I think you misunderstand the situation. You don't see the masts, you don't see the ship. What you see is the flag. The flag is the only physical thing here. In this instance of occurrence, the number of masts, and the ship, is non-physical. The fact is, that the person hoisting the flag may not even have seen any ship nor any masts, so this aspect is clearly non-physical. In this particular physical occurrence, which is the occurrence of the flag, it is quite clear that the masts and ship are non-physical. If you haven't yet, in 67 pages of this thread, capacitated yourself with the ability to understand this, then maybe you should give it up. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is obviously you who is misunderstanding. Is a ship with three masts a physical thing or no? The fact that you say it isn't shows that it is you that doesn't understand what they are talking about. If the person putting up the flags never saw a ship, then why are they putting up flags? What is the cause, if not seeing a three-masted ship on the horizon? To explain this, all you can ever talk about is causal influences - why the man is putting up flags, and why he's putting them up in that particular pattern. The answers to those questions lie in causation. It's that simple.

Why do you insistently claim that information is both physical and non-physical, when in reality you haven't apprehended the non-physical aspect? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because you have yet to give a concise definition of what it means to be "non-physical", and what the distinction you are making between physical and non-physical is.

I very explicitly explained how information/meaning is not the same as cause/effect. Cause/effect implies a direct, necessary relation between two things. Information/meaning implies a system of interpretation as a medium between the two. Therefore there is no necessary relationship between the two, the relationship is contingent on interpretation The two, cause/effect, and information/meaning are clearly not the same at all, and your claim is nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I have told you till I'm blue in the face that information/meaning can be independent of minds. There is information everywhere, it's just that we tend to ignore a great deal of it. Information doesn't need a non-physical counterpart to exist. It merely needs causation, or for an effect to represent some series of causes.

What the hell are you talking about? What is the case, is that we can interpret correctly, as intended by the author of the sign, or incorrectly in a way not intended. What determines this is whether the person interpreting utilizes the appropriate system of interpretation. How does the fact that a person misunderstands, due to hallucination or any other reason, tell you anything specific or informative about the state of the person's body? What kind of nonsense principles are you appealing to? — Metaphysician Undercover

So, when a person is hallucinating, that doesn't indicate that they are on drugs, or that they are mentally unstable? Does one hallucinate before or after taking drugs? If one hallucinates after taking drugs, then isn't the hallucinations the effect of the drugs, and therefore refers to the drugs in the system, and can provide information about the kinds of drugs they took? You're performing these mental gymnastics in an attempt to hold your feeble arguments together, and all it does is make your position less clear and make you appear as if you don't know what it is you are talking about. This is what happens every time I engage you.

So we cannot look at a signal, and interpret its meaning, by referring to its cause, as you seem to think, that is a dead end method. It leads nowhere. It is a dead end, because all we will see is that a human being created the signal. We cannot see the human being's intent so we cannot know what the human being meant with that signal. Looking for the cause of the signal cannot give us an answer to what is meant by the signal, it's a dead end. We will see that the human being meant something, and so there is a "cause" of the signal, but we'll have no idea of how to determine what the human being meant. Therefore this is useless in determining meaning. The only approach we have, toward interpretation is to determine the proper system of interpretation, and this will allow us to interpret the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is so stupid. We get at each other's intent every time we read each other's words, as the words are an effect of your ideas and your intent to convey them. Misunderstanding your words is misunderstanding your idea and your means of conveying it, which is the cause of me reading your words. If you had no idea, or no intent to convey them, I wouldn't be reading your words. This is so simple and obvious, the fact that you aren't getting it is shows that you are either obtuse, or simply like to argue for the sake of arguing.

The principle of sufficient reason demands that there is an objective reason as to why all hydrogen atoms behave the same way every time. The reason is one of two: Either the atoms are connected in some way, or they are not. If they are, then this connection is what is called the universal form, or genus, or species. If they are not, then the phenomenon is a mere coincidence, which, while logically possible, fails the law of parsimony until the first reason is refuted. — Samuel Lacrampe

What you don't seem to understand is that the "universal form" is the abstraction, a description which we use to describe the objects. We have a description of the hydrogen atom, electrons, neutrons, protons, weight, etc. This is the "universal form" of the hydrogen atom. So indeed, all the hydrogen atoms which are judged to be hydrogen atoms, are connected by this universal form. But this connection is one produced by that human judgement. It's artificial as a connection produced by the judgement that they are the same type. They are thus "connected" to each other, as hydrogen atoms, because they've been judged to be hydrogen atoms.

To make things easier, more straight forward, let's say that we've divided out from the vast reality, these individual things, parts, and each of these parts, though it is different, is also similar, and due to that similarity, we call each by the same name, "hydrogen atom". Notice the first premise, we separate these things out, we individuate them from their environment, which is the whole vast universe in which they exist. The problem is that we can't really completely separate them from everything else, so no matter what we do, they are still fundamentally a part of a larger whole. And, like I explained in the last post, either a thing gets its identity by being a part of a larger whole, or it gets its identity from being an individual, whole itself, but it can't be both because this is contradictory. In reality, a thing is part of the larger whole, and cannot be absolutely separated, so this is its true identity.

There is an assumption that hydrogen atoms have individual, separate existence, as individual things, and this is what gives them their identity, according to the "universal form". But this is not really a true assumption, the true identity of each hydrogen atom is as a part of a larger whole. It is an artificial identity which we have created in this act of individuation. In reality, they always exist in an environment, as part of that environment, so none of these hydrogen atoms ever really have completely independent existence as independent things, in an absolute way. The universal form lacks in truth in this way, and this lacking is known as the accidentals which are proper to each individual.

Now, you say that the fact that these things are similar means that they are connected in some way. And you claim that this connection is the universal form, which is known as the hydrogen atom. In reality, the connection is that they are all a part of one larger whole, one universe, and so they really are connected, just as you say is necessary, in order for them to be similar. But this connection is through the natural environment of their existence, it is not through the universal form. Why they are similar is a function of their position within the whole, not a function of the universal form of the hydrogen atom. The universal form, the form of the hydrogen atom, is the principle by which we individuate these parts, divide them out as separate entities. Therefore, the inverse to what you say is what is really the case. The universal form is not what connects these things, it's what divides them out into separate, but similar entities. This division is artificial. In order for us to know the real connection, how they are all part of one and the same universe, requires that we know the particular form of the particular thing, which is the universe, not the universal form of the hydrogen atom.

So for example, imagine that there was one fundamental particle, like the ancient atomist thought, or what Aristotle called prime matter. Each instance of this particle would be precisely the same as every other, only having a different spatial location. All of reality would consist of different combinations and patterns of this one repeating particle. Such a particle would be like a point with only a location in space because it could not have any spatial form, or else that form would be in principle, divisible itself. In that case, we in theory, divide down the universe to a most fundamental object, and if we followed your principles, we would theorize that if we know the universal form of that fundamental object we have what is required to understand the entire universe. The problem is, that in doing this we have really just flipped the whole problem inside out, and haven't solved anything. That fundamental particle could have absolutely no universal form, in order that it might constitute all material forms, and suddenly, the "form" of all things becomes the relationships which these particles have with one another.

So, when we in theory, we divide down the universe into parts, such that we can identify the parts according to similarities, and classify them according to universal forms, what we do is create less and less different types, and more and more objects of these different types. What this indicates, is that what constitutes "a different type", is principally the difference in the relationships which the parts have to each other, not a difference in the part itself. Therefore when we come to understand the universal form of a particular type of part, say the hydrogen atom, this universal form, which is a human creation, is not a principle of the connectedness of things, which would really be found in the relationships between parts within a larger thing, it is a principle of division.

What you don't seem to understand is that the "universal form" is the abstraction, — Metaphysician Undercover

And what you never seemed to have grasped despite your voluminous posts in this thread, over several months, is that the fundamental claim of Platonic realism is that Universals are real, and don’t simply exist in individual minds.

All of the specifics discussed such as triangles, numbers, and so on, are simply illustrative examples. In this respect, I think Samuel’s understanding of the issue is much nearer the actual Thomist understanding than your own.

And what you never seemed to have grasped despite your voluminous posts in this thread, over several months, is that the fundamental claim of Platonic realism is that Universals are real, and don’t simply exist in individual minds. — Wayfarer

I totally understand that. But I disagree with Platonic Realism. Some of the reasons for my disagreement are explained in that last post. Other reasons for that disagreement I have been explaining throughout the thread. It is not the case that I do not grasp the fundamental claim of Platonic Realism. It is the case that I find it to be an untenable position.

All of the specifics discussed such as triangles, numbers, and so on, are simply illustrative examples. In this respect, I think Samuel’s understanding of the issue is much nearer the actual Thomist understanding than your own. — Wayfarer

As far as I know, the Thomistic understanding is not a Platonic Realism, it is more accurate to say that it is a Neo-Platonic Idealism. There is a big difference between Platonic Realism and Neo-Platonic Idealism. The principal difference, as I described earlier in the thread, is that Neo-Platonic Idealism validates the existence of independent Forms, through the existence of particulars, such that real independent Forms are particulars, emanating from the One, while Platonic Realism maintains the untenable position that universal forms have real independent existence.

My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point; and from there, we find genera (genus in plural apparently), that individuals participate in. This view allows for both individual forms and universal forms.

Unless I misunderstood, it sounds like you claim that the whole, the universe, is the one and only true identity as the starting point; and then from there, associate individual things as the divided parts of the whole, like body parts are to one body. Where does the individual form fit in, if individuals do not possess true identities? Also, is your view pantheism?

The problem with that, is that maths is predictive — Wayfarer

No, maths should not be an absolute candidate to stand up because it cannot prove itself to be consistent. Please refer Hilbert's second problem on arithmetic. Without proved consistency, anything is merely empirical regardless of how many successful cases it has dealt.

whether information, generally speaking, is physical — Wayfarer

that depends on your understanding of "physical", whether it's matter and energy as it now stands or just part of existence or the whole existence.
The first case gives an absolute NO.
The middle, also a No: found no good definition of information but for the sake of the argument, information is a sequence of data. The sequence can be 1-length or above (not sure any meaning with zero length). Data itself, overall, is existence, including any possible forms, discovered or undiscovered. If physical is just a subset, then information should not be within that. Can intersect probably but I haven't thought of a good example. Finally still a No.
The last assumption, a big YES. As physical identifies with existence then nothing is outside.

Sorry Samuel, I missed this post so I'm delayed in response.

My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point; and from there, we find genera (genus in plural apparently), that individuals participate in. This view allows for both individual forms and universal forms. — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree, individuals are true identities. The question here though, is where do universals come from. Are they something pre-existing which we discover, or do we create them within our minds? We all want to say that they pre-exist, and we discover them, because this validates as "real", our knowledge. It makes for well-grounded epistemology. The problem is that we make mistakes, we find out later that our universals were not accurate, so we change them. Then our complete system of universals appears like something changing, evolving, such that the pre-existing universals are only ideals which we strive for, but never completely obtain , and the reality of them is hard to justify.

Unless I misunderstood, it sounds like you claim that the whole, the universe, is the one and only true identity as the starting point; and then from there, associate individual things as the divided parts of the whole, like body parts are to one body. Where does the individual form fit in, if individuals do not possess true identities? Also, is your view pantheism? — Samuel Lacrampe

So we take the whole "the universe", as an individual, one. And as an individual it has true identity as one particular. But as the whole, of everything, it is also a true universal. Now the universal is grounded with true identity, true independent existence, as a particular. When we proceed to validate universals as true and real, now, we must proceed from that "One" to position each universal in relation to the One. So we might proceed to differentiate animate from inanimate for example. If we start from a particular individual, like the individual man, and assign a species "man" to the individual, then assign a genus, "animal", etc., we are proceeding in the opposite direction, creating the universals as we go, for that particular purpose. And the universals created are not necessarily real unless they are properly related to the true universal, the One.

Hey MU. My turn to apologize; I will be busy and likely not as responsive on the Forum, possibly until the beginning of next year. I hope to resume this conversation at that point, and get to the bottom of this reality thing.

Cheers.

maths should not be an absolute candidate to stand up because it cannot prove itself to be consistent. — Dzung

It is still predictive - you wouldn't be responding on a computer if it wasn't. In that post I was responding to subjectivism, that numbers are 'only in the mind' or 'purely conventional'; which doesn't account for the effectiveness of mathematical reasoning in making predictions and discoveries. This doesn't rely on maths being absolute, whatever that means.

individuals are true identities. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see any reason why Thomists would say that. After all the Bible states that 'God is no respecter of persons'; and 'He who loses his life for My sake, will be saved'. Christians are 'saved' not because of their personalities, but in spite of them. Of course that is bound to be a contentious claim, but in any case, I think you far overestimate the importance of the notion of 'the individual' to ancient and medieval philosophy, where it was hardly a matter of consideration for them; that only comes about with much later democratic humanism.

No problem. It's a busy time of year. Cheers!

I don't see any reason why Thomists would say that. — Wayfarer

This was Samuel's point, which I didn't disagree with.

My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point; and from there, we find genera (genus in plural apparently), that individuals participate in. — Samuel Lacrampe

It is an Aristotelian principle, the law of identity, a thing is the same as itself. This hands identity to the thing itself, as a particular, such that the identity of a thing is not the description of the thing, the description employing universals, because identity is particular to the individual.

After all the Bible states that 'God is no respecter of persons'; and 'He who loses his life for My sake, will be saved'. Christians are 'saved' not because of their personalities, but in spite of them. Of course that is bound to be a contentious claim, but in any case, I think you far overestimate the importance of the notion of 'the individual' to ancient and medieval philosophy, where it was hardly a matter of consideration for them; that only comes about with much later democratic humanism. — Wayfarer

I don't quite see how your reference to the Bible is relevant to the issue of "true identity". It is argued strongly by Paul, in the New Testament, that in relation to resurrection, the eternal, immortality of the soul, it is the individual person whose existence persists. And if you think about it, these concepts loose their meaningfulness when removed from the individual.

The "individual" is of extreme importance to Aristotelian logic, as is evident from his law of identity discussed above. It forms the basis for the concept of "substance", and substance is the grounding of all logic. Here's the first line of Ch.5 of Aristotle's "The Categories":

Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse.

90% agreed. The rest 10% is what "absolute" is about. So if you disregarded that 10% we would have total agreement. I.e maths is predictive and useful and cherished ..etc but just to a certain extent... like any other sciences - empirical ultimately, no more. It's just the best among any lame tools. Hence its predictability's trustworthy is also risky to be used as priori against subjectivism.

maths is predictive and useful and cherished ..etc but just to a certain extent... like any other sciences - empirical ultimately, no more — Dzung

But maths is NOT empirical. That's the whole point. There is no empirical proof required of [insert mathematical theorem here] - it's purely intelligible, it comprises truths of reason alone. But - and this is the amazing thing - even despite that, it makes entirely novel predictions about nature, that otherwise would never have been discovered. Which is what makes the notion of the 'synthetic a priori' so interesting. If you haven't encountered Eugene Wigner's The Unreasonable Efficiency of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences, it's worth a read (even though it's badly written).

thanks it will take me a good time to read the article as I am not good at time management. I meant including maths are empirical because if the plain arithmetic cannot prove itself consistency then on which ground do we put trust in it other than on empirical belief?

it's worth a read — Wayfarer

I have just read some of its reviews, there are pro and against. Have you read both sides? And your opinion for the against (e.g http://www.dartmouth.edu/~matc/MathDrama/reading/Hamming.html)? I think they are much to my side.

Back! Happy New Year all! >:O >:O >:O

The problem is that we make mistakes, we find out later that our universals were not accurate, so we change them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, the very fact that we can determine that our description of universals are inaccurate proves that we have knowledge of the real universal; because if we did not, then we could never judge our description to be inaccurate. You might reply that if we knew the universal, then we could always accurately describe it. This is very much the Meno's Paradox: "If we know what we're looking for, inquiry is unnecessary. If we don't know what we're looking for, inquiry is impossible. Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible."

To solve the paradox, we need to make the distinction between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. As per Aristotle, we have implicit knowledge of universals, obtained through the process of abstraction, and we are searching for the explicit knowledge. The ability to describe the universal accurately is the explicit knowledge, and the ability to judge if our description is accurate is the implicit knowledge. This is how the socratic method works. This also explains why we can all use the concept of 'justice' correctly and meaningfully in a sentence (e.g. "the holocaust was unjust"), but have trouble coming up with the perfect definition of 'justice'.

Regarding the universe as the One: I will put this topic on hold for now to focus on the one above.

Actually, the very fact that we can determine that our description of universals are inaccurate proves that we have knowledge of the real universal; because if we did not, then we could never judge our description to be inaccurate. You might reply that if we knew the universal, then we could always accurately describe it. This is very much the Meno's Paradox: "If we know what we're looking for, inquiry is unnecessary. If we don't know what we're looking for, inquiry is impossible. Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible." — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree that in seeking knowledge we assume that there is such a thing as what you call "the real universal". The point I made earlier in the thread, is that this perfect universal is "the ideal", and as the ideal, it is no longer a universal, it has the characteristics of a particular. This is what Plato recognized in "The Republic" when he saw "the good". Suddenly "the real universal" is no longer a universal, it is a particular. Now it is necessary that the inquiry take a whole new course. We have been seeking the real universal, but we have been looking in the completely wrong place because there is no such thing as "the real universal", what we would call "the real universal" is actually a particular. When we determine what is required of the universal to be "real", we describe a particular. This opens a whole new perspective onto the nature of ideas and forms, the reality of the particular form.

To solve the paradox, we need to make the distinction between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. As per Aristotle, we have implicit knowledge of universals, obtained through the process of abstraction, and we are searching for the explicit knowledge. The ability to describe the universal accurately is the explicit knowledge, and the ability to judge if our description is accurate is the implicit knowledge. This is how the socratic method works. This also explains why we can all use the concept of 'justice' correctly and meaningfully in a sentence (e.g. "the holocaust was unjust"), but have trouble coming up with the perfect definition of 'justice'. — Samuel Lacrampe

So this distinction between explicit and implicit requires an assumption of the ideal, a perfection of the universal, and this ideal is necessarily a particular. Therefore such judgements always involve, within the implicit, the assumed reality of the particular. As much as we explicitly judge the universal, i.e. the universal is what is being judged for level of accuracy, this indicates a privation in the reality of universal, in reference to the assumed real perfection which is a particular.

The point I made earlier in the thread, is that this perfect universal is "the ideal", and as the ideal, it is no longer a universal, it has the characteristics of a particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am trying to understand what you mean by this. Each universal form or concept is "particular" in the sense that it is unique relative to other concepts. If it was not, then they would fail the principle of indiscernible; and to this, I agree. But if you mean that concepts are particulars in the same sense that this rock is a particular, then this cannot be. As per Aquinas, matter is what gives universal forms their particularity. Therefore universal forms without matter cannot be particulars.

If you still mean the latter, then what reason do you have to support the claim that the ideal is necessarily a particular?

My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point — Samuel Lacrampe

Yeah I said that. I did not mean it in the sense that individual persons must have individual ontological value, or do not share a common human nature. I meant it in the sense that I am me and not you, and you are you and not me. From this, we conclude that we have separate identities or individual forms (called soul in this case), although we both participate in the same universal form or species of human.

I am trying to understand what you mean by this. Each universal form or concept is "particular" in the sense that it is unique relative to other concepts. If it was not, then they would fail the principle of indiscernible; and to this, I agree. But if you mean that concepts are particulars in the same sense that this rock is a particular, then this cannot be. As per Aquinas, matter is what gives universal forms their particularity. Therefore universal forms without matter cannot be particulars.

If you still mean the latter, then what reason do you have to support the claim that the ideal is necessarily a particular? — Samuel Lacrampe

You agreed with me that our descriptions of the universals are imperfect. You have your description, I have my description, and there are differences between the two. But we assume that there is what you called "the real universal", the correct conception of any concept, and this is what I called the perfect conception, or the ideal. Do you agree that the perfect conception, or ideal, must be a particular? This means that it must be unique in its existence. If you had one tiny aspect of the conception wrong, then you wouldn't have the perfect conception, And so the conceptions that each of us have are riddled with these minor deficiencies and are not the "real universal".

So the "real universal", due to this perfection, is necessarily a particular. As you say, a rock is also a particular. But your suggestion is that a rock is a particular in a different way from the way that the "real universal" is a particular. How can this be? A particular is a particular. What defines the particular is that it is a unique, one of a kind ,individual. In the sense of being a particular I see no difference between an immaterial particular and a material particular. Your claim appears to be that an immaterial particular is different from a material particular. I'll agree with you on that difference between immaterial and material,.but as a particular there appears to be no reason to believe that there is any difference, one is a material particular, the other an immaterial particular.

As per Aquinas, matter is what gives universal forms their particularity. Therefore universal forms without matter cannot be particulars. — Samuel Lacrampe

There appears to be something confused in this statement. The universal form, without matter, is the ideal, the perfect, and is therefore necessarily a particular. Human minds, and their conceptions are corrupted by the material nature of the human body, and so human conceptions do not obtain the level of the ideal, they are imperfect. So the difference in conception, of the same concept, between you and I, and others, is due to our material nature, and this is why we do not achieve the perfect conception, the ideal. However, if we are to assume that there are such perfect forms, without matter, then by the very assumption that they are perfect, ideal, then they are necessarily individual.

It is just a misunderstanding on how the term "particular" is defined. The way you use it for the universal forms, I now understand it to mean that each universal form is unique; and I agree.
According to the dictionary here, particular is defined as "used to single out an individual member of a specified group or class." In this strict sense, universal forms cannot be particulars because they are synonymous to "specified group" or "class" in the definition, and this would not make sense. In this strict sense, only things like individual rocks can be particulars because they are individual members of the universal form of rock-ness.

That is exactly why I deny that universal forms have any real independent existence, it becomes contradictory in the way that you describe here. The independent universal must be a unique individual, as I described, and this makes it a particular. But as you explain, it doesn't make sense to say that the universal is a particular. So it becomes necessary to dismiss the notion that universal forms have existence independent from the human minds which conceive of them. That is why the Neo-Platonists, and Christian theologians moved on to describe the independent Forms as individuals. The Neo-Platonists described a procession of individual forms emanating from the One, and Aquinas described God and the angels as independent Forms.

That which is communicated is non-physical- a concept- and the means of communicating it are physical.

But, all of our concepts are mental images formed from our experience with sensible realities.

The underlying question should be:

Do ideas and concepts exist apart from the sensible images of which they are composed?

I would say yes, because one idea can exist under various images and examples.

Is THAT concept, stripped from images, when communicated via a sensible medium- sensible or insensible?

Let's consider again the two statements below.
(1) Each universal form is particular because if it was not so, then they would fail the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles.
(2) A universal form cannot be a particular because a particular is defined as "used to single out an individual member of a specified group or class."

I don't see a contradiction in the statements; only an ambiguity in the term "particular". The term in statement (1) means "unique only". The term in statement (2) means "unique yet belonging to the same genus as other particulars".

If it is true that all humans are humans, and all rocks are rocks, then the universal forms of human genus and rock genus exist. It is possible that these genera cease to exist if all humans and rocks cease to exist; but nevertheless, the human genus is a different thing from the individual humans it comprises.

Hello.

Is THAT concept, stripped from images, when communicated via a sensible medium- sensible or insensible? — Daniel Smith

The concept itself must be insensible; because if it was sensible, then we would have no use to communicate the concept through a second layer of sensible images and examples, which are numerous, as you said.

Do ideas and concepts exist apart from the sensible images of which they are composed? — Daniel Smith

I would also say yes, by pointing to the concept of "justice". We all understand the concept, and yet have no clear sensible image of it. The image of a scale is merely a symbol of it, not the real thing.

don't see a contradiction in the statements; only an ambiguity in the term "particular". The term in statement (1) means "unique only". The term in statement (2) means "unique yet belonging to the same genus as other particulars". — Samuel Lacrampe

Let me see if I understand what you're saying. The universal becomes a particular, as per my arguments, and is represented as (1). Now this particular, may be a member of a class (which itself is a universal), and therefore also a particular. So you say that there is no contradiction in claiming that the universal is really a particular, as the particular may be unique, distinct, yet also the member of a class(2).

The issue though is whether the universal, as universal, has any real existence. What I've argued is that it has real existence only as a particular. I don't deny its real existence absolutely, only its real existence as anything other than a particular. You seem to want to insist that it still has real existence as a universal as well. The problem I see is that "universal" refers to what you call "class" or "genus" in (2). And, that a particular is a member of a class or genus, requires a judgement. So in (2), you assume that a class has real existence, as group of particulars, from which individuals may be singled out. But we do not have the premise to give real existence to this group, or class. The premise is that the universal is necessarily a particular, and there is no premise that the particular might consist of a number of other particulars.

The issue is how to validate this "class". The class is what we call the universal form, and if it has real existence, it exists as a particular. You want to assume that this particular, has numerous members, other particulars within it. How do you validate that this is real? It appears to me like this is only a matter of an assumption, and if so, it is simply judgement. And if it's just a judgement, how can it be real?

If it is true that all humans are humans, and all rocks are rocks, then the universal forms of human genus and rock genus exist. It is possible that these genera cease to exist if all humans and rocks cease to exist; but nevertheless, the human genus is a different thing from the individual humans it comprises. — Samuel Lacrampe

That a particular object is a rock, or that one is a human being, is a matter of judgement. So I would say that these categories, these classifications, the genus of rock, and the genus of human come into existence as a result of such judgements. I agree that the human genus is different from the individual human beings, because the genus, as the universal, comes into existence through human judgement. The existence of the universal, the genus is dependent on human judgement. The question is how do we assign real existence to something which is dependent on human judgement.

If we assume that the universal has real existence independent from human judgement, then we are right back around the circle, stating that the universal is a particular. If you wish to say that some particulars are members of other particulars (these are the particulars which we call universals), then we still have the problem that this is a matter of judgement. So it appears to me, that this relationship which makes something a member of a class, or genus, is a matter of judgement. In order to make the universal something real, we need to make the judgement something real.

Let me see if I understand what you're saying. The universal becomes a particular, as per my arguments, and is represented as (1). Now this particular, may be a member of a class (which itself is a universal), and therefore also a particular. So you say that there is no contradiction in claiming that the universal is really a particular, as the particular may be unique, distinct, yet also the member of a class(2). — Metaphysician Undercover

You are correct. This was not what I was saying, but I was mistaken because I forgot that universals may be a members of higher universals, like the human genus is a member of the genus of living beings.

[...] The existence of the universal, the genus is dependent on human judgement. The question is how do we assign real existence to something which is dependent on human judgement.[...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree that concepts or universal forms are dependant on human judgement. The reason is that judgements can be either true or false: if the judgement points to reality, then it is true; and if not, then it is false. Thus the reality or existence of the concepts in the judgement precedes the judgement. If concepts or universal forms were dependant on human judgement, then no judgement could be either true or false; which is absurd.

I disagree that concepts or universal forms are dependant on human judgement. The reason is that judgements can be either true or false: if the judgement points to reality, then it is true; and if not, then it is false. Thus the reality or existence of the concepts in the judgement precedes the judgement. If concepts or universal forms were dependant on human judgement, then no judgement could be either true or false; which is absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe

Consider that we have two things, the particular, and the universal form, which is the class, or genus. The particular has a unique form, what it is, and the universal is also a case of what something is. Yet the two are not the same, because the universal must allow that many of the particulars are of the same class. So there are two distinct forms, the form of the particular, and the universal form.

The issue is how does a particular become a member of any class (universal form). My claim is that this can only occur by judgement because a certain type of relationship between the particular form and the universal form is required, and this relationship is established by a judgement. A mind compares the two forms and passes judgement. It is clear that the human mind through judgement does make this type of relationship, so I don't think that I am wrong there. But perhaps the human mind is not the only way that such a relationship can be made.

You argue that there is truth and falsity to this type of judgement therefore the relationship which is being judged must be something real. But this argument will turn out to be circular. The truth or falsity of whether any particular is a member of a specified class, depends on how that class is defined. But the definition is commonly produced by a human judgement.

So if we assume that the universal form is defined independently from human judgement, we have no way of knowing whether our definition matches the independently existing definition, whether our understanding of the universal form matches the real universal form. Then how would we ever know whether or not it is true that any particular is a member of any class? Since we couldn't know whether our definition matches the independent definition because all we have is the definitions we produce anyway, then truth and falsity, to us, are just a matter of judgement anyway. Then whether the particular was "really" and "truly" a member of any class, would require a judgement by God.

So we still do not avoid the need for a judgement, unless you can say how one form could have that specific relationship with another form, without being judged to have it. Suppose it's a relationship of similarity for example. All particular forms are by their nature distinct, unique, so they are essentially different. What could unite them within the same class, as "the same", except a judgement?

So if we assume that the universal form is defined independently from human judgement, we have no way of knowing whether our definition matches the independently existing definition, whether our understanding of the universal form matches the real universal form. — Metaphysician Undercover

We already covered this issue here. It is solved by making the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge of the universal form or concept. The implicit knowledge is obtained through abstraction from observing particulars; and then if our explicit definition agrees with the implicit knowledge, then it is the true definition. This explains why we all sense that the definition of justice for humans, "equality in treatment", is a more accurate definition than "don't steal".

If the definition of concepts is only produced by a human judgement, even if agreed upon by all men without dispute, then the definitions would not point to anything objectively real, and thus no judgement could ever be true or false, that is, point to reality or not; which is absurd.

Furthermore, even the particular form of individual things is defined by its properties which are all universal forms or concepts, aside perhaps from the x, y, z, t properties. E.g. The particular form of this individual chair is: A chair (concept), made of wood (concept), red in colour (concept), located at position x, y, z, (not a concept I think). If it was not so, then we could never know any general knowledge like "chairs made of wood can burn", without testing every individual wooden chair.

We already covered this issue here. It is solved by making the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge of the universal form or concept. The implicit knowledge is obtained through abstraction from observing particulars; and then if our explicit definition agrees with the implicit knowledge, then it is the true definition. This explains why we all sense that the definition of justice for humans, "equality in treatment", is a more accurate definition than "don't steal". — Samuel Lacrampe

We're pretty much going around in circles but we are at a slightly different point, because now you mention truth. I don't believe that the implicit/explicit description can be used to explain truth. Truth itself is an ideal, thus to know the truth would require having explicit knowledge of the universal form. Truth, which is a complete exclusion of mistake from our belief, cannot be obtained through what you call implicit knowledge.

If the definition of concepts is only produced by a human judgement, even if agreed upon by all men without dispute, then the definitions would not point to anything objectively real, and thus no judgement could ever be true or false, that is, point to reality or not; which is absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe

You slightly misrepresent this, and when properly represented, it is not absurd at all. Definitions can point to something real without obtaining "truth", because truth must be a complete lack of mistake in such pointing. If you use "true" or "truth" in a less strict sense, then we can say that if human beings agree, that this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality. If you release "true" from its strict sense which renders it an ideal, complete lack of mistake, in order that it be grasped by implicit knowledge, then there is nothing to prevent us from saying that truth is what human beings agree on.

What is the case is that a judgement concerning the relation between a particular and a universal, cannot ever be known with certainty to be true or false. And this is not absurd because we must always allow that each, our understanding of the particular, and our understanding of the universal are not necessarily without mistake, even though we might believe that they are without mistake. So "truth" as the ideal cannot be obtained, but "truth" in the lesser sense, of pointing to reality, is implied by human agreement.

Furthermore, even the particular form of individual things is defined by its properties which are all universal forms or concepts, aside perhaps from the x, y, z, t properties. E.g. The particular form of this individual chair is: A chair (concept), made of wood (concept), red in colour (concept), located at position x, y, z, (not a concept I think). If it was not so, then we could never know any general knowledge like "chairs made of wood can burn", without testing every individual wooden chair. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think that this is not at all true. Our knowledge of particulars is known to be incomplete, and that is precisely because we can only know the particular through universals. So no matter how we describe any particular, the fact that we describe it in terms of universals, will always leave our knowledge of the particular, incomplete. It is very evident that our knowledge of particulars is always incomplete. And regarding your comment about "general knowledge", this is exactly what is expressed by the commonly cited "problem of induction". The conclusions we make through inductive reasoning are never absolutely certain, as they are based in probability.