It seems to me that I have answered the question of "Is information physical?". It is physical and non-physical, with concrete and abstract thinking being both effects and causes of other effects. It then becomes an arbitrary matter of what part of the chain any group of people are discussing.

So if there is no further argument against information being the relationship between causes and their effects, and the only arguments are simply about the kinds of information (the kinds of causal relationships, like between concrete and abstract thinking with the different causal relationships each one has, or between the "physical" and "non-physical" and the different causal relationships each one has), then I think we are done here.

If you'd like to continue the discussions on concrete vs. abstract thinking and physical vs. non-physical you can start a new thread on those topics.

We're simply talking about information - what it is and how it flows. — Harry Hindu

What information is, is a universal. How information flows is dependent on the nature of the particulars (human being, dog, thermostat, rock, particles, and so on) that are the locus of cause-and-effect.

One that has been lost in the to and fro is that I acknowledged at the outset that universals don't exist, but that they're real. — Wayfarer

To exist and to be real are generally considered to be coterminous. If you want to say that there is an order that is real beyond being inherent in existent things then you are faced with the problem of incoherence. We could have no idea whatsoever what kind of actuality such an order could enjoy. "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind".

Whatever we might want to say about such a thing could not be anything but empty words. Empty words are fine, even wonderful, if they are filled with poetic meaning; but poetic content cannot become the subject of epistemological argument.

'Socrates knew that the moral ideas in virtue of which alone we are human, which alone give meaning and value to human life, have no source other than the mind. They constitute an intelligible realm fully independent of the sensible world. — Wayfarer

I don't agree with this kind of idea at all, based as it is on the separation of mind and world. Moral ideas have their source in feeling, in living intuitions, in the living world itself. This kind of dichotomous thinking should have died with Descartes.

But the attempt to make such faculties and powers the 'object of investigation' is to reify them, to treat them as things or objects or forces in an objective sense; in short, to objectify them. They're not existing things, but 'only the order the mind itself confers on the world through ideas born in the mind'. However, those ideas and capabilities are fundamental to our ability to know. That is the sense in which they're 'real but not existent'. — Wayfarer

The thing is, they are either real forces as we conceive them in some sense or they are imaginary. On the other hand every conceivable way of thinking about the world is itself a real force just insofar as we are involved in and changed by it. It seems to me that you are reifying an "order of the mind" as though it is one absolute thing, rather than seeing that there are countless orders of the mind, just as there are countless natural complexes; and that all those orders of the mind are themselves natural complexes with their own capacities to influence and be influenced. We do not merely 'know' but we also feel, act, create, exhibit, judge, believe and imagine.

The mind does not "confer order on the world" but the orders of the mind reflect the orders of natural complexes insofar as we are constantly affected by them; I would say. So, it seems that I just don't see things in the light of the subject/ object dichotomy, as you seem to do.

How the mind is different to this, or indeed to anything, is that it is the subject of experience. — Wayfarer

As I see it the mind/body (I don't think of them as separate at all) is also the object of experience insofar as it is affected by it, just as any object is. On the other hand objects are the subject of experience insofar as they are affected. We, and all other objects, are subjected to experience. The terms 'subject' and 'object' are replete with ambiguity.

We could have no idea whatsoever what kind of actuality such an order could enjoy. — Janus

Platonism holds that the domain of number is a real domain. A quote from the SEP article, Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics:

Platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and practices. Just as electrons and planets exist independently of us, so do numbers and sets. And just as statements about electrons and planets are made true or false by the objects with which they are concerned and these objects' perfectly objective properties, so are statements about numbers and sets. Mathematical truths are therefore discovered, not invented.

...Platonism must be distinguished from the view of the historical Plato.

...Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects which aren't part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences.

You may not agree with mathematical Platonism - many don't - but it can't be dismissed so easily.

Moral ideas have their source in feeling, in living intuitions, in the living world itself. — Janus

Would you find them in the animal kingdom? It seems to me that they are an essential aspect of the human condition, what it is that makes human life what it is.

Platonism holds that the domain of number is a real domain. — Wayfarer

Yes, but what does that claim mean? How would its being a real domain differ from its being a merely conceptualized or imagined domain?

Would you find them in the animal kingdom? It seems to me that they are an essential aspect of the human condition, what it is that makes human life what it is. — Wayfarer

Are you claiming that animals have no sense of compassion for or fairness towards their fellows?

I think you are making an error with the claim that because 1 can be divided, then it loses its original nature of being the most simple unit or identity. 1 whole can be divided into two halves, but notice that we are forced to change identity, as underlined, in order to speak truly. 1 whole = 2 halves, but 1 whole ≠ 2 wholes, because 1 ≠ 2. Similarly, 1 m = 100 cm, but 1 m ≠ 100 m. In other words, for a given identity, 1 remains the simplest unit; and if it gets divided, then it gets divided into different identities. As such, the nature of 1 remains unchanged. — Samuel Lacrampe

The point though, was that the concept of one changed, evolved. My proposal was that in the original sense the concept of "one" did not allow that one could be divided. But then someone proposed the principle of fractions, which would require that "one" be redefined such that the one could be divided. There are numerous examples of evolution in mathematical principles. The addition of the numeral 0, and negative integers is one example. More recently we have what is called imaginary numbers. Before imaginary numbers, there was no square root of -1, that was disallowed by the conceptual structure. Now there is a square root of -1, it is allowed.

I think that identity is a different issue. Say that something is identified as "the one". We can say that the one is divisible into halves, quarters, etc.. But to say that it is divisible is to say that it is potentially two, four, etc., it is not actually two or four, because according to its identity it is one. If we actually divide it, say in half, then it no longer has its identity as one, because it is now two. I believe that this is an important ontological issue which is often overlooked.

We commonly say that an object is composed of parts, molecules for instance. So we talk about the object as if it has a dual identity, it is one object, but it is also a bunch of molecules. But this is contradictory. Either we have identified one object, or we have identified a number of objects, but they are clearly not the same identity. What has happened is that we have given mathematical equivalence to the numerous molecules, and the one object, and we think that just because there is a mathematical equivalence, they have the same identity. But they do not. In reality, we identify the object, and say that it is potentially divided into molecules, but the molecules don't really have identity as actual individual things unless the division is carried out. And if the division is carried out, the original object no longer maintains its identity. To have both identities at the same time is contradictory.

It is indeed my position that the particular thing and the universal form are inherently united. If I understand you correctly, your position is that the particular and the universal are distinct, objectively disconnected, and only related by man-made judgement, is that correct? From this view, does it follow that only particular forms are objective real, where as universal forms are only man-made? — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes, that is my position exactly.

But then it must also have a universal form in order to be part of the genus or species it belongs to. If this was not the case, then two things made of the same material could in principle behave completely differently. E.g., two rocks composed of the same minerals, when put in contact with fire, could react differently, such that one could be inert, and the other one could blow up. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't see how you draw your conclusion here. Suppose that two distinct atoms of hydrogen are both very reactive. Why must they be members of a "universal form" in order that they will both react in a similar way? They are similar, that's why they behave in a similar way. Yes, they are members of the universal form, hydrogen, but that's a human designation based in our determination of similarity. The human designation of this universal form, "hydrogen", is how we, as human beings understand the similarity. The reason why there are such similarities is not covered by the human concept, and this is the reason why they behave in a similar way, because they are similar. So the "universal form", does not account for why there are things which behave in a similar way, it just describes the fact that they do. That there are similarities is neither accounted for by the particular form, nor the universal form, it is something different altogether.

But this would be absurd. We could never know any generalities; only particulars after having done particular tests on each one of them. Furthermore, we could never perform any inductive reasoning, such as "all rocks made of this mineral are inert to fire", or "all fires are hot", or "no human can breath under water", etc. — Samuel Lacrampe

We can make these conclusion because there are real similarities, and real consistencies. But "universal form" refers to the way that we understand these similarities and consistencies. "Universal form" refers to a described similarity. The description of the similarity is not the same as the cause of the similarity, so we can't really say that the "universal form" gives us the reason why inductive reasoning works. The universal form follows from the inductive reasoning, as a description of the similarity, but we have to dig deeper if we are to determine why there are such similarities. and it is answering this question, why are there these similarities, which would tell us why inductive reasoning works. The universal form does not do this for us.

1. What exactly is the distinction you are trying to make when using the terms, "non-physical" and "physical"? What exactly does it mean for something to be "non-physical" as opposed to "physical". — Harry Hindu

That's pretty straight forward. Generally, things sensed and understood through the laws of physical are physical, and those which aren't are non-physical. In the context of this thread, we are talking about information, so there is the physical signal which is sensed, and the non-physical, what is meant to be signified. In the example of the op there is a flag as the physical signal, and the non-physical idea represented is the number of masts on a ship. There is necessarily a system of interpretation which relates the two.

Can you provide a specific example or two of when it would be useful to make a distinction between "non-physical" and "physical" when talking about cause and effect and information flow? — Harry Hindu

In all cases of information we need a clear distinction between non-physical (what is signified), and physical (signal) or else the system of interpretation cannot be properly applied and the signal may not be properly interpreted. The interpretation will be corrupt. This is the case in hallucination, there is not a clear distinction between what is physically real, and what is non-physical, the interpretation. All cases of misinterpretation are cases of not properly distinguishing between what is proper to the physical aspect, and what is proper to the non-physical.

No. The effect (whatever effect we are talking about) is a representation of it's prior causes. It has nothing to do with whether or not some cause, or some effect is "physical" or not. All effects carry information about their prior causes. All effects are representations of their causes. — Harry Hindu

When the cause is intention (final cause) we cannot necessarily determine the cause from the effect unless we have the proper system of interpretation. So in the case of the intentional presentation of information, the fact that the effect (the physical sign) is a representation of the cause (what is meant, or intended) is irrelevant to the matter of interpretation. What is relevant is the system of interpretation.

No, it wouldn't be useful because there could be instances where the cause and effect sequence we are talking about is all "physical", or all "non-physical". — Harry Hindu

This doesn't make sense. The fact that something could be all physical, or all non-physical is clear evidence of why we need to be able to distinguish between the physical and non-physical in order to produce an accurate interpretation. If something were completely physical, yet you apprehended a non-physical meaning behind it, this would be delusion. If something were completely non-physical, all in your mind, and you thought that it had a physical presence, this would be hallucination.

It then becomes an arbitrary matter of what part of the chain any group of people are discussing. — Harry Hindu

Do you think misinterpretation, delusion, and hallucination, are arbitrary matters?

So if there is no further argument against information being the relationship between causes and their effects, and the only arguments are simply about the kinds of information (the kinds of causal relationships, like between concrete and abstract thinking with the different causal relationships each one has, or between the "physical" and "non-physical" and the different causal relationships each one has), then I think we are done here. — Harry Hindu

That information is a relationship between cause and effect, is what is insignificant. It is insignificant, because in order to determine what is meant (cause), from the physical signal (effect), it is required to know the system for interpretation. So the fact that one is the cause, and the other is the effect is completely irrelevant to the matter at hand, when there exists information, because the matter is to interpret, and knowing that one is cause and the other effect as a fact, does nothing to help us interpret. It's like looking at a physical thing, and saying I know for a fact that this physical object is a sign, while having absolutely no idea how to interpret it. Without having any idea of how to interpret it, how would you know for a fact, that it is a sign?

So the very abilities we have to determine what is or isn't the case in the objective world are innate to the intelligence, which is able to reflect the order that is found in nature. That is the sense in which it is 'transcendent' - it is the faculty by which we make sense of the world, but the source of which is not itself amongst the objects of analysis (except for nowadays it is widely assumed, falsely in my view, that such abilities have a biological origin.) — Wayfarer

Would you not agree that our intelligence is widely and correctly assumed to have a biological foundation? When it comes to beliefs concerning origins, I think there is extreme variety out there. I assume you have a certain band of intellectuals in mind. But does anyone listen to philosophers? I think there is a fair amount of not-knowing and not-caring about origins. On the other hand, we deeply care about our biological foundation. A dead man as far as the living man knows does not write love poems. The body is in this sense a vessel. Along these lines, the physical becomes important as what threatens or sustains the body. In my view, the mere theoretical interest in the physical as a source of truth is already 'theological' or ideological or religious in its drive. It's a claim on the sacred, on that which one dies for, one might say.

Such views (god or no-god, mind or no-mind) seem to me like expressions of an energy or libido or status anxiety or god-shaped-hole that is minimally bodily. We can fall in love with ideas. That these ideas are theistic or materialistic may be secondary. Poets are senators.

Would you not agree that our intelligence is widely and correctly assumed to have a biological foundation? — ff0

I think 'foundation' is the wrong word. Obviously we have an organic or animal nature which is the subject of the discipline of biology, but I think the emphasis on biology is exaggerated because of the role evolutionary theory plays in modern culture.

My view (and this is something that I have to develop) is that the 'furniture of reason' - by which I mean the ability for abstract thought, counting, reasoning, language, and so on - are not products of biology. The species evolves to the point where it can develop such abilities, but (for instance) the law of the excluded middle is not a consequence of biology. The ability to grasp it might be a consequence of evolution. But when a being evolves to that point, of being able to ask 'what am I', 'what does this mean', and so on, then at that precise instant, they're no longer simply a biological creature. And I imagined that threshold was crossed by h. sapiens - indeed it is what endows us with sapience. Tremendously unpopular view, I know.

That's pretty straight forward. Generally, things sensed and understood through the laws of physical are physical, and those which aren't are non-physical. In the context of this thread, we are talking about information, so there is the physical signal which is sensed, and the non-physical, what is meant to be signified. In the example of the op there is a flag as the physical signal, and the non-physical idea represented is the number of masts on a ship. There is necessarily a system of interpretation which relates the two. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the number of masts on a ship is a physical thing. You see the masts and can feel them. So you have failed to show what exactly is non-physical. Try again.

In all cases of information we need a clear distinction between non-physical (what is signified), and physical (signal) or else the system of interpretation cannot be properly applied and the signal may not be properly interpreted. The interpretation will be corrupt. This is the case in hallucination, there is not a clear distinction between what is physically real, and what is non-physical, the interpretation. All cases of misinterpretation are cases of not properly distinguishing between what is proper to the physical aspect, and what is proper to the non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you not read what I wrote. I said that what is signified and what is the signal is what is the effect and what is the cause, and it doesn't matter whether or no one is physical or not, as we could be talking about all physical causes and effects in which case both the signified and the signal are both physical. The fact that you are hallucinating is a effect of some state of your body. Your hallucinating informs me that you are on drugs, mentally unstable, etc. If I have to explain this again, I'm done.

This doesn't make sense. The fact that something could be all physical, or all non-physical is clear evidence of why we need to be able to distinguish between the physical and non-physical in order to produce an accurate interpretation. If something were completely physical, yet you apprehended a non-physical meaning behind it, this would be delusion. If something were completely non-physical, all in your mind, and you thought that it had a physical presence, this would be hallucination. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it makes sense. It's evidence that we don't need those terms, not that we need to make a distinction - a distinction that you still have yet to make clear.

I have no idea what you are talking about in those last few sentences. Again, information/meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. It doesn't matter if there is some mind that is part of the causal chain. There is still meaning/information in causal relationships, of which a mind could be part, but isn't necessary for there to be information/meaning.

Do you think misinterpretation, delusion, and hallucination, are arbitrary matters? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think they are effects of causes. Does not the fact that one is misinterpreting, deluding, or hallucinating inform you of some state of their body? Doesn't one's misinterpreting, deluding, and hallucinating have some causal effect on the world?

That information is a relationship between cause and effect, is what is insignificant. It is insignificant, because in order to determine what is meant (cause), from the physical signal (effect), it is required to know the system for interpretation. So the fact that one is the cause, and the other is the effect is completely irrelevant to the matter at hand, when there exists information, because the matter is to interpret, and knowing that one is cause and the other effect as a fact, does nothing to help us interpret. It's like looking at a physical thing, and saying I know for a fact that this physical object is a sign, while having absolutely no idea how to interpret it. Without having any idea of how to interpret it, how would you know for a fact, that it is a sign? — Metaphysician Undercover

What exactly are you interpreting? What does it mean to interpret? Doesn't it mean that information/meaning is there in all causal relationships that you are trying to get at accurately? To misinterpret something is what it means for there to be a true causal relationship that you didn't get at accurately, right? It means that there is a causal relationship independent of your mind that you either get at (interpret) or don't (misinterpret).

But the number of masts on a ship is a physical thing. You see the masts and can feel them. So you have failed to show what exactly is non-physical. Try again. — Harry Hindu

I think you misunderstand the situation. You don't see the masts, you don't see the ship. What you see is the flag. The flag is the only physical thing here. In this instance of occurrence, the number of masts, and the ship, is non-physical. The fact is, that the person hoisting the flag may not even have seen any ship nor any masts, so this aspect is clearly non-physical. In this particular physical occurrence, which is the occurrence of the flag, it is quite clear that the masts and ship are non-physical. If you haven't yet, in 67 pages of this thread, capacitated yourself with the ability to understand this, then maybe you should give it up.

Why do you insistently claim that information is both physical and non-physical, when in reality you haven't apprehended the non-physical aspect?

Again, information/meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. It doesn't matter if there is some mind that is part of the causal chain. — Harry Hindu

I very explicitly explained how information/meaning is not the same as cause/effect. Cause/effect implies a direct, necessary relation between two things. Information/meaning implies a system of interpretation as a medium between the two. Therefore there is no necessary relationship between the two, the relationship is contingent on interpretation The two, cause/effect, and information/meaning are clearly not the same at all, and your claim is nonsense.

I think they are effects of causes. Does not the fact that one is misinterpreting, deluding, or hallucinating inform you of some state of their body? Doesn't one's misinterpreting, deluding, and hallucinating have some causal effect on the world? — Harry Hindu

What the hell are you talking about? What is the case, is that we can interpret correctly, as intended by the author of the sign, or incorrectly in a way not intended. What determines this is whether the person interpreting utilizes the appropriate system of interpretation. How does the fact that a person misunderstands, due to hallucination or any other reason, tell you anything specific or informative about the state of the person's body? What kind of nonsense principles are you appealing to?

What exactly are you interpreting? What does it mean to interpret? Doesn't it mean that information/meaning is there in all causal relationships that you are trying to get at accurately? To misinterpret something is what it means for there to be a true causal relationship that you didn't get at accurately, right? It means that there is a causal relationship independent of your mind that you either get at (interpret) or don't (misinterpret). — Harry Hindu

As I explained, the causal relationship is irrelevant. When we see a signal created by another person, we know that the person is the cause, and the signal is the effect. That is taken for granted. But it is of no value in helping us to interpret the signal. What allows us to interpret is knowing the proper system of interpretation.

So we cannot look at a signal, and interpret its meaning, by referring to its cause, as you seem to think, that is a dead end method. It leads nowhere. It is a dead end, because all we will see is that a human being created the signal. We cannot see the human being's intent so we cannot know what the human being meant with that signal. Looking for the cause of the signal cannot give us an answer to what is meant by the signal, it's a dead end. We will see that the human being meant something, and so there is a "cause" of the signal, but we'll have no idea of how to determine what the human being meant. Therefore this is useless in determining meaning. The only approach we have, toward interpretation is to determine the proper system of interpretation, and this will allow us to interpret the meaning.

If I have to explain this again, I'm done. — Harry Hindu

OK, I think you're done, because you keep reverting back to what has been demonstrated to be nonsense.

Obviously we have an organic or animal nature which is the subject of the discipline of biology, but I think the emphasis on biology is exaggerated because of the role evolutionary theory plays in modern culture. — Wayfarer

I hear you, but I am pointing at something far less theoretical. I need to keep this body intact as a vessel for my soul. If a truck runs me over, then I can no longer pray or write love poems (perhaps the same thing). So I mean 'foundation' in the sense of the legs of a tall statue. I want to get behind or beneath all the arguments on the ideological level. This may be impossible, so I'm talking about a direction of thought.

I'm thinking of what we non-theoretically know. When the knife slips from our hands at the kitchen counter we move our feet. We don't want that blade in our feet. Embodiment as experience, not as theory.

But when a being evolves to that point, of being able to ask 'what am I', 'what does this mean', and so on, then at that precise instant, they're no longer simply a biological creature. And I imagined that threshold was crossed by h. sapiens - indeed it is what endows us with sapience. Tremendously unpopular view, I know. — Wayfarer

I pretty much agree. We experience the fact of reasoning. We swim in the fact of language. Within this fact we can indulge in the talk of origin, grinding our ideological ax. What interests me, though, is a wakefulness to the fact of our embodiment and of our swimming in this language. The medium is overlooked in our obsession with the message. That's fine for others. I like the idea of giving a voice to the medium --of simply describing the pre-theoretical situation.

If a truck runs me over, then I can no longer pray or write love poems (perhaps the same thing). — ff0

Of course. I've learned quite a bit about 'traditional' dualism in this thread - hylomorphic, meaning 'substance-form' duality. It doesn't see the mind and body as being able to exist separately (although that said, there are very many grey areas surrounding the nature of the 'immortal soul' as a consequence). But then, I do believe that ultimately humans are, as in the traditional understanding, 'betwixt apes and angels', whereas today's dogma is that we're all ape ;-)

I know what you mean by that dogma. It's around. It exists. But would you not agree that it's pretty small in terms of the proportion of humans who embrace it? It's the theoretical vanity of a few philosophers. It's a particular ascetic religious practice that enjoys doing without anything 'iffy.' It's a kind of know-it-all-ism --betrayed in practice by those who espouse it. The woman we love is not an 'ape.' Our best friend is not an 'ape.' Nor do any of us see an ape in the mirror. It's a bogus position. Or it's bogus as an existential position. To see ourselves as mere apes is to negate this seeing. The metaphysical arrogance in such a statement subverts its pseudo-humility and pseudo-skepticism. It's a religious myth, in short, without the guts to understand itself as such. Or that's how I currently see it, for better or worse.

But would you not agree that it's pretty small in terms of the proportion of humans who embrace it? — ff0

Still disproportionately influential. It was the subject of this discussion about Nagel's book.

The point though, was that the concept of one changed, evolved. My proposal was that in the original sense the concept of "one" did not allow that one could be divided. But then someone proposed the principle of fractions, which would require that "one" be redefined such that the one could be divided. There are numerous examples of evolution in mathematical principles. The addition of the numeral 0, and negative integers is one example. More recently we have what is called imaginary numbers. Before imaginary numbers, there was no square root of -1, that was disallowed by the conceptual structure. Now there is a square root of -1, it is allowed. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that, if we remove the identity or unit such as 'm' from the number, that anyone thought that 1 could not be divided. As you say yourself later on, one body can be divided into many molecules, and everyone can see that. So I think your claim once again shows the evolution of symbols, not of the concepts they point to.

Otherwise, I agree about your statement regarding how one object is composed of many parts. Physical objects can in theory be divided into an infinite quantity of smaller parts.

Yes, they are members of the universal form, hydrogen, but that's a human designation based in our determination of similarity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The principle of sufficient reason demands that there is an objective reason as to why all hydrogen atoms behave the same way every time. The reason is one of two: Either the atoms are connected in some way, or they are not. If they are, then this connection is what is called the universal form, or genus, or species. If they are not, then the phenomenon is a mere coincidence, which, while logically possible, fails the law of parsimony until the first reason is refuted.

Besides, do you not believe in objective species at least when it comes to living beings, such that all humans are part of the human species, all dogs part of the dog species, and all trees part of the tree species? Science could explain this by mere DNA, but this only pushes the problem back a step, and does not explain why the DNA is similar among beings of the same species.

whereas today's dogma is that we're all ape — Wayfarer

You're exaggerating to say the least. Nobody seriously thinks humans are descended from apes; the accepted thought is that we share a common ancestor. It is universally acknowledged that humans have a far greater range of capability, emotion and intelligence than the apes.

The process that allows sensory input to create cognition is not a physical thing. It doesn’t ‘exist’, because we’re at a single point in it at any given time.

Action doesn’t exist because what ‘did’ is gone and what ‘will’ hasn’t happened.

The process that allows sensory input to create cognition is not a physical thing. It doesn’t ‘exist’, because we’re at a single point in it at any given time. — Brianna Whitney

Interesting point, but doesn't this assume that time is like the real number line? What if existential time is deeper than mathematically conceived physics time? For us the future seems to penetrate the so-called present. And the so-called present drags along the past. To read this paragraph requires that you drag along what you've already read in anticipation of the period, for instance.

You're exaggerating to say the least. — Janus

It's called 'hyperbole'. Daniel Dennett semi-seriously insists that we're 'moist robots' in a similar vein. And many people will insist that we're anything but human.

The process that allows sensory input to create cognition is not a physical thing. It doesn’t ‘exist’, because we’re at a single point in it at any given time. — Brianna Whitney

Hi Brianna, and welcome to the Forum. Well said! X-)

Hullo! Thnx! Excited to find you all.

It's called 'hyperbole'. Daniel Dennett semi-seriously insists that we're 'moist robots' in a similar vein. And many people will insist that we're anything but human. — Wayfarer

Really...hyperbole!...I'd never heard of that before....

So, you and Dennett are just indulging in hyperbole on different sides of the fence...some sort of an anthropoid shit-flinging match? Well, I gotta say "moist robot" wins hands the argument down! :s

Hullo! Thnx! Excited to find you all. — Brianna Whitney

You're welcome Brianna, hope you enjoy your stay here.

Unless we all believe we’re Moist Multi-Dimensional Robots, there’s not enough common context to communicate large theoretical possibilities.

MMDR Bots

Moral ideas have their source in feeling, in living intuitions, in the living world itself. — Janus

I completely agree. For that reason I find 'mechanical' or dry, theoretical approaches to what we ought to do troubling. The individual as such is the possibility of rewriting any such tidy set of rules or concepts. This 'living world itself' is exactly the kind of phrase I like for trying to point out the context in which all our thinking-doing-feeling occurs. The idea of a 'thinking substance' strikes me as a fantasy that rips out language from the body and its context. Even the concept of the body is a ripping-out.

As I read Hegel, this is what the understanding does. It's the awful power that rips things out of their truth in the whole --a necessary evil, if you will. It's the kind of 'error' that makes life as we know it possible. We sew together the limbs and organs metaphysically and call it the living truth, but it's dead. It's not that we 'should' stop 'understanding' things (or that this is about what 'we' should do), but rather only about pointing out to whomever may find it useful that I at least see a jigsaw puzzle corpse where others claim a theology lives and breathes.

There are concepts, actions, and objects. Dissect before you amputate. They aren’t exclusive of each other.

Typically one highlights what one is responding to here and a quote button will appear. Then it becomes clear who you are speaking to and they get a notification. Of course you don't have to, but it will probably make the forum more enjoyable.

The individual as such is the possibility of rewriting any such tidy set of rules or concepts. This 'living world itself' is exactly the kind of phrase I like for trying to point out the context in which all our thinking-doing-feeling occurs — ff0

I hear the phrase as referring to us observing and creating a paradigm as events unfold, not creating new events. Input?

For me it would be both creating new interpretations and new events, by word and deed respectively. Though one might say that speech is a sort of action, that disembodied thought is a useful fiction. I mean the thought as 'meaning' is a sound or a mark set forth or projected from a body, etc.

Also I mean the individual is only an individual in a potent sense as the threat/promise of a new way of saying/doing. Finally, the 'living world itself' is just the mess we're in. It's local, temporary individual life that we all already have before we can come up with theories that apply beyond our local, personal situation. We are thrown into these little lives. We don't choose our faces, our parents, the language(s) we learn as children. We find ourselves hurtling forward in a way we did not choose. Our thinking rips pieces of this flow out of their original context. We strive beyond the idiosyncratic. We strive against the entanglement, ambiguity, the swamping endless context....

Thoughts?