But recall that Aaron answered a question from you the other day about the traditional philosophical view of God as ‘being itsellf’, to which your response was:

I can't see what being could be (apart from being merely our idea) over and above the totality of beings. Being is comprised of beings I would say, just as beings are manifestations of being; I can't think of any other way to make sense of it.


The fact that ‘you can’t think of any other way to make sense of it’, is not actually an argument against this understanding. — Wayfarer

I think it is a challenge to the coherence of the idea that being is something over and above the totality of beings. Here, for the sake of not losing context, is the full exchange:

That every being participates in Being does not imply that Being is identical with the totality of beings, nor that beings are "part of" (in the compositional sense) Being. It simply implies that beings would not be without Being. In other words, God and nature can still be understand as ontologically distinct. The key difference between Aquinas (Monotheism) and Spinoza (Pantheism) is going to be found in their contrasting definitions of substance. — Aaron R

I can't see what being could be (apart from being merely our idea) over and above the totality of beings. Being is comprised of beings I would say, just as beings are manifestations of being; I can't think of any other way to make sense of it. It seems to me that God and nature cannot be understood to be ontological distinct unless God is conceived as otherwise than being; as potentiality or creative freedom, or something along those lines. But then potentiality and creative freedom would seem to be inherent in being, and so would not be "otherwise" at all.

You might say that being consists in the act of being, and so it is ontologically distinct from the totality of beings in that sense. But I think of beings as acts of being, so being would equally be the totality of acts of being, that is one great act of being, and again there would be no ontological distinction.

If you think the idea of being is coherent understood otherwise than as either the totality of beings, or the act of being; then all you have to do is give an account of the alternative understanding.

Whereas here I am inexpertly trying to deal with metaphysical arguments that do claim that ‘being as such’ is real, and real in a way that doesn’t require your agreement or buy-in. In other words, there might be something about this school of argument that you’re not seeing. Please don’t take that as a put-down or an ad hominem because it isn’t intended as such, although we have reached this point in previous debates. — Wayfarer

Here is an example of what I find frustrating in attempting to discuss with you. You claim that there is "something about this school of argument that you're not seeing" and yet you are unable to tell me what it is. I don't take this personally "as an ad hominem or put-down", but it is either condescending (and all the more unjustifiably so if you cannot back it up with an explanation) or it is an evasive tactic; neither of which belong to philosophical discussion as I see it.

I have had a genuine moment of epiphany and that I glimpsed a reality which I have come to think is now lost and forgotten. That is why I have a sense of antagonism towards what a lot of people take for granted. I think it ‘pushes buttons’ because it questions the taken-for-granted nature of reality. — Wayfarer

I have had such moments also, and intensely so. But I draw no conclusions from those moments; and I don't think the ineffable understanding one feels there has any bearing on metaphysical arguments one way or the other. There is 'something more' to be sure; I have no argument with that; but that lies in the realm of "that whereof we cannot speak", except in allusive language. I think philosophy must consist in more than merely allusion; it must also be rigorously consistent. We don't need to rely on the ancients to do philosophy all that is required is imagination and logic. Of course I am not suggesting that we don't need to be familiar with the historical dialectical unfoldment of ideas; to attempt to do philosophy in a total vacuum would be too laborious and time-wasting.

Particular Imagined existences are always part of general material existence though, and the material (in the sense of 'content') of imagined existences is always the material of material existence. — Janus

This doesn't make sense to me. Are you saying that matter has an imagination, and imagines what it will be prior to being that?

This argument holds only if determinism is presumed. I don't accept determinism so the argument has no power to persuade. — Janus

That's not true. The argument is very consistent with free will, so long as you allow that the human mind with its freely willed decision is the cause of the thing being the thing that it is. No determinism here. All material things can be caused necessarily to be the things which they are, without denying free will. The will is not a material thing, and acts as the cause of material things being the things that they are. It is the assumption that the will is a material thing which denies the possibility of free will.

So, what you think of as essence is something which changes constantly along with the conditions of your existence or is it something prior to your existence? — Janus

Of course essence is something which changes. "Essence" refers to what the thing is, so if a thing is changing so is its essence. This is well explained by Aristotle under the concept of "form". The form of the thing is "what" the thing is, and that became known as "essence" by the Latin speakers. The form is the actuality of the thing, what is active, while the matter is passive.

The issue I have with Metaphysician Undiscovered concerns his obfuscation over what it means to say 'two things are the same' or 'two representations have the same meaning'. — Wayfarer

Your confusion comes from your refusal to acknowledge the two distinct ways in which "same" is used. Not recognizing ambiguity and equivocation in your own use of the term causes you to be confused when someone attempts to point it out to you. My actions of attempting to explain to you these two distinct ways in which "same" is used does not constitute obfuscation. Your attempts to disguise this difference is obfuscation.

Try reading the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on "Identity", as a starting point. This is from the first paragraph of the introduction:

A distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973).

But as for 'blurring the difference' - I am making a very general point about the ontology of ideas. I generally assume that most readers understand ideas to be ultimately within the individual mind (as MU has stated throughout). If pressed, most will say that ideas are, therefore, the product of the brain, which in turn is the product of evolution. This is the general consensus in modern culture. Of course its true that none of the pre-modern philosophers understood evolutionary science, so none could respond to it. — Wayfarer

Have you read Plato's Republic? He makes comparisons to breeding dogs, and choosing for favourable characteristics. At one point he puts forth a proposed system of eugenics. Breeding of human beings within the proposed republic is supposed to be completely controlled, to select for favourable traits. Who gets to breed is supposed to be arranged by a lottery, but the lottery is fixed, such that the rulers can control and breed for favourable characteristics. The controlled breeding is disguised, and hidden from the common people by what is called "the noble lie".

This doesn't make sense to me. Are you saying that matter has an imagination, and imagines what it will be prior to being that? — Metaphysician Undercover

No I was referring to entities that we have imagined, responding to your example of someone making a plan for something.

That's not true. The argument is very consistent with free will, — "Metaphysician

I wasn't referring to determinism in that connection but to ontological determinism, where the nature of future entities is determined by their present internal conditions. even here it could not be rightly said that what entities will become is exhaustively determined by what they presently are because it is also determined by external conditions affecting them.

I wasn't referring to determinism in that connection but to ontological determinism, where the nature of future entities is determined by their present internal conditions. even here it could not be rightly said that what entities will become is exhaustively determined by what they presently are because it is also determined by external conditions affecting them. — Janus

So my description of free will holds then. The nature of future entities is not necessarily determined by their present internal conditions, nor by their external conditions, it may be determined by an act of free will. And so you have no argument against the principle that the form of a thing is prior to the material existence of that thing. You reject this principle based on your claim that it is determinist, but it is not. In the case of free will the future of the object is determined neither by the object's internal conditions nor by the object's external conditions, it is determined by an act of free will which is an immaterial cause.

I don't mind the standpoint of nominalism or subjectivism, insofar that the arguments are rational and respectful. If a standpoint is false, then a flaw should exist, and it is a matter of finding it.

And I agree, although, again, it’s important to distinguish a ‘form’ from a ‘mental image’. That is a hard distinction to draw but it’s important. — Wayfarer

I am still unclear about this one. Is 'mental image' the same as 'concept', that is, the form once abstracted in the mind? Or else, if by 'mental image' you mean the physical visualization in the mind, then I agree that concepts are not that; because concepts, being universals, cannot have accidentals properties, which are necessary for any physical visualizations.

I read a few comments where you discussed what sameness is and it seemed to me that MU was more or less right. — Πετροκότσυφας

I don’t want to re-hash all of that again, but Metaphysician Undisovered denied that two propositions that say the same thing are actually saying the same thing. And so on ad nauseum. And if you want to argue that A ‘for you’ means something different than A ‘for me’, then I will likewise say you’re obfuscating.

My basic position is very simple: ideas are real, and they're not reducible to the physical.
— Wayfarer

But that's empty — Πετροκότσυφας

Well, that’s the argument in the OP - that the content of an idea can remain unchanged, despite changing every aspect of its physical representation, including the material system it is represented by. If you think this through, it suggests at least a dualist model in which ‘meaning’ (= information) and ‘representation’ are separable. That is the basis for arguing for a form of hylomorphic dualism, as ‘hylo-morphism’ means ‘matter-form’. So by this analogy, the ‘form’ corresponds with the idea being transmitted and the ‘matter’ is the material means of transmission - flags, Morse Code, and written journal entries. So I am claiming that to say that ‘information is physical’ confuses the two; it’s a category mistake (at the very least).

Futhermore, you said nothing about the response I provided to your quoted passage, which included a direct reference to the point at issue, from Bertrand Russell. I think I addressed the objections raised.

Your confusion comes from your refusal to acknowledge the two distinct ways in which "same" is used. Not recognizing ambiguity and equivocation in your own use of the term causes you to be confused when someone attempts to point it out to you. My actions of attempting to explain to you these two distinct ways in which "same" is used does not constitute obfuscation. Your attempts to disguise this difference is obfuscation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m perfectly aware of the distinction between ‘the same’ in a numerical sense, i.e. ‘the same object’, and ‘the same’ as in ‘the same kind’. That has never been at issue. You’re changing the subject again.

You claim that there is "something about this school of argument that you're not seeing" and yet you are unable to tell me what it is. I don't take this personally "as an ad hominem or put-down", but it is either condescending (and all the more unjustifiably so if you cannot back it up with an explanation) or it is an evasive tactic; neither of which belong to philosophical discussion as I see it. — Janus

I can’t tell you what it is, because it arises from a gestalt shift in the understanding, it requires a different way of seeing the problem. But then I try to explain, and from my perspective, you don’t understand the explanation, and instead say that I’m evading your questions. So there’s a gap here and I don’t think I can close it.

then all you have to do is give an account of the alternative understanding. — Janus

The ‘alternative understanding’ in this case, is the traditional philosophical form of theism that you were discussing at the time. ‘Giving an account’ of that, would be out of scope, short of summarising the whole subject again; my point is that saying ‘you can’t see why such an understanding could be true’, doesn’t amount to an argument. (I think I’ve pointed out an article before, by a Bishop, called ‘God Does Not Exist’, about this very point, but nobody seems to get it.)

But I draw no conclusions from those moments; and I don't think the ineffable understanding one feels there has any bearing on metaphysical arguments one way or the other. — Janus

Whereas I think that this is where metaphysics has to come from.

In particular, whether ideas have a reality apart from the natural world or whether they are grounded in the natural world. In general terms, this is the problem of universals. — Andrew M

Andrew M understands the problem!

I am still unclear about this one. Is 'mental image' the same as 'concept', that is, the form once abstracted in the mind? Or else, if by 'mental image' you mean the physical visualization in the mind, then I agree that concepts are not that; because concepts, being universals, cannot have accidentals properties, which are necessary for any physical visualizations. — Samuel Lacrampe

Did you by any chance glance at the article on Feser’s blog from which the original text about ‘the triangle’ was extracted? In any case, here’s another Feser example:

a mental image of a chiliagon (a 1,000-sided figure) cannot be clearly distinguished from a mental image of a 1,002-sided figure, or even from a mental image of a circle. But the concept of a chiliagon is clearly distinct from the concept of a 1,002-sided figure or the concept of a circle. I cannot clearly differentiate a mental image of a crowd of one million people from a mental image of a crowd of 900,000 people. But the intellect easily understands the difference between the concept of a crowd of one million people and the concept of a crowd of 900,000 people. And so on.

Think, McFly, Think (and I recommend having a read of the whole post.)

We don't need to rely on the ancients to do philosophy all that is required is imagination and logic. — Janus

And value! Where in that, is the domain of value, some way of anchoring qualitative judgement? Or is it entirely subjective, ‘beyond words’, can’t be spoken about: in which case what role does it play in philosophy?

It’s not specifically about ‘the ancients’. What is preserved in Platonist philosophy - which was also profoundly influential in the Scientific Revolution - was a means of discerning a metaphysic of value. Again, you criticise others for ‘scientism’, and yet when I try to present an argument against scientific materialism you criticise that, too.

I am arguing that there was a specific kind of metaphysic inherent in the Western philosophical tradition, which has been lost. This is what I’m trying to articulate and explain. I get that I’m not doing it well.

your remarks seem to be all over the place. — Πετροκότσυφας

Not at all. When Metaphysician Undercover came into this thread, it was to say that two sentences which say the same thing, don’t really say the same thing, but similar things, which devolved into a pointless argument about the difference between ‘similar’ and ‘same’.

Sorry I wasn’t clear about the remaining points, they seem fairly clear to me, but I’m obviously saying far too much, so I will desist. Thanks for your comments.

A lot of these points have been discussed over the last two months since this thread started.

You say you're arguing for a form of hylomorphism, yet it seems closer to some form of cartesian dualism and when you're asked to provide details (for example, what counts as a substance in your version of hylomorphism, what is form, what is matter, what are particulars, what are universals etc), you just don't. — Πετροκότσυφας

There was a very succinct statement from a text book on Thomist psychology given in this post here. It is a clear statement of ‘hylomorphic’ (form and matter) dualism. Actually you might notice that directly above that post, I am in total agreement with Metaphysician Undercover on the key point of the whole thread. The key phrase in this passage is:

if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.

That reflects the Aristotelian version of the Platonic forms, which are said to be imperishable and are perceived by ‘the intellect’ directly, in a way comparable to how the grasp of rational truths are apodictic. (Lloyd Gerson gives the example ‘equals less equals are equal’ as a self-evident truth of logic.)

What ‘forms’ are, is of course a huge question, but the way I understand it is that the ability to understand abstract truths relies on the ability of the mind to grasp representations which signify ideas and particularly general ideas, i.e. ideas that operate universally. Within that context, I understand ‘universals’ in the same way they are usually explained in text books i.e. ‘a universal is what particular things have in common, namely characteristics or qualities. In other words, universals are repeatable or recurrent entities that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things.’ But I also think that mathematical entities such as natural numbers are types of universals. So by universals, I mean numbers, natural laws, conventions, grammatical structures - all of which require the activities of a rational mind. We are, as the Greeks said, ‘the rational animal’, and reason works because it perceives universal principles.

So the above passage is saying that the ‘corporeal senses’ perceive the particular qualities of individual things (accidents) while the intellect grasps its type, its essence.

As for substance - that is a bearer of attributes; it is ‘always a subject, never the predicate’. The original term for ‘substance’ was ‘ousia’ which is nearer in meaning to our word ‘being’ than what we think of as ‘substance’ nowadays.

The difference between hylomorphic dualism and Cartesian dualism is that the latter depicts ‘res cogitans’ as something which exists separately from the physical, as a kind of self-existent substance that exists in its own right. The earlier forms of dualism doesn’t depict it in those terms, as they are not conceived of as existing separately. ‘The soul is the form of the body’, I think is one of the doctrinal sayings of Aristotelianism.

The key point I’m trying to elucidate is that the aspect of the mind that sees meaning, and is capable of abstract reasoning, is not something that can be explained in physical terms, because the objects of such judgements, be they mathematical, or be they judgements of kind and type, are not themselves physical. I often use numbers as paradigmatic cases. When we count, we’re performing a rational operation by which we discern a truth which is common to all who are capable of counting, but which can only be grasped by such a mind. That is why logical and mathematical laws mean something - precisely because they have a common meaning, to all who think. You can’t choose what ‘7’ equals, or how many sides a triangle has. That is where I differed strongly with Metaphysician Undiscovered, who keeps insisting that such ideas only exist in individual minds. I say they are independent of individual minds, but are still mental in nature, as they can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. Hence, ‘objective idealism’.

Clearly scientific reasoning relies on mathematical thinking - I think that’s impossible to dispute. But what kinds of things are numbers? How do they exist? That is the exact question that the passage from Aristotle was about and one of the central questions of Platonic realism. Platonists generally say that numbers are real - both Frege, and Godel were Platonic realists. But a number - say, the number 7 - is not an existing thing, as it can only be grasped by a mind capable of counting. So it’s an ‘intelligible object’. That is the point of Platonic realism, as far as I understand it. And if Platonic realism is correct, then the fundamental objects of the Universe are not necessarily material in nature - they might be ‘more like Platonic ideas’, in Heisenberg’s comment.

Augustine on Intelligible Objects

Obviously knowledge has progressed immensely since the time of the ancient Greeks. Yet philosophical disputes remain. Those disputes often find their origin in the fundamental differences between the views of Plato and Aristotle. In particular, whether ideas have a reality apart from the natural world or whether they are grounded in the natural world. In general terms, this is the problem of universals. — Andrew M

The theory of natural selection, which Aristotle and Plato didn't know about when making their explanations, brings human beings and their ideas fully into the natural world. It seems quite obvious that, if humans are products of the natural world and their ideas are influenced by and in turn influence the natural world, then they are part of the natural world.

The whole idea that humans are apart from the natural world is based on the preliminary explanations of the world and our place in it where we didn't have access to the scientific knowledge we have today. Humans are inherently self-centered and believed they were specially created by a god. They believed in being a separate creation, apart from nature. They believed in souls, which is really just the hard problem of consciousness. All this forms the basis of this original contention between religion and science - between idealism and realism. The division isn't necessary anymore thanks the the theory of natural selection. It brings us all together into one reality - the natural one.

I’m perfectly aware of the distinction between ‘the same’ in a numerical sense, i.e. ‘the same object’, and ‘the same’ as in ‘the same kind’. That has never been at issue. You’re changing the subject again. — Wayfarer

How can you say that the two ways of using "same" has never been at issue? My argument, from the beginning has been that the conclusion of your argument follows from an equivocation of those two distinct ways of using "same", though my way of expression may not be the clearest. I don't deny your right to use "same" in the way you do, I just question what it means. This is the first line from my first post to you:

This argument is very problematic as well. The word "same" here is used in a very unphilosophical way. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, do you understand the difference between these two ways of using "same"? One way is to say that two things are the same "qualitatively", that by reference to some quality or qualities, they are the same. This is what I call "same" based in similarity. The other way of using "same", what Sanford calls "numerically" the same, is to say that they are one and the same thing, what I call the very same.

At my table I have four chairs, and all four are the same chair, qualitatively, because they are members of the same set. But I sat in a different chair yesterday from today, because they are not the same numerically. I can only say that I sat in the same chair (numerically) if it is the very same chair, even though they are all the same chair, qualitatively.

Not at all. When Metaphysician Undercover came into this thread, it was to say that two sentences which say the same thing, don’t really say the same thing, but similar things, which devolved into a pointless argument about the difference between ‘similar’ and ‘same’. — Wayfarer

While I was trying to explain to you the two different ways of using "same", and produce my refutation of your argument on the charge that you equivocate, you just kept reasserting "it is the same information", and "you are obfuscating".

Now that you are fully acquainted with, and understand the two distinct ways of using "same", are you ready to analyze the argument, to see in what sense "same" is used in the premise, and to see in what sense "same" must be used to draw the conclusion, and determine whether there is equivocation? Perhaps we may come to an agreement.

So, when you say that two distinct sentences say "the same" thing which way is "same" used? It appears to me, like it must be used in the qualitative sense. The meaning can't be identified as the very same (numerically) because there are slight differences which we ignore as accidental, in order to claim that the meaning is the same. Nor can we produce a temporal continuity from one instance of meaning to another, (as we can with the chair), to say that it is numerically the same. Do you agree that "same" is used here in the way that Sanford calls "qualitative"?

when you say that two distinct sentences say "the same" thing which way is "same" used? — Metaphysician Undercover

They are used to communicate the same information: ‘three-masted ship, Greek, arrives after noon’. Irrespective of which language is used, or which system of communication, the information remains the same. So, not the numerically the same, but the meaning remains the same.

It doesn’t mean some other type of ship, arriving in the morning. That message would be ‘similar’ insofar as being about the same type of thing, but it would be a different message. And in such a case it would be wrong. (“Schulz! You said Danish! The ship is Greek!’)

The meaning can't be identified as the very same (numerically) because there are slight differences which we ignore as accidental, in order to claim that the meaning is the same — Metaphysician Undercover

The whole point of the idea is that the obvious differences in the way the information is represented, don’t effect the message which is being transmitted. The argument is that the information content must be separable from the representation in order for this to be the case.

It is ‘the same information’ because no matter how it is represented, it always means the same thing. The meaning is determinate. Because of the kind of example it is, there is not a lot of room for equivocation or mis-translation. Obviously in a much more complex matter, then the information that is translated or transmitted by various means, might not be exactly the same - errors might creep in. But that is still not really germane to the point.

The question asked at the outset was: in such cases, what differs, and what stays the same? It is meant to illustrate a simple but important point. And once the principle is established, it has many implications - it is an argument for a form of dualism, because it illustrates that the meaning-content, which is what the rational mind of the human is able to discern, is separable from the physical form i.e. the representation.

Now, I readily acknowledge that my style of argumentation is idiosyncratic and that I am inclined to large leaps of logic and topic, which have been reasonably criticised by yourself and others. I’m taking that on board and will attempt to express myself in a more disciplined way. However, in this case, I don’t see any need to concede that ‘the information is not the same’.

(Incidentally, the Edward Feser blog article about triangularity was taken from Some Brief Arguments for Dualism, Part IV. His comments on the determinate nature of universals are extremely relevant to this thread.)

So my description of free will holds then. The nature of future entities is not necessarily determined by their present internal conditions, nor by their external conditions, it may be determined by an act of free will. And so you have no argument against the principle that the form of a thing is prior to the material existence of that thing. You reject this principle based on your claim that it is determinist, but it is not. In the case of free will the future of the object is determined neither by the object's internal conditions nor by the object's external conditions, it is determined by an act of free will which is an immaterial cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you impute free will to all entities then?

In any case, I would say that even in a case where free will is operating there could be no prior form (independent of the constraining present internal and external existential conditions which you have said constitute an entity's essence) which determines what an entity will become: because if there were then that so-called freedom would be determined by that prior form and not by itself; freedom cannot be freedom if it is determined by something apart from, and prior to, itself; it must be thought as causa sui.

Or are you claiming that this form is free will? If so, the ideas of something formed and something free do not seem to mesh together very well. So, it remains entirely unclear to me as to exactly what you are trying to say here.

Also, why must an act of free will be "an immaterial cause" if the the physical is not deterministic?

But then I try to explain, and from my perspective, you don’t understand the explanation, and instead say that I’m evading your questions. So there’s a gap here and I don’t think I can close it. — Wayfarer

If you allude to your experience, I can respond by saying that I have an idea of the kind of experience you are alluding to. I can only do that if I have had the kind of experience you allude to. But this is not the stuff of rigorous philosophical argument which is what metaphysics must be. Nor is it the stuff of science.

It might be in line with a phenomenological approach, but remember the epoché in phenomenology; it is not appropriate to draw conclusions about the metaphysical nature of the world or reality from phenomenological analyses of experiences. The best we can hope for is clarification of what it is that we experience, in the sense of how we experience what we experience or how it seems to us. This is a matter of affection, or feeling, as I have been pointing out. It is the stuff of religion and the arts; not of metaphysical argument. You seem to be trying to dissolve the boundaries between two approaches; which I think will lead to the dissolution of both approaches

The ‘alternative understanding’ in this case, is the traditional philosophical form of theism that you were discussing at the time. — Wayfarer

If we examine the traditional conceptions of God, then we are faced with logical contradictions. Those contradictions cannot be evaded if you want to remain rigorous. I mean, sure, you can just shrug and say "God is mysterious" and move on, but that is faith ( and I'm not saying there is anything wrong with that, either, but it is not philosophical argument). In any case you have often stated that you do not believe in the traditional theistic conception of God yourself, that you are a Buddhist, so to be honest; I have no idea where you are coming from.

For me to say " I can't see how such a conception it could be true" is, to be sure not an argument, but an avowal that I can't see the philosophical way clear of the aporias which seem to be inherent in the conception in question. It is an invitation to the interlocutor to clear up my concerns, if they can; or to admit that they cannot see past them either, if they cannot.

Whereas I think that this is where metaphysics has to come from. — Wayfarer

Then you need to explain how metaphysics can proceed from phenomenological analysis. If you do that then you will qualify for the Nobel prize for philosophy (oh, wait there is no Nobel prize for philosophy! :’( )

The closest anyone has come to that I would say is Heidegger, but he subsumed metaphysics to phenomenology; and rejected traditional metaphysics as "onto-theology", so his approach will not help you to realize your aspirations.

Andrew M understands the problem! — Wayfarer

And Aristotle had the solution!

It seems quite obvious that, if humans are products of the natural world and their ideas are influenced by and in turn influence the natural world, then they are part of the natural world. — Harry Hindu

Yes, which was Aristotle's naturalist view as opposed to Plato's dualist view (realm of matter plus realm of forms).

But it is also important to note that Aristotle's position was not that nature is equivalent to matter (which is just to reject one horn of Plato's dualism) but, instead, that nature is hylomorphic. That is, what exists are particulars and they are an inseparable unity of matter and form.

And value! Where in that, is the domain of value, some way of anchoring qualitative judgement? Or is it entirely subjective, ‘beyond words’, can’t be spoken about: in which case what role does it play in philosophy? — Wayfarer

Ethics is not determinate, just like aesthetics and metaphysics are not; but that does not stop philosophers from discussing within these disciplines. They proceed by dialectical reasoning and try to approach some truth through elimination of incoherence, inconsistencies and contradictions. Nothing in philosophy can be "anchored" to some 'final authority' because the very idea of final authority is anathema to philosophy. What you are looking for belongs to theology; where authoritative starting premises are taken on faith, and reason works within those bounds.

so to be honest; I have no idea where you are coming from. — Janus

Not for want of trying on my part.

You need to try to give a coherent, consistent account, if you want others to understand your standpoint. I don't think you have attempted to address my questions with any such account. if you think there is anything you have said in the way of an actual cohesive argument that I have failed to address then please point to it, otherwise I think wer'e done.

agree.

So, not the numerically the same, but the meaning remains the same. — Wayfarer

OK, so the meaning is not numerically the same, then I assume you use "same" in the qualitative sense. This means that there is some difference between the two things which are being called the same, they are not one and the same, in the sense of numerically the same. Do you agree?

The whole point of the idea is that the obvious differences in the way the information is represented, don’t effect the message which is being transmitted. The argument is that the information content must be separable from the representation in order for this to be the case. — Wayfarer

But since there is some difference between the two things which are referred to as "the same", then we need to account for this difference. Why would this difference not be due to the (physical) way which the information is represented?

It is ‘the same information’ because no matter how it is represented, it always means the same thing. — Wayfarer

The information, in its various different forms of representation, doesn't mean exactly the same thing, the very same thing, in the sense of numerically the same. It means the same thing in the sense of qualitatively the same. Therefore there are still differences, accidentals. We need to explain the existence of these differences, and how else can we do that without considering the possibility that the differences in the physical medium are responsible for this. If the information were the same in the sense of numerically the same, we wouldn't need to consider the physical existence of the information, the very same information would come through different media. But the information is not the very same, it is qualitatively the same.

So I think that if the information could exist completely independent of any physical medium, it would appear in any physical medium as the very same information, numerically the same. But since the information is in some way dependent on the physical medium for its existence, it cannot switch from one physical form to another without some sort of change in itself.
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In other words, if it were purely immaterial, like the soul is believed to be, it could change from one physical form to another, maintaining its identity as the very same soul, numerically the same, despite having a completely different body. So take myself for instance, my soul had a different physical body when I was a baby, from what it has now that I am grown. But it's still the very same, numerically the same soul, now, as it was then. "The soul" serves as the underlying actuality, the underlying form, which allows me to say that I am the very same person which I was earlier. But "the soul" is not information. And "same" is used in the other way when referring to information. There is no single actuality which underlies all the different instances of the same information. This is evident from the fact that to be actual, information requires that it be interpreted. The act of interpreting gives the information its actuality, but this is carried out by an intellect which is independent from the information.

So you impute free will to all entities then? — Janus

No, I don't impute free will to all entities. You disagreed with the logical argument that the form of a material object is necessarily prior to the material existence of that object with the claim that it makes things deterministic. I showed how it is not inconsistent, with free will, because the form could come from a freely made decision. This does not mean that the form of every material object is derived from a free will decision. It is possible that the form of every object comes about from a freely willed decision, and that's what those who argue that the universe is created by the will of God say. Still, this does not imply that the entities themselves have free will.

It seems to me, that you are just looking for excuses to avoid the argument I presented, rather than addressing the logic of the argument itself.

In any case, I would say that even in a case where free will is operating there could be no prior form (independent of the constraining present internal and external existential conditions which you have said constitute an entity's essence) which determines what an entity will become: because if there were then that so-called freedom would be determined by that prior form and not by itself; freedom cannot be freedom if it is determined by something apart from, and prior to, itself; it must be thought as causa sui. — Janus

No, the free choice determines that form, not vise versa. Remember, we are talking about an object coming into being. Prior to it coming into being there are no necessary internal or external conditions, because there is no object. It is only when there is an object, that it is necessary that there is an essence of that object. So by looking at an object we are inclined to describe its essence in those terms, of internal and external conditions, which it necessarily has, but prior to the object's existence, we know these as possibilities. Therefore it is evident that the form of the object which is prior to its material existence, which we know as possibilities, is fundamentally different from the form of the object which we know through its material form.

Or are you claiming that this form is free will? If so, the ideas of something formed and something free do not seem to mesh together very well. So, it remains entirely unclear to me as to exactly what you are trying to say here. — Janus

As I said, the logical argument necessitates that the form of the object is prior to its material existence. This form is not the free will, but the free will may determine this form. The human act of producing, or creating something is an instance of this. Prior to the object existing, there is no necessity of it coming into being. At the moment in time when the object comes to be the material object which it is, the moment which we call the present, what it is, is determined. At this moment the free will can act to determine what it will be.

Also, why must an act of free will be "an immaterial cause" if the the physical is not deterministic? — Janus

The physical is determined, by the forms. That was the original argument. You didn't like the argument because it was contrary to your belief that determinism isn't the case. I demonstrated that this is not inconsistent with free will, so determinism isn't a problem. That the physical world itself is deterministic is not a problem because what we are talking about here is the immaterial forms, which are distinct from the physical world. The physical world consists of all things which have come into being at the present. But what was the present has already become the past, so this is entirely past time. And past time is deterministic.

They are all excellent questions and quotations, and I'll do my best to address some of the points raised. I will acknowledge that I haven't gone through the hard yards of studying all these texts yet, so as I set before, I'm flying by the seat of my pants, but will try and respond.

So, what does Aristotle mean when he says: "For if attributes, such as "moving" or "white," do not exist apart from their substances"? — Πετροκότσυφας

I think he's asking, how can you say that attributes exist, in the absence of any particulars in which they're instantiated. How can there be 'whiteness', in the absence of any and all white things?

Again, I think the answer revolves around the sense in which corporeal bodies (the proverbial apples and chairs) and universals (roundness, quantity) exist.

You will notice in the earlier passage you quoted, this statement:

For if besides sensible solids there are to be other solids which are separate from them and prior to sensible solids, clearly besides sensible planes there must be other separate planes, and so too with points and lines; for the same argument applies.

So here I think the argument is, that 'sensible solids' are actual physical objects, like a cube. That cube exists here in front of us. So the question is, where does the 'ideal cube' reside? Where does that exist? Does that mean we have the 'sensible' cube, on the one hand, and the 'ideal' cube, as separate entities? In which case we have a proliferation of entities! That seems very much the objection (and incidentally rather similar to Ockham's much later objection.)

This is why I quoted the passage from Russell on universals. He demonstrates that the attribute of 'being north of', exists 'nowhere and nowhen'. So the same answer can be given in respect of Aristotle's question above. To say there is an 'ideal cube' is not to say that the ideal actually exists. It is a 'noumenal object', that is, an ideal object of the intellect, that exists only in an intelligible sense, as an object of reason. But bear in mind, the term 'object' here is strictly speaking a metaphor, because if you reify it as an actual object, then you fall into the trap of asking 'where is it'. And it's not anywhere, because it's prior to, above, or transcendent to anything in time and space. Nevertheless, to understand the form is to grasp the 'idea of a cube. And that is also why it's real - even if you lived in a world where there were no actual cubes, a square, four-sided solid would always exist as a possible object, while a square circle would not.

This is why I posted the passage from Augustine on Intelligible Objects. Again, I don't know all the details of Augustine's views of universals vs Aristotle vs Plato but I sense that he is much nearer Plato's view, probably because he's a mystic. I don't think Aristotle grasped the sense of the transcendental nature of the intellectual objects, because he was not. Plato was a mystic (literally, because he was an initiate into the Mystery schools, which is what the word 'mystic' means); Aristotle was a pragmatist and an empiricist (although certainly nothing like a materialist in today's sense).

So to try and clarify, again, ask this question: does a number, say the number 7, exist? (This is not sophistry.) You will say - of course, you just wrote it. But that's only a symbol, which denotes a quantity, a numerical value. That is what the number is, and that is something that only can be grasped by a mind capable of counting; hence, an 'intelligible object'.

Here is what Augustine has to say of intelligible objects:

Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds, because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, the individual mind does not alter them in any way, it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Furthermore the mind discovers them rather than forming them or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate...

...certain intelligible objects - for example, the indivisible mathematical unit [i.e. prime numbers] - clearly cannot be found in the corporeal world (since all bodies are extended, and hence divisible.) These intelligible objects cannot therefore be perceived by means of the senses; they must be incorporeal and perceptible by reason alone.

...We refer to mathematical objects and truths to judge whether or not, and to what extent, our minds understand mathematics. We consult the rules of wisdom to judge whether or not, and to what extent, a person is wise. In light of these standards, we can judge whether our minds are as they should be. It makes no sense, however, to ask whether these normative intelligible objects as they should be; they simply are and are normative for other things.

In virtue of their normative relation to reason, Augustine argues that these intelligible objects must be higher than it, as a judge is higher than what it judges. Moreover, he believes that apart from the special sort of relation they bear to reason, the intrinsic nature of these objects shows them to be higher than it. These sorts of intelligible objects are eternal and immutable; by contrast, the human mind is clearly mutable. Augustine holds that since it is evident to all who consider it that the immutable is clearly superior to the mutable (it is among the rules of wisdom he identifies), it follows that these objects are higher than reason.

(Source cited previously).

The heuristic method I am working on, is that real numbers and the forms, and so on, are real in the sense of being like a blueprint towards which existing things are inevitably drawn by a kind of tropism. The Aristotelean objection to that arises because it doesn't allow for the fact that there are different levels or modes of existence. There is the mode of existence of corporeal objects, which are compound, mutable, etc (the phenomenal realm); but the mode of existence of mathematical objects and natural laws, is of a different order, in that they transcend corporeal or individual existence; they are of a higher order (the formal realm). This is the gist of Platonic epistemology as laid out in the Analogy of the Divided Line (although I acknowledge my understanding of it is revisionist.)

Now, I acknowledge I haven't dealt with those passages quoted in detail - really there's a lot in them, and it just the kind of material I know I need to study to understand it in detail. But I think the understanding of the intelligible or incorporeal nature of forms and mathematical objects, and the way in which they can be said to exist, is the key to the whole business.

If the geometrician can consider man qua solid, why can't the biologist consider man qua evolved animal? — Πετροκότσυφας

Biologists certainly may consider man qua animal; the issues arise when biology is taken to over-ride philosophy, which happens when the abilities of h. sapiens are treated as of a piece with those of other animals. Because then it implicitly claims that reason and language and other human attributes serve only the purpose of survival, only the propagation of the genome. (This fact may 'astonish' Richard Dawkins but I find it sisyphean.) This then is regarded as 'progress', or a 'scientific discovery' when really it's nothing of the kind; by historical accident, the 'scientific, biological' account replaced the 'mythological, biblical account', and now is treated with quasi- or pseudo-religious reverence, when it philosophically it just places humans on the level of other animals, and then proclaims that this is a discovery. Anyway, that's beside the point.

Yes, which was Aristotle's naturalist view as opposed to Plato's dualist view (realm of matter plus realm of forms). — Andrew M

Then the theory of natural selection proves that Aristotle was right as opposed to Plato?

But it is also important to note that Aristotle's position was not that nature is equivalent to matter (which is just to reject one horn of Plato's dualism) but, instead, that nature is hylomorphic. That is, what exists are particulars and they are an inseparable unity of matter and form. — Andrew M

What are "particulars"? Would that be similar to saying that nature is made up of "information"?

To say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that fashions things on the model of the Ideas? Besides, anything may both be and come to be without being imitated from something else; thus a man may become like Socrates whether Socrates exists or not,and even if Socrates were eternal, clearly the case would be the same. Also there will be several "patterns" (and therefore Forms) of the same thing; e.g., "animal" and "two-footed" will be patterns of "man," and so too will the Idea of man.Further, the Forms will be patterns not only of sensible things but of Ideas; e.g. the genus will be the pattern of its species; hence the same thing will be pattern and copy. Further, it would seem impossible for the substance and that of which it is the substance to exist in separation; — Πετροκότσυφας

This is exactly the question which Plato addresses in The Timaeus, how eternal Ideas may relate to particulars. The question has arisen as at the heart of the critique on Pythagorean Idealism, such Idealism being supported by the theory of participation. The problem with "participation" had been exposed in The Parmenides. This is why the Neo-Platonists invert their understanding of the Forms, such that the true Form is a particular, rather than a universal, it is the One. And, the passive role of the Idea in "participation", as that which is participated in, is replaced with an active role of the One, in "emanation". The One is an active Form which emanates forth reality, rather than a passive Idea which is participated in. This allows that the relationship between the eternal One, and particular entities is a relationship of causation.

Then the theory of natural selection proves that Aristotle was right as opposed to Plato? — Harry Hindu

"Prove" is not the right term. Instead it is a theory that is consistent with Aristotle's natural philosophy.

What are "particulars"? Would that be similar to saying that nature is made up of "information"? — Harry Hindu

Not quite. Particulars are individual things that exist (e.g., an apple, Harry Hindu, a chair). This is contrasted with universals which are common to many particulars (e.g, red things, humans, things with four legs).

Information is a universal. A relevant definition in the context of this thread would be, "What is conveyed or represented by a particular arrangement or sequence of things" (Oxford dictionary).

Part of Wayfarer's argument, I think, is that information isn't the sort of thing you can bump into or detect with your senses. Therefore it shouldn't be considered to be part of the material world. Since information is not an illusion and also not reducible to material, it would seem to imply there is an immaterial (Platonic) realm of ideas or forms.

Aristotle would instead say that information is in the particulars (e.g., the flags being waved or the ship log book) and, as a consequence of being intelligent creatures, humans can perceive the information, or form, that is there. This is no different in principle from perceiving that the flag is red or that the ship log book has a rectangular shape, which are also formal aspects of those particulars.

For Aristotle nature is an inseparable unity of matter and form. Whereas for Plato, matter and form (or ideas) constitute separate and distinct natures.

Part of Wayfarer's argument, I think, is that information isn't the sort of thing you can bump into or detect with your senses. Therefore it shouldn't be considered to be part of the material world. Since information is not an illusion and also not reducible to material, it would seem to imply there is an immaterial (Platonic) realm of ideas or forms. — Andrew M

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For Aristotle nature is an inseparable unity of matter and form. Whereas for Plato, matter and form (or ideas) constitute separate and distinct natures. — Andrew M

It is simple enough to demonstrate that information is not physical (at least certain types). We can use the Test of Imagination, as Chesterton calls it: If a thing x is imaginable without the property y, then y is not essential to x. Thus if a certain type of info is imaginable without any physical properties, then physical properties are not essential to this type of info. And this is precisely what we do when we imagine universal forms such as triangle-ness, whiteness, justice, etc. As universals have no particulars by definition, and all physical properties are particulars, then universal forms are imagined without physical properties. Therefore information regarding universal forms is not physical.

That is not to say that universal forms actually do exist without matter, but only that they can exist without matter, without contradiction.

You need to respect the fact that the properties which a thing actually has, and the properties which a thing is said to have are not necessarily the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your logic is correct; however, we can take a shortcut when it comes to physical things, because of the law of physics that no two physical things can occupy the same space at the same time. As such, the properties of place and time are sufficient to determine if two physical objects observed are the same. And... it is also possible for universal concepts, because they have a limited quantity of essential primary properties (they may have an infinite quantity of essential secondary properties, but these are not critical in defining the concept, as previously explained).

It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around.
— Samuel Lacrampe

There are two sides to this procedure, and you are completely neglecting one side. The perception of the object is one factor which allows us to describe it, but knowing the words, and their meanings is another factor. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are missing my point, as I was using my statement above merely as an analogy. My point was that we are certain of the truth of particular examples that contain the concept, such as "this is not a triangle". My hypothesis that "we already have implicit knowledge of the concept from observation" explains this phenomenon, and has not yet been refuted.

Did you not ever go to school in your life? It is quite clear, that in school we learn the concepts, they are taught to us by our teachers. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that we can learn some concepts in school, but it does not follow that concepts are subjective. We are taught some math concepts, and yet it is clear that these concepts are objective. Besides, what about the fact that people born blind cannot apprehend the concept of redness, despite having gone to school? Remember that the essential property of redness is not "this light frequency range", which is merely its cause (and good luck explaining light), but purely this.

I simply explained that you were working off an incorrect definition of "ideal", which made the ideal into a particular instance of occurrence. If "ideal" is made into a particular instance of occurrence, then any occurrence is the ideal of that particular occurrence, and "ideal" looses all meaningfulness. So I could define the "ideal" as obtaining 40% on my math exam, then if I get 40% on my math exam I have obtained the ideal. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

What is your definition of ideal? Mine is "perfection; as good as a thing can possibly be". Note that I don't mean Perfection in everything (this could only be God); only in the thing discussed. Under that definition, it is definitely possible to reach ideals. The ideal answer to 2+2 is 4, because it is as good as it can possibly be. And a 100% score on an exam is the ideal score, because there is nothing to add to reach a better score. I don't understand your example of "40% score on an exam"; what is this ideal of? Not score, because it is possible to obtain a better score.

Aristotle would instead say that information is in the particulars — Andrew M

And I think a Platonist response would be, very simplistically - what put it there? What is the origin or source of the order? Now this is not an 'argument from design', because I’m not proposing a causal sequence originating with an intentional act by a designer; the argument I would invoke is that wherever we look, we find an already-existing order, and in fact we rely on that order to explain or understand anything.

Nowadays I think naturalists believe, mistakenly, that science explains the order. But science doesn't explain that order - it assumes it. However, the question of the ‘nature of order’ is, by its very definition, 'meta-physical'; the order is physical, but the 'cause of the order' is beyond, or prior to, the forms in which the order shows up. Trace all the sequence of material causes back to the year dot, and it is said to begin at 'the singularity' (as if by magic!)

The atom, which was supposed to be the fundamental physical unit, has itself been shown to be mostly empty space, and yet many people, and even many scientists, still continue to believe that atoms are fundamental. But surely the order which precedes and informs the atoms is fundamental. Without that order, nothing could come into existence. So the order is nearer to the cause, and the atoms nearer the result. That's certainly how the various types of Platonism understand it.