Because (some) animals sometimes react to things in a way that resembles what we do (which says little about what we perceive when we do that thing) does not validate the argument that they perceive objects because there is a similar "structure".

At most you could say that some animals react to different environmental cues relevant to certain species-related tendencies.

This does not show that they individuate, discriminate or make attributions to things in a way that resembles our experience.

What gives you what you have is reading into animals what we do in some cases, not others.

Yeah that's fair enough. I'll give Kastrup props for making idealism a topic of debate, but there are other formulations which are more interesting.

You are misunderstanding the point. I'm not saying animals

individuate, discriminate or make attributions to things in a way that resembles our experience. — Manuel

I don't even understand what you mean exactly by "individuate, discriminate or make attributions to things". For example do you think doing those things would require language?

I'm saying that observation of dogs, the animal example I've been using, shows they see much the same environmental features: doors, balls, walls, stairs trees to piss on etc as we do. Their behavior demonstrates this. They don't see a wall where I see a door, or vice versa, otherwise they'd be bumping into walls trying to get outside, and failing to see exists where they are available.

Anyway, the point is very clear to me. If oy disagree then I would like to see a cogent explanation for their behavior towards the things we see in the environment being consistent ours. To be honest I have not been able to understand at all what you objections to this have been.

Dogs (or other animals) do not need language to discriminate, individuate or make attributions to objects. I also, repeatedly have said that they perceive something. The issue here (as I see it) is one of thinking that because animals engage in certain interactions with objects implies shared perceptual phenomenology.

That dogs avoid running into walls or urinate on the trees only implies things like avoiding pain or easing discomfort, etc. But it is precisely when you say that the behavior of a dog in relation to a tree or a door is evidence of a shared structure, you are smuggling in what you are trying to prove: that dogs see balls as balls, or walls as walls (I am explicitly putting aside cognitive content, I am only speaking about objects we refer to as balls or walls).

The burden of proof is not on me to show what other animals think - I don't know what they think or how they interpret the world, that's why there are essays like Nagel's What's It Is Like to Be a Bat?. If you can't say (as I can't) what it's like to me (a human being), how am I in position to say what is it like to be a dog? They avoid pain. That is a reasonable, conservative guess.

Identical behavior does not tell you what is going on inside. The very same evidence that you use to argue that dogs see a "structure' of a ball, is one anyone can use in relation to the behavior of ant in relation to the ball, or fish for that matter.

If you don't understand this, I literally cannot express myself better, but we can't proceed much more.

I have sympathy for the position you are expounding. It's tricky stuff because to discuss it we are already deeply immersed in human framing, possibly smuggling in assumptions.

I'm not overly convinced by the idea that a dog sees a fish just as we do. The phrase "just as we do" seems unproven. Does a dog see a fish? Obviously not: it has no language. It perceives "prey" in some form, perhaps. But does it interact with a conceptual world or an instinctive one? I'd suggest the latter. When we see a fish, do we perceive food, prey, another animal, an allergy threat, or even potential mercury poisoning? I think a dog engages with a fundamentally different world, one that shares the same raw material to some extent, though ours is elaborated and structured by conceptual frameworks and language which transform it entirely. Reducing this to "well, we both see a fish" overlooks critical distinctions and makes assumptions about just what is shared.

Well put! What you are saying closely matches my own intuitions.

It is hard because what we see is so obviously that it is very hard to step out of it.

That dogs avoid running into walls or urinate on the trees only implies things like avoiding pain or easing discomfort, etc. But it is precisely when you say that the behavior of a dog in relation to a tree or a door is evidence of a shared structure, you are smuggling in what you are trying to prove: — Manuel

That's not true, I'm not smuggling anything in, but just making simple observations.. I'm not talking about structures I'm talking about trees. The fact that the dog urinates on trees consistently shows that it consistently sees something I call a tree at the same location I do. When I throw the ball for the dog it watches me intently and when I raise my arm it begins to run anticipating that I will throw the ball. It sees my body and can read the body language. It sees the ball going in the same direction as I see it. If I throw a brick instead of a ball he will not chase it or if he does he will not try to pick it up when he gets close enough to see it is too big for him to pick up. Just as I see it as 'not-to'be-picked-up-by-the dog, so he also see it as not-to-be-picked-up. This consistency demonstrates clearly that the dog and I share a world at least at the most basic level.

I'm not overly convinced by the idea that a dog sees a fish just as we do. The phrase "just as we do" seems unproven. Does a dog see a fish? Obviously not: it has no language. It perceives "prey" in some form, perhaps. But does it interact with a conceptual world or an instinctive one? I'd suggest the latter. — Tom Storm

What you're missing is that the dog undoubtedly sees what we call a fish, because we observe him picking it up and eating it. It is also undeniable that the dog recognizes the fish as food, just as we do, although obviously not in a linguistically mediated way. The salient point is that the dog sees the fish at the same location in space and time as we do, and from that it follows that "something", mind-independent ontic structures which are either fundamentally physical or mental or neutral (it doesn't matter), ensures there is a shared world as perceived. Science tells us that dogs see only in shades of yellow and blue, so of course things are not going to look just the same to a dog as to a human. And when we consider insects, of course the differences could be vast.

As a defender of phenomenology and/or idealism, one point I have to continually re-state is that I don't think this means 'the world is all in the mind' (and that this is what it is often interpreted to mean.) There is a real, external, material world which is described by science. But the mind/observer is not 'out there' as a phenomenal existent among others, and can't be derived from or explained in terms of external phenomenal existents. This means that our grasp of reality, even while objective (or, better, inter-subjective), is still always that of a subject. In that sense, there is no 'mind-independent reality'. But this doesn't mean that the world is dependent on your or my mind. Just that it can never be truly or absolutely objective.

Put another way, I am not saying the world depends on minds. I’m saying that the distinction between mind-independent and mind-dependent is itself a distinction drawn from within experience, and cannot be used to step outside experience altogether.

Where this falls foul of empiricism is the belief that the world is strictly mind-independent, that it exists as it is independently of the mind. Whereas the counter to that is that reality is not something we're outside of or separate from, so this presumed division between mind and world doesn't ultimately hold. (This last is especially suggested by non-dualism, which is more characteristic of Asian than European philosophy.)

Where this falls foul of empiricism is the belief that the world is strictly mind-independent, that it exists as it is independently of the mind. — Wayfarer

The world as perceived is obviously not independent of the perceivers. But it seems obvious there is a "contribution" to what is perceived from a perceiver-independent reality that ensures the possibility of a shared world among perceivers. That "reality" could be mental or physical or neutral in ultimate constitution, and that is a separate question (probably unanswerable).

For my own clarification:

I think we are talking past each other. Now you're talking about trees rather than structures, which is not a distinction I introduced.

The issue remains the same: you're treating anthropomorphic descriptions as if animal behavior shares our phenomenology. I don't believe these descriptions serve to establish what you are claiming. It may be obvious to you, but it isn't for me.

Since this is the case we disagree at a fundamental level, so, I think it's best to move on. You can have a final say.

The issue remains the same: you're treating anthropomorphic descriptions as if animal behavior shares our phenomenology. — Manuel

No I'm not and that's not what I've been saying at all. Anyway I think I've reached the point of diminishing returns so I'm happy to leave it where it is.

The world as perceived…. — Janus

…the world (as perceived), is presupposed, and from such temporal antecedence….

…..is obviously not independent of the perceivers. — Janus

….the independence of it with respect to perceivers, is given necessarily. That which wasn’t already there (and is so for whatever reason and in whatever manner), cannot be something there (merely from its effect on some form of sensibility).

The world as perceived not independent of perceivers, is far too close to tautological meaninglessness, insofar as perception is not independent of perceivers.

The world (…) is independent of perceivers….is true;
The perceived (…) is independent of perceivers….is false;
The world (perceived) is independent of perceivers….is true;
The perceived (world) is independent of perceivers….is false.

On the other hand, insofar as that which is perceived necessarily exists given its effect on sensibility, to then grant such existence is obviously not independent of perceivers, says far too much with respect to both perceiver and perceived, for the simple reason existence has nothing to do with perception, but is only the necessary condition for its possibility. Whatever the relation between existence as such, and the form of its manifestation in things, which just is that necessary condition, occurs further intellectually/rationally downstream than mere sensation.

Is time just some overblown metaphysical concept, or is it something which seldom receives proper attention.
————-

But it seems obvious there is a "contribution" to what is perceived from a perceiver-independent reality that ensures the possibility of a shared world among perceivers. — Janus

…from a perceiver-independent reality contradicts the obviously not independent of the perceivers.

The contribution to what is perceived, just is whatever is perceived. But it does not follow, given sufficient distinctions in species-specific intellectual capacities, worldly contributions to perceptions of one species have any apodeitic commonality with worldly contributions of another, for granting such certainty is tantamount to equating rational intellect with mere instinct.
————-

I had a JRT, I was her one and only human her entire life. For 18 years she was a job-dog, a hiking partner, a pillow thief. Every once in awhile, when I said something to her, she’d tilt her head in that oh-so-cute sorta way, and it occurred to me…she’s wondering what I meant. Only after a few of those, I began to think maybe she was wondering….WTF am I supposed to do that??? There’s no way to tell, from a mere tilt of the head, whether the confusion it suggested belonged to her because of her, or to her because of me. The point being, not the confusion, which may not have even been, but the possibility of correcting it, which may not have even been necessary.

Some nature show tells me aspen trees, given their interconnectedness, correspond according to a root system. Then I try to imagine trees talking to each other, and I get nothing. But I cannot say they don’t talk to each other, only that I can’t imagine how they do. Or, they really don’t and some other natural condition gives that appearance. I mean, a chemical injected in one tree showed up in another, miles away. If I deny anthropomorphism, trees are just trees and anything that connected will interact naturally, I’m not any part of it and therefore shouldn’t get all prophetic over it.

My New Year’s resolution…don’t bug so much.

Wish me luck?

Insofar as I could understand it, I think I agree with most of what you say there, and I think disagreement often hinges on an alternative turn of phase or two.

As to JRTs and dogs in general, I shared a life with two of the former for 15-16 years until they died, and now with two cattle-type dogs. When they tilt their heads like that they are wondering what the sounds or the gestures we are making signify―we can read their body language, and they ours since they are not so different from us. Go with your intuitions and don't overthink it.

You don't bug me, so no need for that New Year's resolution. I do wish you luck in whatever other tasks you may have set yourself, though.

….whatever other tasks you may have set yourself…. — Janus

I thought about applying some pure reason to this universal consciousness idea, but….turns out…it’s too much like aspens communicating with each other: cool idea but without any possibility of obtaining certainty. And without that possibility, it is then commonly called a waste of time, makes no difference whether true or not, which is synonymous with being irrelevant.

The common rejoinder then becomes…yeah, but it’s fun to play with, right? But no, it isn’t, if it follows that your consciousness has anything whatsoever, in any way, shape or form, to do with mine, which seems plausible given its ground as a universal condition. I summarily reject your consciousness as having anything at all to do with mine, simple as that. Easy to see that if I reject yours, I must also reject anyone else’s, which is to reject every instance of it except my own, which just is to reject the universality of it.
(BOOM!!!)

Or, how about this: is it just me or is there a teeth-grinding contradiction in “extrinsic appearance of inner experience”? Have we not yet come to grips with the certainty that no experience is ever of appearances on the one hand, and no experience is itself an appearance, on the other?

Even the thread title implies an inconsistency, in that the strictly metaphysical doctrine of idealism as such concerns itself only with the internal machinations of human subjects, for which, regarding the being of external things in general, there is not the least import. Descartes may be forgiven for labeling internal machinations/external things in general as different substances, with its accompanying ontological implications, as long as he is credited as first to demonstrate the necessity for there being such a difference in the first place, and in which ontology as such falls aside.
————-

….disagreement often hinges on an alternative turn of phase or two. — Janus

True enough, for folks like us. On higher levels, alternative turns of phrase lead to completely different philosophies, in which case the philosopher’s alternative conceptualizations revert to the Everydayman philosophiser accepting them, which then very well could be his mere misunderstanding.

Like, me, and, universal consciousness. Extrinsic appearance.

And those thinking Kant a phenomenologist. (Sigh)

The common rejoinder then becomes…yeah, but it’s fun to play with, right? But no, it isn’t, if it follows that your consciousness has anything whatsoever, in any way, shape or form, to do with mine, which seems plausible given its ground as a universal condition. I summarily reject your consciousness as having anything at all to do with mine, simple as that. Easy to see that if I reject yours, I must also reject anyone else’s, which is to reject every instance of it except my own, which just is to reject the universality of it. — Mww

Are you rejecting the existence of other consciousnesses or just the idea that they have any actual connection with yours, as distinct from merely a similar constitution to yours? Kant would seem to espouse the latter, while Schopenhauer would seem to espouse the former. Kastrup follows Schopenhauer in saying that we do know something of the noumenon in that we are instances of it, and in that we know ourselves both form the outside, as manifest entities and form the inside via introspection.

That said, he doesn't claim that we know for sure what the nature of the noumenon is; he says that he sees no reason why evolved earth monkeys such as ourselves should be able to know with certainty the ultimate nature of reality. He says instead, that the something we do know of the noumenon via inner experience allows us to make educated guesses as to its nature, but we can never be sure those guesses are true.

Personally, I'm not convinced that consciousness is universal and fundamental, but as I've said many times, I think that any coherent ontological idealism cannot do without universal consciousness as a substitute for actual existents, to explain the obvious fact that we all perceive the same things at particular spatiotemporal locations.

Or, how about this: is it just me or is there a teeth-grinding contradiction in “extrinsic appearance of inner experience”? Have we not yet come to grips with the certainty that no experience is ever of appearances on the one hand, and no experience is itself an appearance, on the other? — Mww

So, experiences are of things not appearances? And experiences are not appearances but experiences of what appears? Language gets tricky in these kinds of matters.

True enough, for folks like us. On higher levels, alternative turns of phrase lead to completely different philosophies, in which case the philosopher’s alternative conceptualizations revert to the Everydayman philosophiser accepting them, which then very well could be his mere misunderstanding.

Like, me, and, universal consciousness. Extrinsic appearance.

And those thinking Kant a phenomenologist. (Sigh) — Mww

By "higher" I take it you refer to professional philosophers? I don't think their insight is necessarily any greater just on account of their more elaborate and systematic grasp of philosophical systems (except of course their insight into those systems). The basic ideas that philosophical systems elaborate are quite simple and are part of the common currency of "Everydayman" in my view.

I've been reading a study by Iain McGilchrist calle The Master and His Emissary that elaborates on the findings of studies investigating the differences between right and left hemispheres. I'm on board with the idea that we have two modes of attention and understanding. The more diffuse, holistic, synthetic and metaphorical understanding being the function of the right hemisphere and the more focused, reductive, analytical and literal understanding being the function of the left.

We need both, but McGilchrist thinks the right is the master and the left the emissary. He also thinks that there have been three periods in human history where the left came to dominate, and that since the Enlightenment we are in one of those periods. He think the instrumental nature of left hemisphere thinking is largely the cause of the terrible, dire situation humanity finds itself in today.

Are you rejecting the existence of other consciousnesses or just the idea that they have any actual connection with yours, as distinct from merely a similar constitution to yours? — Janus

I have no warrant for rejecting the validity, or indeed even the constitution, of resident consciousness in other human subjects, but I am perfectly within my justifications for denying, a priori, if there should be such consciousness in other subjects, the influence of it beyond its own range.

The point was, that the universality principle which holds for each and every instance of a particular, re: human subjective consciousness, is not the universality principle which holds for each and every possible objective condition in general. In other words, the universality of consciousness is one thing, but universal consciousness is quite another. The former the negation of which is contradictory, the latter the affirmation of which is impossible. All of which reduces to….it’s fine to say everyone has his own consciousness, but the possibility of such truth cannot stand as sufficient ground for saying consciousness is universal.
————-

Kastrup follows Schopenhauer in saying that we do know something of the noumenon in that we are instances of it….. — Janus

This is why I let three pages here go by without commenting: I don’t know Kastrup at all, so I have no reason to think he follows Schopenhauer. But I do know Schopenhauer, and he doesn’t so much favor the knowledge of noumena as he does the knowledge of the Kantian ding an sich. So if Kastrup says Schopenhauer says we know something of the noumena because we are instances of it, he is in utter and complete conflict with Kant, who was the originator of the modern version of both noumena and ding an sich, and possibly in some conflict with Schopenhauer in that the latter only concerns himself with the fact Kant disavows any possible knowledge of the thing-in-itself, which Schopenhauer argues we certainly do, iff the thing-in-itself is represented as will, which has nothing to do with noumena in the Kantian sense at all.

And here, of course, is what you were talking about with that alternative turn of phrase. Kastrup and Schopenhauer apparently both treat noumena differently than Kant, and maybe ever differently than each other. But regardless of all that, it amazes me to no end, how it is even possible to suggest we are instances of noumena in the first place, without, first, representing the concept outside its original definition, and second, accepting the newly represented concept as having some sufficient form of additional explanatory power.
————-

….in that we know ourselves both form the outside, as manifest entities and form the inside via introspection. — Janus

So the argument for sufficient explanatory power resides in the notion we know ourselves in two different forms of ourselves. Which is true enough, insofar as we know ourselves as both subject and object. But these are different kinds of knowledge, re: empirical/a priori, originating under different conditions, re: theoretical/speculative, and are not connected in any way with each other except transcendentally, for the belonging of both to a single consciousness.

None of which is sufficient reason to suggest we humans are instances of noumena, insofar as the very notion of noumena in its original Enlightenment sense, has no possibility of ever having an object subsumed under the conception of it.

Again, I’m not familiar with the preemptive conditions necessary in Kastrup, that facilitates the suggestion of a possibility in his philosophy that has been established as impossible in its predecessor.
—————-

So, experiences are of things not appearances? And experiences are not appearances but experiences of what appears? Language gets tricky in these kinds of matters. — Janus

Yes, language is tricky, but here I think it’s more a matter of systemic procedure. In short, though, no, experience is not of things or of appearances; experience is of representations of appearances, and appearances are the effect of things on sensibility. You could get away with saying experience is of phenomena, which is a representation of that which caused sensation, sensation being whatever affect the appearance of a thing has. Technically, in theoretical constructions, more is required for experience than mere phenomena, but it isn’t really wrong to begin with it. It’s like…you can’t get to the conclusion of a scientific theory from mere observation, and you can’t get to the conclusion of a hypothetical judgement with only a major premise.

And, correct, experiences are not appearances; one is the temporally/methodically opposed extreme of the other. For human intelligence in its empirical domain, there is nothing for it before the not-known of appearance, and there is nothing for it after the known of experience.

The correspondence of the unknown appearance, to the known experience, through representation, depends exclusively on relations prescribed by the system itself (however metaphysically speculative that may be) and therein resides the commonality between various instances of that system in separate human subjects. It never was the contribution of the thing; it was the contribution of the system to which the thing (“…the undetermined object of empirical intuition….”) is given, which is functionally identical for all otherwise rationally-capable humans.

If an object is as round for you as it is for me, it does not follow it is round because of the object, which may only possibly be the case, but because your system and my system are so much alike yours tells you the object is round and mine tells me the object is round, which is necessarily the case. It is impossible to determine roundness from the object alone, but can only be determined from the effect the object has. We are supported in this, for the roundness of objects for us with our intelligence, does not necessarily hold for forms of intelligence in which roundness is impossible for us to be acquainted. If the object was indeed round in itself, and the same object was given to any other kind of intelligence it would necessarily be round for that intelligence as well as our own, which is something impossible for us to know.

Things that don’t appear to sensibility cannot be known by means of the system, but can be inferred from within the system;
Things that are inferred from within the system may never be given as appearances to the system, hence may never be known by means of the system, but that is NOT to deny their existence;
Things that are inferred may never be appearances, hence may never be known by means of the system, and that IS to deny their reality.

Inference implies the proper use of logic. But human intelligence is prone to mere thought, which is a use of logic in form but not necessarily in accordance with rules of proper inference. In other words, as I’m sure you’re aware, we can think whatever we want. Carrying these threads out to their conclusion is found the absurdity of proclaiming humans as instances of noumena, or asserting the roundness of things to a fish, unless the rules themselves are changed. And if the rules change, that which the rules governed must also change….so how in the HELL would the idea that humans are instances of noumena ever have been formed in the first place?
————-

I'm on board with the idea that we have two modes of attention and understanding. — Janus

I’m with you. I’ve always been a proponent of the intrinsic human dualistic nature, so would you also admit to being one? Maybe you’re of the opinion that being on board with an idea, isn’t the same as being a proponent of what the idea suggests. Or maybe being dualistic in some aspects of human nature is not to be dualistic in toto. What say you?

I’m also with you…or him anyway…regarding the instrumental nature of left hemisphere, but I’m not so sure about it being the causal condition of all that bad stuff.

But then…there’s today’s major headline…..(shrug)

if Kastrup says Schopenhauer says we know something of the noumena because we are instances of it, he is in utter and complete conflict with Kant, who was the originator of the modern version of both noumena and ding an sich, and possibly in some conflict with Schopenhauer in that the latter only concerns himself with the fact Kant disavows any possible knowledge of the thing-in-itself, which Schopenhauer argues we certainly do, iff the thing-in-itself is represented as will, which has nothing to do with noumena in the Kantian sense at all. — Mww

I don’t think he does. I have Kastrup’s book Decoding Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics, and he’s very careful not to misrepresent. Kastrup isn’t saying that Schopenhauer overturns Kant by gaining theoretical knowledge of noumena. Schopenhauer accepts Kant’s critique of object-knowledge, but not Kant’s assumption that all knowledge must be objectifying. Will is not a noumenon in the Kantian sense, nor an object behind appearances, but what is disclosed in immediate self-awareness prior to representation. The conflict with Kant is therefore deliberate and principled, not a confusion — and Kastrup’s reading tracks this distinction rather carefully.

I'm not very familiar with Kastrup's philosophy, but in one of interviews (I think with Curt Jaimungal) he says that we know something of the noumen (sic) via introspection. He refers to it as consciousness not will. From my own reading of Kant (admittedly years ago) I don't see a coherent distinction between the duality of thing (for us) and thing in itself and the duality of phenomena (things for us) and noumena (things in themselves).