I would also like to learn of your views regarding dogs' deception and the nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about. — javra

Are you asking me to use my own philosophical position to offer an alternative account of the dog's behaviour?

"The nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about" is an odd phrasing. Again, it presupposes that being well grounded is something that happens after thought/belief formation. At the language less level there is no arguing for one's own belief. There is no act of justification.

Some belief on the language less level is well grounded upon it's initial formation. It doesn't make sense to talk about these beliefs in terms of how their well-grounded-ness 'comes about', unless my answer satisfies that query...

I would also like to learn of your views regarding dogs' deception and the nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about.
— javra

Are you asking me to use my own philosophical position to offer an alternative account of the dog's behaviour? — creativesoul

That conversation hinges upon what counts as deception. I would deny that the dog deliberately sets out to trick another dog.

You, however, have not provided a single interpretation of what belief is. Describing that a belief about belief is not the belief itself does not define what you mean by belief. Give it a go. What is belief to you? — javra

All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things.

I greatly doubt that we’ll find common ground. I’ve also lost the desire to further debate this issue. I’m giving a partial reply so as to not be utterly off-putting:

If non-linguistic belief is correlations drawn between different things such that it presupposes its own correspondence to fact/reality then this belief will be acquired, hence learned, via the different things that become correlated. The belief then “comes about”. And unless lesser animals’ beliefs are always fully devoid of error, there must then be a means by which well-grounded beliefs attain this property in their initial formation.

You seem to however insist otherwise.

All belief presupposes it's own correspondence somewhere along the line. Positing belief at the genotype level is to posit belief that is inherently incapable of presupposing it's own correspondence. — creativesoul

No. Evolutionary theory would readily account for this. But I sense you will insist otherwise.

On the ground that any and sensible notions of trust must include - in some fundamental sense - what our everyday notions of trust include. — creativesoul

For the record, the Wiktionary definition is what everyday notions of trust entail. It is a long standing wiki page, after all.

The same grounds as above, and on the ground that that definition inevitably leads to aburd consequences(reductio ad absurdum).

The performance of a vehicle relies on all sorts of different qualities and people. It does not trust. — creativesoul

Next you’ll tell me that a vehicle acts and reacts? No, vehicles lack an agency by which to hold confidence in or reliance upon—something I take to be commonly understood.

That conversation hinges upon what counts as deception. I would deny that the dog deliberately sets out to trick another dog. — creativesoul

The denial or evasive treatment of research findings is not a thing I feel in any way comfortable with. I won’t ask you to specify what you mean by “deliberately”. I don’t know how one could believe that the dog in the Wikipedia example sat on the treat by accident until the other dog left the room. But I’m confident it can be conceptualized this way. Still, I’ll continue trusting research findings that are published by well-reputed peer-review journals, such as the APA (which I've previously linked to).

All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

Yet this does not distinguish thought from belief so as to define what belief is.

Again, I more than likely won’t continue in this debate, believing that it’s ran its course.

If non-linguistic belief is correlations drawn between different things such that it presupposes its own correspondence to fact/reality then this belief will be acquired, hence learned, via the different things that become correlated. The belief then “comes about”. And unless lesser animals’ beliefs are always fully devoid of error, there must then be a means by which well-grounded beliefs attain this property in their initial formation.

You seem to however insist otherwise. — javra

Not really. I think that you're making it more complex than it need be.

Drawing correlations is thought and belief formation. Being well grounded, on my view, means having sufficient reason to believe... being warranted. I think it is a mistake to call this a 'property' of belief. It adds unnecessary complications...

A language less creature can learn that touching fire causes pain/discomfort by virtue of touching fire for the first time. That creature's belief is not that "fire hurts when touched" or that "fire causes pain/discomfort". Those are our reports of that creature's mental ongoings(belief). They can be accurate enough descriptions without being equivalent in content. They must be in order for us to sensibly talk about it.

The creature's belief cannot consist of propositional content. Propositions aren't meaningful to the creature. I referred to this earlier, when cautioning about what need be kept in consideration when reporting upon belief that is not existentially dependent upon language.

The creature draws a correlation between it's own behaviour(touching fire) and what happened afterwards(the onset of pain). That is thought/belief formation that is not existentially dependent upon language. The creature's belief consists of the correlation. The belief is existentially dependent upon the content of the correlation itself(touching fire and pain). All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content. The fire becomes significant to the creature by virtue of belief formation. The creature attributes meaning by virtue of drawing these correlations.

Regarding whether or not this particular example of belief is well grounded...

What better reason is there to attribute/recognize causality?

The dog can sit on the treat intentionally as a means of gathering resources without ever needing to consider the other dogs' mental ongoings...

For the record, the Wiktionary definition is what everyday notions of trust entail. It is a long standing wiki page, after all. — javra

The definition, as it was written, led to the conclusion that a vehicle trusts it's parts and the people who maintain/built them.

That is prima facie evidence that that definition is unacceptable, regardless of how long it's been a Wikipedia page...

Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief.
— creativesoul

On what grounds do you affirm this?

Example: I see an odd shaped red apple on the table for the first time. I'm not at all familiar with this type of apple. — javra

Claiming that you are not at all familiar with a type of apple is a performative contradiction. You are obviously familiar with it enough to categorize it as an apple.

I either trust that it is there as seen, trust that it is not as seen, or trust that both possibilities might be valid; the latter being an instance of uncertainty while the two former cases are instances of certainty. Regardless, all three scenarios are initially experienced by me without without a sense of familiarity, without thought, and without beliefs about beliefs (belief is what we're addressing to begin with, so I'm assuming you were here addressing beliefs about beliefs).

I may be wrong here, but it seems to me that you're wanting to say that language less creatures are capable of trust(without familiarity) by virtue of trusting their physiological sensory perception when encountering novel things. Not having the ability to doubt the veracity of one's physiological sensory perception and/or rudimentary thought and belief is not equivalent to trusting it. Any such notion of trust which would allow such a loose criterion(trust equaling all reliance upon something) would lead us to claim that vehicles trust their parts.

The notion is unacceptable as it is. It obviously requires some refinement.

Your example above is chock full of thinking about thought and belief all the while simultaneously denying that.

I find that physiological sensory perception alone(not the kind of 'perception' informed by language) is inadequate for thought and belief. A creature can perceive something without drawing correlations between it and something else. Such things are not meaningful/significant to a language less creature.

All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things.
— creativesoul

Yet this does not distinguish thought from belief so as to define what belief is. — javra

At the language less level there is no difference. At the rudimentary level there is no difference. They both consist of the exact same things - correlations. All thought and all belief consist of correlations. All differences in either are determined precisely by virtue of the content of the correlations.

The meaningful difference between the terms "thought" and "belief" has to do with the attitude of the user... uncertainty. Uncertainty arises from becoming aware of our own fallibility. The ability to consider some statement or other without necessarily believing that it is true(the only difference between thought and belief) requires rather complex language replete with proxies(names) for one's own mental ongoings.

A bit on reflective thought...

I find that reflective thought can be both, prior to thinking about one's own thought and belief and after. The content of the reflection is memory. Memory does not require thinking about thought and belief. For that reason, positing it alone is utterly inadequate for helping us to delineate thought/belief that is not existentially dependent upon language from that which is. However, we could determine the content of the memory as a means to ascertain whether or not that content is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought and belief. We could also determine whether or not that content is existentially dependent upon language.

I greatly doubt that we’ll find common ground. I’ve also lost the desire to further debate this issue. I’m giving a partial reply so as to not be utterly off-putting: — javra

Thanks.

In general, I find that we agree on much more than we disagree. However, regarding this particular topic of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language, there are indeed stark differences in our views.

This became clearer to me after you denied that belief must begin simply and grow in it's complexity.

I would be more than willing to discontinue discussing everything else except one thing...

I would like for you and I to set out the bare minimum criterion for what counts as belief. I think a comprehensive comparison between the two(I'm assuming that there will be some differences) will lend itself to a much greater understanding.

I haven't been able to ascertain yours. I've definitely tried to. On my view, there must be something that all belief have in common which makes them belief aside from just calling them all by the same name...

To refresh a previous argument of mine, operational knowledge can well be, ontically, not erroneous. Nevertheless, this is not currently possible to prove epistemically.

Are we not somehow agreeing to this? My only issue here is that infallibility to me is an epistemic property. My bad if I didn’t make that explicit previously. Maybe this facet makes a notable difference? If not, then we indeed disagree. Call it a day? — javra

I'm satisfied.