Italic Quotes Taken From Wikipedia Article on Panpsychism

In philosophy of mind, panpsychism is the view that mind or a mindlike aspect is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality.[1] It is also described as a theory that "the mind is a fundamental feature of the world which exists throughout the universe.
The role and place of mind in nature is at the heart of both neutral monism and panpsychism. I think it is a mistake to use the terms experience, mind and consciousness as though they were synonyms. It is non-conscious experience which is fundamental to nature. Consciousness is the highest form of unified, integrated, self-aware experience and may be limited to humans (with language and abstract thought). Mind on the other hand is also a lesser form of unified and integrated experience and may come in various forms (such as the hive mind of bees and ants) or the distributed but communicative neural networks of the octopus, or the awareness of higher animals with brains. It is non-conscious experience (proto mind or mental pole) which is the most fundamental type of mental property in nature. The intrinsic (not extrinsic or measurable or observable) property of even the most fundamental units of nature (relationships to other events, to the past and to future possibilities) that is the basis of panpsychism.

They therefore ascribe a primitive form of mentality to entities at the fundamental level of physics but do not ascribe mentality to most aggregate things, such as rocks or buildings.[1][9][10]
A frequent criticism of Panpsychism is the assertion that it must postulate that rocks and other such structures must be “conscious”. The taunt intending to make the concept seem ridiculous on its face. This is a misunderstanding. No serious proponent of panpsychism asserts the consciousness of rocks or other such simple aggregate structures. It is also a misunderstanding of the use of the word “consciousness” to mean the kind of high level, integrated, unified, self-aware experience such as we humans ourselves experience. To have such high level experience one must also have a physical structure which is complex, integrated and unified (such as a brain). I tend to avoid using the term “consciousness” for the type of fundamental mental property found ubiquitous in nature and instead prefer the term experience or proto mental. The term experience used in this way does not mean conscious experience but a more fundamental relationship and interaction between events and time.

Charles Hartshorne contrasted panpsychism and idealism, saying that while idealists rejected the existence of the world observed with the senses or understood it as ideas within the mind of God, panpsychists accepted the reality of the world but saw it as composed of minds.
Panpsychists do not reject the “reality” of the physical properties of nature. They merely postulate that the physical properties alone are incomplete explanations of the experiential aspects of nature.

Panpsychism is incompatible with emergentism.[8] In general, theories of consciousness fall under one or the other umbrella; they hold either that consciousness is present at a fundamental level of reality (panpsychism) or that it emerges higher up (emergentism).[8]
It is the notion that somehow inert, non-experiential, matter with only physical properties somehow in certain combinations gives rise to experience, mental activity, mind and consciousness that strikes the panpsychist as irrational and mysterious (more magical then logical). The notion that some form of experiential or proto mental property is intrinsic to matter, particularly if one has an event based (process) ontology where relationship and interaction to other events and to events of the past and possibilities of the future are fundamental seems more logical and rational.

Other forms or types of Panpsychism
Goff has argued that panpsychism avoids the disunity of dualism, under which mind and matter are ontologically separate, as well as dualism's problems explaining how mind and matter interact.

Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory-He believes consciousness is nothing but integrated information, so Φ measures consciousness.

Goff has used the term panexperientialism more generally to refer to forms of panpsychism in which experience rather than thought is ubiquitous.[1]

Though there some radical Platonists, such as Max Tegmark, who believe reality has no intrinsic properties. By Tegmark's account, the universe is made of math without anything to ground it.

Panpsychism has recently seen a resurgence in the philosophy of mind, set into motion by Thomas Nagel's 1979 article "Panpsychism"[22] and further spurred by Galen Strawson's 2006 realistic monist article "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism."[23][24][25] Other recent proponents include American philosophers David Ray Griffin[1] and David Skrbina,
These are all good reading for anyone interested in a more detailed exposition of the various notions and forms of panpsychism.

In the 20th century, panpsychism's most significant proponent is arguably Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947).[4] Whitehead's ontology saw the basic nature of the world as made up of events and the process of their creation and extinction. These elementary events (which he called occasions) are in part mental.[4] According to Whitehead, "we should conceive mental operations as among the factors which make up the constitution of nature."[8]
I am strongly influenced by Whiteheads variety of Process Philosophy. The fundamental units of nature are events, not physical particles. Events have physical aspects and duration but they also have experiential aspects to other events and to the past and to the future. I prefer David Ray Griffins use of the term panexperientialism (avoiding the usual connotations associated with the terms mind or consciousness) to refer to these proto mental aspects of events. Objects are merely repetitive events. These notions are more in keeping with our knowledge about the true nature of reality at its most fundamental level. Fundamental particles are really just quantum events and measured properties are really just relationship and interactions.

Panexperientialism is associated with the philosophies of, among others, Charles Hartshorne and Alfred North Whitehead, although the term itself was invented by David Ray Griffin in order to distinguish the process philosophical view from other varieties of panpsychism.[8] Whitehead's process philosophy argues that the fundamental elements of the universe are "occasions of experience," which can together create something as complex as a human being.[4]
Complex, integrated, unified physical structure gives rise to complex unified integrated experience (mind and consciousness). It seems a very logical proposition and in keeping with our observations and experience of the world. Science measures only the physical, measurable and empirical properties of the world. The intrinsic nature of things (even our own mental experience) remains outside the realm of empirical measurement. So, while science is one of our most valuable tools for exploring and understanding nature, it always gives us only a partial and incomplete picture of “reality”.

From Neutral Monism Article in Wikipedia
Substance can have both extrinsic properties and intrinsic properties. Extrinsic properties are properties that are outwardly observable, such structures and form. Intrinsic properties are properties that are not outwardly observable and concern the intrinsic nature of a thing.[note 1] By its very nature physics deals with the extrinsic properties of matter As a consequence, most of the positive claims in these fields are related to the extrinsic properties of reality. When it comes to describing the intrinsic nature of matter physics "is silent". However, just because the intrinsic properties of matter are unknown does not mean they don't exist.[no
Perhaps this is the most important concept. Merely because we cannot measure something or detect it with our senses or instruments does not mean it does not exist. Our measurements and our senses give us only an incomplete and partial view of nature. Also on this note the “warmth of the sun” and “the redness of a rose” are just as much a part of nature and our experience as infrared and wavelengths of color. It is all part of nature: we cannot pick and choose; the distinction between primary and secondary properties is really at its heart an artificial distinction and the source of many of our philosophical problems.

And one question that this throws up for me, is what exactly is being explained when we ‘explain consciousness’?

When we explain why water boils or metal rusts or uranium atoms decay, we have an explanatory hypothesis or prediction, on one side, and an observed effect, on the other. Left hand side is prediction, right hand side is result or observation. But when we seek to ‘explain consciousness’, we have no such division - we are that which we are seeking to explain. So there simply cannot be an objective explanation of the nature of consciousness analogous to objective explanations of phenomena, as a matter of principle (which is another way of stating the hard problem.)

But understanding that takes a gestalt shift. This is well-understood, if not always well articulated, by the various forms of Eastern philosophy that fall under the umbrella term of 'non-dualism'. The 'duality of subject and object' is precisely the subject of their analysis. That is why non-dualism has become a subject of consideration by modern theories such as 'enactivism'.

What has to be seen through, is the pervasive tendency to 'objectify' and to seek to understand everything through the prism of 'objectification'. This is more than a theory, it's a stance, a way-of-being in the world. That stance is what has to shift.

Oh, and here is Thomas Nagel's chapter on panpsychism.

Kind of yea. I’ll just add this: the label switching is simpler so should be favored by Occam’s razor. We already assume that some things other than us are conscious. We assume each other is conscious and that animals that are like us are “conscious”. And that things get “less conscious” the less like us they become. That would be panpsychism.

The standard view adds two more assumptions on top:

1- At some point things stop being conscious.
2- When enough non conscious things come together consciousness magically pops up.

And these two assumptions are completely unfounded and assuming them has demonstrably gotten us nowhere. That’s the appeal of panpsychism, that it’s actually simpler and more intuitive. Panpsychism assumes LESS about the world not more.

But understanding that takes a gestalt shift. This is well-understood, if not always well articulated, by the various forms of Eastern philosophy that fall under the umbrella term of 'non-dualism'. The 'duality of subject and object' is precisely the subject of their analysis. That is why non-dualism has become a subject of consideration by modern theories such as 'enactivism'. — Wayfarer

There are several Eastern philosophical and Buddhist concepts which run in a vein similar to monist and process philosophy. One would be the concept of "maya" or illusion, another would be the concept of impermanence "anicca". It is the unity and the flux of reality which dominates.
The distinction between subject and object, between self and other and any attachment to the impermanent things of the world are all false dichotomy. In the process view reality is a constant flux, a becoming, composed of events not objects. All things are relationships and interactions and thus the notion of independent existence is an illusion. There are many different ways to try to express these abstract concepts and many different terminologies and terms from different philosophers to express them. I usually resort to process philosophy and particularly Whitehead to try to express these views as this is the terminology and author that seems to speak to my mode of thought and expression but I find the same basic concepts in many different places.

Do you find different uses for the terms consciousness, mind, mental,psychic and/or experience. Because I find terminology to be one of the difficulties in promoting the concept of universality of mind in nature.

The issue of the part/whole relationship which is more relevant here, is the question of whether parts can be said to be things, in the same context in which the whole is a thing. The nature of a "part" is that it necessarily exists in specific relations to other parts which collectively make up the whole. In this context, the whole is the thing, and the part is a part of that thing. Notice the necessity in the part's relationship with others, as essential to the word "part". There is no such necessary relationship in the concept of "thing", or "object". An object is an independent entity having relations with others, but not having any specific necessary relations. — Metaphysician Undercover

A part has a necessary relationship with other parts that all together go into constituting the whole. A thing is just a thing, anything, and there are no necessary relationships in being a thing. Ergo, a part is just as much a thing as a whole is a thing. I agree with you so far.

Therefore it is inherently contradictory to say that a part is itself an object, or thing, in the same context in which it is a part. The "part" is constrained by the necessity which makes it a part, and an object has no such constraint. Therefore to be both is contradiction. This logic of part/whole relations reflects the fact that in order to make a part into a proper object, the whole needs to be divided. When the whole is divided, it is annihilated. So it is impossible that the part exists as an individual object at the same time while it is a part. And we should never apprehend a part as an object because this is a logical incoherency. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems to be a repetition of the first paragraph with some additional information of course. I'll agree to this too.

If the assertion is that everything has a soul/mind, then not only do the parts of the car, (if each can exist as an individual thing), have a soul/mind, but also the car itself, as a thing has a soul/mind. There is no fallacy of composition here. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, once I talk about things I can't talk about parts. How come then that you talk about the car having a soul then? After all, the car is, essentially, the whole consisting of parts and you said, in your own words, "....to make a part into a proper object, the whole needs to be divided. When the whole is divided, it is annihilated" (in the second paragraph of your post) and this is exactly what you've done when you made the claim that "...not only do the parts of the car (if each can exist as an individual), have a soul/mind..."

To make things easier, let's continue with the example of a car. At one point, you're saying that the parts of a car are things and ergo have souls/minds (accepted) and that you can't view them as parts to do that (accepted). Then you go on to say the car is also a thing and so has a soul/mind but the problem is you can't talk of a car anymore because when you took the parts of the car as individual things, you, by your own admission, believe that"...the whole (the car) needs to be divided. When the whole (the car) is divided, it (the car) is annihilated". :chin:

The standard view adds two more assumptions on top:

1- At some point things stop being conscious.
2- When enough non conscious things come together consciousness magically pops up. — khaled

"Magic" on this forum tends to be used instead of "mysterious", including here. When anyone on TPF fails to understand something, he declares it "magic" and hence feels allowed to deny phenomena that he can't explain.

Because "magic"... :-)

Yet not knowing how to explain a phenomenon is no ground to deny it. Otherwise we would never learn anything new.

Get rid of your cheap "magic" tricks and accept the real thing instead: puzzlement and wonder as fundamental and beautiful aspects of our intellectual life.

Only then will you have any chance to do philosophy.

:up: :100:

"Magic" isn't just the unexplained, it's the fundamentally unexplainable. To deny something because it would be magic is to deny that anything is fundamentally unexplainable.

Strong emergence suggests the appearance of something from nothing and for no reason: when you arrange some stuff together, some new stuff appears, not because of anything to do with the pre-existing stuff, but just because.

(If the new stuff did have anything to do with the underlying stuff, that would be merely weak emergence, and not magic, not unexplainable, just surprising and unexplained, but still in principle reducible to the fundamental underlying stuff).

The basic issue with panpsychism is its ignorance of life as a prerequisite for any psychism. Dead people don't talk much. There must be a reason for that...
— Olivier5

The two do seem to be closely related.

I think you're onto something there.

Consciousness can be equated with living. Perhaps only living things, beings, are in complex realities, where there appears to be material.

If pulling a bunny out of an empty hat is magic then pulling consciousness out of non conscoius blocks is also magic in exactly the same way.

Dead people don't talk much. There must be a reason for that.

Mutes don't talk either, but I'm pretty sure they're conscious. These two properties aren't related then.

If pulling a bunny out of an empty hat is magic then pulling consciousness out of non conscoius blocks is also magic in exactly the same way. — khaled

Did it ever occur to you that they may be perfectly rational explanations unknown to you in both the cases of the rabbit and consciousness?

Mutes don't talk either, but I'm pretty sure they're conscious. These two properties aren't related then. — khaled

So you think dead people are still conscious but can't say it anymore?

It is the unity and the flux of reality which dominates.
The distinction between subject and object, between self and other and any attachment to the impermanent things of the world are all false dichotomy. — prothero

What is lacking, is praxis - a way in which this insight gives rise to actual consequences, other than the writing of academic papers for an academic audience. My objection to 'panpsychism' is precisely that it attempts to 'objectify' consciousness - to create a scientific model in which it can be incorporated. But this doesn't come to terms with why no scientific model, in the modern sense, can ever do that. So its exponents might get an audience, book sales, and so on, but they'll never get to the truth of the matter.

Consciousness can be equated with living — Punshhh

I think a lot of the chatter about 'consciousness' actually seeped into modern discourse through the influence of Vedanta. There is the well-known Sanskrit compound with which you in particular will be more than familiar: sat-chit-ananda, सच्चिदानंद, 'being-knowing-bliss'. Never going to crack that nut from within the bounds of science.

But when we seek to ‘explain consciousness’, we have no such division - we are that which we are seeking to explain. So there simply cannot be an objective explanation of the nature of consciousness analogous to objective explanations of phenomena, as a matter of principle (which is another way of stating the hard problem.) — Wayfarer

On the contrary, a requirement of a proper definition of consciousness such that explaining consciousness is actually explaining something is that we can identify it in something that has it that is not ourselves, otherwise our explanation is nothing more than personal testimony. To put it another way, if consciousness *is*, then consciousness *does*, and we ought to be able to identify it in an object of study by what how it behaves.

Things like the hard problem exist specifically to add by hand a component that does nothing at all, and therefore is not amenable to scientific study. If it does nothing, how are we aware of it in a first person way, in the same way we are aware of the redness of a red ball which *is* amenable to scientific study? The answer is merely that enough of us believe in it, even though many do not. Is popular belief worth a damn to a good explanation of consciousness? No. Does this fact temper the role of belief when defining consciousness robustly? Alas also no.

How is that related to consciousness if at all? — khaled

The scientific study of all aspects of consciousness, such as perception and identity, fall within psychology and therefore, where possible, neurology.

Continuing along the same line of thinking viz. that panpsychism commits the fallacy of composition/division, consider a 4 meter wooden plank. In accordance with panpsychism it has a (one) soul/mind. Break it into two, each piece 2 meter long, and there must now be two souls. Break each 2 meter long piece into 1 meter lengths and now we have four souls. You can keep halving the pieces so obtained and the number of souls will double with each halving. The question is, does a 4 meter long wooden plank have one soul or an infinite number of souls (assuming halving ad infinitum)? If you say, the 4 meter long wooden plank has one soul then what of the infinite souls necessarily contained therein and if you say it has an infinite souls then what's the plank, as a whole, in soul terms? You can't say that both the plank has infinite souls and also one soul because that would be a contradiction.

The two are similar in that they're both understood to have intentionality or ententionality. — frank

Yes, there is an implicit intentionality in all life: the will to survive etc. which is not unlike the multilayered intentionality of any conscious thought.

How does Ententionality differ from or brings a nuance to Intentionality?

Did it ever occur to you that they may be perfectly rational explanations unknown to you in both the cases of the rabbit and consciousness? — Olivier5

Maybe but I don't think there are. I think strong emergence is nonsense. You have to assume that the rabbit didn't pop up out of nowhere, that there was always a rabbit (or the constituents of a rabbit) in the hat but that we couldn't see it, for that trick to make sense.

So you think dead people are still conscious but can't say it anymore? — Olivier5

Not necessarily. I'm pointing out that the ability to talk is not indicitive of consciousness.

Maybe but I don't think there are. — khaled

Based on what? Your ignorance or your knowledge? If knowledge, of what? What is there objectively or logically, that makes it impossible for new combinations to fold or unfold in a new way, and for new phenomena to appear as a result?

Life emerged. It wasn't there at the beginning. Atoms are not alive. If emergence of something as complex as life can happen, then I see no reason to exclude the emergence of consciousness from the realm of possibilities.

I'm pointing out that the ability to talk is not indicitive of consciousness. — khaled

So what exactly is indicative of consciousness?

On the contrary, a requirement of a proper definition of consciousness such that explaining consciousness is actually explaining something is that we can identify it in something that has it that is not ourselves, otherwise our explanation is nothing more than personal testimony. — Kenosha Kid

I do understand why you would see it like that.

Things like the hard problem exist specifically to add by hand a component that does nothing at all, and therefore is not amenable to scientific study — Kenosha Kid

And I see why you say that, too. But i think there actually is a problem, which you’re not seeing - and that if you don’t see it as a problem then there’s no use trying to explain it further.

Life emerged. It wasn't there at the beginning. Atoms are not alive. — Olivier5

Life is a pattern. Perfect knowledge of how atoms operate will lead you to understand how "clusters" of them operate. If you could predict accurately all the motions of every single atom you would have been able to predict the second world war.

However for consciousness nothing like that seems to be the case. No amount of knowledge of how particles operate will lead to the conclusion that there is an experience that accompanies their operation assuming that the particles themselves don't have any sort of "mental properties". Because the experience is not a pattern of movement, or charge, or any other physical property.

Consider this:

Can you conceive of a clone of your self acting in the exact same way you do but without conciousness?

If no then you would be implying that consciousness is necessary for our function, that it natrually comes out of the particles that make us up. In this setup "consciousness" is akin to "temperature". Knowledge of everything about the particles will lead you to discover that these particles will act a certain way. Temperature is a pattern produced from the movement of the particles, and it would make no sense if the particles couldn't move (didn't have kinetic energy to be precise). Similarly consciousness would be a pattern produced from the particles and it would make no sense if these particles didn't have any mental properties. That particles have some mental properties is panpsychism.

If you can conceive of such a thing then consciousness is not necessary for our function, and so no amount of studying our function (neurology/psychology/biology) will lead us to detect it. In whichcase the best we can do is say that we don't know anything about why consciousness exists and furthermore that we don't know which participants are conscious and which are not.

The scientific study of all aspects of consciousness, such as perception and identity, fall within psychology and therefore, where possible, neurology. — Kenosha Kid

But how would that lead to a general theory of consciousness? In psychology and neurology the most you can confirm is "When X happens Y follows". "When asked to focus on a demanding task, participants fail to notice the dancing gorilla". But that would be akin to saying "When I press A on my keyboard the letter A is typed on the screen". This would work for explaining how a PC works eventually by testing countless hypothesis and sometimes breaking open the PC (neurology) but it does not answer whether or not the PC is conscious, or why it would or wouldn't be.

Perfect knowledge of how atoms operate will lead you to understand how "clusters" of them operate. If you could predict accurately all the motions of every single atom you would have been able to predict the second world war. — khaled

This sentence is simply not true: combination of things adds information that was not present in the things being combined. No knowledge of atoms will ever allow you to predict this monster:



Chaperone proteins "Heat Shock Protein 60" and HSP10 (the cap), so called because their molecular mass is approximately 60 and 10 kDa. This means that the whole complex composed of two "baskets" (HSP60) and two "caps" (HSP 10) is more than 8000 times larger than methane, the simplest organic compound (CH4, of molecular mass 16).

This is an example of a chaperone protein, that is to say a protein that helps other proteins. In this case it helps them take or recover their correct shape after they have been damaged by heat.

Perfect knowledge of how atoms operate... — khaled

...which is ruled out by the uncertainty principle....

Can you conceive of a clone of your self acting in the exact same way you do but without conciousness?

If no then you would be implying that consciousness is necessary for our function, that it natrually comes out of the particles that make us up. In this setup "consciousness" is akin to "temperature". — khaled

Consciousness may be necessary for our function, and yet totally different from temperature in that it may require an actual dedicated mechanism, an organ, a structure, in order to happen rather than just piling things up with no particular structure.

No knowledge of atoms will ever allow you to predict this monster: — Olivier5

Really?

Chaperone proteins "Heat Shock Protein 60" and HSP10 (the cap), so called because their molecular mass is approximately 60 and 10 kDa. This means that the whole complex composed of two "baskets" (HSP60) and two "caps" (HSP 10) is more than 8000 times larger than methane, the simplest organic compound (CH4, of molecular mass 16). — Olivier5

Seems like you defined it pretty damn well here though. I'm sure you mean "won't help you predict that this monster would form in the process of evolution". But even that is false. Realistically, yes no amount of computing we can realistically do will ever predict something of that complexity, but it is theoretically possible.

But this seems like bs to me:

combination of things adds information that was not present in the things being combined — Olivier5

If the behavior of this protein doesn't match the predicted behavior that we get by solely applying our best physical theories to it, then either the physical theory is inadequate or the molecule doesn't behave as we think it does. We don't throw up our hands and say "Guess this molecule is so complicated that it is for some reason allowed not to obey our laws because combination of things adds information that was not present in the things being combined (whatever that means)"

If we knew everything there is to know about the state of the world at the big bang, and we had a working physical theory, we would be able to predict everything until today with the highest certainty possible. If we are not able to do this then either we don't have enough computation power, our theory is wrong, or our data is wrong. You sound like you're proposing that despite having all 3 we would still be unable to make accurate predictions because... what exactly?

Consciousness may be necessary for our function, and yet totally different from temperature in that it may require an actual dedicated mechanism, an organ, a structure, in order to happen rather than just piling things up with no particular structure. — Olivier5

Yes but whatever that organ or mechanism is made of it has to have mental properties there at some level. Those cannot arise out of nothing. And panpsychism isn't claiming that consciousness is a piling up of things with no structure. Figuring out that structure is the "combination problem".

...which is ruled out by the uncertainty principle.... — Wayfarer

Sure but on the macro level the uncertainty principle becomes irrelevant so prediction should still be possible as far as I know. Or rather that is what should be the case but for some reason quantum mechanics calculations start breaking down at a level that is "macro enough". But that's why I said "perfect knowledge" as in a working theory that actually works at all levels (the whole goal of physics)

A thing is just a thing, anything, and there are no necessary relationships in being a thing. Ergo, a part is just as much a thing as a whole is a thing. I agree with you so far. — TheMadFool

This is not what I said. What I said is that a part is not a thing. If "thing" is defined as having no necessary relations, and "part" is defined as having necessary relations, then to be both at the same time would be contradictory.

So, once I talk about things I can't talk about parts. How come then that you talk about the car having a soul then? After all, the car is, essentially, the whole consisting of parts and you said, in your own words, "....to make a part into a proper object, the whole needs to be divided. When the whole is divided, it is annihilated" (in the second paragraph of your post) and this is exactly what you've done when you made the claim that "...not only do the parts of the car (if each can exist as an individual), have a soul/mind..." — TheMadFool

The soul is not a thing.

To make things easier, let's continue with the example of a car. At one point, you're saying that the parts of a car are things and ergo have souls/minds (accepted) and that you can't view them as parts to do that (accepted). Then you go on to say the car is also a thing and so has a soul/mind but the problem is you can't talk of a car anymore because when you took the parts of the car as individual things, you, by your own admission, believe that"...the whole (the car) needs to be divided. When the whole (the car) is divided, it (the car) is annihilated". — TheMadFool

Again, the soul is not a thing. You seem to be proposing that the soul is a part, and also a thing, and insisting that this is contrary to what I said. But we do not apprehend the soul as a thing and therefore you are proposing a false premise.

The question is, does a 4 meter long wooden plank have one soul or an infinite number of souls (assuming halving ad infinitum)? — TheMadFool

Again, you are making the same mistake I pointed out already. The four meter plank is one thing, it has not been divided. You cannot speak about it as if it were a large number of things, just because you have the capacity to divide it. It has not been divided. If it were divided you could not call the pieces a 4 meter plank. To talk about the plank as if it is both divided and not divided at the same time is simple contradiction.

. I'm sure you mean "won't help you predict that this monster would form in the process of evolution". — khaled

No, I mean you could not figure out what this molecular machine does, based on knowing its components only, not anymore than you could predict what a car does based only on a description of its parts. Even if you had a good description of the STRUCTURE of the car / protein, you'd need to know additional stuff about the environment of the car / protein to understand its function. Like you'd need to know that a certain fuel has to be added in that hole at the back of the car, that a key needs to be inserted to start the car, that roads are somewhat included in the concept of car, etc. And someone would have to teach you how to drive the car.

In the case of the HSP 60-10 complex, it turns out it's a molecular machine to fix other molecular machines. We know this by looking at how it works in a cell, not by looking at it's atoms.

Proteins are the building block of life, but they are very unstable, and can mis-fold (or fail to fold properly) when the cell is too dry or hot. Misfolded proteins are like loose cannons for the cell. So HSPs 'fix' them. Here is how we think it works for HSP60/10:


The "polypeptide" (equivalent to an unfolded or misfolded protein) gets in the basket (HSP60); some fuel is added then the lid (HSP10, here noted GroES) is put on; then more fuel is added and the polypeptide folds correctly; then the lid goes off etc. ATP is the fuel. The system is polyvalent: it can fix a large number of proteins, not just one type.

What I said is that a part is not a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, since, as per panpsychism, only things have mind/souls, a part can't have one since, after all, it isn't even a thing to begin with.

The soul is not a thing — Metaphysician Undercover

So a soul is nothing then. Why all the hullabloo then?

Again, you are making the same mistake I pointed out already. The four meter plank is one thing, it has not been divided. You cannot speak about it as if it were a large number of things, just because you have the capacity to divide it. It has not been divided. If it were divided you could not call the pieces a 4 meter plank. To talk about the plank as if it is both divided and not divided at the same time is simple contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry but I can't see your point. Begin from any point in an organized system - bottom-up or top-down, you're eventually going to have to make a jump from a whole to its parts and wherever, whenever, this happens, you're at risk of commiting the fallacy of composition/division.

Sorry but I can't see your point. Begin from any point in an organized system - bottom-up or top-down, you're eventually going to have to make a jump from a whole to its parts and wherever, whenever, this happens, you're at risk of commiting the fallacy of composition/division. — TheMadFool

Yes, but only if you're making an inference. Simply holding the position that both parts and the whole of, say, a plank, simultaneously have their own conscious identities (as I do) need not commit fallacies of composition/division if that conclusion was arrived at by other types of inference. You have to have an inference to have a fallacy.

"theory of consciousness" is different from "definition of consciousness". I am bad at defining things but if I were to define consciousness it would be "Having a first person view" or something like that. I definitely have a first person view, but I can't tell if you do or not. I may not know what conditions produce consciousness as I defined it but I definitely know I have it. It's like how I can know that I am typing on a PC right now but not understand how a PC works or how the internet works. — khaled

The theory and the definition need to integrate well. You can't have a definition that contradicts the theory. And your definition has to make sense enough to be explainable in the first place.

You define consciousness as a "first person experience". But what does that really mean? What is an experience? What does it mean for an experience to be first person? Is there such a thing as second or third, or zero (views from nowhere) person experiences?