If you use "true" or "truth" in a less strict sense, then we can say that if human beings agree, that this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I understand you correctly, your position is that our concepts are not completely true, but are consistent among all humans, and this indicates that we are close to truth. I see a few flaws with this view.

(1) There is a self-contradiction in the assertion that "the complete truth cannot be obtained but truth in the lesser sense, of pointing to reality, is implied by human agreement". If complete truth can never be obtained, then this statement can never be validated to be completely true.

(2) It fails the principle of parsimony: If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. Thus if everyone perceives the same concept, it is reasonable to assume the concept is pointing to the real thing; until it is invalidated. But it cannot be invalidated, for the same reason that your position cannot be validated, as shown in (1).

(3) You wish to escape the absurdity that no judgement can ever be determined as true or false, by arguing that we can have mutual agreements among everyone, and claim "this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality". I agree that we can have mutual agreement among everyone, but why is this an indication that we are pointing toward reality? If the concept of a single individual is not true, then why would the whole group, which is nothing but the sum of all individuals, be any more true?

I will once again opt out of the "problem of induction" discussion, for the purpose of focusing on the one above.

(1) There is a self-contradiction in the assertion that "the complete truth cannot be obtained but truth in the lesser sense, of pointing to reality, is implied by human agreement". If complete truth can never be obtained, then this statement can never be validated to be completely true. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't see any problem with this, no self-contradiction. It's like the statement "any statement may be doubted". That statement may be doubted too. But there is no self-contradiction unless I state that it is undoubtable that any statement may be doubted.

2) It fails the principle of parsimony: If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. Thus if everyone perceives the same concept, it is reasonable to assume the concept is pointing to the real thing; until it is invalidated. But it cannot be invalidated, for the same reason that your position cannot be validated, as shown in (1). — Samuel Lacrampe

The principle of parsimony is very weak as a proof. It suffers in the same way as the problem of induction. To conclude "it probably is", does not give us what is needed to state, beyond a doubt, that it is. We can't avoid that degree of uncertainty, that it still may not be a duck.

So this doesn't get us any closer to proving that there are real, independent universal forms. The point I've been making throughout this thread is that we do not all apprehend "the same" concept. "The same" implies one unique individual. When we say that we have "the same" concept in each of our minds, what we really mean is similar, due to personal peculiarities, idiosyncrasies. We dismiss the differences as accidental (a difference which doesn't make a difference), such that the concept which we each have is essentially the same. But when we adhere to a solid principle of identity to define "the same", then any difference makes a difference..

It appears to me, like you are arguing that these similarities "point to", a real concept, a real universal form which is independent. I say that the differences, the peculiarities, which we each have, "point to" the lack of a real universal form. I support my claim by pointing to differences, and saying that there are no examples of human concepts which are "the same" between individuals. So the assumption of "the same" is faulty. How do you support your claim?

Take your example. We see an object as a duck. and call it a duck. We call another thing a duck, and another, and another, and so on. You say that we call each one a duck because it looks and acts like a duck. This implies that there are some criteria whereby a thing is a duck. What is that criteria, other than what we say it is? You say that because we all agree, this indicates that there is a real form, or defining criteria. The problem though is that we do not all agree, we have our personal peculiarities. We overlook the personal differences for the sake of agreement, but how does this validate the real existence of the ideal?

3) You wish to escape the absurdity that no judgement can ever be determined as true or false, by arguing that we can have mutual agreements among everyone, and claim "this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality". I agree that we can have mutual agreement among everyone, but why is this an indication that we are pointing toward reality? If the concept of a single individual is not true, then why would the whole group, which is nothing but the sum of all individuals, be any more true? — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree with you here. It is that very principle of probability discussed above. Agreement indicates that we are probably pointing toward reality, but not necessarily. However, my reality is a reality of difference. Agreement is a function of difference, it is made necessary because of difference. The fact that we must obtain agreement to proceed in communion indicates that difference is fundamental. Agreement is necessitated by differences. It is not a function of any real sameness or similarity, it is derived from the desire to overlook our differences, and this is a desire for sameness. Desire for something indicates a lacking, a wanting, of that thing. Now sameness, like the ideal, is what is desired, what is lacking, or non-existent, and this drives agreement in the form of intent. Desire relates to the future, what is not yet existing, what is lacking, and that's where the sameness of the ideal is categorized. And that's why the ideal doesn't have real existence.

This objection (3), would only create a difficulty for my position, if your objection (1) above was a valid objection. But as it stands, it is exactly what validates my claim that universal forms have no real independent existence.

Hey MU. Sorry for not being as responsive as last year. Obligations are getting in the way. This trend may continue for a while, but I do plan to answer all the objections above at some point.

Hello MU. I am back; at least temporarily. Though it has been a while, I hope you are okay to resume this conversation. I will resume it in the next post below.

I don't see any problem with this, no self-contradiction. It's like the statement "any statement may be doubted". That statement may be doubted too. But there is no self-contradiction unless I state that it is undoubtable that any statement may be doubted. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are correct that there is no self-contradiction in the sense that the statement "the complete truth cannot be obtained but truth in the lesser sense, of pointing toward reality, is implied by human agreement" must be necessarily false. However, there is a self-contradiction in the assertion of the statement, as in "it is completely true that we cannot obtain complete truths". To escape the contradiction, the statement must remain in the state of hypothesis. Now on the other hand, there is also a flaw in saying "it is completely true that we can obtain some truths completely", because it creates circular reasoning. Indeed, the very nature of the topic is such that we will forever remain in the state of hypotheses regardless what position we take, and never be able to rise to a higher level of certainty. And this brings me to the point on the principle of parsimony.

The principle of parsimony is very weak as a proof. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, but given the nature of the topic as shown in the previous paragraph, this principle is unfortunately the best method we have left. As such, if I perceive some thing, it is more reasonable to assume that the thing perceived is the real thing, than not, until a flaw is found in the hypothesis. And you claim to have found one, as follows:

I say that the differences, the peculiarities, which we each have, "point to" the lack of a real universal form. I support my claim by pointing to differences, and saying that there are no examples of human concepts which are "the same" between individuals. So the assumption of "the same" is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

This depends on the degree of difference. Let's take a common-sense example: You and I both observe the same duck, and we describe it to a third person. I say "it has a beak, two wings and is brown". If you say "it has a trunk, leaves, and is green", then I agree that this type of difference is significant enough to debunk the 'sameness' conclusion, and by extension refute the 'complete truth' hypothesis. But if you say "it has wings, a beak, and is beige", then even though there are differences in the description (different words in different order), this type of difference is not significant enough to debunk the conclusion that we are describing the same thing, by common sense. As such, your demand for complete sameness is unreasonable. Then I claim the differences are for the most part insignificant, as demonstrated in the example of 'triangle' way back then, where I described it as "a flat surface with 3 straight sides", and you described it as "a plane with 3 sides and 3 angles". Surely you understand that I don't disagree with your description, and that the differences can simply be attributed to differences in expressions.

Agreement is necessitated by differences. — Metaphysician Undercover

That does not sound right. You and I surely agree that the sum of 2 and 2 is 4 and nothing else. Here is an example of agreement with no difference. Are you perhaps mixing the concept of 'agreement' with 'tolerance' or 'compromise'? Regardless, I think the first two points above are more decisive to the topic.

Hi Samuel, nice to hear from you. I'm going to have to refresh my memory on the issue here, it's been a while. I'll be back soon.

However, there is a self-contradiction in the assertion of the statement, as in "it is completely true that we cannot obtain complete truths". — Samuel Lacrampe

But I wouldn't make that statement as an assertion, because it would be obvious that it was self-contradicting. It is made as a proposition, a proposal which you might either accept or reject. You simply misrepresented it as an assertion so that you could dismiss it as self-contradictory. That's a classic straw man.

Indeed, the very nature of the topic is such that we will forever remain in the state of hypotheses regardless what position we take, and never be able to rise to a higher level of certainty. And this brings me to the point on the principle of parsimony. — Samuel Lacrampe

Isn't that the state which knowledge is always in? Consider science. We do not insist that the body of scientific knowledge consists of facts and truths, absolute certainties, we say that it consists of theories which have been verified by empirical observation. So it really is the case that we remain in the state of hypotheses, but we gain confidence that the hypotheses have been proven, such that they are taken as theories, and certainty increases by degrees.

I agree, but given the nature of the topic as shown in the previous paragraph, this principle is unfortunately the best method we have left. As such, if I perceive some thing, it is more reasonable to assume that the thing perceived is the real thing, than not, until a flaw is found in the hypothesis. And you claim to have found one, as follows: — Samuel Lacrampe

I am actually opposed to the principle of parsimony, because it promotes lazy, simplistic descriptions of complicated things. This is not conducive to good understanding and advancements in knowledge. Consider as an example, that you and I live side by side, and we see something on the far horizon that looks like a dark spot on the ground. So we call it the dark spot. Every day we meet each other out in front of our houses and say "there's the dark spot, it's still there". By the principle of parsimony, that's exactly what it is, "the dark spot". We have no inclination to investigate, and describe it in more detail, because we're completely satisfied that that's what the thing really is, the dark spot.

This depends on the degree of difference. Let's take a common-sense example: You and I both observe the same duck, and we describe it to a third person. I say "it has a beak, two wings and is brown". If you say "it has a trunk, leaves, and is green", then I agree that this type of difference is significant enough to debunk the 'sameness' conclusion, and by extension refute the 'complete truth' hypothesis. But if you say "it has wings, a beak, and is beige", then even though there are differences in the description (different words in different order), this type of difference is not significant enough to debunk the conclusion that we are describing the same thing, by common sense. As such, your demand for complete sameness is unreasonable. Then I claim the differences are for the most part insignificant, as demonstrated in the example of 'triangle' way back then, where I described it as "a flat surface with 3 straight sides", and you described it as "a plane with 3 sides and 3 angles". Surely you understand that I don't disagree with your description, and that the differences can simply be attributed to differences in expressions. — Samuel Lacrampe

In your example, we both have different descriptions, and you are assuming that we are describing the same thing. That assumption is not sufficient. It might be the case that we are talking about the same thing, it might not be the case. To support your argument, you need more than the assumption that we are talking about the same thing, you need to demonstrate that we actually are talking about the same thing. This is what you are arguing about concepts, that my concept of triangle, and your concept of triangle actually is the same concept, not that it may be the same, or that you are assuming that it is the same.

So, let's see how we really determine whether or not we are actually speaking about the same thing. Since we can use different words to describe the same thing, as you demonstrated, then to be certain, without a doubt, that we are describing the same thing, we must somehow point to the thing. In the case of the concept, I point to the idea in my mind, and you point to the idea in your mind, and we are pointing to different things. Your claim that this would be an insignificant difference really doesn't make sense. It's clearly a big difference. If we were trying to determine whether or not we were talking about the same physical object, say, "the chair", and I pointed to an object in my house and you pointed to an object in your house, then clearly we are not talking about the same object, despite the fact that we might use similar words to describe these objects.

Furthermore, the claim of "insignificant difference", does not suffice to prove that similar things are actually the same. You are simply trying to reduce "same" to "similar", but this is not a reduction which can be made in any sound way. It's like what apokrisis and wayfarer tried to argue earlier in the thread, that if there are differences which don't make a difference, then we can say that two things are the same. However, the whole point of my argument is that there is a distinction to be made, between "similar" and "same". If you agree that there is a distinction between similar and same, then in making this distinction there can be no such thing as a difference which does not make a difference, because this would allow that two similar things are the same. And that would negate the distinction between similar and same which we would have agreed to uphold.

Surely you understand that I don't disagree with your description, and that the differences can simply be attributed to differences in expressions. — Samuel Lacrampe

If there are differences between two things, then they are similar and not the same. Do you agree?

That does not sound right. You and I surely agree that the sum of 2 and 2 is 4 and nothing else. Here is an example of agreement with no difference. Are you perhaps mixing the concept of 'agreement' with 'tolerance' or 'compromise'? Regardless, I think the first two points above are more decisive to the topic. — Samuel Lacrampe

The point I was making is that there is only a need for us to agree if there are differences between us. If there were no differences in what we believed, it would be the same, and there would be no need for agreement, the same is one and the same. It is only because there are differences between us, that we need to negotiate those differences, and come to an agreement.

Just to clarify, I was not accusing you of self-contradiction, but rather pointing out the limitations of such a topic as whether truth can be attained. Yes, scientific topics also start with hypotheses, but do not end there, because these hypotheses can be validated empirically. This topic on truth however can never be validated, by its very content. This is why we are reduced to rely on the principle of parsimony. There is simply no better approach here. But it's not as bad as what you make it sound. The principle states that it is more reasonable to retain the simplest hypothesis that explains all the data. Your "dark spot" example is not a correct one, because it gives no explanation, and so does not satisfy the principle. But a simple explanation would be adequate, and would still leave the inclination to investigate further for validation (if possible).

In your example, we both have different descriptions, and you are assuming that we are describing the same thing. That assumption is not sufficient. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

My point was that even when we are describing the same thing like a duck (and we know this by pointing to the same object), then it still happens that we can give different descriptions.

In the case of the concept, I point to the idea in my mind, and you point to the idea in your mind, and we are pointing to different things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure what you mean by "pointing to the idea in my mind". Concepts or ideas are like signs that point to something else. If I have the idea of a specific chair in mind, I would not "point to the idea in my mind", but point to the specific chair in reality, which the idea is about.

However, the whole point of my argument is that there is a distinction to be made, between "similar" and "same". If you agree that there is a distinction between similar and same, then in making this distinction there can be no such thing as a difference which does not make a difference, because this would allow that two similar things are the same. And that would negate the distinction between similar and same which we would have agreed to uphold. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are making an error. Yes, you are correct that it is impossible for similar things to be one and the same thing. However, it is possible for similar descriptions of a thing to be about one and the same thing. And as shown previously, it is very probable that our description of the same duck will have insignificant differences in words and order of words.

I accept your clarification about "coming to an agreement" on things that were not previously agreed upon.

My point was that even when we are describing the same thing like a duck (and we know this by pointing to the same object), then it still happens that we can give different descriptions. — Samuel Lacrampe

So your argument is that we each describe the same thing with different words. But this does not necessitate that the thing we are each describing with different words is the same thing. So your argument just creates a possibility, it doesn't produce anything conclusive.

I am not sure what you mean by "pointing to the idea in my mind". Concepts or ideas are like signs that point to something else. If I have the idea of a specific chair in mind, I would not "point to the idea in my mind", but point to the specific chair in reality, which the idea is about. — Samuel Lacrampe

We are discussing whether "chair", or "triangle", or any other word, refers to the same concept when you interpret the word and when I interpret the word. Do you agree that we determine conclusively that we are talking about the very same thing, by pointing to the thing we are talking about, or in some other way determining it's spatial-temporal location? This is how we determine that the thing we are each talking about is actually the same thing.

Now, in the case of a concept, how are we going to point to it to determine whether it's the same thing which we are each talking about? I could point to the idea in my mind and you could point to the idea in your mind, but then we are clearly pointing to different things. You could argue that because we call it by the same name, "triangle", then it is the same thing, but the reality is that "triangle" refers to a universal idea, and therefore many particular things go by that name. So if we use different words to describe the conditions by which something qualifies as a "triangle", then clearly we do not have the same concept of "triangle".

You are making an error. Yes, you are correct that it is impossible for similar things to be one and the same thing. However, it is possible for similar descriptions of a thing to be about one and the same thing. And as shown previously, it is very probable that our description of the same duck will have insignificant differences in words and order of words. — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree that it is possible for similar descriptions to refer to one and the same thing. But the type of thing we are talking about here is a concept. And I do not believe that different description can refer to the same concept because I believe that the concept is the description itself. If the description is the concept, then it is impossible that a different description could be the same concept.

Let's assume a description, "big and red". My claim is that the concept is inherently tied to these descriptive words, such that there cannot be any separation between the description and the concept. If you tried to remove the concept from "big", or the concept from "red", you would be left with nothing because those words determine the concept. Without the description, "red", there is no concept of red. You seem to believe that the concept is separable from the words, such that different words can be used to refer to the same concept. So for instance, "huge and magenta" might refer to the same concept as "big and red". But clearly these two are different descriptions. Being different descriptions, I think they must be different concepts.

Consider two descriptions which are completely equivalent, 32 degrees Fahrenheit, and 0 degrees Celsius. They are derived from different measurement systems, so clearly they are different concepts. "2+2", and "4", despite being equivalent, are distinct concepts.

So I don't see any examples of instances where different descriptive words describe the same concept. You and the others just assert, without justification, that they do. You say that we each describe a "triangle" differently, but this difference is insignificant, a difference which doesn't make a difference, we are still talking about the same thing. So you make an unjustified assumption that we are talking about the same thing, despite these differences. I say the description is the concept, so any difference in description indicates that it is not the same concept. I am pointing to the concept, showing you the concept, it is the description, expressed in words, and in this way I show you that different descriptive words express different concepts. If you want to support your position, in which the concept is something other than the description, something referred to by the description, or described, you need to point to the concept, show it to me. How is the concept "triangle" something other than what is described as a triangle.

So your argument is that we each describe the same thing with different words. But this does not necessitate that the thing we are each describing with different words is the same thing. So your argument just creates a possibility, it doesn't produce anything conclusive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, it does not make it necessary but possible; and this possibility is sufficient to refute your argument that, since we give different descriptions of concepts, then the concepts must be different. We are therefore back to the starting point obtained from the principle of parsimony, namely that concepts coincide with real things, because it is the simplest hypothesis.

Now, in the case of a concept, how are we going to point to it to determine whether it's the same thing which we are each talking about? — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that for particular physical beings, we can validate that we are talking about the same thing by pointing to its spatial-temporal properties. Also, this cannot be done for universal concepts because I argue that they are not physical beings. However, we can get close to certainty by testing numerous particular physical beings that have the universal concept as its genus. For example, we can test if my judgement of the shapes here, here, and here match with your judgement that they have 'triangle' as their genus. Since our judgement is based on our respective concept, then the more objects we test, the closer we get to certainty that our concept is the same. Another way is to see if we agree with each other's description, despite their minor differences. I personally believe this way is also legit, but I know you don't because you demand complete sameness in descriptions. So on to the next section below.

I do not believe that different description can refer to the same concept because I believe that the concept is the description itself. [...] If you want to support your position, in which the concept is something other than the description, something referred to by the description, or described, you need to point to the concept, show it to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

I find that position surprising. Recall that if the concept is not connected a being in reality, then the consequence is that no proposition ever spoken can be true, that is, reflect reality. Up to now, I thought your position was that our concepts are connected to real beings, and although they may fail to accurately match the real beings, they nevertheless come close to it. I was willing to take that position seriously. But now, it seems your new position is that a concept is nothing but the description itself, not referring to another thing, thereby completely severing its connection to any real being. Consequently, no truth can ever be spoken. I hope I am misunderstanding something, because as it stands, your new position leads to absurdity. It forces you to give up on metaphysics (which is ironic given your name), and by extension, truth, and by extension, philosophy, which is the search for truth.

Indeed, it does not make it necessary but possible; and this possibility is sufficient to refute your argument that, since we give different descriptions of concepts, then the concepts must be different. We are therefore back to the starting point obtained from the principle of parsimony, namely that concepts coincide with real things, because it is the simplest hypothesis. — Samuel Lacrampe

You've lost me now. I don't see how "concepts coincide with real things" supports your argument. If I remember correctly, you were arguing that concepts, as universals, have real existence. If they coincide with real things, then they are particulars. That is what I was arguing, if we want to give concepts real existence, we must reduce them to particulars, either as the form of a particular thing, or as an ideal universal.

Since our judgement is based on our respective concept, then the more objects we test, the closer we get to certainty that our concept is the same. — Samuel Lacrampe

All this demonstrates is that we judge these few things in a similar way. It doesn't demonstrate that we have the same concept. However, the fact that we each described our concept of "triangle" in a different way does demonstrate that we each have a different concept of "triangle".

I find that position surprising. Recall that if the concept is not connected a being in reality, then the consequence is that no proposition ever spoken can be true, that is, reflect reality. Up to now, I thought your position was that our concepts are connected to real beings, and although they may fail to accurately match the real beings, they nevertheless come close to it. I was willing to take that position seriously. But now, it seems your new position is that a concept is nothing but the description itself, not referring to another thing, thereby completely severing its connection to any real being. Consequently, no truth can ever be spoken. I hope I am misunderstanding something, because as it stands, your new position leads to absurdity. It forces you to give up on metaphysics (which is ironic given your name), and by extension, truth, and by extension, philosophy, which is the search for truth. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think we've been away from this discussion for too long, and we've both lost track of what each other has been arguing. perhaps we ought to give it up. Why must a concept be connected to a "real being"? A concept may be completely artificial. An architect designs a building. The concept is completely in the architect's mind, then on the paper. it is not connected to a "real being". Or do I misunderstand you?

[...] If they coincide with real things, then they are particulars. That is what I was arguing, if we want to give concepts real existence, we must reduce them to particulars, either as the form of a particular thing, or as an ideal universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

You presuppose that all beings are particulars. Why is that necessary? I would agree that all physical beings are particulars, due to having particular spacial-temporal properties. But this would not apply to non-physical beings.

All this demonstrates is that we judge these few things in a similar way. It doesn't demonstrate that we have the same concept. However, the fact that we each described our concept of "triangle" in a different way does demonstrate that we each have a different concept of "triangle". — Metaphysician Undercover

It can also mean that we judge these things in the same way. I thought we previously agreed that different descriptions can still refer to the same thing.

I think we've been away from this discussion for too long, and we've both lost track of what each other has been arguing. perhaps we ought to give it up. Why must a concept be connected to a "real being"? A concept may be completely artificial. An architect designs a building. The concept is completely in the architect's mind, then on the paper. it is not connected to a "real being". Or do I misunderstand you? — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand that it has been a while. It is unfortunate, but it's reality. Yes, we can leave it at that. This was fun. I think I will post a new discussion at some point, to start fresh with the things I have learned here. I have still answered below your questions for completeness, but I don't expect a response afterwards.

Concepts must be connected to real beings, because if not, then no proposition ever spoken can be said to be true, because truth means reflective of reality. Thus if I say "the apple is red", there must exist a real being for the apple, and a real being for the property red, in order for the proposition to be true.

Yes, concepts may also be artificial, as is the case for man-made things like a house or guitar. In this case, the concept precedes the being that is built from the concept. But for non man-made things like 'apple' and 'red', the being precedes our concept of them. E.g., we would not grasp the concept 'red' if red things did not exist.

You presuppose that all beings are particulars. Why is that necessary? I would agree that all physical beings are particulars, due to having particular spacial-temporal properties. But this would not apply to non-physical beings. — Samuel Lacrampe

It's not a presupposition, it's a conclusion from inductive reasoning. All examples of beings, that I know of are particulars. If someone showed me examples of beings which are not particulars, I would have to reconsider. This does not deny the reality of non-physical being. As I argued earlier in the thread, each particular physical being has a unique form which necessarily precedes its material existence. This form must be non-physical, but it is particular.

Also, I argued that if the type of form which we call a universal, has real existence, independent from human minds, these universal forms must be "Ideals", implying perfection in their conception. This perfection implies that they can be in no way other than what they are, so this indicates that they must also be particulars. Despite the fact that we call them universals, if they have real existence independent from human minds, they must actual exist as particulars. So I conclude that any real being, must be a particular.

It can also mean that we judge these things in the same way. I thought we previously agreed that different descriptions can still refer to the same thing. — Samuel Lacrampe

Again, your just arguing from possibility. My conclusions are inductive, so I accept the possibility that I am wrong. But, as I explain above, I believe my inductive conclusions to be quite strong, so you'll have to bring something more to my attention, than the possibility that I could be wrong, in order to get me to reconsider.

Wow, this has a few replies already.

So is information physical?
I find it helpful sometimes to dumb things down. The simplest example of information that comes to mind is a wave. Do you think a wave is physical? Me ... yes.

Do I think wave is matter? No so much. Rather, it seems best described as a pattern of matter (although I defer to the quantum mechanics amongst us).

So there you have it: Information is physical but not matter.

Moderators close this thread!

Do I think wave is matter? No so much. Rather, it seems best described as a pattern of matter (although I defer to the quantum mechanics amongst us). — Kym

What about light waves, what do you think they are a pattern of?

Moderators close this thread! — Kym

I don't think the moderators just randomly close threads like that.

I am questioning whether information, generally speaking, is physical. — Wayfarer

As a physicalist, I'd say every thing that exists is physical. In your thought-experiment, it seems that, generally, "information" is being characterised as subjective experience of phenomena that is communicated via various means to other people. Every person who receives that "information" experiences it in its various forms in which it has been communicated, and also experiences "information" in different ways. "Information" in this sense, and ontologically then, is not a static thing or object, but a whole set of processes involving intention, interpretation, judgement, etc., and methods of communication regarding specific subjective experiences of phenomena.

The question I want to explore is: in such a case, what stays the same, and what changes? — Wayfarer

As a nominalist, I'd say nothing literally stays the same. The initial experience of the ship by the sentry will be communicated via particular instruments. But that experience cannot literally be communicated from a first-person perspective, only from a third-person perspective can others try to understand what the sentry is attempting to communicate. So it's not as if the "information" the sentry has of the ship in the first instance is a static or un-changing thing that gets tainted or reduced via methods of communication. Rather, "information" is just the sentry's experience of the ship in that system/context; and then the communication of the information that is received by another person occurs in another system/context. The shipping clerk, for example, is experiencing phenomena (the sea-horn) and interprets that as a communication from the sentry. This is because the clerk has already established what the sounding of a sea-horn within that context might mean. And the process continues from there.

By the way, I believe that "ideas" are physical as mental states/brain states.

As a nominalist, I'd say nothing literally stays the same — numberjohnny5

Well, you’d be mistaken. The information could be transmitted wrongly, or correctly. If it’s transmitted correctly, then it stays the same. The rest is not germane.

The information could be transmitted wrongly, or correctly. If it’s transmitted correctly, then it stays the same. The rest is not germane. — Wayfarer

Well if you disagree with nominalism then that might make sense. Again, I don't think "information" is some static, object-like thing to get "right" or "wrong". That's because, under nominalism, "information" ontologically is just conscious experience of phenomena that is interpreted/judged in particular ways, which could involve truth-statements. What the "information" is about regarding truth-statements can be true or false, of course.

Still not the point. The particular piece of information in question - about the ship - can be described exactly, by any one of a number of media and even systems of representation. The same can be said for all manner of information. If I write out a formula or a recipe or an equation, I can employ a wide range of systems or languages to encode it. Yet, one digit wrong, and the chemical won’t form, or the cake won’t bake, and so on. So the information in each case is the same, even if the representation is completely different.

Numberjohnny claims to be both physicalist and nominalist. That ought to play out nicely. I would think that there is no room for meaning in such an ontology. Ideas are reduced to mental states and mental states are reduced physical brain states.

Where's meaning?

Still not the point. The particular piece of information in question - about the ship - can be described exactly, by any one of a number of media and even systems of representation. The same can be said for all manner of information. If I write out a formula or a recipe or an equation, I can employ a wide range of systems or languages to encode it. Yet, one digit wrong, and the chemical won’t form, or the cake won’t bake, and so on. So the information in each case is the same, even if the representation is completely different. — Wayfarer

So you're describing information as a (meaningful) judgement about phenomena (I'd include any experience of events or objects, including recipes or equations, as phenomena, btw), is that right? A formula, recipe, or equation is (or can be) a meaningful (set of) statement/claim(s) presented in particular ways/forms. People can "understand" the meaning of such statements and attempt to relay them to others via various forms of communication, or as you say, representation. In that sense, trying to guarantee that "information" (statements/claims) remains consistent is what you mean about "information" staying the "same" (barring nominalism re same/identical). Is that right?

I would think that there is no room for meaning in such an ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

That would depend on what you think meaning is ontologically.

Ideas are reduced to mental states and mental states are reduced physical brain states. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. Although I don't often invite notions of reduction as part of my view; reductionism is rather imposed upon my view by others. (Not that it can't be helpful to use "reduction", especially as part of the received/standard views in philosophy or other intellectual milieu's.) That's mainly becuase I think there's often a stigma when employing "reduction" in these debates (probably from those who aren't identity theorists and dualists, which makes sense), at least in my experience, and I think that can sometimes be a red-herring about views like mine. I'd rather frame your statement I quoted as: particular ways of organising reality that are identical to particular properties and processes. So in other words, I'd merely say "ideas are identical to mind states/brain states."

Where's meaning? — Metaphysician Undercover

Located in minds/brains

That's mainly becuase I think there's often a stigma when employing "reduction" in these debates (probably from those who aren't identity theorists and dualists, which makes sense), at least in my experience, and I think that can sometimes be a red-herring about views like mine. — numberjohnny5

I have no problem "reduction", I think it's a useful tool. I've been accused of being reductionist but generally speaking I don't see how that's bad. Anyway, I'll try to refrain form using it in conversation with you.

Located in minds/brains — numberjohnny5

I don't think that this is consistent with nominalism. Generally a nominalist will claim that meaning is the property of a community of language users, as the result of conventions, agreements, or rules of language use. Without these communal rules, how could one brain interpret a piece of language in a similar way to another brain? And without that consistency between individual language users, how could there be meaning? Or, do you think that meaning is completely subjective, entirely within each brain? Do you think that any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants, and each way would be an equally valid interpretation?

Or, do you think that meaning is completely subjective, entirely within each brain? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes.

Do you think that any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants, and each way would be an equally valid interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd say that "any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants," (there's no objective rule saying everyone must interpret anything in any particular way whatsoever); and that those interpretations that the brain is trying to match (by speculation) with what they believe the intention of the writer was/is can be relatively similar or dissimilar to the writer's intentions. In other words, the brain's interpretation cannot be identical with the writer's intentions (since those are, necessarily, two numerically distinct brain states). On the other hand, if the brain wasn't trying to match the writer's intention(s) with their interpretation, then they can't be "right" or "wrong" with how they interpret the writing.

I'd say that "any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants," (there's no objective rule saying everyone must interpret anything in any particular way whatsoever); and that those interpretations that the brain is trying to match (by speculation) with what they believe the intention of the writer was/is can be relatively similar or dissimilar to the writer's intentions. — numberjohnny5

If any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants, then on what basis would you say that there is any "information" in any writing? If there is nothing objective, and any mind can determine the meaning as whatever it wants, then we cannot say that the writing gives us any information because any meaning derived is completely fabricated by the interpreting mind.

But to say that the interpreter must try to match the intention of the writer, is to contradict this (any way that the brain wants). So which is it, that you believe? Can the writing be interpreted in any way that one wants, or do we assume that there is a correct way, the way intended by the writer? If we assume that there is a correct way, then don't we have to turn to conventions and such to support an interpretation?

If any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants, then on what basis would you say that there is any "information" in any writing? If there is nothing objective, and any mind can determine the meaning as whatever it wants, then we cannot say that the writing gives us any information because any meaning derived is completely fabricated by the interpreting mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

My definition of "information" is a combination of the phenomena perceived that is then cognitively organised, and communicated via various means if the individual so chooses. (I'd say "information" is similar to (nominalistic) conceptualism for me.) That means that there is no objective meaning, if that's what you mean.

But to say that the interpreter must try to match the intention of the writer, is to contradict this (any way that the brain wants). So which is it, that you believe? Can the writing be interpreted in any way that one wants, or do we assume that there is a correct way, the way intended by the writer? If we assume that there is a correct way, then don't we have to turn to conventions and such to support an interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not saying the interpreter must try to do anything, btw. I'm saying the interpreter has a choice to match the writer's intention through the writing. They don't have to choose that though. They can choose to interpret the writing any way they want. That's what I meant by these earlier statements:

"(there's no objective rule saying everyone must interpret anything in any particular way whatsoever)"

"On the other hand, if the brain wasn't trying to match the writer's intention(s) with their interpretation, then they can't be "right" or "wrong" with how they interpret the writing."

And to be clear, I'm not saying that the interpreter is trying to match their intention with the writer's intention. I'm saying the interpreter can try to match in the form of a guess/speculation what they believe the writer's intention was/is.

That means that there is no objective meaning, if that's what you mean. — numberjohnny5

This thread was opened over 6 months ago, and all of these issues have been canvassed in depth. However, and I'm not going to argue the point beyond this post, if there was 'no objective meaning', then nobody could ever be correct, or incorrect, about anything. You couldn't write down instructions for how to build a computer, or specify how TCP/IP works, or how information is routed across the internet. All of these things work, because there are successful ways of making them work, which can be communicated via specifications and instructions, which are accurate. And if they were not accurate, and the technological solutions they refer to did not actually exist, then there would be no computers nor an internet. So the fact that you're able to participate in a debate, on the internet, using a computer, contradicts the point you're making - which, incidentally, is not a point at all, but simply a very long-winded way of saying that 'meaning is whatever you want it to be'. Or, in short - whatever.

I'm not saying the interpreter must try to do anything, btw. I'm saying the interpreter has a choice to match the writer's intention through the writing. They don't have to choose that though. They can choose to interpret the writing any way they want. That's what I meant by these earlier statements: — numberjohnny5

OK, so what you are saying is that anything written can have absolutely any meaning whatsoever, depending entirely on the interpretation. What the written thing means is whatever any individual who interprets it thinks it means.

Do you recognize that this means that the written material cannot communicate any information from one individual to another? The interpreting individual gives the written material any meaning whatsoever.

OK, so what you are saying is that anything written can have absolutely any meaning whatsoever, depending entirely on the interpretation. What the written thing means is whatever any individual who interprets it thinks it means. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, since meaning is mental events, then anything that is not mental events has no meaning or cannot produce meaning. This is because ontologically, meaning, as mental events, is not materially non-mental events. So a piece of writing, say, on a white piece of paper in black ink, is not ontologically the "same kind" of stuff as the 'intention' of the writer who wrote on that paper, intentions being mental events. In other words, the properties of brain/mind states are not the "same kind" of properties as ink on paper. Interpretations are also mental events.

If you had learned the conventional uses of the words and phrases in the piece of writing and were also assigning those conventional uses to the writing, then you or others could "accurately" interpret what the writer intended with the writing (assuming the writer wasn't lying, pretending, etc.). If you were using unconventional uses of the words/phrases in the piece of writing and assigning those unconventional uses to the writing, then you or others wouldn't be as "accurate" re the writer's intentions.

Do you recognize that this means that the written material cannot communicate any information from one individual to another? The interpreting individual gives the written material any meaning whatsoever. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure how literal you're being there. Do you recognise that "written material" doesn't actually "do" anything like an intentional mind does?

In a nutshell, communication, in my view, is person A expressing their mental events via various mediums or "representational forms" (as Wayfarer put it) (e.g. symbols, sounds) to person B, where person B interpret's person A's mental events via the various forms. This communication is possible if both persons have learned (i.e. they have learned the conventional uses of the language they're using, and therefore assign those conventional meanings onto "representational forms") how to assign meanings onto "representational forms", and how to interpret another person's intentions/beliefs from those representational forms. The more conventional both person's assigned meanings onto said forms, the more likely they are to accurately interpret their intentions/mental events.

Again, it all depends on whether the individual is attempting to accurately interpret another individual's intentions via language and behaviour. I think you're misunderstanding me. I'm not saying an individual just arbitrarily gives the "written material any meaning whatsoever" when trying to interpret the writer's intentions. An individual can interpret any meaning about the writing without caring about what the writer's intention was/is. The writer's intentions might not be valued by the individual interpreter. They might not care what the writer was trying to communicate. That's up to the individual. They can't be right or wrong about that if that's what they want to do. It's their free choice. But if they're trying to interpret the writer's intention as accurately as possible, they can make well-reasoned guesses; and it would be possible for these guesses to be confirmed as accurate or not by the writer.

This thread was opened over 6 months ago, and all of these issues have been canvassed in depth. — Wayfarer

What if you spun the situation around? That instead, it was you who posted on this thread after it began 6 months ago, and you disagreed with the OP and some other posters. Would you be persuaded that just because "the issues have been canvassed in depth" that either, say, (a) your views must be mistaken, and/or (b) that it wasn't worth trying to argue your views?

However, and I'm not going to argue the point beyond this post, if there was 'no objective meaning', then nobody could ever be correct, or incorrect, about anything. — Wayfarer

There's no need to be objectively correct/incorrect (not that it's possible with meaning). All that's sufficient is instrumental utility. Guesses/speculations/assumptions/agreements/etc. demonstrate that they are good-enough for communication to be effective. It's not an either-or issue, and that's where your problematic thinking lies.

You couldn't write down instructions for how to build a computer, or specify how TCP/IP works, or how information is routed across the internet. All of these things work, because there are successful ways of making them work, which can be communicated via specifications and instructions, which are accurate. — Wayfarer

I agree, they are successful methods of communication. This is because language is (very often) a successful means of communication. Language-users are generally aware of the conventional uses of their language, and when language-users employ those conventions, communication can be very accurate (in the sense of "matching" what language-users intend with their methods of communication) and useful.

And if they were not accurate, and the technological solutions they refer to did not actually exist, then there would be no computers nor an internet. So the fact that you're able to participate in a debate, on the internet, using a computer, contradicts the point you're making - which, incidentally, is not a point at all, but simply a very long-winded way of saying that 'meaning is whatever you want it to be'. Or, in short - whatever. — Wayfarer

I'm sorry that you fail to understand my stance on this. Maybe that's my fault. But your representation of my stance isn't accurate. I never said "meaning is whatever you want it to be". That's not the definition I use. Rather, I think that if a person wants to interpret any piece of writing/sounds/etc. in any way they prefer, then that's their prerogative if they're not interested in trying to "understand" what the intentions are that produced a piece of writing/sounds/etc. If the interpreter is not trying to be "correct" with matching the intention of the writer, then they can't be "correct/incorrect" with their interpretation. They have chosen to assign the meaning they have for whatever reason they have.

On the other hand, if a person is attempting to "understand" what the intention behind a piece of writing was/is, then they might assume the writer/speaker is using language conventions, and then assign language conventions to what the writer/speaker is expressing. In the latter case, though, because meaning is not a non-mental event/thing, there's not any objective (as in, non-mental) thing to try to match. So it's a category error to assume you can actually be objectively "correct/incorrect" with regards to getting meanings right/wrong. All you can do is try to make well-reasoned guesses via the writing/sounds/etc. re the writer's/speaker's intentions. And it helps if both writer and interpreter are using language conventions (that's the utility of conventions in general).

I hope what I've written there is clear in helping you "understand" my views a bit better, even though I am aware you're not interested in continuing this convo with me.