• Cheshire
    47
    This doesn't make sense.
  • creativesoul
    3.1k
    ...If I think I am right saying abortion is wrong, how would there be a real effort in determining what is true or false about that belief?Blue Lux

    You're talking about belief regarding what's considered to be acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. "Wrong" here isn't equivalent to having false belief. Rather, it's equivalent to agreeing or disagreeing with standards of moral belief(codes of conduct).

    None of this is applicable to a language less creature. Those creatures cannot have these sorts of beliefs.
  • creativesoul
    3.1k


    What's 'this'? What doesn't make sense?
  • Cheshire
    47
    The conversation has gotten of the OP. It still applies. None of us are applying it.
    1h
    creativesoul
  • Blue Lux
    480
    I can easily say that it is intelligence rather than language that is the criterion of these sorts of beliefs.
  • creativesoul
    3.1k


    What doesn't make sense?

    Our discussion has gotten off the OP. That is clear because we're no longer discussing it's relevance to the OP. However, it is still relevant to the OP. Because it is still relevant to the OP, but we're not discussing that relevance, it makes perfect sense to say what I did.
  • creativesoul
    3.1k


    Yes, one can easily say almost anything.
  • Blue Lux
    480
    Belief is determined by many things, perhaps language capacity, intelligence, imagination, etc.

    But what of the belief that something is right or wrong, with seemingly no conscious basis? An example of this is taboos. There are certain taboos in ancient cultures of which the basis for believing certain things transcends any linguistic approach to them.

    There is too the tendency to completely change words and names of people in some ancient cultures based on beliefs that have absolutely no intelligibility ascertained through analysis.
  • Cheshire
    47
    this makes more sense.
  • Blue Lux
    480
    We're talking about, and fleshing out the details for a criterion; what counts as thought and belief that is not existentially dependent upon language.creativesoul

    Poetic ideas. Fantasy.

    Language is a rendering of experience. Belief is prior to language not in a temporal degree but is more proximal and/or primordial. Belief belongs to the realm of experience. Belief is instantiated by language in that belief lacks a manageable form prior to its translation. Language is rendered by belief. Language is, partly, a sublimation of belief. An example of this is as follows.

    I met a person. I fell in love with that person. I believed that I loved them. I believe still that I love them. But the feelings constituting this belief do not originate with the words that contain them in such a statement about them. The feelings constitute an inclination, tendency and direction a sort of amalgamation of feelings and affects, and such a 'thing' crystallizes into language to be expressed. Is this not the fundamental operation of language?-- to, primarily, express? What would be expressed if it originated in the same tool of expression? Would all belief thus be a sort of simulacrum, representation after representation? Nihilistic? Some web of the arbitrary? This is obviously false. Something prior to language is expressed by language. Never does a belief originate in language, unless it is an artificial conglomeration labeled as 'belief.'
  • javra
    592
    Enjoi your weekend, my friend.creativesoul

    Cheers, amigo. Good news is I managed to do the more important parts of what I should’ve done. But back to debating.

    False analogy.creativesoul

    Well, not by my count. The analogies intended to address non-reflective awareness of certain givens universally applicable to all awareness-endowed beings (I maintain, to all life). Here’s a very relevant, yet controversial, issue (relevant to the issue of awareness): the awareness of self. Self-awareness as it’s typically understood requires thought about thought/belief in the form of a concept of self. Yet the sheer awareness of what is other and what is not-other—and, thereby, an innate and non-reflective awareness of selfhood via which one acts and reacts—is inherent in all life; otherwise, it would starve to death, for one example. What I’m trying to get at is that the same non-reflective awareness of what is other and what is not-other—for simplicity, here strictly concerning dogs—can apply with equal validity to a non-reflective awareness of what is correct and what is erroneous. More on this below.

    So the relevant question is...

    Can any creature be aware that it is wrong/right about those things without being aware that it has true/false belief about those things?

    I think not.
    creativesoul

    Whereas I, again, think this is the case.

    There's a remarkable difference between being right/wrong and being aware of that. Being wrong/right is having true/false belief. Given that, being aware that one is wrong/right is being aware that one has true/false belief. Nothing else suffices.creativesoul

    Addressing only the first sentence, yes, of course; but this only from the point of view of our adult human awareness which, in part, consists of an awareness of our abstracted notion of what the true/false dichotomy requires. But the true/false dichotomy doesn’t exist because we’ve conceptualized it as an abstraction; rather, we’ve conceptualized it as our best map of a pre-existing territory. In this case, roughly expressed, the territory is the potential relations we as sentient beings hold with that which, firstly, is other relative to us as consciousnesses and, secondly—or, even more abstractly—with that which is ontic (here including the very presence of us as consciousnesses). But one does not need to conceptualize what truth and falsity are in order to make this distinction via consciousness/awareness—just as a being does not need to hold an abstracted understanding of selfhood to hold a crude but stanch innate awareness of what is itself and what is other.

    A language less creature can form and have true/false belief without being aware of it. It can experience unexpected events(and confusion) as a result. I'm not arguing against the notion of a non-linguistic creature having true/false belief. Thus, I'm agreeing that such a creature can be right/wrong. I'm arguing that such a creature cannot be aware that it is right/wrong without being aware that it has true/false belief.creativesoul

    Here, I’m picking up on the culturally common understanding of awareness as consisting of humans’ awareness of abstractions regarding awareness. Thus, of self-awareness in the sense of being aware of an abstraction regarding awareness as the core of the (conscious) self—or something to this effect. It yet still amounts to a belief about belief(s)—and not to the non-reflective belief itself. Ok, this issue of non-reflective beliefs and acquired complex beliefs which then act as non-reflective beliefs via which we then filter yet other beliefs we're addressing can, of itself, become very complex. Still, I’m trying to clarify that this is not what I’ve previously intended:

    Imagine, for example, that to the dog 1 + 1 = 1 just doesn’t feel right whereas 1 + 1 = 2 does. The dog then acts and reacts accordingly (I imagine only on average in relation to this simple arithmetic). The dog here doesn’t need to hold an awareness of the concepts of true and false (nor of the concepts of error and correctitude, for that matter … all of which being abstract thoughts/beliefs which one holds trust for, i.e. believes). Nevertheless the dog will instinctively trust via is awareness-dependent apprehensions of information (i.e. will hold a pre-reflective awareness) that one sum is wrong (and will thereby find it unfavorable) and the other is right (and thereby favorable).

    I don't know if I've lost you so far—this regardless of whether or not you agree. I'm sure that if I have you'll let me know. But here's a different example that may be of greater service:

    Dogs are relatively good at deceiving. This, again, requires a belief about the beliefs of others when they are being deceived. For willful deception to be at all effective, the dog then must hold a certainty that engaging in behaviors X will (or at least is very likely to) create an erroneous belief in the other which—simultaneously—the deceiving dog apprehends to be an erroneous belief and, therefore, not a correct belief. Wikipedia gives the example of a dog that sits on a treat to hide it till the other leaves the room. I’ve got plenty of anecdotal accounts of my own (e.g., with a very intelligent shepherd dog I had as a kid), but let’s go with the Wikipedia example. The dog must be aware that the treat really is beneath its bum. It must also be aware that by concealing it this way the other will then hold an erroneous belief that there is no treat in the room. Here again, I argue, is required an awareness of error and non-error regarding that which is—an awareness that is not dependent on abstract thoughts/beliefs regarding the concepts of right/wrong, or true/false, or error/non-error, etc. A belief-endowed awareness that can well be non-reflective (though in this case likely does contain some inference and, hence, reflection regarding what's going on in the mind of the other).

    I’ll grant your objections to the study that dogs can discern error in 1 + 1 = 1 (thought I yet disagree with them) … but when it comes to dogs’ ability to deceive, here I’m holding fast. I’ve had too many experiences with dogs to deny them this ability.
  • javra
    592
    I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability.
    — Cheshire

    The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: — javra


    Well, there's certainly a difference between "nothing ontic" and lacking the knowledge that a thing is ontic. So, the explanation that follows doesn't really fit the claim I'm making here.
    Cheshire

    I found your statement somewhat ambiguous and was doing my best to cover all the bases, just in case.

    The more important part of my reply was this:

    Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided.javra

    In other words, your use of knowledge here is that of an absolute, or infallible, knowledge. That "we may not ever know if it is actually ontic"—for example—is only a problem when one believes such infallible knowledge can be had. Come to believe that we cannot hold infallible knowledge in practice for anything, and this problem fully dissolves, for we then can and do fallibly know "if its actually ontic"--and no other form of knowledge is possible.
  • javra
    592
    I was waiting for your two word post to be somehow enhanced. But seeing that it hasn’t been …

    I disagree.Cheshire

    Ok. Noted.
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