Spinoza and Hegel all reject the supernatural — Janus

Further to Spinoza - I have been looking into his well-known phrase 'the intellectual love of God' (amor Dei intellectualis ), and it is thoroughly metaphysical, in just the same way as medieval Jewish mysticism was. (And bear in mind, the words 'metaphysical' and 'supernatural' are Greek and Latin terms, respectively, meaning the same thing.)

This is a passage from a comparison of Spinoza and the well-known Moses Maimonides, whose 'Guide for the Perplexed' was a standard text in Spinoza's day:

According to Maimonides' exegesis, as explained by his commentators, the sword can destroy the body, but not the disembodied intellect. Maimonides quotes also other [Old Testament] verses….The one who knows and passionately loves God has no fear of death, because the intellect cannot be physically harmed; and this eternal freedom from the bodily passions is true "peace".

In Ethics, Vp38-39, Spinoza echoes Maimonides, and argues that amor Dei intellectualis removes the fear of death, since the intellect is invulnerable. The more the mind has intellectual knowledge, the more it remains "unharmed". Consequently, those who have eternal intellectual knowledge "hardly fear death".

Spinoza and Medieval Jewish Philosophy, edited by Steven Nadler, P103.

The phrase 'the intellect is invulnerable', is an exact parallel to the Aristotelian 'active intellect' that was subject of this discussion some weeks (or months!) back (indeed the essay notes that Maimonides' book is overall Aristotelian); the idea is that the 'active intellect' is the faculty which perceives the intelligible form of things; this is to all intents, a reference to 'the soul' i.e. the immortal aspect of the being. So here, 'the mind' which is 'unharmed', i.e. cannot be destroyed by the sword, is to all intents the 'immortal soul'.

Based on that, parents that want to keep their offspring alive, have to feed them (that young humans have to be provided with food instead of getting it themselves is in itself another such fact). — Πετροκότσυφας

I think this is very close to the naturalistic fallacy. And besides, none of the quoted passage does anything to address what has been rightly called The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. One of the noticeable achievements of mathematical physics, is to discover hitherto entirely unknown, and even unsuspected, properties of matter, on the basis of mathematical symmetries and reasoning. To reduce mathematics to 'behaviours' seems comically insufficient to account for these achievements. (It's also worth mentioning, again, the considerable influence of Platonism on the development of modern scientific method, via the influence of the Italian Renaissance humanists on Galileo, among others.)

I am not claiming to have a 'theory of number', by the way. The Wikipedia entry on Philosophy of Math is long, and detailed, with many competing theories and a large number of references. I don't have a theory of maths beyond the claim that number is real, but not physical, and that it also can't be wholly understood simply in terms of human mental capacity. So my claim that at least in some respects, mathematics is discovered, even if in other respects it is the product of the imagination. I rather like the saying, God created the integers, all else is the work of Man.

I have said numerous times that this distinction is unnecessary as the "physical" and "non-physical" still interact and are causally influenced by each other. — Harry Hindu

As I've told you already, the fact that two things interact is not reason to deny that there is a useful distinction to be made between those two things. If you want to claim that the distinction between physical and non-physical is unnecessary, you need a much better argument than that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't that my point - that it ISN'T useful to make such a distinction when talking about causation and information flow?

What exactly IS the distinction being made anyway, and why? If I have said that information is both "physical" and "non-physical", then what use is there to make a distinction between them? If you're wanting to simply make a distinction between different kinds, or forms, of information, then you aren't making an argument against anything I have said, as it is all still information.

Stimulus and response are different to language and abstraction. — Wayfarer

Stimulus and response and language and abstraction are simply different forms of information flow. You're simply talking about different levels of causation/information flow. You haven't made an argument against anything I have said.

It has been said that ‘intelligence is the ability to make distinctions’. There are some fundamental distinctions you’re failing to grasp here, although it is habitual nowadays to ignore the distinction between h. Sapiens and other animals (which is ‘sapience’, the Latin equivalent of ‘sophia’, which is wisdom, which is what philosophy is named for.) — Wayfarer

I grasp the distinction you are making, it's just that it doesn't go against anything I have said. You and Andrew M are simply talking about different levels of causation. You are simply saying that humans can get at the deeper causal influences of what it is that they are experiencing at any moment. Humans just get at more information than other animals because we can get at the deeper causes - all the way back to the Big Bang.

That's true, but I'm not just referring to seeing the flags and that they're being waved (which, as you say, also involves a flow of information). Seeing the flags waving is presumably automatic and instinctual for humans and animals alike.

I'm instead referring to the higher-level information that is being communicated via the flag waving, namely, the ship arrival details.

Now that information is in the world as well. But to interpret and understand it requires the ability to think abstractly, it is not just an automatic sensory process. — Andrew M

You, like Wayfarer, are simply trying to move the goal-posts. I'm talking about information flow and causation. You are simply talking about different degrees, or levels, of causation and information flow.

You agreed that seeing flags is a form of information flow. This just means that the flags, the light and your sensory system are the causes of your experience of seeing flags. Seeing flags provides information about those things - the flags, light and your sensory system.

All you are saying is that there is another cause, a deeper cause, or a cause that is prior to those things. What you are saying is that some human put those flags up because they were caused by the information that some ship will arrive at port at a certain time. Some ship arriving at port at a certain time was the first cause of this sequence. That influenced some human to put a particular pattern of flags up (his education of which flags to put up are also part of this causal sequence), which then caused the experience of seeing those flags up in some one else, who then interprets the information by getting at the causal influences of what it is they are seeing. All we are doing is talking about causation and how information flows from the first cause to the final effect we are talking about at any given moment.

Some things, like the integers, are included in that domain, and other things, like the square root of -1, are not. — Wayfarer

So you do not believe in imaginary numbers? They've become a very important part of modern mathematics, I believe they are integral to quantum equations. Issues such as "imaginary numbers" cast doubt on that "domain" which you speak of. A mathematician can make up a principle, an axiom, simply because it is useful for some purpose. It may then get used and accepted by others. Whether that axiom is a "true" principle and ought to be accepted as part of that domain of mathematical objects is another question. If we cannot distinguish which mathematical objects are part of that domain, and which are not, then what supports the assumption that there is such a domain?

To clarify, I was referring to information pointing to no concepts, that is, meaningless raw data, like statics from the tv set, perceived by the senses but unintelligible to the mind. Otherwise, I agree that meaningful information must be non-physical, for the reason you pointed out. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't see how it is possible that information could be meaningless. That appears to be contradictory to me. To judge that something is information is to claim that it is not meaningless.

You are once again confusing the symbol or word, with the concept it points to. Yes, we can change the symbols 1, 2, 3, ..., but we cannot change the concepts I, II, III, ... As such, we can make 1+1=3 if we change the symbols, but cannot make I+I=III <-- As you can see, there is one too many bar on the right side of the equation, which makes it unbalanced.

And as it is with concepts of numbers, so it is with other concepts. E.g., we can change the word "red", but the concept of red-ness will remain unchanged. — Samuel Lacrampe

I believe concepts change too. I believe that 1 was originally used to signify the most simple unit. Unlike 2, 4, 6, 8, it could not be divided. As the practise of division developed it was allowed that 1 could be divided, and this gave us fractions. So the concept signified by 1 changed from being the most simple, indivisible unit to being infinitely divisible. Furthermore, I believe that the entire conceptual structure of what the numerals, 1,2,3,4,5, etc., represent changed significantly when the symbol for zero was integrated into the system, allowing for negative numbers. This marked the beginning of a revolution in mathematical reasoning which eventually allowed for the proper development of algebraic equations.

Your claim that concepts do not change is clearly refuted through reference to the evidence which is the evolution of human thought.

A rock participates in the form of rock-ness, even before a subject observes it or find a word or symbol for it for the first time. — Samuel Lacrampe

There is a problem with this perspective. That "a rock participates in the form of rock-ness" requires a judgement. The thing itself, and the form of rock-ness are two distinct things. In order that the thing is what is called "a rock", the existence of the thing must be analyzed, and the form, "rock-ness" must be analyzed and a judgement made, that the thing qualifies to be called a rock.

Without that judgement, the particular thing, and the universal form must be inherently united. In the way that I describe, the particular and the universal are distinct, and a judgement relates them. Without the judgement, they must be already related through participation. Furthermore, the thing must be united to each universal which might be used to describe it. Then there is the problem of whether those universals are correct or not. Does the thing only participate in correct universals? What allows us to judge it incorrectly then?

Evidence of human activity indicates to us that we judge things according to their properties, and call them by the applicable name as determined by this judgement. There is no evidence that a thing is actively participating in all sorts of universal forms. The evidence is that we judge it as such. Following Aristotle, we assume that every thing has one particular form, proper to itself, it does not participate in numerous universal forms, it has one form. But, it is judged by human beings according to numerous universal forms, and so it is described by those words.

think this is very close to the naturalistic fallacy. And besides, none of the quoted passage does anything to address what has been rightly called The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. One of the noticeable achievements of mathematical physics, is to discover hitherto entirely unknown, and even unsuspected, properties of matter, on the basis of mathematical symmetries and reasoning. To reduce mathematics to 'behaviours' seems comically insufficient to account for these achievements. (It's also worth mentioning, again, the considerable influence of Platonism on the development of modern scientific method, via the influence of the Italian Renaissance humanists on Galileo, among others.) — Wayfarer

What I was trying to point out to Πετροκότσυφας is that Wittgenstein offers a strangely backward way of looking at things. He assumes that there are behavioural regularities, consistencies such as word usage, which become descriptive laws, or "rules", then right and wrong, correct and incorrect, are determined according to whether one acts as the descriptive rule indicates.

Clearly this is backward to what is really the case. What is really the case, is that right and wrong, correct and incorrect, are determined by reasoning, logical consistency, etc.. What follows from this are prescriptive rules of how one ought to behave to maintain logical consistency, and rationality. Then behavioural regularities follow from this teaching of how one ought to behave.

The issue is that Wittgenstein saw the human mind with its reasoning, thinking, understanding, will and intention, as a dark and foreboding place, one which could not be approached or understood, incomprehensible because it is internal and secretive, only having the capacity to be judged according to its outward expressions. So he defined his terms, and structured his epistemology such that right and wrong is limited to the judgement of such outward expressions, right and wrong can only be attributed to actions. Right and wrong cannot be attributed to the principles which an individual holds within one's mind, and which form the basis of one's actions.

Isn't that my point - that it ISN'T useful to make such a distinction when talking about causation and information flow?

What exactly IS the distinction being made anyway, and why? If I have said that information is both "physical" and "non-physical", then what use is there to make a distinction between them? If you're wanting to simply make a distinction between different kinds, or forms, of information, then you aren't making an argument against anything I have said, as it is all still information. — Harry Hindu

Of course it's useful to make such a distinction, just like it's useful to distinguish between cause and effect. Following your stated principle, it would be pointless to distinguish between cause and effect, because this is an interaction and there is no point distinguishing between the two parts of an interaction. But we make those distinctions in order to understand.

So if information has both a physical and a non-physical part, it is important to distinguish between these, just like its important to distinguish cause from effect in a causal relation. I would argue that since the physical part of information is always a representation of the non-physical part, the non-physical part is necessarily prior in time to the physical part.

I think it is far too sweeping to say that Kant, Spinoza and Hegel 'all rejected the supernatural'. There are books on 'Hegel the mystic'; Kant said the purpose of his philosophy was to 'find the limit to knowledge so as to make room for faith'; the high point of Spinoza's philosophy was 'the intellectual love of God'. It is also the case that the rejection of metaphysics, in a general and broad sense, was the defining characteristic of positivism. And you yourself have on numerous occasions in this thread, and elsewhere, said that anything you regard to be 'supernatural' is out of bounds for philosophy; I seem to recall your quoting Biblical verses in support of that argument in this very thread. — Wayfarer

Mysticism is not a supernatural phenomenon, but a natural human one. It consists in imagination, feeling and intuition; what else? I predict you will say that it points to something 'higher'; but you can't say what that "something" is, or in what sense it could be real, apart from your mystical feeling. Now, don't get me wrong; I think those mystical feeling can have great value; they can totally transform lives in ways nothing else can; but this does not entail that they are anything more than feelings. Why can't they be valued as such without demanding that they point to 'something' that cannot ever be anything for us apart from our feelings?

Kant's faith is a feeling; it is based on the necessity of what he thinks must be presupposed in order to warrant our sense of moral freedom and responsibility. I think he is mistaken in this, because our sense of moral freedom and responsibility is sufficient unto itself; it is the feeling of being free and yet responsible to our own kind. There is no morality without moral feeling and intuition. Hegel made this point when he said that if there is a set of rules or imperatives, then morality is already deficient.

Spinoza's "intellectual love of God" comes, for him, from our intuitive intellectual capacity ( which he sees as being the highest function of intellect) to see things sub specie aeternitatis or 'under the aspect of eternity. You need to read Spinoza and understand him; he is one of the first naturalists; he is opposed to all forms of what he terms "superstition" which for him includes any purported "knowledge" that is not based on what can be observed or discovered as a necessity of reason.

Further to Spinoza - I have been looking into his well-known phrase 'the intellectual love of God' (amor Dei intellectualis ), and it is thoroughly metaphysical, in just the same way as medieval Jewish mysticism was. (And bear in mind, the words 'metaphysical' and 'supernatural' are Greek and Latin terms, respectively, meaning the same thing.) — Wayfarer

See my other response to you on this. 'Metaphysical' and 'supernatural' could be taken, on a tendentious interpretation, to mean the same thing; but remember that the original (Aristotle's) meaning of 'metaphysics' was not anything to do with supernaturalism; but was "after physics" which is taken by scholars to refer to the fact that it was a subsequent discourse to his Physics.

Metaphysics really is part of epistemology; in the sense that it attempts to deal with what we can know apart from the empirical. Kant reduced it from speculative philosophy that postulates God, spiritual entities, monads, substances (in the Cartesian, Spinozistic and other 'essentialist' kinds of senses) and so on. Kant wanted to establish the limits of knowledge to make room for faith; which is essentially feeling, and more akin to ethics and aesthetics, as I have explained. If you don't understand Kant's project as a critical rejection of speculative systems like Platonism, Scholasticism, Cartesianism, Spinozism and Leibnizism, then you simply don't understand Kant. Have you ever read the CPR or any of the major secondary works that deal with it?

Also, to return to Spinoza; there is no significant mention of any afterlife in his philosophy. Have you read his Ethics? The most he suggests is that since we are ideas in God, that is in eternity, in that sense, and in that sense only we may be said to have eternal life. But this would not be anything we could ever experience, because experience requires change, temporality. This would suggest that even God can only experience himself through his creation. For Spinoza God is not transcendent, supernatural but actually is nature: "Deus sive natura".

If you don't understand Kant's project as a critical rejection of speculative systems like Platonism, Scholasticism, Cartesianism, Spinozism and Leibnizism, then you simply don't understand Kant. — Janus

Again, that is far too sweeping. Kant didn't reject rationalist philosophies altogether. He critiqued both rationalist and empiricist philosophies of his day, as well the dogmatic metaphysics of his predecessors. I am currently reading his Prolegomena, which is in itself a metaphysical text. He adopted the Aristotelian categories of the understanding. I agree, he certainly didn't accept the literal interpretation of 'the forms' as something existing, but then, I'm not sure I'm saying that either, as I am distinguishing between what exists (i.e. the phenomenal domain) and what is real (the formal domain). The formal domain might well be understood as 'structures in consciousness', but that doesn't mean that they're only 'internal to the individual', they are still universal, in the sense of being archetypes, etc.

Spinoza's "intellectual love of God" comes, for him, from our intuitive intellectual capacity... — Janus

Spinoza plainly uses 'intellect' in the same sense of other medievals, i.e. ultimately derived from the neoPlatonist 'nous'; it means nothing like what a modern secular academic means by it. That book I mentioned yesterday, makes the comparison between Spinoza and other Jewish mysticism very plain. He is a religious philosopher, but in a non-orthodox sense , which is probably what got him sanctioned by the Jewish community.

Sure there's a naturalistic reading of Spinoza, but at the centre of it, the 'intellectual love of God' is very much like 'union with the Divine' which is found in many forms of the perennial philosophies that have lived over the ages.

I studied a unit on Spinoza as an undergraduate many decades ago but I never felt a particular affinity with him. I agree he doesn't speak of 'the afterlife' in any kind of literal sense, but the philosophical or mystical understanding of 'the deathless' is nothing like the popular ideas about 'heaven'. The book I was reading yesterday notes that both Spinoza and Maimonides wanted to disabuse people of their anthropomorphic images of God.

But my interpretation, from the passage I quoted, is that the Philosopher/Sage, by dis-identifying with 'the objects of sense' and 'subduing the passions', realises him or herself as the imperishable Mind, Intellect or Soul and this is as much true for Spinoza as for many or all the other pre-moderns.

It consists in imagination, feeling and intuition; what else? I predict you will say that it points to something 'higher'; but you can't say what that "something" is, or in what sense it could be real, apart from your mystical feeling. — Janus

The whole point about mysticism is 'transformation of perception'. It is to 'see with new eyes', to undergo an inner transformation or re-evaluation of the whole of experience. That is why it is impossible to recount through descriptive language. It is not that it's 'vague' or 'subjective' or 'can't be described' - it's a transformation of perception, it is a different way of being.

In Plato, the symbolism of the allegory of the Cave talks of what happens when the philosopher/mystic ascends to the 'light of the sun' and then returns. The prisoners, according to Plato, would infer from the returning man's blindness, caused by his not being able to see in the comparative darkness of the cave, that the journey had harmed him and that they should not undertake a similar journey. Socrates concludes that the prisoners, if they were able, would therefore reach out and kill anyone who attempted to drag them out.

The reason higher truth can't be described, is because the individual has to understand it for themselves. Where, do you think, in the current curriculum of philosophy, as it is practiced and taught in the Western academic system, such an understanding is imparted? It is actually a highly politically-incorrect thing to believe in today's world, for various complex historical reasons. So I get why it pushes buttons.

Hegel made this point when he said that if there is a set of rules or imperatives, then morality is already deficient. — Janus

There's another thread currently quoting a passage from Hegel:

"Everything that from eternity has happened in heaven and earth, the life of God and all deeds of time simply are the struggles for Mind to know itself, to make itself objective to itself, to find itself, be for itself, and finally unite itself to itself; it is alienated and divided, but only so as to be able thus to find itself and return to itself. Only in this manner does Mind attain its freedom, for that is free which is not connected with or dependent on another. True self-possession and satisfaction are only to be found in this, and in nothing else but Thought does mind attain this freedom.

Hegel is not speaking of 'imagination, feeling and intuition'. According to Russell, in History of Western Philosophy, Hegel's 'absolute mind' is identical with the 'first cause' in Aristotle.

"Reason," Hegel says, "is the conscious certainty of being all
reality." This does not mean that a separate person is all reality;
in his separateness he is not quite real, but what is real in him is
his participation in Reality as a whole. In proportion as we become
more rational, this participation is increased.

The Absolute Idea, with which the Logic ends, is something like
Aristotle's God. It is thought thinking about itself. Clearly the
Absolute cannot think about anything but itself, since there is
nothing else, except to our partial and erroneous ways of appre-
hending Reality. We are told that Spirit is the only reality, and
tffat its thought is reflected into itself by self-consciousness. The
actual words in which the Absolute Idea is defined are very
obscure.

As indeed are many things in Hegel.

Now, don't get me wrong; I think those mystical feeling can have great value; they can totally transform lives in ways nothing else can; but this does not entail that they are anything more than feelings. — Janus

Notice that in this framing, mysticism might be valid, but it is entirely subjective. It is wholly and solely a matter of 'how you feel'. And you can respect that, because individuals have a right to such private and subjective feelings. But when it comes to accepting that it might reveal something that is actually true - well, different story altogether.

But this would not be anything we could ever experience, because experience requires change, temporality. — Janus

Think about the etymology of the word 'ecstasy' (and no, I'm not talking party drugs.) It means 'ex-stasis', literally 'standing outside oneself'. That is why there is an emphasis on ecstatic states in mysticism, although, again, that's something that is barely comprehended in current culture.

Nevertheless I think ‘the domain of natural numbers’ is a perfectly intelligible expression, even if it’s not something that exists in a spatial or temporal sense. — Wayfarer

Yes, the expression is fine as a metaphor. The key point is that number is a universal and so ultimately derives its meaning from observed particulars.

So again, a Platonic realist view, as I would understand it, is not that natural numbers are existing things in an existing place, but that they’re real, insofar as they’re the same for anyone capable of counting. It’s possible to be wrong about maths (as I nearly always was, and failed the subject). — Wayfarer

Agreed and this is also consistent with Aristotle's realist view.

Furthermore, numbers are not ‘aspects of the natural world’, if by that we mean the world that is perceptible by sense, as they are only perceptible by means of reason. — Wayfarer

This is the sticking point.

A cat has four legs. It seems to me that the number of legs the cat has is an aspect of the natural world.

It's true that we have to reason in order to know that. But we do so by abstracting from what is perceived via the senses, in this case the cat (and other four-legged animals). Hence why Aristotle characterized humans as the rational animal.

All we are doing is talking about causation and how information flows from the first cause to the final effect we are talking about at any given moment. — Harry Hindu

Yes, so the ship arrival details were transmitted via a causal process that resulted in those details being entered into a log book. We agree about that.

Do you also agree that the humans involved in transmitting that message were thinking abstractly in order to understand the message and relay it on?

If by definition, you mean quite literally the description of the concept, and not the concept in itself, then I agree with you. (man this topic is hard). — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes that's what I mean.

realises him or herself as the imperishable Mind, Intellect or Soul and this is as much true for Spinoza as for many or all the other pre-moderns. — Wayfarer

Spinoza did not give ontological primacy over mind or matter; for him both are aspects of substance, which is eternal. So, the eternal is as much matter for Spinoza as it is mind or intellect. He doesn't have an idea of soul as far as I can recall.

It's mistaken to say that Spinoza uses intellect in the same way as "other medievals". Which other medievals? Spinoza was thinking against the scholastic tradition, not with it. What's the point of distorting philosophical ideas to fit your own favored conceptions; especially when you haven't even read, or as you avow, understood them; as is obviously the case with Spinoza.

It is not that it's 'vague' or 'subjective' or 'can't be described' - it's a transformation of perception, it is a different way of being. — Wayfarer

If such a thing were indeed possible; you would only know that if you had realized it; and I don't believe you have.Like me, you may have experienced the feeling that suddenly everything has become clear, and that you can see things as if for the first time; but that yields no discursive knowledge at all; it is an ineffable state. What is known in such a state is more like a feeling than a knowing; because nothing discursive or determinate is known. This is amply attested to by the different metaphysical accounts associated with the various religious traditions. The common thread is the feeling; the kind of experience; which is a commonality of affectivity.

You are distorting those passages form Hegel through a tendentious lens. I have read Hegel's Phenomenology, and many secondary works about it and the Science of Logic. You are not qualified to speak about Hegel because you have read no such works. When you have read and studied Hegel to an adequate degree I will listen to what you have to say about his philosophy.

Notice that in this framing, mysticism might be valid, but it is entirely subjective. It is wholly and solely a matter of 'how you feel'. And you can respect that, because individuals have a right to such private and subjective feelings. But when it comes to accepting that it might reveal something that is actually true - well, different story altogether. — Wayfarer

This is more misreading. I haven't anyway said it is totally "subjective" I don't even accept the dichotomy of subjective/objective as it is normally framed, any more than I do the duality of mind/body. To be honest, I've had enough of trying to respond to your constant misunderstandings and tendentious misreadings of philosophers and of what I and others write on here. It's just too much effort trying to correct someone who has no intention of listening to anything which does not fit into his pre-conceived world picture. As I see it, since I have known you on this and the other two older forums, you have been repeating the same themes and mistakes over and over.

It's mistaken to say that Spinoza uses intellect in the same way as "other medievals". Which other medievals? — Janus

The book I was looking at yesterday was the one I mentioned at the time, 'Spinoza and Medieval Jewish philosophy. Not scholastic Catholicism, obviously. The essay I was reading, compared him with Maimonides, who was famous in the ancient and medieval world.

What's the point of distorting philosophical ideas to fit your own favored conceptions — Janus

I can ask you exactly the same question: you read everything through a specific mindset also.

If such a thing were indeed possible; you would only know that if you had realized it; and I don't believe you have — Janus

You know that how?

You are distorting those passages form Hegel through a tendentious lens. — Janus

They are copied verbatim and speak for themselves, even if that is an inconvenient truth for your interpretation.

The common thread is the feeling; the kind of experience; which is a commonality of affectivity. — Janus

I did do an honours degree in Comparative Religion, on pretty much exactly this subject.

I haven't anyway said it is totally "subjective" — Janus

It's subjective, personal, it might convey a truth, but only internally and personally - that is exactly what you said: 'they don't convey anything more than feelings'.

As I see it, since I have known you on this and the other two older forums, you have been repeating the same themes and mistakes over and over. — Janus

I understand why you don't accept my interpretations. I didn't pursue philosophy as a subject, because I don't like the way it is generally understood in the secular west. It is not at all concerned with the kind of enlightenment that I am interested in understanding. Everything nowadays is instinctively read through a naturalistic lens, and that is what I'm arguing against.

The key point is that number is a universal and so ultimately derives its meaning from observed particulars. — Andrew M

The contrary view is that observed particulars are intelligible insofar as, and only because, they're instantiations of universals.

The essay I was reading, compared him with Maimonides, who was famous in the ancient and medieval world. — Wayfarer

Sure, but you wouldn't be able to judge whether what was being proposed was on the mark unless you were familiar with Spinoza's and Maimonidies' philosophies.

I can ask you exactly the same question: you read everything through a specific mindset also. — Wayfarer

Everyone has to interpret what they read through their own understanding; but tendentious reading is another matter. If you had read Kant, Hegel and Spinoza and the relevant secondary literature to the extent that I have then I would be prepared to listen to any critiques of my interpretations you might have.

Those three thinkers share at least one significant thing in common: they all reject any notion of real transcendent realms. If you agree with that, then all I can say is that you don't agree with most of the scholars who have spent so much time studying those philosophers. If want to argue for an alternative interpretation, you need to provide actual textual evidence for alternative interpretations which are plausible. You can hardly do that if you haven't even read the philosophers in question and the literature about them.

You know that how? — Wayfarer

I didn't say I know it, I said I believe it, and that is based on my assessment of what you have to say. I am not really convinced that the common idea of spiritual enlightenment is even a sound idea. Are you going to claim that you are self-realized? If you are then why not go out into the world and enlighten people, and help the poor, or whatever, instead of wasting time arguing about inconsequential matters on these forums?

I didn't pursue philosophy as a subject, because I don't like the way it is generally understood in the secular west. It is not at all concerned with spiritual enlightenment, which it once used to be. — Wayfarer

Again, if that is your attitude then you are wasting your time on these forums; I would say. Spiritual enlightenment, whatever it is, is not a matter of philosophy, in the sense of something that can be sensibly argued about, but is a matter of lived feeling and the profound transformation it may bring, in my view.

I'm not interested in your academic credentials; what you say speaks for itself.

Those three thinkers share at least one significant thing in common: they all reject any notion of real transcendent realms. — Janus

None of them were atheists.

Are you going to claim that you are self-realized? — Janus

No.

I'm not interested in your academic credentials — Janus

How about yours, Janus? How is that going for you? I did take the time and trouble to do two degrees which are actually pretty useless from the viewpoint of making a living, and have often had a hard time doing so. So, yes, I might well be wasting my time here, but no more than anyone else.

If you are then why not go out into the world and enlighten people? — Janus

I have given quite a bit of time as a casual or guest speaker at the Buddhist Library, evening colleges, and other places, and I'm certainly on the lookout for other ways to serve.

None of them were atheists. — Wayfarer

That's actually questionable; but irrelevant in any case.

How about yours, Janus? How is that going for you? — Wayfarer

I have never mentioned them nor claimed they are important in any case; so what's the point of the question?

Spiritual enlightenment, whatever it is, is not a matter of philosophy, in the sense of something that can be sensibly argued about. — Janus

So, what do you take 'the allegory of the Cave' to be about, then? Don't you read it as a metaphor for spiritual or noetic illumination?

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed. — Socrates

The allegory could be about that; or it could be about what Plato understood to be a pure, rational intuition of the forms.
I doubt Plato had any conception of enlightenment analogous to the Eastern understandings of the idea.

Of course it's useful to make such a distinction, just like it's useful to distinguish between cause and effect. Following your stated principle, it would be pointless to distinguish between cause and effect, because this is an interaction and there is no point distinguishing between the two parts of an interaction. But we make those distinctions in order to understand.

So if information has both a physical and a non-physical part, it is important to distinguish between these, just like its important to distinguish cause from effect in a causal relation. I would argue that since the physical part of information is always a representation of the non-physical part, the non-physical part is necessarily prior in time to the physical part. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wrong. Depending on what we are talking about, the cause can be "physical" and the effect "non-physical", or vice versa. Or it is even possible that they both be "physical" or both be "non-physical". Again you evade the questions we need answered in order to make any sense of what you are saying.

What exactly IS the distinction being made anyway, and why? If I have said that information is both "physical" and "non-physical", then what use is there to make a distinction between them? If you're wanting to simply make a distinction between different kinds, or forms, of information, then you aren't making an argument against anything I have said, as it is all still information.

"Non-physical" does not always precede the "physical". The idea of your mother does not precede her material existence. If it did, you have a great deal more explaining to do - like how it is that you are even here - an effect of physical causes like sex and birth.

Yes, so the ship arrival details were transmitted via a causal process that resulted in those details being entered into a log book. We agree about that.

Do you also agree that the humans involved in transmitting that message were thinking abstractly in order to understand the message and relay it on? — Andrew M

I already agreed to that and even explained what abstract thought was in relation to getting at information (the causal relationships between causes and their effects). Thinking abstractly is an effect of prior causes and a cause of subsequent effects (both "physical" and "non-physical").

The difference between humans and other animals is simply the degree in which we can delve into the causal relationships of nature. A smell informs an animal of some state of affairs in their environment. We are talking about a causal relationship between the smell (the effect) and the cause of the smell (a predator). For most animals, this is as far as they go. There is no trying to get at why the predator is chasing them, or what hunger is, or natural selection, or the Big Bang, etc.,.

Humans can go further as a result of the realization that their experience is an effect of the world and that the world, and it's things, continue to exist beyond their experiences of them. This is typically called Object Permanence. This happens usually within a year of being born. We go from thinking that our experience is the world, to thinking that our experience is of a world that is there even when we aren't experiencing it. We go from being solipsists to being realists. We go from thinking concretely to abstractly, which then increases exponentially as when we learn language.

This seems logical because for a solipsist, there would be no such thing as an abstract thought, not even to the degree animals have it in understanding that smells and sounds aren't just real themselves, but refer to other real things that aren't smells and sounds. For a solipsist, there would be no such thing as causal relationships, or information.

Depending on what we are talking about, the cause can be "physical" and the effect "non-physical", or vice versa. Or it is even possible that they both be "physical" or both be "non-physical". quote]

Right, so why would this mean that it is not useful to distinguish between physical and non-physical?
— Harry Hindu

Again you evade the questions we need answered in order to make any sense of what you are saying. — Harry Hindu

What question are you talking about? I am only objecting to your claim that it is not useful to distinguish between physical and non-physical.

What exactly IS the distinction being made anyway, and why? If I have said that information is both "physical" and "non-physical", then what use is there to make a distinction between them? If you're wanting to simply make a distinction between different kinds, or forms, of information, then you aren't making an argument against anything I have said, as it is all still information. — Harry Hindu

If, as you say, information is both physical and non-physical, then it would be useful for us to determine which aspects are physical and which are non-physical, in order to understand the nature of information.

So consider this. We have identified an object, and we have named it, "information". We agree that it is both physical and non-physical, but we still don't have a firm agreement or understanding concerning the nature of this thing. Do you not think that it would be productive to proceed toward analyzing how we distinguish between physical and non-physical within that thing, in order to get an understanding of the nature of that thing? For example, suppose we have identified and object which is both blue and not-blue. Do you not think that it would be productive to analyze how we distinguish between the blue and the not-blue of that object in order to understand the nature of that object.

In other words, if we agree that an object has contrary properties, my claim is that it is useful to determine the way that we distinguish between those contrary properties within that object, in order to understand the object. By the law of non-contradiction, we only allow that the same object has contrary properties at different times. That is why I used a temporal explanation in my last post.

Non-physical" does not always precede the "physical". The idea of your mother does not precede her material existence. If it did, you have a great deal more explaining to do - like how it is that you are even here - an effect of physical causes like sex and birth. — Harry Hindu

Ok, I agree that in some examples, the physical precedes the non-physical. Perhaps you agree with me though, that the way to approach this issue is through temporality, because that is the only way to accept that contrary properties are attributed to the same object. My argument was in the case of this one specific type of object, which we have identified as "information", the non-physical property precedes the physical because the physical is a representation of the non-physical.

Except that "two plus two equals four" is a mathematical proposition. Splitting food and assorting things is not. I was referring to the latter. Tell me MU, so that I might understand what you're saying, is "two plus two equals four" right according to you? If it is, in virtue of what is it correct? — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes two plus two equals four is right. It is right because it is consistent with the logical principles of mathematics which ensure that it is right. This is contrary to Wittgenstein's position that the statement "two plus two equals four" is right because it is an action which is consistent with certain descriptions of human behaviour.

Sure. You can always prefer math that fail to build houses and fly planes as good as the ones we use. Why you would do that, I don't know, I wouldn't and people tend to want houses that do not collapse and planes that do not crush, but, sure, you can do that. In a less queer fashion, the principles are the extra-mathematical practices and the practices internal to our mathematical systems, i.e. established procedures of calculation. — Πετροκότσυφας

Efficiency and success does not prove that you are right. This is very evident in the fact that one may be very efficient and successful in carrying out wrong, or evil activities.

So you give examples of where efficiency and success have been used to produce things which are taken for granted as being good things, and you conclude, therefore efficiency and success determines what is right. However you fail to account for the instances in which efficiency and success produce evil, and these instances are what demonstrate your position as faulty.

So, twice two four is not correct simply because "that's what everybody does". It is correct because we want ways to do stuff out in the world and we have found that this specific and syntactically rigorous system of calculation within which twice two four is decided, helps us do exactly that. Had you built an equally rigorous system which would help us do stuff out in the world and in which twice two twentyfive, would just mean that you built a new system, not that twice two four is wrong in the old system. — Πετροκότσυφας

See, "two plus two equals four", is not right because it allows us "to do stuff out in the world". Right and wrong are how we judge the stuff which we do in the world. If "two plus two equals four" only incited us to do bad things in the world, like "kill your neighbour" only incites us to do bad things, then we would have to judge "two plus two equals four" as wrong, like we judge "kill your neighbour" as wrong, despite the fact that we use it to do stuff in the world.

The fact that "two plus two equals four" allows us to do stuff in the world, is not what makes it right or wrong, because the stuff which is done with it may be either right or wrong. Therefore "two plus two equals four" must exist in relation to other principles of rationality to ensure that it is used properly, and therefore right. That is why I insist that the reason why "two plus two equals four" is right, is because it is consistent with other logical principles of rationality, not because it allows us to do things.

Right and wrong are judgements of the quality of the things done, not a judgement of the capacity to do things. So we must always refer to a further principle, one which distinguishes right from wrong, in general, to determine whether the stuff we are doing is right or wrong. And the fact that a principle allows us to do stuff does not make that principle right, because in reality, it is that principle's relation to the further principle which determines whether it is right.

Had you built an equally rigorous system which would help us do stuff out in the world and in which twice two twentyfive, would just mean that you built a new system, not that twice two four is wrong in the old system. — Πετροκότσυφας

Notation systems, and even numerical systems, are matters of convention - you could calculate in base 12 but it would be very awkward. But whatever notation or base you used, would have to conform to the fact that half of 4 is 2.

Except that he says mathematical propositions (like other formal propositions) acquire their sense from extra-systemic applications, otherwise they would be syntactically right but empty, a literally useless game of signs. — Πετροκότσυφας

So that's a very big difference, isn't? It's the difference between truth as coherence, and truth as correspondence. I say that 2+2=4 because it is coherent within the logical system of which it is a part of. You say that 2+2=4 because this corresponds to something real. What does it correspond with? People using those symbols that way, and getting the results that they want.

The problem with your perspective, is as I've described, you have no basis for the claim that 2+2=4 is "right". The fact that you can use 2+2=4 to get the results which you want, does not make 2+2=4 "right", because getting what you want is not always what is right. The fact that 2+2=4 is a part of a coherent logical system is what makes it right. That is why your perspective is wrong.

The issue you raise, that "otherwise they would be syntactically right but empty, a literally useless game of signs" is not relevant, because correspondence is established by firm ontological principles. The Wittgensteinian approach is an attempt to avoid the need for ontological principles. As I've demonstrated though, it's a failing attempt because it gives us no realistic approach to the judgement of right and wrong, while firm ontological principles provide us with an approach to that judgement.

n other words I don't think that the idea that universals are physical or non-physical is a proposition that could be correct or incorrect; but merely more or less useful or fruitful in different contexts. This is why I have been criticizing Wayfarer on this; because he seems to think there is some higher, unimpeachable truth of the matter regarding universals; that universals point to some 'higher, supernatural order". I don't believe any of that; I don't think there is anything like an ultimate authority or power beyond nature that could hold sway over us and our investigations. — Janus

I've gone back over some of the points you have raised. One that has been lost in the to and fro is that I acknowledged at the outset that universals don't exist, but that they're real.

Now plainly that seems a contradiction insofar as we generally understand 'what is real', and 'what exists', as essentially the same.

You're right in saying that universals, forms, and so on are not existing or objectively real, and that it was just such an idea that was criticized by Kant. You're also right in saying that such ideas are best expressed metaphorically or through art and other indirect means. But in doing some more reading on the question, specifically of Plato and Kant, I came across some interesting insights on a philosophy blog (here.)

'Socrates knew that the moral ideas in virtue of which alone we are human, which alone give meaning and value to human life, have no source other than the mind. They constitute an intelligible realm fully independent of the sensible world. The instances of justice, reasonableness, courage, that we find in the outside world are only seen as such, adjudged as such, in the light of the ideas. Socrates may have remained solely concerned with moral ideas, but Plato saw that not only are the moral concepts together with the notions of mathematical equality and number purely intelligible but that all things of the sensible world only have meaning for us in virtue of the intelligible forms engendered in the mind.'

'When Plato weaves of the intelligible forms a picture of the world, he is quick to tell us that the account he gives is no more than a ‘likely tale’. The pure intelligible forms, which give us no objective knowledge, and which cannot be embodied in any definitive theoretical formulation are nevertheless the realm in which we have our intelligent being, in which we live intelligently and have our proper life as human beings. ....It is a mode of life, a plane of being, that has to be, and can only be, realized in constant creation of myth, acknowledged as myth, in art, in poetry, in metaphysical systems that declare themselves to be merely ‘likely tales’, and in the ideals of honour, friendship, loyalty, patriotism, which the cynic has no difficulty in showing to be one and all illusory.'

'Kant’s ‘understanding’ corresponds to Plato’s dianoia, where the mind can legislate for the phenomenal world because what it may find in the world of regularity is only the order the mind itself confers on the world through ideas born in the mind. Here the mind finds meaning and order in the world as the world presents itself to the mind, but cannot go beyond the immediate presentations of the world. Yet beyond and above the dianoia, Plato had a place for nous, noêsis, phronêsis.'

These passages are near to what I had in mind when I started this thread, which as I have already stated, ought to have been about 'ideas' rather than 'information'. And they show what is meant by the notion of 'transcendental truth' in the Western philosophical tradition. The mind is possessed of an innate order, which by virtue of reason is able to 'legislate for the phenomenal world', because there is a correspondence between the operations of the mind, and those of nature herself. The source of that order can't be demonstrated to be in the world itself as it is internal to the activities of the mind. Nor can the idea of the forms be proven - hence Plato saying it's no more than 'a likely tale'. I think that accounts for much of the indirectness of Plato's musings on such matters - exploring the idea from various perspectives, through dialectic, and so on. It is pointedly *not* a dogmatic metaphysics, indeed the term 'metaphysics' wasn't known to Plato (or Aristotle).

So as regards there being a 'higher, unimpeachable order' - my appraisal of your criticism of this is that you identify such ideas with religious authority, and reject it on that account. But my argument is philosophical - it is that the innate ability that the mind has to count, categorise, compare - in short, to reason - is required to even declare what the physical is, what is natural and what is not. So the very abilities we have to determine what is or isn't the case in the objective world are innate to the intelligence, which is able to reflect the order that is found in nature. That is the sense in which it is 'transcendent' - it is the faculty by which we make sense of the world, but the source of which is not itself amongst the objects of analysis (except for nowadays it is widely assumed, falsely in my view, that such abilities have a biological origin.)

But the attempt to make such faculties and powers the 'object of investigation' is to reify them, to treat them as things or objects or forces in an objective sense; in short, to objectify them. They're not existing things, but 'only the order the mind itself confers on the world through ideas born in the mind'. However, those ideas and capabilities are fundamental to our ability to know. That is the sense in which they're 'real but not existent'.

An abstraction is not, by definition, physical; but what it is an abstraction from may be. So gravity is not an abstraction as you previously said it is, but is a phenomenon that may be thought of as physical insofar as its effects are observable even though it is not. My original point was to ask how mind is different than this. — Janus

How the mind is different to this, or indeed to anything, is that it is the subject of experience. The mind is never an object of experience, we never 'experience the mind', the mind is 'what experiences'*. Yet reason itself, the ability to count, to quantify, analyse, and so on, originate within the mind.

I think nowadays there is a widespread belief that science or naturalism understands how the mind does this, but I doubt such accounts, as the mind, not being an object of analysis, is not part of nature; it is more accurate to say that nature exists in the mind, rather than vice versa. (This is similar to Husserl's critique of naturalism, it is not intended as absolute idealism.)

--------------------
*This is a key point that is brought about by Eastern, as distinct from Platonic, philosophy.

That is correct. My point is therefore that an object being mental is not sufficient to demonstrate that it is non-physical. And as it is the case for mental images conveying no information, so it is as well with mental images that do convey information, for they remain mental images. The image remains physical, even though the information it conveys is not.

I believe concepts change too. I believe that 1 was originally used to signify the most simple unit. Unlike 2, 4, 6, 8, it could not be divided. As the practise of division developed it was allowed that 1 could be divided, and this gave us fractions. So the concept signified by 1 changed from being the most simple, indivisible unit to being infinitely divisible. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is an interesting topic. I think you are making an error with the claim that because 1 can be divided, then it loses its original nature of being the most simple unit or identity. 1 whole can be divided into two halves, but notice that we are forced to change identity, as underlined, in order to speak truly. 1 whole = 2 halves, but 1 whole ≠ 2 wholes, because 1 ≠ 2. Similarly, 1 m = 100 cm, but 1 m ≠ 100 m. In other words, for a given identity, 1 remains the simplest unit; and if it gets divided, then it gets divided into different identities. As such, the nature of 1 remains unchanged.

That "a rock participates in the form of rock-ness" requires a judgement. The thing itself, and the form of rock-ness are two distinct things. [...] Without that judgement, the particular thing, and the universal form must be inherently united. In the way that I describe, the particular and the universal are distinct, and a judgement relates them. Without the judgement, they must be already related through participation. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is indeed my position that the particular thing and the universal form are inherently united. If I understand you correctly, your position is that the particular and the universal are distinct, objectively disconnected, and only related by man-made judgement, is that correct? From this view, does it follow that only particular forms are objective real, where as universal forms are only man-made?

My position is that both types of forms exist objectively. Indeed, particular forms must exist in order for a thing to have its own identity. But then it must also have a universal form in order to be part of the genus or species it belongs to. If this was not the case, then two things made of the same material could in principle behave completely differently. E.g., two rocks composed of the same minerals, when put in contact with fire, could react differently, such that one could be inert, and the other one could blow up. But this would be absurd. We could never know any generalities; only particulars after having done particular tests on each one of them. Furthermore, we could never perform any inductive reasoning, such as "all rocks made of this mineral are inert to fire", or "all fires are hot", or "no human can breath under water", etc.

The difference between humans and other animals is simply the degree in which we can delve into the causal relationships of nature. — Harry Hindu

Yes. And that difference of degree is significant enough to warrant making a distinction between automatic, concrete perceiving (present in humans and animals generally) and reflective, abstract thinking. Which was why Aristotle characterized humans as the rational animal.

I think we are in essential agreement.

I still don't see how it is useful to make that distinction when talking about information flow and cause and effect. We are simply talking about the contents of some mind being the effect of some prior cause, or cause of some effect.

Humans aren't the only rational animal. It seems that every animal behaves in certain ways as a result of it's perception of it's environment. Making a distinction whether the perception is concrete or abstract isn't useful here. We're simply talking about information - what it is and how it flows.

What question are you talking about? I am only objecting to your claim that it is not useful to distinguish between physical and non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

1. What exactly is the distinction you are trying to make when using the terms, "non-physical" and "physical"? What exactly does it mean for something to be "non-physical" as opposed to "physical".

2. Can you provide a specific example or two of when it would be useful to make a distinction between "non-physical" and "physical" when talking about cause and effect and information flow?

If, as you say, information is both physical and non-physical, then it would be useful for us to determine which aspects are physical and which are non-physical, in order to understand the nature of information.

So consider this. We have identified an object, and we have named it, "information". We agree that it is both physical and non-physical, but we still don't have a firm agreement or understanding concerning the nature of this thing. Do you not think that it would be productive to proceed toward analyzing how we distinguish between physical and non-physical within that thing, in order to get an understanding of the nature of that thing? For example, suppose we have identified and object which is both blue and not-blue. Do you not think that it would be productive to analyze how we distinguish between the blue and the not-blue of that object in order to understand the nature of that object.

In other words, if we agree that an object has contrary properties, my claim is that it is useful to determine the way that we distinguish between those contrary properties within that object, in order to understand the object. By the law of non-contradiction, we only allow that the same object has contrary properties at different times. That is why I used a temporal explanation in my last post. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it wouldn't be useful because there could be instances where the cause and effect sequence we are talking about is all "physical", or all "non-physical".

Ok, I agree that in some examples, the physical precedes the non-physical. Perhaps you agree with me though, that the way to approach this issue is through temporality, because that is the only way to accept that contrary properties are attributed to the same object. My argument was in the case of this one specific type of object, which we have identified as "information", the non-physical property precedes the physical because the physical is a representation of the non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The effect (whatever effect we are talking about) is a representation of it's prior causes. It has nothing to do with whether or not some cause, or some effect is "physical" or not. All effects carry information about their prior causes. All effects are representations of their causes.

Your mind is a representation of some state of your body, as the state of your body influences your mind, just as your mind has the power to influence the world. Any state of the mind relays information about some state of your body because of the causal relationship between them.

The texts are there, read them. — Πετροκότσυφας

I've read, here's some quotes:

They agree in what they do. Mathematical truth isn't established by their all agreeing that it's true—as if they were witnesses of it. Because they all agree in what they do, we lay it down as a rule, and put it in the archives. Not until we do that have we got to mathematics.

It is as if we had hardened the empirical proposition into a rule. And now we have, not an hypothesis that gets tested by experience, but a paradigm with which experience is compared and judged. And so a new kind of judgment

They are determined by a consensus of action: a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting in the same way. There is a consensus but it is not a consensus of opinion. We all act the same way, walk the same way, count the same way.

The agreement of humans that is a presupposition of logic is not an agreement in opinions, much less in opinions on questions of logic.

See, correct or incorrect in mathematical procedure is determined according to whether we behave in a manner which is consistent with those who have gone before us, not according to some rational principles of what constitutes right and wrong. An "empirical proposition" (descriptive rule) becomes a prescriptive rule (what one ought to do). If this were reality, we could not employ rational principles to demonstrate that what has been common practise in the past, is actually wrong and ought to be changed, because common practise is necessarily right by the definition of what constitutes the right procedure. Therefore knowledge could not evolve. It is extremely faulty (illogical) epistemology.