It seemed quite clear to me, so perhaps you could point me to the parts which seem unclear to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here is the passage in question:

Sure, organisms are "agents", but we need an agent which acts as the cause of the organism. If the material body is an organism, and semiosis is responsible for the existence of this living material body, then the agent which practises the semiosis which brings this material body into existence must be immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do we need "an agent which acts as the cause of the organism" as opposed to the physical conditions that give rise to the organism. I have no idea what you mean to be asserting here.

Why do you say that semioisis independently of (presumably) physical conditions are "responsible for the existence of this living body"? Are you rejecting the idea that semiosis could be part of the physical conditions or the idea that physical conditions themselves just are signs? If so, on what grounds? What else could physical conditions be but signs?

Why do we need "an agent which acts as the cause of the organism" as opposed to the physical conditions that give rise to the organism. — Janus

Do you agree that the organism, as a physical body consists of semiotic activities? That is the principal premise, semiotic activities are the cause of the physical body which is the living organism. As I described earlier, semiotic activities require an agent. The agent is the cause of semiotic activities. Therefore the agent causes the semiotic activities and the semiotic activities cause the physical body. As the cause of the physical body, through the means of semiosis, the existence of the agent is prior to the existence of the physical body and is therefore non-physical.

Why do you say that semioisis independently of (presumably) physical conditions are "responsible for the existence of this living body"? — Janus

I am following what apokrisis appears to argue, that semiosis is responsible for the existence of the living body.

Are you rejecting the idea that semiosis could be part of the physical conditions or the idea that physical conditions themselves just are signs? — Janus

To describe physical conditions is one thing, and to describe semiosis is to describe another thing. The two are completely different because physical conditions are not described in terms of interpreting signs. We describe physical conditions by interpreting things, but the things themselves, the physical conditions, are not described as an interpretation of signs, they are described as "what is". To describe physical conditions in this way, as semiosis, would require a metaphysics which assumes the supernatural as inherent within the natural, so this is not "physical conditions" at all, as is commonly implied by this phrase.

So I am not saying that physical conditions are not signs, but if they are, then they must have been created as signs. As I said in my last reply to you, a sign only exists as a sign if it was created as a sign. Therefore if all physical conditions are signs, then the creator of the first physical condition must be something other than a physical condition, i.e. non-physical.

What else could physical conditions be but signs? — Janus

I'll agree that all physical conditions are signs. But do you understand that this necessitates the conclusion that something non-physical existed prior to the first physical condition, to create the first physical condition as a sign? A sign can only exist as a sign if it was created as a sign. Only if you premise that the first physical condition was not a sign do you allow for the possibility that there was not something non-physical prior to the first physical condition.

Do you agree that the organism, as a physical body consists of semiotic activities? — Metaphysician Undercover

If all physical processes are counted as being semiotic activities, then yes.

We describe physical conditions by interpreting things, but the things themselves, the physical conditions, are not described as an interpretation of signs, they are described as "what is". — Metaphysician Undercover

In fact they are not described at all, but merely defined as what is. All that can be described are processes, signs. What reason do we have to think there is a brute in itself physicality apart from the in-formed things we experience, and which are signs; that is, can only be understood as relations and processes.

I'll agree that all physical conditions are signs. But do you understand that this necessitates the conclusion that something non-physical existed prior to the first physical condition, to create the first physical condition as a sign? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just the old familiar 'first cause' or 'unmoved mover' argument. It presumes that nature must conform to the demands of our logic, which is not something that is capable of demonstration. You can adopt it as a basic presupposition and then build from there if you want, but different presuppositions are possible. You are assuming that the physical cannot be self-caused, but what argument can you offer to support that assumption?

If all physical processes are counted as being semiotic activities, then yes. — Janus

No, I'm talking just about living bodies here. The semiotic agent is required for the existence of the living physical body, if the body consists of semiotic processes. Therefore the semiotic agent is prior to the existence of the physical body. There is no evidence of such an agent in non-living physical existence, so we ought to conclude that the agent is non-physical. But if you assume that the agent is part of the non-living physical existence, then you just defer the problem such that the agent must be prior to all physical existence. Dfpolis seems to be arguing in this direction, assuming that the agent with the attribute "desire", inheres within matter itself. So when matter came into existence it already had the agent which is responsible for giving it form inherent within it.

In fact they are not described at all, but merely defined as what is. All that can be described are processes, signs. What reason do we have to think there is a brute in itself physicality apart from the in-formed things we experience, and which are signs; that is, can only be understood as relations and processes. — Janus

You can assume that there is no substance to the world if you want, that all there is is relations with nothing being related, and processes with nothing acting in those processes, but what's the point of this? All your definitions would be unsound because you could define any random relations and processes and they would all just be imaginary, fictions, because there would be nothing actually in these relations, or carrying out these processes.

We are faced with certain realities which we cannot dismiss, such as that the existence of things past cannot be changed. Therefore we have reason to believe that there is "a brute in itself physicality".

This is just the old familiar 'first cause' or 'unmoved mover' argument. — Janus

Yes it's pretty much a simplified version of the cosmological argument which is a very good, forceful, and valid argument.

It presumes that nature must conform to the demands of our logic, which is not something that is capable of demonstration. — Janus

No, the argument actually does the very opposite of this, it forces us to conform our logic to the evidence of the "brute in itself physicality", rather than allowing our logic to wonder off into phantasy land, when we do not acknowledge the reality of this brute physicality, as you suggested above.

The argument comes in different version, but here's a better explanation. We take a number of principles gathered from the evidence of physical existence, and combine simple deduction with simple induction to produce a conclusion. We observe the existence of physical things, which come and go in time, and we realize from the evidence, that the potential for any physical thing precedes, in time, the physical existence of that thing. And, we conclude that the nature of potential is such that the thing is not necessarily brought into existence, it's existence is contingent; a particular cause, or causes, are required in order that such and such particular thing is brought into existence, and not something else. so we conclude deductively that all physical things are "contingent", dependent on a cause or causes. Since this appears to be the case with all physical things, then we can conclude by induction that it is the case for every physical thing. Therefore there is a cause which is prior to every physical thing. Being prior to every physical thing, this cause is non-physical.

You are assuming that the physical cannot be self-caused, but what argument can you offer to support that assumption? — Janus

There is no evidence of anything self-caused, that is an instance of allowing your logic to go off into phantasy land, not being constrained by the evidence of brute physicality. The notion of "self-caused" is actually contradictory and ought to be dismissed as such.

The cause is always prior in time to the thing caused. To be self-caused would require that the thing is prior in time to itself. That's contradiction because prior in time to the existence of the thing, the thing does not exist. But if at this time it acts to cause the existence of itself, it must exist. Therefore this notion of "self-caused" requires that the thing both exist and not exist at the same time, and that's blatant contradiction.

Thanks for mentioning your article, "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle".

I found it to be clear, enlightening with regard to explaining the differences between the Platonic and Aristotelian positions, and its conclusion regarding the active potency of hyle to be consistent with a contemporary description of gene expression (among other things).

When you ask me to tell the truth, you are asking me to be honest, to tell you what I truly believe, and not be deceptive. You are not asking me for an account relative to your concern, it is strictly my concern which you are asking for, what I believe. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually I'm interested in reality. I want to know where my keys really are. So, I'm not at all interested in your beliefs as beliefs However, being charitable, I accept that your knowledge may be limited and will not press you beyond your abilities.

This is being honest with oneself. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't mean we can't truly know what we experienced.

But now you're using "truth in a completely different way, to refer to a relationship between our knowledge and reality. Above, truth is to honestly represent one's own experience — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I started with "truth is the adequacy of what is in the mind to reality" -- as a relation between our representations (primarily knowledge) and reality. You're the one that side-tracked into honesty.

In relation to honesty, I said that an honest statement is one that reflects the reality of what is in our mind -- again a relation between reality and representation.

then reality must be experience — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confused. Experiences are real. That does not mean reality is experience.

This is getting tedious, and we are making no progress. So I am not spending any more time on discussing truth with you.

Thank you for your appreciative comment.

GIven your biological interests, I wonder if you would like to read in my article, "Mind or Randomness in Evolution," Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies (2010) XXII, 1/2, pp. 32-66 (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution). As a physicist, I would like a biological perspective.

I agree.

Now, the question is, for a physicalist, how can consciousness (as subjective awareness), produce effects that can be selected by evolution?

Didn't I already reply to this post yesterday? Check above.

GIven your biological interests, I wonder if you would like to read in my article, "Mind or Randomness in Evolution"...As a physicist, I would like a biological perspective. — Dfpolis

I have downloaded, and am happy to read your article, "Mind or Randomness in Evolution", however; my interest in biology is only incidental to my interest in cognitive psychology. So I'm not really in a position to offer a well-informed biological perspective.

Forum members who have had a career in one of the biological sciences are better placed to provide relevant insights. Hopefully one or more of them will accept your invitation.

I've noticed your YouTube channel, and am interested in becoming somewhat familiar with your views on intentionality and mind as time permits.

But if you assume that the agent is part of the non-living physical existence, then you just defer the problem such that the agent must be prior to all physical existence. Dfpolis seems to be arguing in this direction, assuming that the agent with the attribute "desire", inheres within matter itself. So when matter came into existence it already had the agent which is responsible for giving it form inherent within it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see this, just logically, as being one possibility, the other being a transcendent agent. So, I must choose which seems more in accordance with my experience, more plausible, more parsimonious or whatever criteria I wish to use. As I said before the idea of a transcendent agent just is dualism, the position of two radically different kinds of being. Now we have the 'dynamic interaction' problem, which seems insoluble.

I also don't agree with you that physicality is manifestly "brute", I think that thinking that is just a (bad) habit of thought; but there is no point arguing about that, because to think one or the other is what Collingwood refers to as an "absolute presupposition", which cannot ever be demonstrated to be true or false.

By "subjective awareness" do you intend to posit something radically separate from the physical? What if the objective and subjective accounts of human nature are simply two incommensurable accounts of the one thing? This would mean that, as Spinoza suggests, res extensa (the physical) and res cogitans (the mental) are simply two attributes of the one substance (although I don't like the idea of substance and so would tend to think "process" instead). This could be akin to a kind of neutral monism, where the fundamental nature of things is neither physical nor mental, but appears as one or the other, depending on the perspective adopted.

Now we have the 'dynamic interaction' problem, which seems insoluble. — Janus

That issue was resolved a long time ago by Plato who introduced a third aspect as a medium between the two, the tripartite person. There are two completely distinct realms of being, and the third is the realm of becoming in which the two interact. As an analogy, consider the future and past as two distinct realms of being, and the present as the realm of becoming, where activity occurs, as the two interact. The problem is that modern monists reintroduce this so-called "dynamic interaction" problem without a proper understanding of dualist principles, therefore without realizing that it really isn't a problem at all.

I also don't agree with you that physicality is manifestly "brute", — Janus

Perhaps I don't know what you mean by "brute", but I think that this term is generally defined in relation to matter, "brute matter", meaning without mind, like matter. So if we take away the "brute" from physicality, we also take away the matter from physicality, and without "matter" temporal continuity becomes extremely difficult to account for. Aristotle introduces "matter" as a means for accounting for temporal continuity, all the aspects of reality which remain the same as time passes. For Newton, this is described as Inertia, the fundamental property of material existence, and "inertia" accounts for the observed temporal continuity of material existence. Inertia is the "brute" aspect of material existence. So if we deny the reality of this brute aspect of physical existence, inertia, we are left with no means for accounting for the temporal continuity of existence which we observe and are described by the laws of inertia.

The problem is that modern monists reintroduce this so-called "dynamic interaction" problem without a proper understanding of dualist principles, therefore without realizing that it really isn't a problem at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nothing you have said explains how the problem of interaction is purportedly dispelled.

Perhaps I don't know what you mean by "brute", but I think that this term is generally defined in relation to matter, "brute matter", meaning without mind, like matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but the way you talk about it is in tendentious terms that already imply the reified notion of mind as substance which is separate from matter. Instead I think of matter and mind as inseparable with matter as its different structures and configurations show varying degrees of mindedness; a difference in kind not in degree. In other words, all matter seems to behave to some degree in lawlike, which means mindlike, ways.

Nothing you have said explains how the problem of interaction is purportedly dispelled. — Janus

I know, it's a complex issue and not easily explained. But let me tell you, it isn't a problem. It's a straw man created by a misunderstanding of dualism, probably stemming from the simplistic Cartesian misrepresentation. So until you tell me exactly what you think the problem is, I can't tell you where your misunderstanding lies.

Yes, but the way you talk about it is in tendentious terms that already imply the reified notion of mind as substance which is separate from matter. — Janus

I wouldn't say that the terms are tendentious, they are just the terms by which an understanding is reached. If you deny the usage you will never develop an understanding. In high school I couldn't understand advanced forms of mathematics because my mind denied the usage of the terms.

"Matter" is a concept which is apprehended by the mind. If you refused to recognize a division between the thing which apprehends, and the thing apprehended, then this is a symptom of your denial, not a symptom of my reification of that division. The fact that it is possible for a mind to apprehend the concept of matter, and also possible for a mind not to apprehend the concept of matter, indicates that there is a separation between these two.

When Aristotle mentioned this in Physics Bk.1, ch.9, he is talking about how others, specifically Platonists, described the existence of contraries. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, he is contrasting his views with those of Platonists. The desire comment relates to his own view.

But later Platonism, and Aristotle redefined "matter", such that it is entirely passive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you have a reference in Aristotle for this? And, how can a completely passive matter solve the problem he discusses in Physics i,9?

Aristotle's Metaphysics you'll see that matter receives form, form being the active part of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

In artifacts matter does receive its form passively from the artificer, In natural processes the role of matter is very different. Aristotle defines nature (physis) as an intrinsic principle of activity and tells us that matter (hyle) is a kind of physis -- and so a principle of activity rather than passivity. If you say matter is passive in natural processes, you confuse natural objects with artifacts, while Aristotle takes great care to distinguish them.

So, where in the Metaphysics do you see the matter of a natural process passively receiving form?

matter is defined as the underlying thing which does not change when change occurs — Metaphysician Undercover

Only substance (ousia) changes -- substantially or accidentally. So, we cannot expect to see Aristotle saying principles change. We can expect to see Aristotle telling us how principles explain substantial change -- and he does that in Physics i, 9. He notes that the original form cannot explain it, because then it would have to work for its own destruction, Nor can the new, contrary, form explain it, because it's not actual (=operational) yet. So, all we have left is hyle, which must act to bring about the new form.

This produces the separation between material cause and final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Material and final causes are indeed distinct. Hyle, as the material cause, is potentially what it "desires." The final form is what hyle "desires."

I've noticed your YouTube channel, and am interested in becoming somewhat familiar with your views on intentionality and mind as time permits. — Galuchat

My understanding of intentionality comes from the Scholastic tradition via Brentano. A key to my approach is the recognition that, as the laws of nature and human acts of will are both species of intentionality, they are in the same theater of operation. Another key is my discussion of the fundamental abstraction of natural science as leaving science bereft of the data to discuss intentional matters.

My understanding of intentionality comes from the Scholastic tradition via Brentano. A key to my approach is the recognition that, as the laws of nature and human acts of will are both species of intentionality, they are in the same theater of operation. — Dfpolis

I like equating intentionality with logical propagation (carrying information forward in time) because it renders unnecessary the use of undesirable psychological metaphors with reference to the laws of nature.

By "subjective awareness" do you intend to posit something radically separate from the physical? What if the objective and subjective accounts of human nature are simply two incommensurable accounts of the one thing? — Janus

By "subjective awareness" I'm not "positing" anything. I'm simply naming an aspect of human experience -- that, by focusing our attention on contents, we transform them from merely intelligible to actually known. When we begin thinking about something, such as "subjective awareness," its nature is an open question -- something to be decided by analysis and perhaps further experience.

I don't think that our awareness, our intentionality, is separate from our physicality. We humans are intrinsic unities -- not two "substances" somehow glued together. Still, being a unity doesn't prevent us from finding different logically distinct aspects when we think about ourselves. Thus, it is perfectly consistent to say that while I'm one being, my physicality is not my intentionality.

There is a lot of underbrush to be cleared here before we can see the trees, let alone the forest. First, is Descartes's aberrant notion of "substance." There is no evidence that we are made either of two things or of two kinds of "stuff."

Aristotle's definition of "substance" (ousia) is much less conjectural. It "posits" nothing. For Aristotle a "substance" is an ostensible unity -- a whole that we can point out -- like you, the planet Mars or the solar system. Once we recognize a whole, we can discern its various aspects -- say height, hair color, age, etc., etc. These are not wholes, but intelligible aspects of wholes. Aristotle calls them "accidents." Again, this "posits" nothing. It merely names an aspect of experience

So, accidents aren't like raisins in a pudding of substance -- they're just different aspects of a unity. If we could name all of a substance's accidents, we'd exhaust it's intelligibility without residue -- there would be no "pudding" (substrate) left after removing the raisins because the raisins, the accidents, are the substance's notes of intelligibility -- collectively they are all we can say about what a substance is.

Another source of confusion is Russell's logical atomism and its spawn. There is no reason to think that all we know can be reduced to a one-to-one correspondence with physical "atoms" (atoma) in the sense of irreducible components.

First, this idea is based on shabby science. Physics has found no irreducible "atoms" composing the cosmos. Rather, it models (very incompletely) the cosmos in terms of continuous quantum fields and their interactions.

Second, logical atomism forgets that knowledge is a subject-object relation. Every act of knowing involves a known object and a knowing subject. This is important because what we know, the instruments of logical representation and manipulation, is our relational to, our interaction with, reality -- not objects in isolation. We always know incompletely. We use abstractions, leaving notes of intelligibility behind. We have a single space-time history, not a universal perspective. Our conceptual space is the result of our uniquely personal history and cultural context.

As a result of this, one object, say a human being, can be thought of in many ways without having to be many things. To think both of our physicality and our intentionality we don't have to be, or combine, both a physical object and an intentional object. We just need to be able to act physically and intentionally.

This is not neutral monism, because real substances -- people like you and I -- are never "neutral." We are wholes that act both intentionally and physically. This does not imply the existence of an underlying neutral "stuff."

If I make a statement and we are to judge the relation between the reality of what's in my mind, and the representation (the statement) for adequacy, how are we to judge this? — Metaphysician Undercover

I may not be able to judge, because I have no direct access to what you know and/or believe.

Typically, you can judge. Suppose a Nazi asks if you're hiding Jews, you know you are, and yet say "no." You're acting morally, but still, you're being dishonest because you're misrepresenting what you know. Now, let's suppose that the Jews, having seen the Nazis drive up, have left. Then you are (accidentally) telling the truth because you have adequately described the reality about hiding Jews, but you are still being dishonest because you have not adequately represented the reality of what you believe.

Meanwhile, the Nazi doesn't care what's going on in your mind, except incidentally. What he wants to know is reality -- the location of Jews.

Do we judge it as adequate for my purpose, or adequate for your purpose? — Metaphysician Undercover

To continue with my example, your "no" is adequate to your purpose of protecting the Jews, but adequacy to that purpose is not adequacy to the reality of the situation. So, saying "no" is uttering a falsehood -- all be it a moral one. The Nazi has no right to the truth in this matter.

More broadly, you may tell me something that adequately describes reality as far as you are concerned, but creates an inadequate representation of reality in my mind. So, you're telling the truth, but I'm not hearing the truth you're telling. For example, thinking of Jane, I ask "Where is she?" You think I'm asking about Jill and say, "At the store," which is true. I think <Jane is at the store>, which is false. So, your statement is true for you, but inadequate and false for me.

As I said at the beginning of the post, when someone asks me to tell the truth, I think they want me to refer to my experience. You think that they want me to refer to reality. So I think you've reduced reality to experience — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm saying that we know reality from experience, not that experience exhausts reality. Experience is my awareness of being acted on by reality and me being acted upon by reality is (identically) reality acting on me. So, in experience, I'm linked to reality by a relation of partial identity.

Thank you for your gracious acceptance of by breaking off the discussion of truth.

Are you panpsychist? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have never met anyone claiming to be a panpsychist, so I have no idea if I may have anything in common with one. I do not call myself one.

I see the cosmos as reflecting intelligent guidance, but not as self aware.

This is not neutral monism, because real substances -- people like you and I -- are never "neutral." We are wholes that act both intentionally and physically. This does not imply the existence of an underlying neutral "stuff." — Dfpolis

I agree with everything you have written there, but just one comment:
Neutral monism need not refer to "stuff", but may simply refer to the most general category of things: being, and signify the idea of the univocity of being as Duns Scotus conceived it in opposition to Aquinas' idea that there are different kinds of being that are analogous to one another.

So until you tell me exactly what you think the problem is, I can't tell you where your misunderstanding lies. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem is we have no way of understanding how transcendent being could interact with immanent being; we simply have no model for that at all. By contrast we do have models of immanent causation based on the idea of the interactions of fundamental forces.

I wouldn't say that the terms are tendentious, they are just the terms by which an understanding is reached. If you deny the usage you will never develop an understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no understanding of dualism to be had, that is the problem. If you can tell me how dual substances are thought to interact then I'll be keen to hear it. The whole notion of substance seems flawed to me; we don't experience substances (except in Aristotle's sense of "distinct entities" but that is a pluralistic notion of unique substances, not a dualistic notion of fundamental substances) and that is why I prefer to think in terms of process; which is what we all experience everyday.

There is no evidence of anything self-caused, that is an instance of allowing your logic to go off into phantasy land, not being constrained by the evidence of brute physicality. The notion of "self-caused" is actually contradictory and ought to be dismissed as such. — Metaphysician Undercover

I forgot to address this. The idea is not that processes within the universe, but the universe as a whole might be self-caused. Why would it be any stranger to say the universe might be self-caused than it is to say that God is self-caused? In any case what evidence do you have that physical events may not be, at least in part, self-caused? To anticipate your objection, this would not be to say that such events are absolutely self-caused, but just that there is some degree of self-cause, which would mean freedom, in nature; it is not utterly deterministic. QM would seem to support this idea.

Why would it be any stranger to say the universe might be self-caused than it is to say that God is self-caused? — Janus

Were the first cause not uncaused, it wouldn’t be called ‘the first cause’. That's what makes it, you know, special.

What point are you trying to make? I asked why the universe as a whole could not be considered to be uncaused.

Do you have a reference in Aristotle for this? And, how can a completely passive matter solve the problem he discusses in Physics i,9? — Dfpolis

I gave you one reference, but there's many scattered through Aristotle's work. The problem discussed here is the categorizing of the contraries. The outcome, which Aristotle settles on, as well as Neo-Aristotelians like Aquinas, is that the two opposing contraries are both of the formula, i.e. formal. This is evident in logic, being and not being, is and is not, has and has not. Matter cannot be opposed to form, so it is categorically different.

Change is described as an altering of the form, via the contraries, from has to has not, etc.. Form, being what has actual existence, is active in this way, changing. Matter, being categorically different is therefore passive. Notice at the end of that section he defines matter as that from which a thing comes to be, and which persists afterward. This makes matter passive, because when a thing changes from being one thing to being another thing, the matter persists, and remains the same matter.

In artifacts matter does receive its form passively from the artificer, In natural processes the role of matter is very different. — Dfpolis

I don't agree, Aristotle works hard to maintain consistency with "matter", and I do not see this difference between "matter" in an artificial thing, and "matter" in a natural thing. Notice how Newton formulated his laws of motion. "Inertia" is the primary property of matter, being "inert". In order that the form of the matter be changed, it must be acted upon.

Aristotle defines nature (physis) as an intrinsic principle of activity and tells us that matter (hyle) is a kind of physis -- and so a principle of activity rather than passivity. If you say matter is passive in natural processes, you confuse natural objects with artifacts, while Aristotle takes great care to distinguish them. — Dfpolis

I don't see this at all. And I don't see how you could argue that Aristotle claims that there's a different concept of "matter" for artificial things from the one for natural things. That would be blatant inconsistency, which Aristotle avoids.

So, where in the Metaphysics do you see the matter of a natural process passively receiving form? — Dfpolis

Why don't you read some of this stuff? It's the only way to really understand it, you need to read and reread it, because it's difficult. Try Bk.7 Ch. 7-8, for a good explanation concerning the relation between matter and form, but I think where he actually says matter receives form is prior to this.

521

Only substance (ousia) changes -- substantially or accidentally. — Dfpolis

Substance changes, but substance consists of matter and form, and it is the form which changes.

He notes that the original form cannot explain it, because then it would have to work for its own destruction, Nor can the new, contrary, form explain it, because it's not actual (=operational) yet. So, all we have left is hyle, which must act to bring about the new form. — Dfpolis

No, hyle is not all we have left, don't make conclusions which are uncalled for. All you've considered here is formal cause, and concluded that it's not formal cause therefore it must be material cause. But you haven't considered efficient cause or final cause yet.

If you can tell me how dual substances are thought to interact then I'll be keen to hear it. — Janus

You'll have to tell me where you see a problem first. It is a common occurrence that one substance acts on another, so you'll have to be more specific. Here's an example, you tell me where the problem lies. Suppose it rains a lot, and the water washes out the ground. The water is one substance, and the ground another. It's called "erosion", one substance acts on another substance. Why do you think that interaction between dual substances is a problem?

Why would it be any stranger to say the universe might be self-caused than it is to say that God is self-caused? — Janus

I've never seen it said by a knowledgeable theologian, that God is self-caused. If I saw that, I would say it's contradictory, and reject it.

Were the first cause not uncaused, it wouldn’t be called ‘the first cause’. That's what makes it, you know, special. — Wayfarer

To say that it is uncaused is clearly not the same as saying that it is self-caused.

You'll have to tell me where you see a problem first. It is a common occurrence that one substance acts on another, so you'll have to be more specific. Here's an example, you tell me where the problem lies. Suppose it rains a lot, and the water washes out the ground. The water is one substance, and the ground another. It's called "erosion", one substance acts on another substance. Why do you think that interaction between dual substances is a problem? — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you playing the sophist now? Clearly i have been referring to the two purportedly fundamental substances of dualism. I haven't said there is an interaction problem when it comes to so-called physical substances. In fact I have said precisely the opposite.

I've never seen it said by a knowledgeable theologian, that God is self-caused. If I saw that, I would say it's contradictory, and reject it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I believe you know very well what I meant and are indulging in sophistry. Why would it be any stranger to say that the universe is uncaused than it is to say God is uncaused?

Are you playing the sophist now? Clearly i have been referring to the two purportedly fundamental substances of dualism. I haven't said there is an interaction problem when it comes to so-called physical substances. In fact I have said precisely the opposite. — Janus

I'm not playing sophist. I want you to tell the problem you apprehend, with two substances interacting, so that I can address this problem directly. As you can see, we commonly speak of substances interacting, why should "fundamental substances" be any different? Did you know that there is a problem with how substances interact in modern physics, it's called quantum uncertainty.

Again, I believe you know very well what I meant and are indulging in sophistry. Why would it be any stranger to say that the universe is uncaused than it is to say God is uncaused? — Janus

But that's not what you said, you said "self-caused", not "uncaused". One implies a cause, the other does not, so they refer to completely different things. I believe the issue here is the nature of time. To say that the universe is uncaused implies that it extends indefinitely in prior time. Some people see the chain of efficient causation and assume it extends infinitely back in time. This is infinite regress, and it is repugnant to the intellect because it doesn't provide a proper explanation, and, since we see that things come and go in time, it is against our inductive reason to assume that something could last forever, infinitely.

God on the other hand, is placed outside of time. Being outside time makes it unreasonable to speak of a cause of God. I think that this is the problem of interaction which you refer to, how does something outside of time interact with something temporal? The issue is quite easily resolved by recognizing that the need to place God outside of time is the result of an inadequate concept of time. The "problem of interaction" is the result of an inadequate concept of time. When time is strictly related to physical existence, then non-physical things are necessarily outside of time. This excludes the possibility of non-physical things interacting with physical things, creating said problem. The problem is caused by an inadequate concept of time, not by the assumption of two substances. So the concept of time needs to be reworked to allow that non-physical things are actual, active in time. You'll see that the Neo-Platonists allow for a procession of non-physical things, and Aquinas used the concept of aeviternal to provide for the medium between the One, God, which is furthest outside of "time", and physical things with temporal existence according to the accepted concept of "time". Within this medium, which is essentially "the present", are both the non-physical realities of the future (having not yet been instantiated), and the physical realities of the past (having come to be).

Thanks for the comment on the relation of neutral monism to the philosophy of being. I have two questions:
(1) Do you have an example of a self-proclaimed neutral monist who is a Scottist in ontology?
(2) Given than Descartes calls both his substances "res," wouldn't he by classed as a monist by this definition?

the two opposing contraries are both of the formula, i.e. formal. This is evident in logic, being and not being, is and is not, has and has not. Matter cannot be opposed to form, so it is categorically different. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does this oppose anything I said about hyle? I did not say hyle was one of the contraries. I said the contraries were the old form and the new form -- as you seem to be saying here.

None of this tells us that Aristotle thought hyle in natural processes was purely passive, gives a reference supporting that claim, or says how a purely passive matter can solve the problem of Physics i, 9

Matter, being categorically different is therefore passive — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a non sequitur. Another way to be different is to be potential, but potential need not mean passive. To make your case, you need to show that potential (dynamis) implies passivity -- a difficult case to make given that the primary meaning of dynamis is "power."

I do not see this difference between "matter" in an artificial thing, and "matter" in a natural thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

One is defined as a kind of physis (nature = "an intrinsic principle of activity") and the other is not. Aristotle distinguishes artifacts by their lack of an intrinsic principle of activity.

Newton is not Aristotle or even Aristotelian -- nor is his physics that of Aristotle.

I don't see how you could argue that Aristotle claims that there's a different concept of "matter" for artificial things from the one for natural things. That would be blatant inconsistency, which Aristotle avoids. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, by distinguishing the natural from the artificial.

Why don't you read some of this stuff? — Metaphysician Undercover

I've read the Metaphysics more than once (some parts many, many times and in Greek), because, as you say, it is difficult. I've also read Plato and some of the pre-Socratics as context and background.

I think where he actually says matter receives form is prior to this — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe that discussion is about artifacts. That is why I want the specific reference.

substance consists of matter and form, and it is the form which changes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Strictly speaking, form does not change. It is replaced by a new form. In Physics i, 9 Aristotle is asking, "where does the new form come from?" Your view does not provide a satisfactory answer.

No, hyle is not all we have left — Metaphysician Undercover

In the discussion of Physics i, 9 there are precisely three principles, and hyle is the only one we have left after eliminating the original and contrary form.