'There is, however, an unconditioned, an unmade, an unfabricated. Were there no unconditioned, unmade, unfabricated, there would be no escape from the made, the conditioned, the fabricated' — Wayfarer

Yeah. There is no escape from it. And the question is why would one even want to escape from it?

If you do Zen, you will know that you can't actually still the mind. Your inner voice is always itching to yap away. Your training to ignore it, let it go, not pursue it, focus on something as unstimulating as possible, is only an attempt to get it to fade into the background a while.

Once you are shaped by linguistic habits, it is only natural for the brain to want to generate a linguistic response to every attentive moment. Whatever is passing through focus demands some kind of spoken comment. It is no different from seeing objects in the world and automatically having the start of the thought of what to do physically. See an axe and already your mind will be leaping to axe-wielding feelings and actions.

So Zen imagines what the mind might be like if it stopped doing what it was designed for. The mind is designed to find some meaningful point of focus in any instant and become flooded with the behavioural responses most appropriate. These include vocal framing responses in humans. We've already got to be getting going with the commenting as part of "being conscious".

That makes a philosophy of Zen very odd to me. I can accept that meditation may be very good for the modern mind. We now have a culture that could be said to be ridiculously wordy. The weight of comment we want to pack in to cover off every passing instant of awareness might be uncomfortably unbalanced. So unwinding back to a more unconditioned state would be a valuable skill to have in that context.

But to make a complete unwinding of the thinking self a cultural goal would be a strangely self-denying one. For me, the "highest plane" would be the balanced state of a mind well adapted to its world. So not too much talk, and not too little.

If Zen is understood as gaining control over that balance, then that makes sense. But note how that is then a meta- state. It is the gaining of control by stepping back another level to discover the variety to be controlled. So it is not about actually returning to some more primal state. It is about stepping back to make decisions on where on a spectrum of less considered states you might want to set your current state. You now have to have a clear idea of what you don't want to be so as to be the thing you do want to be.

Being "primal" is thus even less primal in being comprehended or measured in terms of what it is not. To achieve that kind of mastery is indeed a higher state of consciousness in being more meta-.

You’re saying that purely for sake of argument. If you were employed to do the job in the thought-experiment, you wouldn't have any latitude. — Wayfarer

I didn't say that just for the sake of argument. You wrote lines in different languages. I don't even know what some of the languages you used were. How could those different lines possibly have the same meaning to me?

You haven't addressed the point I made. The conclusion of your argument can only be derived through equivocation, that's why it's sophistry. When you say "the same meaning" you mean "same" in the sense of "similar". But the argument's conclusion can only be drawn if "same" is taken in the sense of "the very same" or "identical". A phrase translated from one language to another doesn't maintain the very same meaning, nor does one phrase have the very same meaning for two distinct people. The meaning is similar. These are differences which often do not make a significant difference in common practise. But when the conclusion of your argument requires no difference whatsoever, then these differences do make a significant difference, because it's enough difference to invalidate your argument.

The information is either conveyed, or it's not. — Wayfarer

This is clearly a misrepresentation of information. If it were the case that either the information is conveyed or it is not, then there would be no such thing as ambiguity. Are you aware of this Wayfarer? Do you recognize the existence of this thing which we call ambiguity? If so, how do you reconcile the existence of ambiguity with your claims of "same meaning"?

I haven't denied that the modes of our experience are culturally mediated, but there must be raw experience that underlies that. You can experience that yourself if you just gaze out your window without thinking about anything. — Janus

As I've just posted, I don't find it possible to literally "not think about anything". And neuroscience explains why that would be the case.

When we sleep, our brain really does try to shut down.

In REM sleep, the brain is active yet the sensory gates are slammed shut at the brainstem. Yet then we erupt with bright imagery and a confused narrative chase after some thread of story.

And even in n-REM sleep, where the neural activity is turned as low as possible, there is still a desultory inner chatter - a meandering disjointed ruminative thinking.

A conditioned brain can't just uncondition itself.

So there are good grounds for disputing your claims that there can be "raw experience" in some foundational sense.

Sure, we can be less talky. We can turn our attention towards a peaceful world and away from our interior chatter. We can lose ourselves in sport, or music, or dance or other absorbing forms of action.

But none of this answers neurologically to an idea of "raw experience".

It has an experiential dimension which I think is largely forgotten and is certainly hardly taught any more.

- Wayfarer

Also you referred to "objective idealism" which is not Plato (which is rather a form of Conceptual Realism) but predominately Hegel, and following him, Peirce. — Janus

I do indeed regard Plato as an objective idealist, in that he believed the Forms or Ideas were real, i.e. they were not simply the creations of individual minds or social conventions. The traditions in which I think the elements of Platonism as a living philosophy have been preserved are Christian, in the form of Christian Platonism. Two examples are Aquinas and 'neo-Thomism', of which Ed Feser is a representative and the Eastern Orthodox tradition, as well as in Christian mysticism. But then, I'm not a Christian apologist; it's just that in those traditions, something of the Platonist understanding has been preserved and still has some vitality.

But the experiential dimension I'm getting at, is not necessarily Christian. What I'm concerned with is a metaphysic of value. What I say has been lost, is due to the historical development or even deterioration of the classical Western tradition due to the influence of scientific materialism. There have been developments, or again, a degeneration, in the understanding of nature, which often shows up in the assumptions we make about reality, about what we take for granted or think is obvious.

Otherwise it remains empty conjecture; "they are real", "no they're not", "yes they are", and so on ad nauseum. — Janus

In the original dialogues and the critiques of the 'Doctrine of Ideas' there are very detailed enquiries into such ideas, which again, you have not shown any interest in. There are various contributors that are trying to address the subject in terms related to the tradition of Western philosophy.

And the question is why would one even want to escape from it? — apokrisis

If you don't feel that need, then nothing need be said - it's a religious or spiritual quest, which I'm not particularly interested in discussing. I drew attention to that passage from the Buddhist suttas, only to provide a point of comparison for what Janus seems to be referring to.

I don't even know what some of the languages you used were. How could those different lines possibly have the same meaning to me? — Metaphysician Undercover

That is the whole point of this thread. The meaning can be represented by entirely different symbols, languages, media types and so on - so 'the meaning' is separable from the representation. It doesn't matter that you can't read French, German, Latin, or morse code, the meaning is the same for those who are can. Not 'similar'- the same.

When you say "the same meaning" you mean "same" in the sense of "similar" — Metaphysician Undercover

Every version means the same: "Greek ship, three masted, arriving after noon". NOT Spanish ship, two masted, arriving this morning, or anything else - it means specifically what it says.

If it were the case that either the information is conveyed or it is not, then there would be no such thing as ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no room for ambiguity in the example given. Of course there can be ambiguity in other matters. But when it comes to conveying technical information, such as specifications, directions, instructions, and so on, then the meaning has to be conveyed exactly. I know this from practical experience, as I'm a technical writer by profession.

That is the whole point of this thread. The meaning can be represented by entirely different symbols, languages, media types and so on - so 'the meaning' is separable from the representation. It doesn't matter that you can't read French, German, Latin, or morse code, the meaning is the same for those who are can. Not 'similar'- the same. — Wayfarer

Have you ever read translations? The translator has a choice as to the best words, the best way to translate. One person will translate with completely different words than another. Clearly, the translation is not the same as the original, it is similar.

There is no room for ambiguity in the example given. Of course there can be ambiguity in other matters. But when it comes to conveying technical information, such as specifications, directions, instructions, and so on, then the meaning has to be conveyed exactly. I know this from practical experience, as I'm a technical writer by profession. — Wayfarer

That you can come up with an example, or a few examples, where there is very little room for ambiguity, doesn't negate the fact that in the vast majority of cases of information there is significant ambiguity. In order for your argument to be valid, there can be no ambiguity in any information, or else we could not call it information. Clearly you misunderstand, and therefore misrepresent, the nature of "information". Ambiguity is a widespread attribute of information, and your argument assumes that if there is any ambiguity whatsoever, it no longer qualifies as "information".

All of which is beside the point, but if we can go for 48 pages with you not getting the point, then I will leave it at that.

I do indeed regard Plato as an objective idealist, in that he believed the Forms or Ideas were real, i.e. they were not simply the creations of individual minds or social conventions. — Wayfarer

An objective idealist says that objects are ideas, are spiritual in essence, they are manifestations of spirit or mind. Spirit or mind is not separate from or transcendent of objects, it is what they are, what is immanent in them. Conversely if Plato says that ideas are objects, that would seem to be a completely different notion. The objective idealists were not Platonists as far as I know; Hegel and Peirce both rejected the idea of anything transcendent. So, you are muddying the waters by trying to mix different modes of thought together, or so it seems to me.

Conversely if Plato says that ideas are objects, that would seem to be a completely different notion. — Janus

The problem is the word ‘objective’. That word didn’t come into use until around the 18th century. But the Ideas of Plato were not simply in individual minds, the were real in the sense that they are ‘common to all who think’, to use Augustine’s expression. So, yes, ‘objective’ might be problematical, but the basic notion of the ‘real nature of the Ideas’ is what is at issue.

Hegel and Peirce both rejected the idea of anything transcenden — Janus

That is simply not true. Hegel apart from being a philosopher, was also a Protestant. Actually if you read Hegel’s philosophy of religion, he develops a very detailed argument of the sense in which God is transcendent. Peirce likewise was not an atheist, although the spiritual side of Peirce is not mentioned much by his scientific affeciandos. He certainly rejected Cartesian dualism but it is simply not true that he rejected ‘the tanscendent’ as a category (although please don’t ask me to go to the bother of looking up a reference.)

As I said to Apokrisis, ‘immanent’ is generally posited in relation to ‘transcendent’; the Christian doctrine of God is that God is ‘both immanent and transcendent’, i.e. appeared in the world in the form of Jesus, and dwells in it as the Spirit, yet is also wholly beyond the world. I think that is the belief of all the major denominations.

. Actually if you read Hegel’s philosophy of religion, he develops a very detailed argument of the sense in which God is transcendent. Peirce likewise was not an atheist, although the spiritual side of Peirce is not mentioned much by his scientific affeciandos. — Wayfarer

Ah, so you've read that work? Perhaps you could proffer a brief account of the key ideas in Hegel's conception of a transcendent God then. My understanding is that for Hegel evolution and history are the unfolding of spirit or God. He broadly accepted Spinoza's account of God as being immanent in nature. He acknowledges that we can think there might be 'something' transcendental (as opposed to transcendent) but this cannot be anything more than an immanent (human) idea. But perhaps you can show where this is wrong.

I never said that Hegel or Peirce were atheists so you are responding to a paper tiger with that comment.

There's an article by Robert M. Wallace, Hegel's God, although some of it is pretty murky, in my opinion. But it is introduced with the statement that ' 'Large numbers of people both within traditional religions and outside them are looking for non-dogmatic ways of thinking about transcendent reality', of which Hegel's philosophy of religion is given as an example.

Peirce likewise was not an atheist, although the spiritual side of Peirce is not mentioned much by his scientific affeciandos. — Wayfarer

It doesn't matter much that Peirce was a believer of some kind any more that it does Newton, Darwin and Einstein were.

As to exactly what kind of theist Peirce might have been - or the various stages that went through - that is a tough question. He wasn't your usual.

His biographers note the strong influence of Emersonian transcendentalism in his circle at the time.

Here's Peirce himself saying he was reared in Cambridge at a time: "when Emerson, Hedge,
and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they had caught from Schelling, and
Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with the
monstrous mysticism of the East.”

All of which is beside the point, but if we can go for 48 pages with you not getting the point, then I will leave it at that. — Wayfarer

Oh I get the point all right. The point is that you keep asserting, over and over again, for 48 pages, "the same", with complete disrespect for the law of identity, and all the evidence which I've brought forward to demonstrate "not the same".

Now you want to go right back and stake you claim of "the same" all over again, dismissing all the evidence of "not the same", as beside the point. Of course it's "beside the point", it's clear evidence against the point. And if I don't get that point, it's because that point is a falsity.

There's an article by Robert M. Wallace, Hegel's God, although some of it is pretty murky, in my opinion. — Wayfarer

Is it "murky" because it doesn't accord with the interpretation you have arrived through you own readings of Hegel's works?

From the article you cited:

" Hegel begins with a radical critique of conventional ways of thinking about God. God is commonly described as a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and so forth. Hegel says this is already a mistake. If God is to be truly infinite, truly unlimited, then God cannot be ‘a being’, because ‘a being’, that is, one being (however powerful) among others, is already limited by its relations to the others. It’s limited by not being X, not being Y, and so forth. But then it’s clearly not unlimited, not infinite! To think of God as ‘a being’ is to render God finite.

But if God isn’t ‘a being’, what is God? Here Hegel makes two main points. The first is that there’s a sense in which finite things like you and me fail to be as real as we could be, because what we are depends to a large extent on our relations to other finite things. If there were something that depended only on itself to make it what it is, then that something would evidently be more fully itself than we are, and more fully real, as itself. This is why it’s important for God to be infinite: because this makes God more himself (herself, itself) and more fully real, as himself (herself, itself), than anything else is."

According to this Hegel denies that God is a being and that God is "omniscient, omnipotent, and so forth". In fact logically, God cannot be anything at all if he is not a being or is not being at all. But then Wallace goes on to say that God, unlike finite things, does not depend on any relation to anything to be what He is. This is a blatant contradiction.

Process theology sees the God/ world relation as absolutely necessary; God needs the world in order to be what he is, in order to be at all, as much as the world needs God in order to be what it is, in order to be at all. The process God is a God that evolves along with the world, not a changeless transcendence. Hegel's God (as Spirit) is also like this, and I think it is likely that Hegel dissembled in relation to orthodoxy in the interests of his public image (I mean he did live in the late 18th through the early to mid 19th century after all) and quite probably also his due to a desire to support what he saw as the socially necessary institution of Christianity.

I've created a separate thread on this topic as it is far from the OP.

What you claim here is false. Without the word "red" there is nothing that "red" refers to. That's the point. You are claiming that thing which "red" refers to would exist without the word red. But without the word "red" there would be nothing which "red" refers to, because there would be no such thing as "red". So this nothing cannot be an existent thing. To get to the point of asserting that there is something which "red" refers to, it is necessary that there is the word "red". — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying then that the word "red" caused the existence of the redness in things, instead of the opposite way around? Following the same train of thought, there was no badness in things until we used the word "bad", and no wetness until we used the word 'wet'; and so to generalize, our words create reality, as opposed to reality causing us to create words to refer to it. Am I correct on your position?

No, I am saying "plane", and you are saying "flat". By what principle of identity do you conclude that two very distinct words are "the same thing". And since it is very clear that these two distinct words are not the same thing, then it is also very clear that we are not saying the same thing when we say these distinctly different words. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to the dictionary here, a "plane" is defined as "a flat surface". By law of maths, if x = y, then x and y are the same thing; and so if "plane" = "flat surface", then "plane" and "flat surface" are the same thing.

This is how we distinguish between when we are referring to two distinct things which are similar to each other, and when we are referring to the exact same thing, by taking account of the accidentals. So it is by analyzing the accidentals that we determine whether we are talking about two distinct, but similar things, or that we are talking about one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does it follow that we cannot test if two things are the exact same if those things don't have accidentals, such as is the case for universal forms, which yourself claimed to exist? How can you speak coherently about universal forms if the first law of logic does not apply to them?

Here is a better way: We test if two things are the exact same by comparing all of their properties, regardless if those properties are essential or accidental, and checking if they are similar or different. As such, the law of identity is applicable to all, even to universal things.

I think, in Aquinas' terminology, the senses perceive the shape, the intellect perceives the Form, and the mind derives the concept. So concepts are internal to minds, but the Forms are not. — Wayfarer

Interesting. Could you explain the differences between "the intellect perceives the Form" and "the mind derives the concept"? I would have imagined that the intellect is part of the mind, and that the concept is the concept of the form. Maybe it is that the intellect is active in abstracting the form, where as the mind is passive and merely stores it (now called concept once in the mind)?

There was a passage I found on an Aquinas-related site which I thought laid it out pretty well - it’s here. Worth reading carefully, I think - it really spells out the meaning of ‘hylomorphic’ (i.e. matter-form) dualism very clearly.

The difference between form and concept is, I think, the intellect ‘receives the form’ but then the mind ‘creates the concept’ (I have read a passage somewhere which spells that out recently, but can’t recall exactly where.) The latter process - ‘conceptualisation’ - is an internal activity of the intellect, but the intellect first receives the intelligible form; it doesn’t create it or imagine it (as per the passage from Augustine that I linked to the other day). This is what is difficult to grasp - because the question then arises, if ‘the form’ is ‘received’ by the Intellect, where does it ‘reside’ before being grasped? The Augustinian answer to that question is that the forms dwell eternally in the divine intellect (which I understand was adapted from Neo-Platonism.) However it almost goes without saying that the details of this issue comprise one of the most controversial and difficult aspects of classical metaphysics.

I think the other thing you should read up on is ‘nous’, if you haven’t already. Nous is a seminal word in philosophy and philosophical theology. It is translated nowadays as ‘mind’ or ‘intellect’ but in the original context it means something like ‘that which sees the real’. It is the root word of ‘noetic’ and also ‘nouminal’ (in Kant; but not of ‘numinous’, which is a common confusion). It has particular meaning in Plotinus as well, which is what I think influenced Augustine considerably, and thereafter became absorbed into classical Western theology. The Wikipedia article on ‘nous’ is not a bad starting point.

Are you saying then that the word "red" caused the existence of the redness in things, instead of the opposite way around? — Samuel Lacrampe

I made no mention of causation, that's your interpretation. What I said is that without the word "red" there is no such thing as what the word red refers to. Do you not recognize that the word "red" is an essential part of "what the word red refers to"? And so there is no such thing as what the word red refers to without the word "red".

Following the same train of thought, there was no badness in things until we used the word "bad", and no wetness until we used the word 'wet'; and so to generalize, our words create reality, as opposed to reality causing us to create words to refer to it. Am I correct on your position? — Samuel Lacrampe

Again, I would not use the same phrasing as you. But I would say that an act must be judged as bad in order to be bad. The judgement of bad or good is not inherent within the act itself. The act must be compared to some set of values, standards, and judged as to whether or not it is bad. The same is the case for wetness.

According to the dictionary here, a "plane" is defined as "a flat surface". By law of maths, if x = y, then x and y are the same thing; and so if "plane" = "flat surface", then "plane" and "flat surface" are the same thing. — Samuel Lacrampe

The defining term is not the same as the term defined. In Aristotelian logic the defining concept is within the concept defined, as an essential feature. So "man" is defined by "animal", as the concept of animal is within the concept of man as an essential property but animal is not the same as man. Likewise, you define "plane" with "flat surface". One is not the same as the other. The defining term is the more general. If defining terms had the same meaning as the words being defined, then we would never get anywhere in our attempts to understand meaning. It would all be circular. "Flat surface" would mean the exact same thing as "plane", and it would be pointless to define one with the other because it would not help you to understand anything. It is the very fact that "flat surface" means something other to you than "plane" does, that it can be used to help you to understand what "plane" means.

Does it follow that we cannot test if two things are the exact same if those things don't have accidentals, such as is the case for universal forms, which yourself claimed to exist? How can you speak coherently about universal forms if the first law of logic does not apply to them? — Samuel Lacrampe

That is exactly what is at issue here, and why there is so much misunderstanding and disagreement about what universal forms are. Apokrisis, following Peirce argues that there is vagueness, and violation of the law of non-contradiction which is an inherent aspect of all universals, it is essential to universals.

Here is a better way: We test if two things are the exact same by comparing all of their properties, regardless if those properties are essential or accidental, and checking if they are similar or different. As such, the law of identity is applicable to all, even to universal things. — Samuel Lacrampe

We determine the properties of physical objects through our senses, observations. And we can compare them. How do you propose that we ought to determine, and compare, the properties of the concepts within each others minds, other than by discussion? Discussion within this thread has demonstrated very clearly that there are differences between any concept denoted by a particular word, between your mind, my mind, and the minds' of others.

In many cases these differences are accidentals, so communication and understanding is still adequate. But these accidental differences are still there, and this disallows us, according to the law of identity, from saying that it is the same concept in your mind, as in my mind. So the law of identity is still applicable, it just forces the conclusion that the same concept of "red" which you have is not the concept of "red" which I have. In this way, the issue is decisively resolved. It is only when you want to give "the concept" some sort of independent existence, such as Platonic realism, and claim that the concept within each of our minds' somehow partakes of this independent concept, that "the concept" becomes some sort of vague object which defies the law of non-contradiction. Leave "the concept" within the minds of individuals and there is no such problem, but there is differences between what 'red" means to you, and what it means to me.

But these accidental differences are still there, and this disallows us, according to the law of identity, from saying that it is the same concept in your mind, as in my mind — Metaphysician Undercover

Most of what you've argued in this thread is that the law of identity means that the meaning of 'the same' is not actually 'the same'; or that A doesn't really equal A, because A for you means something different than A for me. So, really, the law of identity contradicts itself, in your reckoning; which renders your arguments unintelligible, as far as I am concerned.

Apokrisis, following Peirce argues that there is vagueness, and violation of the law of non-contradiction which is an inherent aspect of all universals, it is essential to universals. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a difference doesn't make a difference, is it really a difference?

The Laws of Thought are framed for dealing with actual differences - differences that make a difference in relation to some generality. So particulars exist in that they contradict some generality. They only partake in that generality in a specific way.

A white horse and a white rhino are both white animals. So is the fact of their being a horse and a rhino a difference that makes a difference qua the universality of the class of "white animals"? Is it not a pointless distinction to say they are different kinds of animals in this context?

And remember that vagueness and generality are not the same in Peirce's view. They are dialectical opposites.

The vague is where distinctions don't even apply as there is no general context, no formative constraints, against which any such judgement could be made. The PNC has nothing to latch on to.

And the general is where all distinctions are subsumed under a common identity. As with the notion of whiteness applied across the class of animals. No particulars are excluded as the general can include them all within its class. Therefore now it is the LEM that has nothing to latch on to. And that becomes definitional of generality.

Most of what you've argued in this thread is that the law of identity means that the meaning of 'the same' is not actually 'the same'; or that A doesn't really equal A, because A for you means something different than A for me. — Wayfarer

If "A" is a thing, then the law of identity applies, because that law says that a thing is the same as itself. So that instance of "A" is that instance of "A", and there is no problem. If "A" refers to a thing, then the law of identity applies to that thing which "A" refers to. The thing has been identified and given the name "A". But you are talking about "what A means". If "A" means something different to you, from what it means to me, then on what basis do you claim that there is a thing which is "what A means"? And if there is no such thing, then the law of identity cannot be applied.

If a difference doesn't make a difference, is it really a difference? — apokrisis

There is no such thing as a difference which doesn't make a difference. That is contradiction. If it has been identified as a difference, then by that very fact, it has made a difference. That's the point of my argument. To say that there is a difference which does not make a difference is pure sophistry, it's self-deception if you believe that.

The Laws of Thought are framed for dealing with actual differences - differences that make a difference in relation to some generality. So particulars exist in that they contradict some generality. They only partake in that generality in a specific way. — apokrisis

The law of identity is intended to distinguish one particular from everything else. If "everything else" is "some generality", then what you say makes sense. But in the act of distinguishing any particular from everything else, every difference makes a difference. Therefore every difference is an actual difference. Your attempt to differentiate between actual differences, and differences which do not make a difference, is pure nonsense.

If "A" means something different to you, from what it means to me, then on what basis do you claim that there is a thing which is "what A means"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Here, let's say 'A means: how to bake banana bread'.

Ingredients

2 to 3 very ripe bananas, peeled.
1/3 cup melted butter.
1 teaspoon baking soda.
Pinch of salt.
3/4 cup sugar (1/2 cup if you would like it less sweet, 1 cup if more sweet)
1 large egg, beaten.
1 teaspoon vanilla extract.
1 1/2 cups of all-purpose flour.

If you and I both follow this recipe, we will both make banana bread. In other words, the recipe results in - it 'means' - banana bread. Not regular bread, not muffins - but banana bread.

. Could you explain the differences between "the intellect perceives the Form" and "the mind derives the concept"? — Samuel Lacrampe

I can't honestly claim to know that details. It's the subject that Edward Feser is expert in. The nearest I could find is this:

(According to Aquinas0 Intellectual knowledge is formed by a conjunction of the passive senses and the active intellect. It is impossible for the intellect to understand anything without the mind forming phantasms, that is, mental images.

The intellect understands by abstracting from phantasms and thereby attains some knowledge of immaterial things. Our knowledge of things, though, is not the same as knowledge of our phantasms, for, if the two types of knowledge were the same, then the taste of honey, for example, could be either sweet or bitter, depending on the state of the perceiver. Rather, the phantasms are the means by which we come to understand things. Knowledge of individuals is prior to knowledge of universals.

The intellect is incapable of directly knowing individual things because it perceives them by means of phantasms. On the other hand, the intellect does perceive universals directly by means of abstraction. The intellect is potentially capable of understanding the concept of infinity insofar as it can form the idea of infinite succession, but it is actually incapable of comprehending infinity. Contingent things are known through sense experience and indirectly by the intellect, but necessary principles governing those contingent things are known only by the intellect.

I would have imagined that the intellect is part of the mind, and that the concept is the concept of the form. — Samuel Lacrampe

The modern concept of 'mind' is different from the traditional 'intellect'. But I admit, I'm running up against the (very narrow) limits of my knowledge of this subject.

There is no such thing as a difference which doesn't make a difference. That is contradiction. If it has been identified as a difference, then by that very fact, it has made a difference. That's the point of my argument. To say that there is a difference which does not make a difference is pure sophistry, it's self-deception if you believe that. — Metaphysician Undercover

You sound so Old Testament about this. Yes, it may all be horribly wrong in your chosen metaphysics, but it follows simply from a probabilistic view of reality.

The principle of indifference is a fundamental constraint on actuality in that view. It explains why we get the “weird” statistics of quantum entangled states and the quantum indistinguishability of particles among other things.

So sure. Reality appears composed of concrete particulars. But the emphasis is on appears. It isn’t really.

If you and I both follow this recipe, we will both make banana bread. In other words, the recipe results in - it 'means' - banana bread. Not regular bread, not muffins - but banana bread. — Wayfarer

How can this make sense to you? It's just self-reference, "banana bread" means banana bread.

What I make, I will call "banana bread", and what you make, you will call "banana bread". But what I make, and what you make are not both the same thing, they are similar. The law of identity is meant to ensure that no one uses sophistry to produce absurd conclusions, such as, that you and I are both eating the same thing. We are not, we are eating similar things. Meaning is based in the similarity between different things. But, the fact that they are different cannot be overlooked in order to claim that the similar things are the same, or else the essence of meaning is lost. That essence is in the similarity of different things. Therefore, that the things are different is fundamental to meaning.

The principle of indifference is a fundamental constraint on actuality in that view. It explains why we get the “weird” statistics of quantum entangled states and the quantum indistinguishability of particles among other things. — apokrisis

Oh, I see, you get "weird" quantum states because you can't tell one particle apart from the other due to the practise of your principle of indifference. Ever think that maybe this is a problem which should be addressed? And, that you choose a metaphysics which simply ignores this weirdness, as if it's acceptable, is an indication that your chosen metaphysics is not up to snuff?

I don't see why temporal and spatial properties would be relational though. Relational to what? — Samuel Lacrampe

To each other object. Space is, in such a metaphysic, composed entirely of relations between objects. Therefore, it could be argued that the objectual properties refering to space are not "of the object", but "of the world". Time could be seen in a similar way, replacing objects with events.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_space

I also don't agree with the negative property concept. Instead of saying "an object has the property of non-x", it seems more correct to say "an object does not have the property x". — Samuel Lacrampe

But that's not the same thing. "A triangle doesn't have the property of compatibility with circularity" states nothing about the potential compatibility of triangularity and circularity, which is exactly what we are trying to get at here. "A triangle has the property of not being compatible with circularity" is already closer to the mark. The first one doesn't have the causal relevance necessary the full phenomena.

I think understanding happens in a time, but not in a space. Here is why: Consider time t1 before I understand an info, and time t2 after I understand it. If we could go back to t1 (somehow), then I would not understand the info. But I understand the info at places p1 and p2, provided it is at time t2. In other words, the existence of understanding seems to be a function of time but not of place. — Samuel Lacrampe

One could argue that there are at least two spaces for each act of understanding : the space occupied by the information itself, and the space occupied by the information necessary to interpret the object of understanding. As such, understanding, as a stand-in for information processing, would be distributed.

What I make, I will call "banana bread", and what you make, you will call "banana bread". But what I make, and what you make are not both the same thing, they are similar. — Metaphysician Undercover

I reckon that seals it for once and for all. Wasn't even that difficult.

I reckon that seals it for once and for all. Wasn't even that difficult. — Wayfarer

It wasn't difficult because you didn't even try. Are you going to try to explain "what A means" or just give some half hearted example of the fact that when two people follow the same recipe they come up with a similar product? How does this demonstrate that there is a "what A means" which is common to the two people? The fact that different people may act in a similar way after reading the recipe does not demonstrate that there is one common "what A means" which is the same for these people. Do you still have no respect for the difference between similar and same?

OK, ordinary probability is fine. So if I roll a 7 with a pair of dice, does it make a difference if I roll a 4 and a 3 instead of a 2 and a 5?

Sometimes differences don’t make a difference. And that is determined by the context.

So the probabilistic view accepts no two things are the same. But then the differences might not count.

Under the LEM, I either threw a 7 or I didn’t. But it doesn’t matter how that 7 was composed ... unless you introduce some further constraint that makes it a particular concern.

In just the same way, you are still the same MU you were a month ago ... even if most of your atoms got swapped by the continuous metabolic turnover of your parts.

Without the principle of indifference, our ordinary world metaphysics would indeed be weird.