"why is the evidence that I have for my consciousness different than the evidence others have for my consciousness?" — Harry Hindu

Good question. The answer presumably is "Because I am me and no on else is." This raises the further question, "Why am I this one and not some other one? And why aren't you, me?" But let's not derail the thread with that.

When an idea gains traction, proponents of competing ideas must retreat, consolidate, and reassert themselves in ways that might even compromise the original point of their ideas. When evolution was put on even stronger theoretical ground by genetics, competing ideas re-emerged as intelligent design. When modern cosmology made a compelling argument for a godless genesis, we got the fine-tuning argument. And look what came after America's first black President. — Kenosha Kid

Is this intended to be an argument against panspychism?

EDIT: My bad, it's an answer to the OP!

Panpsychism -- a retreat to an old idea that competes with reductionism and thus is attractive to anyone uncomfortable with reductive explanations for consciousness (which is where the evidence is now pointing) -- is an encouraging symptom of the fact that neuroscience is making good progress. We might not have predicted that panpsychism specifically would enjoy a resurgence, but we ought to have predicted that some such anti-reductionist theory of consciousness would. — Kenosha Kid

You're saying that people who are open to panpsychism are "uncomfortable" with the facts. I think this is in line with csalisbury's view that the characters on the stage include:

1. A strong, intrepid physicalist, courageously facing the wilderness of truth, simultaneously defeating both panpsychism and nihilism.

2. A weak, muddleheaded boy, plaintively pushing magic on the world, in need of pummeling.

Freud.

Doesnt anyone want to agree with Deacon that it's quantum theory?

Then how can you say the YOU are conscious if you can't tell if anyone else is conscious, and there is no theory of conscious? — Harry Hindu

"theory of consciousness" is different from "definition of consciousness". I am bad at defining things but if I were to define consciousness it would be "Having a first person view" or something like that. I definitely have a first person view, but I can't tell if you do or not. I may not know what conditions produce consciousness as I defined it but I definitely know I have it. It's like how I can know that I am typing on a PC right now but not understand how a PC works or how the internet works.

"theory of consciousness" is different from "definition of consciousness". — khaled

:nod:

Not me. Some panpsychists might be motivated by quantum theory, but I'm not sure who.

We haven’t even figured out how to explain chemical bonds form purely out of quantum mechanical principles, and it may be a type of emergent phenomenon where doing so is not possible. There’s still decades and centuries in the future to figure out how far we can do it successfully, — Saphsin

But this is a very different kind of problem from consciousness. WIth enough time and effort we KNOW that we can explain how chemical bonds form because we can all see chemical bonds. We can test different hypothesis and jointly determine which is correct because we can all see the experiment right in front of our eyes.

But for consciousness it is different. I can't tell if you're conscious, or what kind of experience you're having. So how might I possibly construct a theory about how consciousness arises when I have no idea how to measure it in the first place? Let's say my hypothesis is "Consciousness arises when there is X level of data integration happening" or something. How can I test that? I can go and make some sort of machine that meets that condition but how can I know that that machine is conscious?

But for chemical bonds if I propose "X is necessary for a bond to form" I can design an expeirment where X doesn't happen and check whether or not the bond forms.

That's why panpsychism comes up, because not DO we know nothing about consciousness using the scientific method we likely WON'T know anything either (I can't see how the problem is approachable). We can know that this part of the brain produces this experience and this part produces that (and even that is based on testimony) but we can never know how consciousness is produces in the first place (because we can't ask rocks if they're conscious or not).

just adds more confusing assumptions — Saphsin

Is actully false though. The assumption that everything is conscious is just as valid as the assumption that there is some point at which things "stop being conscoius" suddenly in the absence of data to show otherwise. So far we have been assuming that there is some point at which things stop being conscious but since we cannot determine that point, nor does it seem like we'll be able to, the alternative hypothesis (that there is no such point) is starting to be seriously considered. They are both untestable for now.

neuroscience is making good progress — Kenosha Kid

Towards what exactly?

Not me. Some panpsychists might be motivated by quantum theory, but I'm not sure who. — bert1

:up:

If you think there’s no details that you can empirically confirm I’m conscious and tease out the manner in which I am so, and it’s just an unfounded inference, you don’t even need panpsychism frankly.

Again, I think you just have lofty expectations for what counts as incremental scientific explanation (it takes a ton of filling in details to get an intuitive grasp of some phenomenon) and settling for a non-explanation. We couldn’t really directly see chemical bonds or atoms until very recent technology, but that didn’t mean before we could, the past few centuries of chemistry wasn’t really improvement of knowledge.

If you think there’s no details that you can empirically confirm I’m conscious and tease out the manner in which I am so, and it’s just an unfounded inference, you don’t even need panpsychism. — Saphsin

No one "needs" panpsychism. It's a theory among many.

settling for a non-explanation. — Saphsin

Panpsychism isn't really "settling". Instead of the "hard problem" which is created when you assume that at some point things aren't conscoius you have the "combination problem" which is asking "How do these "conscoius particles" add up to form a human consciousness and how does a human conscoiusness break down into particles", again, another unassailable problem.

I don't know why you went into this expecting panpsychism to be some sort of physical theory explaining how consciousness arises. It isn't, it is just metaphysical flavor. Which do you wanna deal with? Unassailable problem A or Unassailable problem B? I like B.

The basic issue with panpsychism is its ignorance of life as a prerequisite for any psychism. Dead people don't talk much. There must be a reason for that...

If you don’t need it, if it doesn’t explain anything, then I don’t know why you’re wasting your time with it. Just put a question mark to it. Frankly I think you’re backtracking, because all this time you’ve been speaking as if it’s replacing the role of the failure of known forms of scientific explanation, not an additional side job.

Panpsychism may be popular, but nowhere near the popularity of the Spice Girls or of Justin Bieber.

You're saying that people who are open to panpsychism are "uncomfortable" with the facts. I think this is in line with csalisbury's view that the characters on the stage include:

1. A strong, intrepid physicalist, courageously facing the wilderness of truth, simultaneously defeating both panpsychism and nihilism.

2. A weak, muddleheaded boy, plaintively pushing magic on the world, in need of pummeling. — frank

I don't know about being in need of pummeling. To borrow from comedian Kevin Bridges, when someone in a bar starts raving about tables and rocks having consciousness, the best thing to do is pat them on the arm, tell them to have a good night, and escape.

Towards what exactly? — khaled

Are you asking me what the point of neuroscience is? Part of neuroscience is a reduction of psychology in terms of more fundamental neurological action, in much the same way that part of physics (quantum electrodynamics) is a reduction of chemistry to more fundamental physical action. So, in this context, toward a neurological basis of psychology.

the best thing to do is pat them on the arm, tell them to have a good night, and escape. — Kenosha Kid

Well, that's less Freudian. :smile:

Doesnt anyone want to agree with Deacon that it's quantum theory? — frank

My panpsychism isn’t at all motivated by quantum theory, but it does touch on it. Basically, I think that “everything has consciousness” only in the same sense that in quantum theory “everything is an observer”: quantum theory doesn’t mean a thinking human-like observer, just anything capable of interacting with the system being “observed”, and like I don’t think the kind of “consciousness” that can be attributed to everything is the thoughtful human-like function that differentiates us from rocks, but a much more boring thing. I do think that both of those boring but superficially mystical-sounding things, quantum “observation” and phenomenal “consciousness”, can be identified with each other, because on my account (like Whitehead’s) “experience” in this sense is just one perspective on interaction.

If you don’t need it, if it doesn’t explain anything, then I don’t know why you’re wasting your time with it — Saphsin

The alternative (that at some point things stop being conscious) also doesn’t explain anything. So why are you wasting your time with THAT? You gotta pick some sort of metaphysical stance here and all of them are untestable, in which case it really doesn’t matter which you pick, that’s mostly personal preference.

all this time you’ve been speaking as if it’s replacing the role of the failure of known forms of scientific explanation — Saphsin

It IS a replacement, that comes with its own questions. It replaces the hard problem of consciousness with the combination problem. Why would someone do that? Because why not, they’re both hard problems.

What happened is: We had the assumption A that we thought was gonna lead us to understand consciousness. We gave up on that idea. Therefore alternate assumptions (panpsychism being one) arose.

All I’m trying to establish here is that panpsychism isn’t a “more complicated” or “unscientific” version of the standard view.

So, in this context, toward a neurological basis of psychology. — Kenosha Kid

How is that related to consciousness if at all? Every psychological bias/fallacy/theory/heuristic/etc still makes sense without consciousness.

So now you’re going in circles and that we need panpsychism, and your previous comment was a total deflection. That was the target of my last comment.

Scientific investigation reveals features and fills in details, it doesn’t satisfy your “why” intuitive inquiries right off the bat. Either it will if we fill in enough details (it’ll take decades or centuries, not surprising it doesn’t right now), or there are limits to scientific investigation and it won’t (and thus we shall remain quiet) or we’ll learn enough to realize the initial mystery turns out not to be a good question (often happens)

When I say panpsychism doesn’t explain anything, I meant exactly that. I didn’t mean its explanations are unsatisfying because it fails to get to the root of the mystery, but that it’s just label switching and has no positively contributing content or description. And I’m utterly confused why you think it does.

So now you’re going in circles and that we need panpsychism, and your previous comment was a total deflection. That was the target of my last comment. — Saphsin

If this is what you think you are simply misunderstanding

When I say panpsychism doesn’t explain anything, I meant exactly that. I didn’t mean its explanations are unsatisfying because it fails to get to the root of the mystery, but that it’s just label switching and has no positively contributing content or description. And I’m utterly confused why you think it does. — Saphsin

I’ve restated countless times that panpsychism doesn’t have any additional explanatory power. It solves the problem of WHY we are conscious (by simply attributing it to everything) and replaces it with the equally challenging problem of “How do these consciousnesses combine?”. This doesn’t explain anything, you’re absolutely correct. But it makes just about as much sense as the alternative view of “There are things that aren’t conscious that come together and magically become things that are conscious”

Panpsychism doesn’t explain anything more than the traditional view, and it is not in any way more complicated. Therefore whether or not you choose it or the traditional view (or something else) is a matter of personal preference. That is all I’m trying to establish

So it’s just word play that brings comfort by the appearance of internal coherency, it doesn’t explain anything or help us grapple with the real world, in line with my first comment. Personally I don’t want to waste my time with that.

↪khaled
So it’s just word play that brings comfort by the appearance of internal coherency, it doesn’t explain anything or help us grapple with the real world, in line with my first comment. Personally I don’t want to waste my time with that. — Saphsin

His point is that its negation is exactly like that as well, so you can't help but waste your time on either one or the other.

There’s a point to doing science with its corresponding philosophical rumination (running into either of the 3 results I mentioned) Empty label switching is a complete waste of time.

The basic issue with panpsychism is its ignorance of life as a prerequisite for any psychism. Dead people don't talk much. There must be a reason for that... — Olivier5

The two do seem to be closely related.

Right. And this may mean that the emergence of life happened first, as a prerequisite for the emergence of consciousness among certain living species. It would follow that we may be unable to understand consciousness without first understanding life, and its emergence from inanimated matter. The two problems are linked.

Right. And this may mean that the emergence of life happened first, as a prerequisite for the emergence of consciousness among certain living species. It would follow that we be unable to understand consciousness without first understanding life, and its emergence from inanimated matter. — Olivier5

The two are similar in that they're both understood to have intentionality or ententionality.

There's another advocate of panpsychism around, named Philip Goff - he actually popped in here once and asked a question in a thread I posted on the topic. Here is a Scientific American OP by him on the subject of his book Galileo's Error.

We rightly celebrate the success of physical science, but it has been successful precisely because it was designed, by Galileo, to exclude consciousness. If Galileo were to time travel to the present day and hear about this problem of explaining consciousness in the terms of physical science, he’d say “Of course you can’t do that! I designed physical science to deal with quantities, not qualities.” And the fact that physical science has done incredibly well when it excludes consciousness gives us no grounds for thinking it will do just as well when it turns to explaining consciousness itself. — Phillip Goff

I'll take a look at that, thanks. I'm a Goff fan. He's done very good work on why emergence is problematic with regard to consciousness.