That emoji looks like it's sweating.

So nothing is fundamentally strongly emergent, — Pfhorrest

Ok. So? — frank

That was my point that I thought you were disagreeing with. If I misunderstood you, then no further comment.

Yes, it's about our assessments, so it isn't baked in.

I'm just frankly utterly confused with the appeal of panpsychism. There are views that I completely disagree with, but I can understand the pull towards those views. But I'm just lost here. It seems like people are just switching words "mental & physical" "1st person & 3rd person" without adding any explanatory depth. Like word play to make the understanding of the metaphysics of emergence of mind seem conceptually coherent in their head, but without any given power to the terms used and the underlying purpose for their usage. I think I understand what consciousness is referring to when people use the term. We think, feel sensations, and so on. And you can get into debates of the nature of what’s being referred to, and questions about whether snails or grasshoppers should be considered to have consciousness, or mini-consciousness. I have no idea what motivates people to extend that notion to everything else in the world. Why do you think that helps explain anything.

I have no idea what motivates people to extend that notion to everything else in the world. Why do you think that helps explain anything. — Saphsin

Because for the longest time we thought that by coming up with the right physics or chemistry or biology we could find the "equation for consciousness". That eventually concsiousness will be consumed by the sciences and be regarded as mundane as temperature. That one day we may develop a "consciousness-o-meter" which measures consciousness the same way a thermormeter measures temperature. But we've slowly given up on that view, it seems that consciousness is not approachable by scientific method. Heck I can't tell if YOU'RE conscious, or if my couch is conscious, much less come up with a theory for consciousness. So the simplest explanation then is to attribute it to everything, so that you no longer need to explain how it arises from "inanimate matter"

In other words, the assumption that there are these physical objects that have no mental properties that somehow come together and suddenly have mental properties has gotten us nowhere, so people are starting to reject it.

In other words, the assumption that there are these physical objects that have no mental properties that somehow come together and suddenly have mental properties has gotten us nowhere, so people are starting to reject it. — khaled

I love the way you've phrased this. The things that we are most familiar with, ourselves, are conscious. We're generous enough to at least extend that to other things that look like us "from the outside" (third person); we suppose they're also like us "on the inside" (first person). Some of us are also willing to extend that to things that are similar enough to us, like other animals. But really, the big assumption being made is not by those who just say "sure, and the less like us on the outside, the less like us on the inside, but there's still some 'on the inside' all the way down", but those who say "...and then at some point there stops being any 'from the inside'", or worse yet, those who say "there's no such thing as 'from the inside', even for you or me".

We're most familiar with our own view from the inside, and the natural assumption (on the Principle of Mediocrity) would be that everything is also like that, that we're not special. If anyone had a burden of proof (and to be clear, technically I don't think anyone does, because epistemology), it would be those who want to say that we're special and most other stuff is fundamentally different from us.

Well no, emergence doesn't have to be dealt with, it just needs to be rejected as illogical. That's very simple, and it doesn't really require any substitute or anything like that unless the person is inspired to seek reality. But when people reject emergence it's usually because they are inspired to seek reality, then an alternative to emergence is required. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your rejection of emergence and your panpsychism are both illogical, and are thus rejected.

n other words, the assumption that there are these physical objects that have no mental properties that somehow come together and suddenly have mental properties has gotten us nowhere, so people are starting to reject it.
— khaled — Pfhorrest

Which brings up the question "What are Physical Objects"? and what are "Mental Properties"?
In the process view objects are merely repeating patterns of events, repetitive becomings not beings and mental properties are interactions, relationships and largely non conscious experiences. Consciousness is a relatively rare and high order of integrated unified for of experience but most of the experiential aspects of nature are of a non conscious and low level variety.

non conscious experiences — prothero

This sounds to me like "Square Circle" or "Married Bachelor"

https://www.processpsychology.com/new-articles/Whitehead.htm
Try this for a more complete explanation of the idea.

Whatever emergentist theory is proposed, the question "Yes, but why can't all that happen without consciousness?" is often not satisfactorily answered. — bert1

I agree it's important to see consciousness as functional, and contend that consciousness is necessary for the integration of various information 'feeds' into a meaningful, intentional whole. It's a sort of data fusion device.

Do you reject the notion of p-zombie functions as logically impossible?

I do. If p-zombies could exist -- I.e. if we could live the exact same lives without consciousness -- then we wouldn't have any consciousness at all. Nature doesn't build things for no reason. Consciousness exists because it brings a Darwinian advantage.

I didn't mean p-zombie humans. More basic as in the functions themselves responsible for consciousness. Which means anywhere those functions are implemented.

please rephrase, I don't get it.

please rephrase, I don't get it. — Olivier5

I mean, if you implemented the functions in humans responsible for the conscious experience of a red apple in a robot or some other non-biological system, would it necessarily be conscious?

Yes. They say "function shapes the organ". If you want the same cognitive performance as a conscious human being, you will need some form of self awareness and consciousness, yes.

EDIT: Just because in my view consciousness is an emergent phenomenon, it doesn't follow that it would come 'naturally' to a machine past a certain degree of complexity, in the absence of a dedicated mechanism. No machine will one day "wake up conscious" like Skynet in the Terminator franchise, without some guy putting in place some actual hardware mechanism for it.

If you only want to fake it decently well, that's another thing.

Panpsychism holds that mind or a mind-like aspect is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. — wikipedia

What strikes me as odd about panpsychism is that it ignores the whole-part distinction. To be clear, panpsychism is the claim that "everything has a soul/mind." Compare this panpsychist assertion with the logically equivalent "every team member of the Chicago Bulls sweats". Now, if I were to conclude that the basketball team known as the Chicago Bulls sweats that's the fallacy of composition; the property of sweating isn't transferrable from the parts (here members of the Chicago Bulls team) to the whole (the Chicago Bulls team itself).

Now, take the panpsychist assertion that everything has a soul/mind in the context of a car. The car has parts. Every part is a thing and since everything has a soul/mind, every part must have a soul/mind but to draw the conclusion that the car itself, the whole, has a soul/mind is the fallacy of composition.

Coming at it from the opposite direction (a more relatable point of view I'm sure), most people will find it easier to think that a car, as a whole, has a soul. If so, according to the panpsychist, since everything has a soul, each and every part of a car should have a soul. That's the fallacy of division.

Since all matter is organized in a simple-to-complex manner, subscribing to panpsychism involves committing either the fallacy of composition or the fallacy of division at every level of this hierarchy.

To cut to the chase, panpsychists have to prove that their thesis doesn't commit the fallacies of composition and division.

By way of illustrating my point, take a look at the notion of super-organisms - ants and bees are super-organisms in that though they're composed of individuals, an entire colony acts as if it's itself a single living unit and despite this they haven't been accorded the same status as an individual organism like a human being who is, like ant and bee colonies, a colony of various cells. Clearly, in this case, biologists have avoided committing the fallacy of composition in the case of ants and bees (by not treating the colony itself as an independent organism) are and the fallacy of division in the case of human beings (by not treating cells as possessed of minds). Is there a lesson to learn from this for the panpsychist?

:up:

To cut to the chase, panpsychists have to prove that their thesis doesn't commit the fallacies of composition and division. — TheMadFool

This is the combination problem. How do these "bits of consciousness" add up to a person and how does a person split up into "bits of consciousness". I have no clue how to solve said problem, but it not necessarily a fallacy.

Now, take the panpsychist assertion that everything has a soul/mind in the context of a car. The car has parts. Every part is a thing and since everything has a soul/mind, every part must have a soul/mind but to draw the conclusion that the car itself, the whole, has a soul/mind is the fallacy of composition. — TheMadFool

That conclusion is not drawn. As the combination problem has not been solved yet.

Coming at it from the opposite direction (a more relatable point of view I'm sure), most people will find it easier to think that a car, as a whole, has a soul. If so, according to the panpsychist, since everything has a soul, each and every part of a car should have a soul. That's the fallacy of division. — TheMadFool

Again, that conclusion is not drawn as the combination problem has not been solved yet.

Panpsychism doesn't have much in the way of explanatory power, since it can't explain how these "conscious particles" combine or split up. But I still think it makes sense as a "default belief". If we are willing to say that the other is conscious, without having any evidence to lead us to that belief, then the burden of proof should be on the perosn that claims that "People are conscious but rocks are not because people are special".

As Pfhorrest said:

The things that we are most familiar with, ourselves, are conscious. We're generous enough to at least extend that to other things that look like us "from the outside" (third person); we suppose they're also like us "on the inside" (first person). Some of us are also willing to extend that to things that are similar enough to us, like other animals. But really, the big assumption being made is not by those who just say "sure, and the less like us on the outside, the less like us on the inside, but there's still some 'on the inside' all the way down", but those who say "...and then at some point there stops being any 'from the inside'", or worse yet, those who say "there's no such thing as 'from the inside', even for you or me". — Pfhorrest

Need to prove that or else the assumtion of a "stopping point" where consciousness no longer exists is at least just as baseless as the assumption that there isn't one (panpsychism).

The fallacies of division and composition are likely to be straw men, because no panpsychist I am aware of thinks that humans are conscious simply because they are composed of conscious cells, nor that cells are conscious simply because they are parts of humans. Their justification for panpsychism does not involve this particular bit of fallacious reasoning.

The combination problem is different and is a real problem for all panpsychists. The combination problem is about which objects are conscious, and how smaller conscious entities somehow 'pool' their consciousness to make a larger conscious entity, and at exactly what stages of complexification this happens. Any panspychist has to either find a version of panpsychism that avoids this problem or a version that solves it. I'm not completely sure what my response to it is.

Now, take the panpsychist assertion that everything has a soul/mind in the context of a car. The car has parts. Every part is a thing and since everything has a soul/mind, every part must have a soul/mind but to draw the conclusion that the car itself, the whole, has a soul/mind is the fallacy of composition. — TheMadFool

If the assertion is that everything has a soul/mind, then not only do the parts of the car, (if each can exist as an individual thing), have a soul/mind, but also the car itself, as a thing has a soul/mind. There is no fallacy of composition here.

The issue of the part/whole relationship which is more relevant here, is the question of whether parts can be said to be things, in the same context in which the whole is a thing. The nature of a "part" is that it necessarily exists in specific relations to other parts which collectively make up the whole. In this context, the whole is the thing, and the part is a part of that thing. Notice the necessity in the part's relationship with others, as essential to the word "part". There is no such necessary relationship in the concept of "thing", or "object". An object is an independent entity having relations with others, but not having any specific necessary relations.

Therefore it is inherently contradictory to say that a part is itself an object, or thing, in the same context in which it is a part. The "part" is constrained by the necessity which makes it a part, and an object has no such constraint. Therefore to be both is contradiction. This logic of part/whole relations reflects the fact that in order to make a part into a proper object, the whole needs to be divided. When the whole is divided, it is annihilated. So it is impossible that the part exists as an individual object at the same time while it is a part. And we should never apprehend a part as an object because this is a logical incoherency.

In addition it is also because deflationary accounts of consciousness that don't involve emergence are also taken to not be treating consciousness seriously enough.

By the process of elimination that would lead to a substantive theory of non-emergent consciousness, which panpsychism seems to fit the mold of. — Mr Bee

Yes, I think panpsychism is often arrived at after a process of elimination. The worst theory apart from all the others.

Why would by big toe be conscious when my brain is conscious of the state of my big toe? Is it my brain that is conscious or my neurons? Are you the consciousness of your whole brain or just one neuron? Panpsychism is just another type of anthropomorphic projection. — Harry Hindu

Your questions are all good ones and need answers from the panpsychist.

If panpsychists are anthropomorphic, everyone else is anthropocentric, or at least neurocentric. What we all have in common is cuntishness, so let's gloss over that and stick to what is true and false, not which ones of us are the worst assholes.

Because for the longest time we thought that by coming up with the right physics or chemistry or biology we could find the "equation for consciousness". That eventually concsiousness will be consumed by the sciences and be regarded as mundane as temperature. That one day we may develop a "consciousness-o-meter" which measures consciousness the same way a thermormeter measures temperature. But we've slowly given up on that view, it seems that consciousness is not approachable by scientific method. Heck I can't tell if YOU'RE conscious, or if my couch is conscious, much less come up with a theory for consciousness. So the simplest explanation then is to attribute it to everything, so that you no longer need to explain how it arises from "inanimate matter"

In other words, the assumption that there are these physical objects that have no mental properties that somehow come together and suddenly have mental properties has gotten us nowhere, so people are starting to reject it. — khaled

This is the best answer to the OP so far.

That one day we may develop a "consciousness-o-meter" which measures consciousness the same way a thermormeter measures temperature. But we've slowly given up on that view, it seems that consciousness is not approachable by scientific method. Heck I can't tell if YOU'RE conscious, or if my couch is conscious, much less come up with a theory for consciousness. — khaled

Then how can you say the YOU are conscious if you can't tell if anyone else is conscious, and there is no theory of conscious?

Given what you said, it seems just as likely that consciousness is a myth kept alive by spiritualists and the religious.

If panpsychists are anthropomorphic, everyone else is anthropocentric, or at least neurocentric. — bert1

No. There are other theories other than "everything is mental' and "everything is physical".

What does it even mean for an atom to have a mind and how does that contribute or integrate with a molecule's mind? Does an atom experience depth because most sensations (visual, auditory, tactile) have an element of depth, or distance relative to the sensory organ used to make an observation. How does an atom experience another atom? Does an atom possess knowledge (memory), or intent? What are the necessary components of mind some entity needs to posses to define it as having a mind?

“Because for the longest time we thought that by coming up with the right physics or chemistry or biology we could find the "equation for consciousness".

Man do you guys have any idea how scientific explanations work? It’s very hard work and potentially incomplete. We haven’t even figured out how to explain chemical bonds form purely out of quantum mechanical principles, and it may be a type of emergent phenomenon where doing so is not possible. There’s still decades and centuries in the future to figure out how far we can do it successfully, computational chemists are working on it. I don’t know what you’re expecting out of scientific explanations, but it’s probably a ghost that isn’t there.

Doing a kind of metaphysics where you switch the words (especially to a radical position such as what we thought was inanimate matter in the rest of universe has elements of consciousness that we see in animals) just adds more confusing assumptions, it gives zero descriptive content that gets us closer to an explanation. Like if it satisfies you to call atoms and molecules as consisting of mental substance instead of physical, that leaves us with “so what now?” It’s an empty pyrrhic victory, you can’t use it for any additional predictions. If we want to know what consciousness is and how it works, everyone else is going to continue their investigations.

When an idea gains traction, proponents of competing ideas must retreat, consolidate, and reassert themselves in ways that might even compromise the original point of their ideas. When evolution was put on even stronger theoretical ground by genetics, competing ideas re-emerged as intelligent design. When modern cosmology made a compelling argument for a godless genesis, we got the fine-tuning argument. And look what came after America's first black President.

Panpsychism -- a retreat to an old idea that competes with reductionism and thus is attractive to anyone uncomfortable with reductive explanations for consciousness (which is where the evidence is now pointing) -- is an encouraging symptom of the fact that neuroscience is making good progress. We might not have predicted that panpsychism specifically would enjoy a resurgence, but we ought to have predicted that some such anti-reductionist theory of consciousness would.

Your questions are all good ones and need answers from the panpsychist. — bert1

The ultimate question that needs to be addressed by any "substantial" theory would be, "why is the evidence that I have for my consciousness different than the evidence others have for my consciousness?".