May I then steal from you, murder you, and rape you? That would be fine?

I think an ought arises from desire. A moral desire... a duty and desire all rolled into one volition/action in accordance with the laws one gives one's self.

You might then say, "and, one ought not do wrong things."
But why? — dukkha

The statement that "one ought not do wrong things" is practically a tautology. You can query whether a particular action is wrong, but asking why wrong things out not be done is like inquiring into whether all bachelors are unmarried men.

This is just self-defeating nihilism.

Apply the analogy of traffic rules. Its ontological status is mind dependent (non-objective), a social agreement. It may seem arbitrary what rules we agree on, but through practice, it is found to be a useful social contract to maintain.

But there may be some moral realists here who could argue you more on point, I am not one of them.

The statement that "one ought not do wrong things" is practically a tautology. You can query whether a particular action is wrong, but asking why wrong things out not be done is like inquiring into whether all bachelors are unmarried men. — Aaron R

Why?

What is the connection between, "x is morally wrong", and "one ought not do x"?

You act like the connection is obvious, so you should be able to explain it.

"X is red", has no connection to whether anyone has any reason at all to act or be a certain way. So why does "X is morally wrong" have this connection?

Both statements are of the same form: X has a particular property. So why does one entail a prescription of how one ought behave, whereas for the other there is no such prescription, at all.

'Morally wrong 'means 'ought not be done'. What else could it mean?

"X is morally wrong" is not synonymous with "X ought not be done." One is an ought and the other is an is. There's this common idea that you cannot derive an "ought" from an "is", which would make no sense if the two statements above had the same meaning.

Morally wrong means something like, "not in accordance with what is morally right or good." When we say something is morally wrong, what we are saying is that thing has the property of being morally wrong. It is a separate thing to say that one ought not do that thing.

Morally wrong means something like, "not in accordance with what is morally right or good." — dukkha

If you want to give "X is morally wrong" a proper alternative definition you need to so without using the term 'moral'. Give it a go. I think you will come to see that the phrase means " X ought not to be done".

Actually, come to think of it, forget about the "is" which is obviously confusing you because of the alleged distinction between 'ought' and 'is', and just think 'morally wrong' is synonymous with 'not to be done' instead.

That's like arguing "x is a good movie" is synonymous with "one ought watch x movie."

One's an ascription of a property "good", the other is a prescription for a behavior.

"X is morally wrong" is not synonymous with "X ought not be done." One is an ought and the other is an is. — Dukkha

It is synonymous, because your 'is' statement is based on a moral judgement. To say something is morally wrong is to say it ought not to be done.

It might be worth reading again David Hume's introduction of the famous 'is/ought' distinction which addresses just this point:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.

Treatise on Human Nature.

So what Hume is saying that there is a fundamental difference between reasoning based on 'is' and on 'ought'. He is saying that any argument based on an 'ought' is different in kind from propositions based on 'is' and 'is not' statements, and that the basis for this kind of argument is generally assumed, without any grounds having been given.

You're evading the issue. Give a non-circular definition of 'morally wrong' without using the term 'moral'.

I suggested that you should drop the "is" and "ought" in order to clear up your confusion, and you respond by making the same point about 'is' and 'ought' again!

:-}

Do you want to claim there is a problem with saying that 'morally wrong' means 'not to be done'?

One ought not to argue from faulty premisses, as by so doing the conclusion is not properly established. X-)

Do you want to claim there is a problem with saying that 'morally wrong' means 'not to be done'? — John

Yes. It is generally held by most people I would guess, that moral statements (eg "murder is wrong") have the form of: X act instantiates the property 'wrongness'.

Sounds like you're arguing for a form of moral noncognitivism called prescriptivism.

To say something is morally wrong is to say it ought not to be done. — Wayfarer

I have spotted another prescriptivist.

For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation

Right here Hume is stating that they aren't synonymous.

If you can't spot basic errors of logic that is not likely to help you.

Yes. It is generally held by most people I would guess, that moral statements (eg "murder is wrong") have the form of: X act instantiates the property 'wrongness'. — dukkha

With the property "wrongness" being the property "not to be done".

What else would the property "wrongness" be?

"Murder is not to be done."

Is this statement truth-apt? If so, what makes it truth-apt?

You shouldn't do immoral things because they are harmful, first of all FOR YOU, and secondly for others. Organisms who seek for their own well-being in a community will avoid lose-lose situations. If an organism doesn't seek for its own well-being, then it is deranged, and it requires treatment.

"Murder is not to be done."

Is this statement truth-apt? If so, what makes it truth-apt? — dukkha

Depends on whether it's to be understood as "don't murder" or as "it is against the rules to murder". If the former then no. If the latter then yes, with the (non-)existence of such rules being the truth condition.

"Why ought one be good ?"

— dukkha

Possibly going out on a limb here due to the difficulty of the question, so no offense meant to anyone...

If I'm understanding it correctly, the basic idea of the OP seems to be a reasonable question, one that benefits from being examined, dissected, and placed under a microscope so to speak. I sincerely doubt that the questioner is being some kind of Ivan Karamozov (who stated that everything is lawful, even crime).

Of course time and circumstances play large factors. Other factors being equal, to drive through an intersection at one particular moment (when the light is green for you) is all well and good for everyone. To drive through the same intersection moments later when the light has been red, and other cars are crossing in front of you is risking death for many people including yourself. One would "pay the price" in many ways even if the car went through the red light accidentally. I state the obvious to emphasize the factor of timing.

One could define "wrong" (in a very general way) as that which causes harm to someone, directly or indirectly. As well as the factor of timing mentioned above, there are other factors. What is the likelihood of someone being hurt? How many people could be hurt? How badly and in what way? If not people being hurt, how about the chance of an animal being hurt? Or property damaged?

If this is beginning to sound like a courtroom argument that one might hear in a criminal trial, perhaps that is to be expected. There very well may be absolutes (right/wrong, good/evil) somewhere in the universe. And these absolutes or ideals may be perceived by some people to some degree. One could perhaps imagine a world where the "absolute/ideal" realm (cf. Buddhism's Two Truths or Plato's Ideals) are completely perceived, understood, and followed by everyone all the time. But for now, we live in a relative world, full of ever-changing circumstances. Where in the best case scenario, people are trying to discern the ideals present in a situation and act in harmony with them.

Intention plays an extremely large role. If someone was planning to severely harm someone, that would be considered a crime. Conversely, if a person accidentally harmed someone while genuinely trying to help them, that (hopefully) would not be considered criminal.

The question in the original post may be one of the most crucial questions, in terms of ethics. Being so, it can't be answered quickly and easily, or maybe even completely. But certainly a critical question worthy of consideration, imo.

I think in terms of how a carer or parent acts towards children. You set boundaries. What words you use doesn't exactly matter. Both parties like boundaries. Children like to know where they stand, and sometimes to transgress. Grown-ups would go crazy if they didn't decide rules of some kind: you'd end up justifying everything from first principles every time Zak asked 'Why not?' or Imogen claimed something wasn't 'fair'.

Then you become grown-up, and rebel against the rules, or work most of them back into your own boundaries, or modify them according to taste. Hm, tying people up can be fun, but only if we all accept we're pretending. Drinking/drugging to excess provides release. Various transgressions.

Likewise in the wider society, there are actions that are not ok. Driving down the wrong side of the street can kill people, building on a park spoils things for people who want greenspace, and so we make laws which proliferate. Anyone can transgress any time, but if caught they have to take the sanctions on the chin, as well as live with the consequences of their actions, if driving down the wrong side of the road, say. We use 'ought' and 'wrong' pretty willy-nilly about these things, and systematisers roll some of them up into systems. I can't be doing with systems apart from something like a virtue view of ethics, but I'm still going to say 'ought' and 'wrong' to people and hope to get a reaction.

I should judge that Hume and our present‑day ethicists had done a considerable service by showing that no content could be found in the notion "morally ought"; if it were not that the latter philosophers try to find an alternative (very fishy) content and to retain the psychological force of the term. It would be most reasonable to drop it. It has no reasonable sense outside a law conception of ethics; they are not going to maintain such a conception; and you can do ethics without it, as is shown by the example of Aristotle. It would be a great improvement if, instead of "morally wrong," one always named a genus such as "untruthful," "unchaste," "unjust." We should no longer ask whether doing something was "wrong," passing directly from some description of an action to this notion; we should ask whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer would sometimes be clear at once. — Anscombe

Thanks for sharing your insights. :)


Yes, those distinctions would be a big improvement over the vague and judgmental "wrong". More precise and helpful, definitely. And I would hope if someone wanted to criticize a post of mine, they would say i was being quite "unjust and unchaste!" :D

they're not just about whether to label a statement right or wrong, — dukkha

They're about how one feels about the behavior in question. So yeah, it's not just a matter of word assignment. Both judgments such as "murder is wrong" and "one ought not to murder" are how one feels about behavior. "Oughts" are implied by "is right is wrong" for most people simply because they feel that one should not perform actions that the person in question disapproves of, or that the person in question feels is a bad idea.

Both judgments such as "murder is wrong" and "one ought not to murder" are how one feels about behavior. — Terrapin Station

Not sure about this. At least personally, when I say "stealing is wrong", I don't mean "I do not think that people should steal". What I generally mean (there are other ways of saying "stealing is wrong", such as catching someone stealing and saying "stealing is wrong!" - here it's a more a command for that person to stop what they're doing), by "stealing is wrong" is that there are objective moral facts about what is right and wrong behavior, and stealing is factually wrong behavior. As in, there's something outside human judgment to which our moral corresponds with and gain their truth value. There's moral facts existing out there somewhere, and it is to this that our moral statements correspond. There are objective facts about how it is that people should behave, and one of those facts is that people should not steal.

Notice here there is no contradiction with stealing something, befitting by the theft, and even enjoying the theft - even delighting in the harm you caused to others - and yet at the very same time believing that you've acted in a morally wrong way. Believing that objectively, it is wrong to steal.

This would make less sense if "stealing is wrong" is a judgment about behavior. Because here I would personally be judging that I should not steal, and then I would go and steal regardless, and enjoy it. If I stole, doesn't that kind of negate the judgement? As in, I musn't of really had that judgment. "It is my personal opinion that I should not steal things and also right now I am stealing something." My action of stealing seems to create doubt about whether I really had that opinion.

One could define "wrong" (in a very general way) as that which causes harm to someone, directly or indirectly. As well as the factor of timing mentioned above, there are other factors. What is the likelihood of someone being hurt? How many people could be hurt? How badly and in what way? If not people being hurt, how about the chance of an animal being hurt? Or property damaged? — 0 thru 9

Harm is definitely something which we consider when trying to figure out whether something is morally wrong or not. But I think people want "wrong" to go further than this. Imagine a case, of someone being the last person at an open casket funeral to 'pay their respects'. The dead person is wearing an expensive ring. Now, I really can't see how anyone would be harmed by stealing the ring. The dead guy isn't going to be harmed, nobody will ever even know the ring was stolen, so they wont be harmed, and you're not harmed either, in fact you benefit by getting an expensive ring.

We still want to say in this situation that what the guy did was morally wrong. And yet in this situation, it's a net benefit really. The thief benefits, and nobody else is harmed.

If this is beginning to sound like a courtroom argument that one might hear in a criminal trial, perhaps that is to be expected. There very well may be absolutes (right/wrong, good/evil) somewhere in the universe. And these absolutes or ideals may be perceived by some people to some degree. One could perhaps imagine a world where the "absolute/ideal" realm (cf. Buddhism's Two Truths or Plato's Ideals) are completely perceived, understood, and followed by everyone all the time. But for now, we live in a relative world, full of ever-changing circumstances. Where in the best case scenario, people are trying to discern the ideals present in a situation and act in harmony with them. — 0 thru 9

Intention is definitely important. The best form of moral behavior is when someone does something for no other reason than they think it's the right thing to do. Moral behavior is cheapened in our eyes, when it's done for an ulterior motive than it simply being someone doing the right thing because it is the right thing to do. Compare, handing in a lost wallet to a police station because you could get a reward, and handing it in because it's the morally right thing to do. In both cases it's the same behavior (on the surface) and yet one is more 'moral' than the other, due to the intention.

Maybe there just isn't a "why" as to why we ought be good. We are just given the freedom of choice to match our behavior to the moral facts, or not. As in, there's nothing in the universe which says we ought act morally right/wrong, the universe just contains the moral facts (eg, x action is morally right, y action is morally wrong). It's purely up to us whether we decide to conform our behavior to these facts. There's nothing in the universe which says it's better or preferable to act morally right or not. It just has the facts, it's up to us what we do with them.

We still want to say in this situation that what the guy did was morally wrong. — dukkha

We do? I wouldn't.

Now, I'm not saying I'm completely immune to judging actions which, objectively, cause no harm or cause a net benefit. If I do happen to notice someone discreetly looting a corpse (which is of course different from your example, where no one notices), then that's likely to give me a very negative first impression of that person. However, that's not because I think there's something inherently wrong with looting a corpse as such if no harm is done, it's simply because of my fuzzy human intuition about social conventions which says that people who loot corpses are very very likely to be asses, and also the fact that I wouldn't immediately know whether there is some potential harm involved or not.

If, however, they beforehand confessed to me that they think it's senseless to bury expensive rings, and that they're going to make themselves the last person to go to the casket and that they're going to pilfer the ring, sell it, and donate the money to the blind kittens' orphanage, and somehow I'm actually convinced that they won't be caught and are actually speaking the truth, then... great! Wonderful, please go ahead. It's the right thing to do and hopefully I wouldn't wimp out of helping them.

You say:

At least personally, when I say "stealing is wrong", I don't mean "I do not think that people should steal". — dukkha

Yet I had said:

"Oughts" are implied by "is right is wrong" for most people simply because they feel that one should not perform actions that the person in question disapproves of, or that the person in question feels is a bad idea. — Terrapin Station

Note first off that I didn't say anything like "when one says that 'x is wrong' what one really means is." I said that for most people, oughts are implied by moral is's because most people feel that one should not perform actions that the person in question disapproves of, or that the person in question feels is a bad idea.

Note also that I'm not saying anything at all about what you might believe about moral claims, such as your belief that there are things that are objectively wrong morally. What I'm talking about is what's really going on, contra your beliefs in this case about the facts of moral claims. What's really going on is not that some behavior is objectively right or wrong. It's false that any behavior is objectively right or wrong. What's really going on is simply that you feel that some behavior is right or wrong, and you feel that one ought to do or not do some behavior.

then I would go and steal regardless, and enjoy it. If I stole, doesn't that kind of negate the judgement? — dukkha

What's typically going on in cases like that is that the person's feelings about stealing are more complicated than simply "one should not steal," where those feelings are also typically wrapped up with feeling strongly that one's moral stances should conform to what one has been taught, at least by particular people (such as parents, perhaps). It can also be a more strictly personal-originated case of cognitive dissonance.

One can sometimes feel trapped between the law-breakers and the law-makers. By which i mean, that if unbridled self-interest is someone's prime motivation, it generally makes little ultimate difference whether they prefer to wear a ski mask or an expensive three-piece suit when doing their business. These two extremes, though superficially different, are like mirror images of each other. They may actually indirectly cause and prolong the existence of each other. A "common type" criminal may have all sorts of rationalizations for their actions which may or may not be accurate.

But when there are too many thieves, a scared public may accept harsh laws and enforcers who may not have the wisdom of Solomon or the compassion of a saint. One remembers A Clockwork Orange, where the thugs became officially sanctioned all too easily, and continued their brutality behind a badge.

A more financial type example is how the sugar replacement Stevia was declared possibly dangerous, highly regulated and even illegal to use as an food ingredient until fairly recently. Once certain large companies were ready to introduce their own Stevia products, then Stevia miraculously became a healthy alternative. One can think of other "herbs" and their proponents given even harsher "justice".

And that is without mentioning the hyper-competitive, ultra-violent champions of Law (secular and Holy) and Flag (national or other) who seem to descend to the level of power where "right makes might" and "might makes (you see that I am) right". This is not necessarily referring to a specific nation, political party, movement, or person. It is so widespread that is seems to be in the drinking water. Like the gallows humor version of the Golden Rule where "the one with the gold makes the rules".

As Gandolf said, "Tell me friend, when did Saruman the Wise abandon reason for madness?"

Hopefully, this course is reversible. (And hopefully this post is somehow relevant to this thread.)