see all of these things means that things had to behave according to some rules, at least most of the time.

    And to the extent that there might have been spatially or temporally local sources of irregularity that did not affect the development of overall structure, scientists have had a hard time finding them. When they seem to have found an irregularity, it is then, eventually, subsumed into some more general, and no-less-regular, theory. This leads me to the next argument.

    2. On the fundamental level of matter, space, and time, the world has proved to be extremely regular. Our best theories about these fundamental entities (QM and GR) make astoundingly precise predictions, are the basis for new and surprising discoveries about realms extremely removed from our own in scale and distance, and allow for the development of useful technology that might have a few decades ago seemed magical. There is also a very good case to be made that matter space and time are truly fundamental--all phenomena can be in some sense be reduced to considerations about matter moving around in space and time.

    So it's hard to see how the world couldn't be as regular as science implies. Surely we animals find regular structures helpful, and so look out for it. But where would this non-regularity fit? It can't be in the behavior of matter, space, and time, because we have very effective (as characterized above) theories that constrain the behavior of those things to a remarkable degree.
  • Joshs
    5.3k
    On the fundamental level of matter, space, and time, the world has proved to be extremely regular. Our best theories about these fundamental entities (QM and GR) make astoundingly precise predictions,Asphodelus

    I agree with you in general concerning the regularity of the world , but I think that the kind of regularity that is implied by your use of ‘extreme’ and ‘precise’ to refer to mathematical descriptions is in fact a less useful notion of precision and exactitude than it might seem. The same models that rely on fixed lawfulness and numeric description to the nth decimal place depend equally on notions of randomness The universe these models depict is one part numerically exact and one part utterly random.
    The way forward beyond the randomness science ascribes to aspects of the rendered world requires a shift from the reliance on calculative exactitude.

    “…the ontological presuppositions of historiographical knowledge transcend in principle the idea of rigor of the most exact sciences. Math­ematics is not more exact than historiographical, but only narrower with regard to the scope of the existential foundations relevant to it.” (Heidegger, Being and Time)
  • SophistiCat
    2.2k
    I agree that with the above, but that does t necessarily mean the below follows from it.Joshs

    Saying the world is mathematical is like saying that it consists of propositional statements.Joshs

    I was just loosely referencing the idea of a clockwork universe, structured world, mathematics being "embedded" in the world - however you want to express it. This general idea has been widely shared by rational-minded people, but caching it out with more philosophical precision opens up a metaphysical Pandora's box, as I am sure you are well aware.
  • jgill
    3.6k
    On the other hand, you can't just make up anything and apply it anything equally successfully. It's a very tight fit, especially at the most basic (aka fundamental) level. This is what makes the fit seem to remarkable.SophistiCat

    How true. My dabbling in complex dynamics seems entirely devoid of physical applications, other than amazing imagery. Few of my colleagues spent time thinking beyond the particular game we were playing, like curious cats.
  • SophistiCat
    2.2k
    I must admit that I was kind of playing devil's advocate here. I do not honestly believe that we systematically confabulate structure where none exists. Peirce famously quipped: "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts." Taken at face value, I think this is exactly wrong. Like many people raised in the same rationalist, scientific tradition, I do not doubt in my heart the vision of a rule-bound world. And this complacency is what worries me sometimes, so I want to push back against it.

    I can think of two arguments against this possibility.

    1. Consider just how implausible it would be for the development of structure in the world--any structure, never mind galaxies, solar systems, complex molecules, life, or intelligent life--without regularity.
    Asphodelus

    Well, structure and regularity are related notions, but yes, of course I wasn't arguing for a solipsist vision in which none of the apparent regularity is real. The world has to be regular enough to produce all these things.

    2. On the fundamental level of matter, space, and time, the world has proved to be extremely regular.Asphodelus

    Yes, this is what convinces the most. It is all right to talk about alternative possibilities in the abstract, but when you actually study nature, especially at its most basic, you see just how tightly it constrains our explanations. And the more closely we look, the less room there is for error, which begs the conclusion that any apparent slack is due to our lack of understanding.

    This doesn't hold equally well across all inquiries though. The larger and more complex the object of study, the poorer the data, the more we have to rely on statistics and plausible extrapolation to make the best of a bad situation. And this is where our optimistic, pattern-seeking nature can get the best of us (not to mention systemic flaws in our scientific institutions). We tend to oversimplify and overexplain in the face of messy or insufficient information.
  • SophistiCat
    2.2k
    it has been asserted by a number of philosophers that the predicational logic underlying mathematics is not irreducible. There may be more ‘precise’ ways to render
    the world than via a mathematical language.
    Joshs

    Can you plain this a bit more? "Not irreducible" = reducible? To what? And has anything been proposed as an alternative to a mathematical language?
  • EnPassant
    665
    Is there any part of the world that is demonstrably non mathematical?
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