Forms, constraints, bounds or limits are "real" to the degree that they "care". — apokrisis

Could you elaborate on the use of "care" in this context? I get that they make a difference, or are bounds, or whatever, but I don't see how that adds up to "cares".

Right. So as I was saying about the principle of indifference.... — apokrisis

No, you are saying that no two things can be absolutely different. I am saying that they can.

Also, you are saying that:

Reality appears composed of concrete particulars. But the emphasis is on appears. It isn’t really. — apokrisis

I am saying that reality is composed of concrete particulars.

Your ontological vagueness merely introduces vagueness. It makes things unnecessarily complicated. I see no reason for it.

Information is the idea, within the conveyor's mind, of the information conveyed in a medium. Therefore, a phrase in Catalan and that same phrase in French are the same information.

Could you elaborate on the use of "care" in this context? — Wayfarer

I'm simply saying I accept a causal ontology in which finality always plays a real part. That finality may seem completely attentuated - as in when talking about the entropic desire of the Second Law. But it is still considered real, even if only a material tendency and not a semiotic relation (as in an organismic function or purpose).

Your ontological vagueness merely introduces vagueness. It makes things unnecessarily complicated. I see no reason for it. — Magnus Anderson

So you are arguing against the principle of indifference by telling me all about how you personally choose to apply it. Congrats.

So you are arguing against the principle of indifference by telling me all about how you personally choose to apply it. Congrats. — apokrisis

I am not arguing against what you call "the principle of indifference". I am arguing against your claim that there is no such thing as absolute difference. I agree that we are only ever aware of a portion of reality (what you call "the principle of indifference") but I disagree that this fact leads to what you claim. There is this thing that you call "the principle of indifference" and then there is this thing we call "absolute difference". They are not mutually exclusive.

I also disagree with your claim that reality is not composed of concrete particulars. I have to note that this claim does not follow from "the principle of indifference" either. Just because we are only ever aware of a portion of reality does not mean that what we are aware of is not reality itself.

Just because we are only ever aware of a portion of reality does not mean that what we are aware of is not reality itself. — Magnus Anderson

'Reality itself' eh? Philosophy as a discipline is based on questioning our innate sense of the reality of common experience. There is a fundamental sense in which reality is constructed by the brain/mind on the basis of sense data, but also on the basis of our intellectual and even biological faculties.

So one of the major points of this thread, I hope, is to call attention to the way the mind is able to interpret signals and signs so as to derive meaning which is able to remain constant even while the signals in which the meaning is encoded vary completely in terms of form and type. Our minds 'see meaning' and 'see reason', more or less reflexively. And what is simply given, what is already the case, might be impossible to completely disentangle from those interpretive acts which the mind is continuously engaged in. That's what I am hoping will be reflected on in this debate.

Furthermore, I have the view that Plato's intuition of universals, forms or ideas is fundamental to understanding this process. I think that universals and forms are something other than simply concepts or internal to the act of thinking but are actually real, albeit in a way that can only be grasped or understood by a rational intelligence. That is the basis on which I am hoping to understand and defend a realist view, with respect to universals.

It allows me to distinguish between accidents and necessities for a start. — apokrisis

Such a distinction is the one that is artificial, arbitrary. It's a good example of how the "difference which makes a difference" is a completely subjective principle. We distinguish necessities from accidents based on our purpose or intent. If the intent is not 'the truth", then the determination is skewed.

So the genome stands for what is necessary. And then that defines what are merely accidents that particularise oak trees - the differences in form that make this one distinct from that one. It is a matter of indifference if one oak tree has a broken limb, or a different pattern of branching, or whatever. — apokrisis

Oh come on, you cannot distinguish what is necessary from what is accidental by reference to the genome. That's nonsense.

So my approach introduces a sound basis for separating reality into its formal necessities and accidental differences. — apokrisis

That's a joke.

There is a fundamental sense in which reality is constructed by the brain/mind on the basis of sense data, but also on the basis of our intellectual and even biological faculties. — Wayfarer

What does it mean that reality one's perception of reality is constructed by the brain on the basis of sense data? That is the question. More generally, what does it mean that X is constructed based on Y? Even more generally, what does it mean that X is caused by Y? What is causality?

What does it mean that reality one's perception of reality is constructed by the brain on the basis of sense data? — Magnus Anderson

It means what it says. Your brain - the most complex single known natural phenomenon in the entire universe - consumes a large proportion of your body's oxygen and nutrients. What's it doing, other than keeping your heart and lungs going (most of which is done by the brain stem which is hardly any different in reptiles)? Why, it's creating your world - integrating all the sensory input into a unified domain of experience, a.k.a. 'the world'. That is reality. The notion of reality being 'there anyway', what persists when there's nobody around to see it, is also a construction of that superb organ, the human brain. We never know anything by other means.

I am not arguing against what you call "the principle of indifference". I am arguing against your claim that there is no such thing as absolute difference. — Magnus Anderson

I'm asking you to think about what viewpoint justifies talking about any absolutes here.

This is the standard problem of a physicist description of material reality. Physics keeps finding that "everything" is only relative. Absolutism keeps melting away and proving only to be an emergent limit. And so I adopt a metaphysics that accounts for that kind of reality.

You keep responding in terms of the predicate logic, the laws of thought, which are designed for reasoning about concrete particulars. And so they take reality to be constituted of parts that are crisp and definite. Things can be absolutely the same, or absolutely different, in the simple-minded fashion you try to demonstrate with set theory. The axiom of choice just applies, no problems.

But the physical facts don't support such a view. The physical facts say that is just the sufficiently coarse-grain approximation. It is a point of view from somewhere in the low energy/large scale middle of things - the classical scale of reality modelling.

You are then falsely extrapolating from a low energy/large scale view to a view universal enough to include the indeterministic quantum foundations of the Cosmos. Congrats by the way if you can do that. You'll get the Nobel for finding the solution to quantum gravity for a start.

So there are two metaphysical views in contention here. I'm pointing out that your logic and its associated classical ontology just don't apply in the final analysis. They are an excellent duo for the middle ground description of what we experience. But we already know a different logic is needed for the actual universalised view of a quantum-based reality.

I also disagree with your claim that reality is not composed of concrete particulars. I have to note that this claim does not follow from "the principle of indifference" either. — Magnus Anderson

It's the other way round. We know from close observation of reality that it doesn't conform to our simplistic logic.

It means what it says. — Wayfarer

That would be evading the question. I much prefer it when people honestly say "I don't know" or "I don't understand your question".

We need to agree on what causality is. No fruitful discussion can take place if we simply skip this step. In my view, causality is nothing but a form of correlation. So when we say that X causes Y what we're saying, roughly speaking, is that X and Y are correlated, or in other words, that whenever X happens Y follows.

My view is that reality is a mass of particulars (i.e. facts, events, sensations, etc.) If we knew everything there is to be known about the world, we'd describe the world in terms of a mass of particulars. We wouldn't be talking about some underlying mechanism (i.e. a universal) that generates these events (i.e. particulars.) No, what we would do is we would say "this happens, then this happens, then this happens, and so on". There would be no descriptions such as "this happens and then that causes this to happen and than that causes this to happen and so on".

Mechanisms are human inventions. We create them for the purpose of prediction. Prediction implies ignorance. If we weren't ignorant we'd have no reason to make predictions. And we make predictions for the purpose of attaining our goals (whatever they are.)

We distinguish necessities from accidents based on our purpose or intent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Except now we are talking about what the Cosmos thinks about the issue. How does it understand the difference between the necessary and the accidental?

Oh come on, you cannot distinguish what is necessary from what is accidental by reference to the genome. That's nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it's all a matter of viewpoint, why do you refuse to generalise your very subjective notion of viewpoint? Why are you so violently opposed to an immanent naturalist metaphysics?

I much prefer it when people honestly say "I don't know" — Magnus Anderson

Except for in this case, it wouldn't have been an honest response.

My view is that reality is a mass of particulars (i.e. facts, events, sensations, etc.) — Magnus Anderson

That is already a well-trodden path, in the form of 'logical atomism', one of the main sources of positivism.

Physics keeps finding that "everything" is only relative. Absolutism keeps melting away and proving only to be an emergent limit. And so I adopt a metaphysics that accounts for that kind of reality. — apokrisis

You have yet to show to me how two well-defined portions of reality that are evidently different in all regards are in fact not different in all regards. Your approach so far has been to look for portions of reality that have something in common so that you can create an appearance that I am wrong by tricking me into thinking that these portions of reality that do have something in common are the portions of reality I am talking about. That's sophistry.

Things can be absolutely the same, or absolutely different, in the simple-minded fashion you try to demonstrate with set theory. The axiom of choice just applies, no problems.

But the physical facts don't support such a view. — apokrisis

You have yet to show that.

My position is closer to that of Ernst Mach.

You have yet to show to me how two well-defined portions of reality that are evidently different in all regards are in fact not different in all regards. — Magnus Anderson

I thought you had to show me two well-defined portions of reality which share nothing in common first. Good luck on that. You've been strangely silent on things like the issue of the collapse of the wavefunction so far.

I am silent on issues that are irrelevant. I don't care about QM. It's irrelevant. As for well-defined portions of reality that share nothing in common, any pair of sets that have no elements in common would do. I already gave you an example with baskets and fruits.

Why are you so violently opposed to an immanent naturalist metaphysics? — apokrisis

I've given you the reasons already, in other threads, as well as this one. You employ unintelligible ontological principles. By appealing to naturalism you deny the well respected dichotomy between natural and artificial, opting for a different definition of "natural". Under this naturalism, artificial becomes a sub-category of the natural. I believe this is a mistaken approach.

I don't care about QM. — Magnus Anderson

Good luck with your classical realism then.

Classical realism? What exactly is that? Google gives me a theory of interpersonal relations. Is that what you mean? I think you're not paying enough attention to what is being said. Einstein was a realist and I don't agree with Einstein's approach to doing science. Among other things, Einstein hated randomness. I don't. I am more of a Heisenberg type of a guy. Just stick to the facts.

well-defined portions of reality — Magnus Anderson

The issue that QM made inescapable was that reality could not be that well-defined; when you get down to the nitty-gritty, the uncertainty principle comes into play. So the more minutely you define it, the less certain it becomes.

I am more of a Heisenberg type of a guy — Magnus Anderson

His 'sticking to the facts' was nothing like positivism, however. It was more like circumspection about what could be said in respect of the objects of quantum mechanics (or indeed whether they really were 'objects' at all.)

the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present (20th) century.

This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use then of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.

During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?

I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or—in Plato's sense—Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.

Heisenberg, The Debate between Plato and Democritus, in Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science (1958)

Another interesting observation:

Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our method of questioning. This was a possibility of which Descartes could not have imagined, but it makes a sharp separation between the world and the 'I' impossible. [this is a crucial insight, IMO]

If one follows the great difficulty which even eminent scientists like Einstein had in understanding and accepting the Copenhagen interpretation... one can trace the roots... to the Cartesian partition....it will take a long time for it [this partition] to be replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality.

That is the work-in-progress we're all undertaking here. :-)

The issue that QM made inescapable was that reality could not be that well-defined; — Wayfarer

Which means exactly what? What does it mean that reality is "well-defined"?

when you get down to the nitty-gritty, the uncertainty principle comes into play. So the more minutely you define it, the less certain it becomes.

How is this relevant to what I am saying? Did I ever say that the universe is necessarily predictable? I don't ever remember saying that.

So far, the argument has been: two sets A = {1,2,3} and B = {4,5,6} are not absolutely different because they have "being a set" in common. But these two sets do not have "being a set" as an element. This is sophistry because it is pretending to be comparing sets A and B when in reality it is comparing sets that are not A and B but that are similar to A and B. That's @apokrisis's argument in a nutshell. He has done nothing to support his claim. All he's done ever since is claim that physics, QM in particular, shows that there is no such thing as absolute difference. Of course, without ever showing how. I have a strong impression that these people do not know what they are talking about. Whenever you ask them to show that they know what they are talking about, they back off.

There is a fundamental sense in which reality is constructed by the brain/mind on the basis of sense data, but also on the basis of our intellectual and even biological faculties. — Wayfarer

There is an inherent contradiction here, because the argument that what we experience is not reality because it is constructed by the brain/mind depends on the assumption that our understanding of the brain/mind corresponds to how things are (reality). the argument thus refutes itself because it is not only circular but contradictory.

The argument is thus not merely like a snake biting its tail, but a snake consuming itself down to the last, most difficult bite. ;)

To each other object. Space is, in such a metaphysic, composed entirely of relations between objects. Therefore, it could be argued that the objectual properties refering to space are not "of the object", but "of the world". Time could be seen in a similar way, replacing objects with events. — Akanthinos

Got it, thanks. In other words, it could be there is no such thing as an absolute cartesian coordinate system for space. I am okay with this theory for space, but it cannot work for time. Time is a function of causality, whereby an effect cannot logically exist before its cause, and so at the very least, the "direction" of time is an absolute.

But that's not the same thing. "A triangle doesn't have the property of compatibility with circularity" states nothing about the potential compatibility of triangularity and circularity, which is exactly what we are trying to get at here. "A triangle has the property of not being compatible with circularity" is already closer to the mark. The first one doesn't have the causal relevance necessary the full phenomena. — Akanthinos

I see your point, that the second statement gives more info than the first one. But as you said before, this results in having an infinite amount of negative properties like "A triangle has the property of not being compatible with figures with 4, 5, 6, ... sides"; which is absurd. [Absurd for a philosopher; not for common people who would not give two craps about such a discussion :D ].

How about this solution: Let's differentiate between first and second properties, whereby second properties are deduced from the first. E.g., a triangle has the first properties of "flat surface" and "three straight sides", and then second properties of "not being compatible with circularity, or figures with 4, 5, 6, ... sides", and "the sum of angles equates to 180°" etc, all of which can be deduced from the first properties. As such, first properties are always positive, and second properties can be positive or negative.

One could argue that there are at least two spaces for each act of understanding : the space occupied by the information itself, and the space occupied by the information necessary to interpret the object of understanding. As such, understanding, as a stand-in for information processing, would be distributed. — Akanthinos

I think I understand; but these spaces seem merely accidental, and not essential to the process of understanding, like a particular triangle will always have a particular size and location, even though size and location are not essential properties. Even if it is not actual, telepathy as a process of transferring info seems logically possible, and would not require these spaces, although time is still inevitably present.

But these two sets do not have "being a set" as an element. — Magnus Anderson

Do these two sets belong to the set of all sets that have no elements in common?

I'm curious as to how both of you think that what Aaron says here would differ from what naturalism allows. Or to put it another why I wonder whether both of you agree that naturalism would not allow mathematical objects to exist "as a nexus of relations etc...". I would also like to hear exactly why Wayfarer thinks that, and why Aaron does, if he does. Also I would like to know whether you think this applies to all possible forms of naturalism, or only to specific forms. — Janus

Sorry, Janus, I overlooked your reply somehow.

It's hard to answer your question because there are so many different forms of naturalism. I've encountered self-proclaimed naturalists who claim to believe in the existence of everything from numbers, to qualia to God. The common thread running through most versions of naturalism is the denial of transcendence, and often the word "natural" is cashed out in reference to the natural sciences. In that case, you end up with claims such as "nothing exists beyond what is posited by the natural sciences". But there's often disagreement regarding even what is and is not to be considered "officially" posited by the sciences.

I suppose that if a naturalist were willing to countenance the existence of sign relations they could attempt to make the case for a naturalistic theory of the intellect. At that point the argument will take its familiar turn into debates about the possibility/impossibility of explaining things such as qualia, semantic content, intentionality, etc. in "naturalistic" terms.

The common thread running through most versions of Naturalism is the denial of transcendence, and often the word "natural" is cashed out in reference to the natural sciences. In that case, you end up with claims such as "nothing exists beyond what is posited by the natural sciences". But there's often disagreement regarding even what is and is not to be considered "officially" posited by the sciences. — Aaron R

Thanks for your response Aaron. I think the underlined part hits the nail squarely. I don't think naturalism has to be defined in terms of science, but rather in terms of what is immanent to human experience. Science is only one part of human experience, so what is immanent to human experience would also include aesthetics and ethics, religion and the divine. What naturalism properly denies is that there is a truly separate supernatural (transcendent) 'realm'. As I asked Wayfarer earlier, how does considering God to be transcendent and supernatural (meaning radically separate and independent) help with explaining its role in creating and/or sustaining the world?

This view produces the problem of interaction which plagued the Cartesian picture. On the other hand an immanent (indwelling and natural) ideas about God's causal efficacy are easier to understand and elaborate, while remaining in the province of philosophy and metaphysics rather than science.

There is an inherent contradiction here, because the argument that what we experience is not reality because it is constructed by the brain/mind depends on the assumption that our understanding of the brain/mind corresponds to how things are (reality). the argument thus refutes itself because it is not only circular but contradictory. — Janus

I really don’t see it. I’m making no assertion of a correspondence between mind and the world. Incidentally, the ‘last bite’ argument was David Stove’s criticism of David Hume, in particular, and positivism, generally, as I’ve mentioned before.

The way in which I say the brain and mind construct the world is consistent with the scientific understanding of cognition and perception. What it challenges is scientific realism, or what I call ‘there anyway’ realism. That is the sense in which the second quotation from this post is relevant.

As I asked Wayfarer earlier, how does considering God to be transcendent and supernatural (meaning radically separate and independent) help with explaining its role in creating and/or sustaining the world? — Janus

It’s an impossible question, or at least a very difficult one. I think you can only consider such questions in the terms that the various theistic and philosophical traditions which incorporate such ideas do.

The common thread running through most versions of Naturalism is the denial of transcendence, — Aaron R

Which often amounts to what Thomas Nagel described as ‘the fear of religion’ in his essay ‘Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion’; Anything But God! That animates an enormous amount of modern philosophy.