Thus if a certain type of info is imaginable without any physical properties, then physical properties are not essential to this type of info. And this is precisely what we do when we imagine universal forms such as triangle-ness, whiteness, justice, etc. — Samuel Lacrampe

How can one imagine triangle-ness without any physical properties? Isn't that exactly what triangle-ness is, a physical property?

As such, the properties of place and time are sufficient to determine if two physical objects observed are the same. — Samuel Lacrampe

The problem here is that space and time are not properties, so neither can place be a property. That's why motion is so difficult to understand, it's not the property of an object, it is a relationship between objects.

And... it is also possible for universal concepts, because they have a limited quantity of essential primary properties (they may have an infinite quantity of essential secondary properties, but these are not critical in defining the concept, as previously explained). — Samuel Lacrampe

How would you propose to determine the spatial-temporal location of a concept?

agree that we can learn some concepts in school, but it does not follow that concepts are subjective. We are taught some math concepts, and yet it is clear that these concepts are objective. Besides, what about the fact that people born blind cannot apprehend the concept of redness, despite having gone to school? Remember that the essential property of redness is not "this light frequency range", which is merely its cause (and good luck explaining light), but purely this. — Samuel Lacrampe

How are you defining "objective" here?

And, with respect to your discussion concerning the concept of redness, all you are doing is defining "redness" in such a way to ensure that a blind person cannot apprehend the concept of redness. I disagree with this type of definition of "concept". I think that if you explain to a blind person, the concept of red, then that person can understand that concept without having to see an example of red, just like a blind person can understand the concept of triangle without having to see an example of a triangle. One needs sight to see the property "red" but not to understand the concept "red".

What is your definition of ideal? Mine is "perfection; as good as a thing can possibly be". Note that I don't mean Perfection in everything (this could only be God); only in the thing discussed. Under that definition, it is definitely possible to reach ideals. The ideal answer to 2+2 is 4, because it is as good as it can possibly be. And a 100% score on an exam is the ideal score, because there is nothing to add to reach a better score. I don't understand your example of "40% score on an exam"; what is this ideal of? Not score, because it is possible to obtain a better score. — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes, your definition of "ideal" is completely different from mine. Ideal to me means perfect in conception. Therefore a thing cannot be an ideal. You define ideal as the perfect thing.

How can one imagine triangle-ness without any physical properties? Isn't that exactly what triangle-ness is, a physical property? — Metaphysician Undercover

You can represent it physically, but it's an ideal object in the sense of being a geometric primitive. And surely the triangle I am just now imagining, is not physical, on account of it's a mental image.

And what, pray tell, is a 'physical property'?

The ideal answer to 2+2 is 4, because it is as good as it can possibly be. — Samuel Lacrampe

It's more that the answer, '4', is the terminus of explanation.

Remember, again, that 'an ideal form' is only perceivable by reason. It is not an image, although an image may be said to convey something about it. So the reason a physical thing cannot be an ideal, is because it's a thing, and all things are compound, corporeal, subject to decay, mutable, etc. This reflects the ubiquitous prejudice of all ancient philosophy, namely, that the material world is corrupted. In Plato, the 'real world' is the 'ideal world' which we (the hoi polloi, the uneducated, the Many) don't see, trapped, as we are, in the Cave.

I think that if you explain to a blind person, the concept of red, then that person can understand that concept without having to see an example of red, just like a blind person can understand the concept of triangle without having to see an example of a triangle. — Metaphysician Undercover

How possibly could a blind person understand 'the concept of colour', when colour is a purely visual experience? (On second thoughts, don’t try to explain that.) Surely the blind can understand 'the concept of a triangle' because aside from imagining it, they can handle it, feel it, pick it up - shape is tactile. But a colour is a different matter altogether, being solely visual.

You can represent it physically, but it's an ideal object in the sense of being a geometric primitive. And surely the triangle I am just now imagining, is not physical, on account of it's a mental image. — Wayfarer

That's a particular triangle you are imagining, not "triangle-ness". I can't imagine triangle-ness without using defining words. And that's the difficulty I had with Samuel's post. Samuel was trying to separate concepts from the words which define them, such that a blind person could not conceive of a triangle because one could not see an example of a triangle. But this is not conception at all, this is imagination. Conception is much more difficulty to understand than imagination because it involves word use convention and inter-subjectivity. One cannot properly conceive of "triangle-ness", without proper word use.

This is what I believe is at the root of the question of "is information physical", word use. I believe definitions are the essence of a concept. Concepts exist as definitions and descriptions. So to understand the nature of a concept we must understand the nature of words. It is the very nature of words, that they cross the boundary between external (physical) and internal (mental), with very little change, we can perceive them clearly. There is very little difference between words imagined within one's mind, when an individual is thinking, and words heard when one is listening. we remember them clearly. What differs is the source of heard words versus words brought up in imagination. So when we consider the significance of words, what is important is the difference between the author and the auditor.

Suppose we remove the physical barrier between these two, the author and the auditor, so that we can represent information as non-physical. Let's say that words pass from your mind to my mind, and back and forth, without the medium. What exactly would the word be then? Words exist within my mind, when I'm thinking of what to say, as representations of the physical entities which I've heard. Without that physical aspect of information, I wouldn't be thinking with words, because they are something which my mind has represented from the physical realm. But what would the concept be then? Right now, concepts exist as descriptions and definitions, but without words, there'd be no such thing. That's why I think it's a mistake to insist on this idea that information is non-physical. The deeper one goes into this analysis, the more it becomes apparent that if information was non-physical it would turn out to be absolutely nothing. So in order that information has any real existence, as anything at all, we must assume that it is physical.

The procedure I prefer then, is not to deny the existence of the non-physical altogether, because we know from other arguments that despite the need to consider that information is physical, the non-physical is very real. We simply accept the reality that information is necessarily physical, and deny the non-physical existence of information. This allows us to approach information for what it really is. It is instances of the non-physical soul, making use of the physical world. We know that the non-physical soul makes use of the physical world already, because that's what the living body is, an instance of the soul making use of the physical world. And we can see that in all human endeavors, they are instances of the soul making use of the physical world.

In this light, Kant's distinction of phenomenal, and noumenal, becomes very intelligible. Kant restricts knowledge to the phenomenal realm, what we receive through our senses, information. Knowledge is phenomenal, it is produced from information, and information is what we get through our senses, it is physical. But in describing things in this way, he necessarily has to posit the noumenal to support the independent existence of what is sensed. The noumenal cannot be physical because it is what we cannot sense. So we arrive at the reality of the non-physical in another way. The non-physical supports the independent existence of the physical. Now we are faced with the task of figuring out how the non-physical soul may apprehend the non-physical noumena directly, without the use of the physical medium, information.

How possibly could a blind person understand 'the concept of colour', when colour is a purely visual experience? (On second thoughts, don’t try to explain that.) Surely the blind can understand 'the concept of a triangle' because aside from imagining it, they can handle it, feel it, pick it up - shape is tactile. But a colour is a different matter altogether, being solely visual. — Wayfarer

A blind person can understand the concept of colour through definition, description, just like one can understand the concept of triangle in this way. If conception was as you describe here, experience dependent, then we could never understand things which had just been described to us, but we had not seen. The various fields of science demonstrate that the true nature of conception is within definition, as there is much which is described and conceived of, without having been experienced.

You can represent it physically, but it's an ideal object in the sense of being a geometric primitive. And surely the triangle I am just now imagining, is not physical, on account of it's a mental image. — Wayfarer

It may (or may not) be useful to draw a distinction between Material and Physical. The triangle is certainly not material, but it can be argued that the representation of it in your mind is physical.

Physics has made this distinction for quite a while: The First Law of thermodynamics is a material law, the Second Law is a physical law. One law governs the behaviour of matter, the other the behaviour of arrangements of matter.

Is 'information' physical?

All information is intentional, and none of it is physical unless you really believe that Jesus put his face on a tree burl or perhaps its him on the Shroud of Turin, pareidolia.

That's a particular triangle you are imagining, not "triangle-ness" — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the whole point of the Edward Feser article that has been discussed at great length in this thread. He makes the distinction between the form and the mental image. Once you understand the form - plane figure bounded by three intersecting straight lines - then you don’t need to imagine it.

Now we are faced with the task of figuring out how the non-physical soul may apprehend the non-physical noumena directly, without the use of the physical medium, information. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair comment. As we discussed about a month ago, in the A-T tradition, the ‘active intellect’ is more or less equivalent to the ‘soul’. It is the ‘rational soul’ that receives the intelligible form.

A blind person can understand the concept of colour through definition, description, — Metaphysician Undercover

It just defies common sense that the blind understand colours, any more than the permanently deaf will fathom music.

The procedure I prefer then, is not to deny the existence of the non-physical altogether, — Metaphysician Undercover

Nowhere in this thread have I denied the existence of the physical. However I will always deny the ultimacy of the physical.

The triangle is certainly not material, but it can be argued that the representation of it in your mind is physical. — tom

Although it would be pointless to argue that, because it’s plainly false.

Although it would be pointless to argue that, because it’s plainly false. — Wayfarer

If the representation of the triangle in your brain is not physical, then why does it take energy to create, increase the entropy of your brain, causes visible changes in a brain-scan?

Because we are embodied beings, then a mental image has physical correlates. But in this case, the physical correlates are analogous to the role of 'representation' in the OP, in which 'meaning' and 'representation' are shown to be separable.

You won't find an image in a brain scan, or by examining someone else's brain. Well, not an image of a triangle; you will see the traces of neural transactions. But neural processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon, are devoid of intrinsic meaning. In themselves they are simply patterns of electrochemical activity. To understand what such phenomena mean, is to impute meaning to them, to interpret them, which is an act that is always internal to the act of thought itself; it is intrinsically first-person. Meaning is imputed, it is not simply given, and it is the intellect that does that imputation. So when you imagine a triangle, your intentional representation actually drives the neural processes, not vice versa; and the way that happens is not understood by science.

(This is because of the 'neural binding problem' concerning the subjective unity of perception, which is one aspect of, or actually is, the 'hard problem of consciousness'. I'm sure this is one of the reasons why serious doubts have emerged about the interpretation of fMRI data.)

Because we are embodied beings, then a mental image has physical correlates. But in this case, the physical correlates are analogous to the role of 'representation' in the OP, in which 'meaning' and 'representation' are shown to be separable. — Wayfarer

Well I literally said that the "representation of it in your mind is physical". You seem to be claiming that representation can be physical, but meaning can't, as if representation is somehow easy and meaning isn't.

Even computer representations of geometric objects must be interpreted by computer programs and given meaning.

You won't find an image in a brain scan, or by examining someone else's brain. Well, not an image of a triangle — Wayfarer

And I was literally expecting to see an actual triangle in a brain-scan. How disappointing!

You seem to be claiming that representation can be physical, but meaning can't, as if representation is somehow easy and meaning isn't. — tom

That's like what I'm claiming - representation is one thing, and meaning another; it's a form of dualism. And the interpretation done by computers is only meaningful because they are in turn interpreted by humans; data has no intrinsic meaning to computers.

//ps//although now I read your original comment again, I took it to mean that the image is nothing other than the physical representation.//

Once you understand the form - plane figure bounded by three intersecting straight lines - then you don’t need to imagine it. — Wayfarer

This is a definition, composed of words. Did you read what I said about the relation between the concept, and words? If understanding the form of triangle, is apprehending this, "plane figure bounded by three intersecting straight lines", then how does one understand the form without imagining the words? And as I explained, the words in our mind are just representations, images, of the physical words.

It just defies common sense that the blind understand colours, any more than the permanently deaf will fathom music. — Wayfarer

But we're talking about understanding concepts here, not about experiencing sensations. The deaf can understand all the principles of music just as easily as the non-deaf. And even though the deaf person cannot hear music, the deaf person could play music. I'm sure you recognize that there is a difference between understanding a concept, and experiencing various sensations. As you've been saying, sensation is of the particular, while the concept is universal. It's true that when concepts are formed, we may abstract from particulars, but once a concept is formed, and has become common knowledge, it is taught by one individual to another. Learning the concept is what is called understanding.

So understanding is not necessarily a process of abstracting from particulars, it may be a process of being taught an already existent concept. Sensing particular instances, such as being shown examples of triangles, is helpful, but not necessary in order to understand the concept. That's what Plato meant when he said intelligible objects may be apprehended directly by the intellect. However, as I indicated in my last post, there is the matter of the words, which still has to be sorted out.

Although it would be pointless to argue that, because it’s plainly false. — Wayfarer

It's not pointless, and here's the point. As you said, the triangle exists in your mind as "plane figure bounded by three intersecting straight lines". These are words, and even in your mind words are simply representations of physical things. So by saying that the triangle is represented by words, rather than a mental image of a triangle, doesn't get us away from a physical representation. We just go to a different type of physical representation, words instead of a figure.

That's like what I'm claiming - representation is one thing, and meaning another; it's a form of dualism. And the interpretation done by computers is only meaningful because they are in turn interpreted by humans; data has no intrinsic meaning to computers. — Wayfarer

I think there may be a need to draw a finer distinction. What do you think:

Representation - the physical encoding of an idea.
Meaning - the physical encoding of how to interpret the representation.
Quale - the subjective sensation of the act of giving meaning.

If it could be argued that the Quale was not physical, i.e. it was independent of matter, encoding, and interpretation, well, that would be very interesting, unless of course you posit some sort of spirit realm, which seems a very boring idea.

If the Quale (or the Meaning) is not physical, then how do we Represent them?

Representation - the physical encoding of an idea.
Meaning - the physical encoding of how to interpret the representation.
Quale - the subjective sensation of the act of giving meaning. — tom

Meaning isn't physical - the interpretive act is internal to thought. It's first person, although not necessarily 'subjective' in the sense we usually intend that word, 'pertaining only to oneself'. There are shared domains of meaning which are, therefore, 'inter-subjective'. But they comprise conventions and agreements between humans, in other words, they're dependent on the imputations which we agree with.

Mathematics provides a means to arrive at quantifiable, inter-subjective agreements, because by measuring according to agreed units and standards, a result can be derived which is common to all observers; something which is obviously fundamental to modern scientific method.

I don't much care for 'quale' or 'qualia', as I see it as technical jargon. But I will say that interpreting meaning is not a sensation. When you understand a mathematical expression, there is no sensation involved - unless you've just made a new discovery, or are pleased with what you have discovered. But apprehending a rational idea is not a sensation; sensation is largely physical, the exchange of ions across membranes. Reflecting on sensation may not be, as it involves abstraction.

unless of course you posit some sort of spirit realm, which seems a very boring idea. — tom

Can you see the hangover of Cartesian dualism in that comment?

If the Quale (or the Meaning) is not physical, then how do we Represent them? — tom

By the means appropriate to the subject. Science uses scientific and mathematical notation; poets deploy verse; painters use colour and texture; and so on. But always, there's an interpretive act going on; the mind is making something out of what it sees.

Part of Wayfarer's argument, I think, is that information isn't the sort of thing you can bump into or detect with your senses. — Andrew M

How can information be detected if not by means of the senses.? It is true that you cannot "bump into" information; it is not a physical object. You cannot bump into gravity, neither is it a physical object; does it follow from that fact that gravity is not physical?

Meaning - the physical encoding of how to interpret the representation. — tom

How can "how to interpret the representation" be anything other than what is in the mind of the interpreter? And this is non-physical.

And this is non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know that? Is it nothing more than a matter of definition?

This does not mean that the form of every material object is derived from a free will decision. It is possible that the form of every object comes about from a freely willed decision, and that's what those who argue that the universe is created by the will of God say. — Metaphysician Undercover

But in the world objects engender other objects in various ways, and the forms those engendered objects take seem to be determined by invariances that we call "physical laws". Objects don't just pop into existence out of nothing. Also, we were speaking about the future states of present objects and entities not only about newly created objects and entities .

Even if the forms of entities were exhaustively determined by God's will as in Leibniz's Monadic metaphysics; why would there need to be a determining immaterial form in between God's act of will and the actual, physical forms of the entities?

Meaning isn't physical - the interpretive act is internal to thought. It's first person, although not necessarily 'subjective' in the sense we usually intend that word, 'pertaining only to oneself'. There are shared domains of meaning which are, therefore, 'inter-subjective'. But they comprise conventions and agreements between humans, in other words, they're dependent on the imputations which we agree with. — Wayfarer

If that is the case, how can the codes TAA, TAG, and TGA mean STOP in DNA encoding and UAA, UAG, UGA mean STOP in RNA encoding?

By the means appropriate to the subject. Science uses scientific and mathematical notation; poets deploy verse; painters use colour and texture; and so on. But always, there's an interpretive act going on; the mind is making something out of what it sees. — Wayfarer

But "making something out of what it sees" is a physical act requiring energy and an increase in entropy. Computers can do this, otherwise they could not do facial recognition, or win at chess, or drive a car.

If that is the case, how can the codes TAA, TAG, and TGA mean STOP in DNA encoding and UAA, UAG, UGA mean STOP in RNA encoding? — tom

Organisms are cases where meaning takes physical form; organisms are not only physical; they embody a level of organisation which is more like language or meaning, than anything describable in purely physical terms; hence the effectiveness of biosemiotics. It’s also the sense in which DNA carries morphic information - it encodes the ‘meaning’ of the organism. (Whether DNA is the functional equivalent of the Aristotelian ‘essence’ is a very interesting question. Also see What do organisms mean?, Steve Talbot, for an extended essay on some of these ideas.)


Computers can do what they’re programmed to do, but it doesn’t mean anything to a computer. A computer will win a chess game - I play computer chess all the time on my iPhone - but it doesn’t have any experience of winning. It’s simply executing an algorithm.

How can information be detected if not by means of the senses? — Janus

There are ideas that are not at all 'detectable by the senses', i.e. in pure mathematics and many other forms of abstract reasoning and logic.

As far as everyday experience is concerned, of course sensations are received, but the discussion is mainly about the interpretation of meaning. If you see a sign in a language you can't understand, then you receive the same physical sensations as the person standing next to you, who can - but you don't know the meaning, obviously.

Due to the pervasive influence of philosophical empiricism, I think nowadays we're all inclined to accept the Humean notion that 'all knowledge begins with experience'. But interestingly, in the discussion of Thomist theory of knowledge, the relationship of sensation and intellect is interpreted differently:

if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

I am working on the idea that language is implicitly a kind of 'universal' in that symbols represent entire classes of things, and not just this or that thing. That maps against Chomsky's ideas of there being a universal grammar, which is a kind of intellectual structure which humans alone possess, which make the acquisition of language possible. Whereas, if the empiricists were correct, and we literally born as a 'blank slate', then that system wouldn't be there primed and waiting to learn to speak.

Organisms are cases where meaning takes physical form — Wayfarer

Quite!

There are ideas that are not at all 'detectable by the senses', i.e. in pure mathematics and many other forms of abstract reasoning and logic. — Wayfarer

How do you represent a number to yourself if not by a symbol derived from an auditory or visual representation?

If you see a sign in a language you can't understand, then you receive the same physical sensations as the person standing next to you, who can - but you don't know the meaning, obviously. — Wayfarer

The bare "sense datum" might be, in principle, thought to be the same in both cases; but I would say that the body of the person who understands, for example, the written sentence would experience different sensations than the person who does not. I'm not clear what you mean to show by this example in any case.

if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

All this really says is that what we know via the senses are particulars and what we know in thought are generalities. No one can sensibly deny this, whether they are empiricists or not. A particular cannot be known as a particularly without knowing what it is in general, or in other words what kind of thing it is; and a generality cannot be known as a generality without prior knowledge of particulars; so I would say that knowledge of things and kinds of things is utterly codependent, and neither kind of knowledge is prior. This must even hold for animals because they can obviously distinguish and recognize particular things within their environments.

I am working on the idea that language is implicitly a kind of 'universal' in that symbols represent entire classes of things, and not just this or that thing. That maps against Chomsky's ideas of there being a universal grammar, which is a kind of intellectual structure which humans alone possess, which make the acquisition of language possible. — Wayfarer

It seems obvious that some animals can recognize classes of things (although they are probably not self-reflectively aware they are doing it), so the ability to 'proto-generalize' must be prior to language, and indeed it would seem to be impossible to learn language without that ability. Animals that cannot learn language probably don't possess the physical or neural requisites. Don't you believe that humans are descended for pre-linguistic hominids? If that is true then it seems most plausible to think that language abilities have evolved.

How do you represent a number to yourself if not by a symbol derived from an auditory or visual representation? — Janus

Right from the beginning of this thread it has been acknowledged that the representation is physical. But number is not - it's a rational operation, a mental act.

I'm not clear what you mean to show by this example — Janus

It was in response to 'the detection of information'. Certainly the senses play a part, but the interpretation of the information is not sensory, but intellectual.

All this really says is that what we know via the senses are particulars and what we know in thought are generalities. — Janus

It says rather more than that, really. Universals are more than simply 'generalities'. The ability to understand universals is central to the ability to abstract and represent ideas, which in turn is fundamental to language and rational thought generally. And that is something more than what animals are able to do; the communicative and cognitive abilities of animals can be accounted for in terms of stimulus and response. This point was discussed earlier in the thread, with reference to a book by Chomsky, 'Why Only Us', which distinguishes animal and human communications with the former being linear, and the latter being based on hierarchical syntax. An hierarchical syntax is required for speech proper which is able to communicate intentionality, temporality, and for generative grammar.

A particular cannot be known as a particularly without knowing what it is in general, or in other words what kind of thing it is; and a generality cannot be known as a generality without prior knowledge of particulars; so I would say that knowledge of things and kinds of things is utterly codependent, and neither kind of knowledge is prior — Janus

It is really not as simple as that; I don't think the question of 'the problem of universals' is amenable to being disposed of in a single sentence.

Right from the beginning of this thread it has been acknowledged that the representation is physical. But number is not - it's a rational operation, a mental act. — Wayfarer

It seems the rational act of grasping a number is the mental act of representing it to yourself; what else could it be? How else can you think 'five' other by mentally hearing the sound 'five' or imagining the symbol '5'?

It was in response to 'the detection of information'. Certainly the senses play a part, but the interpretation of the information is not sensory, but intellectual. — Wayfarer

It's not clear to me how you know the interpretation is not a physical act, an act of inner, rather than outer, sense? You wouldn't be able to do it if you were brain dead, or even significantly fucked up on drugs, surely?

Really you’re not showing any understanding of the topic. You kind of join in, I try and explain it, and then you attempt to dismiss the argument on the basis of ‘what you reckon’. Quite a few people have made contributions to this thread, and also offered constructive criticisms of my position which I attempt to respond to, but your attitude is simply argumentative and dismissive. Which is disappointing, because in the past I have felt we have had some kind of rapport, but as far as philosophy is concerned, I’m afraid that seems to have entirely dissappeared.

I believe I understand the issues. I have been trying to address your arguments by asking questions that suggest different hypotheses than yours to explain the data you present in support of them. From my perspective you are not interested in addressing alternative possibilities; which is disappointing because to do so would be the scientific approach. It seems that because I offer alternatives you say I don't understand the topic, or I argue only on the basis of "what I reckon". What "constructive criticisms" of your position have others offered, how have you taken them on board and how has it modified your position?

I don't base my feeling of rapport with others on whether they agree with my philosophical ideas but on what experiences or kinds of experiences we have in common, and how openly and honestly we can speak about them. I don't believe you have been paying much attention or giving much thought to what I have saying to you at all, probably because it is simply not what you want to hear. You do seem to be able to deal better with "argumentativeness' from others. I don't know why exactly this is; perhaps it is because you feel I have betrayed the rapport you used to feel. It is true that at one time, when I first began to participate on philosophy forums I thought pretty much as you seem to think now, and I used to offer very similar arguments (and so I understand how you think and your arguments very well); but I have since altered my standpoint somewhat.

Actually I had decided not to respond to your posts any more since my responses seem to aggravate you, and I believed that you would not respond to mine for the same reason; but you did, and so here we are again. :-}

It is simple enough to demonstrate that information is not physical (at least certain types). We can use the Test of Imagination, as Chesterton calls it: If a thing x is imaginable without the property y, then y is not essential to x. Thus if a certain type of info is imaginable without any physical properties, then physical properties are not essential to this type of info. And this is precisely what we do when we imagine universal forms such as triangle-ness, whiteness, justice, etc. — Samuel Lacrampe

How would you imagine a universal triangle that is not a particular kind of triangle, namely scalene, isosceles or equilateral?

I think that fails Chesterton's test.

So maybe you're thinking of the definition of a triangle (e.g., a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles). And, yes, we can think coherently about that. But the definition is not separable from particulars either, whether the human being that thinks about it or the books that contain it.

Nowadays I think naturalists believe, mistakenly, that science explains the order. But science doesn't explain that order - it assumes it. However, the question of the ‘nature of order’ is, by its very definition, 'meta-physical'; the order is physical, but the 'cause of the order' is beyond, or prior to, the forms in which the order shows up. Trace all the sequence of material causes back to the year dot, and it is said to begin at 'the singularity' (as if by magic!) — Wayfarer

Yes, order (or, in a deeper sense, causality) is necessary to explain anything. But note that those terms are also universals and so are also grounded in observable particulars. There is no view from nowhere.

While classified as metaphysics, Aristotle expected his own cosmological argument to be evaluable on natural and empirical grounds.

How can information be detected if not by means of the senses.? — Janus

What we detect with our senses are particulars - we see the flags and the person waving them, the log book, and so on, but we don't literally see information. To detect it requires the capability of abstracting over those particulars.

It is true that you cannot "bump into" information; it is not a physical object. You cannot bump into gravity, neither is it a physical object; does it follow from that fact that gravity is not physical — Janus

Like information, gravity is a physical abstraction. What we actually feel is the ground beneath us (as it accelerates towards us).

What we detect with our senses are particulars - we see the flags and the person waving them, the log book, and so on, but we don't literally see information. To detect it requires the capability of abstracting over those particulars. — Andrew M

Yes, certainly it's obvious that we don't "see" information, and that we need to be able to generalize ( in fact we need to be able to do that even to see the particulars as anything at all let alone as signs) and I already stated that myself.

Like information, gravity is a physical abstraction. What we actually feel is the ground beneath us (as it accelerates towards us). — Andrew M

Right, again you are agreeing with what I said, which was that gravity is not directly experienced by the senses.

But you haven't addressed the point of what I said; which is the question as to why we should not therefore think of gravity as 'non-physical". Gravity is considered by physicists to be more than merely "a physical abstraction". There is even a search for 'gravity particles', referred to as gravitons. Neuroscientists believe they have already found 'mind particles'; they refer to them as neurons. (Of course they are not fundamental since they are cells composed of more fundamental particles, but what if there were fundamental mind particles, would we then say that mind is non-physical?).

How do you know that? Is it nothing more than a matter of definition? — Janus

Surely it's not definitions. I don't interpret according to definitions in my mind. I might consult a dictionary if I have difficulty interpreting, but even the words in the dictionary need to be interpreted, and I do this without consulting definitions.

But in the world objects engender other objects in various ways, and the forms those engendered objects take seem to be determined by invariances that we call "physical laws". — Janus

How is a physical law anything other than an immaterial Form?

Even if the forms of entities were exhaustively determined by God's will as in Leibniz's Monadic metaphysics; why would there need to be a determining immaterial form in between God's act of will and the actual, physical forms of the entities? — Janus

Because this is what the evidence shows us, that there are immaterial Forms between God's act of will and physical objects. They may be what you call physical laws. If material objects must obey physical laws, then there must be a reason for that. The reason is the will of God. We cannot observe God's act of willing, just like we cannot observe a human act of willing, what we observe is things behaving in such a way as to demonstrate that there is an act of will behind the behaviour of those things. When I see a human being walking down the street, I am not observing an act of willing, I am observing a physical thing behaving in a way which demonstrates an act of will behind that behaviour. The act of willing is not itself observable.