...nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor. — Blue Lux

I just thought about this another way...

If offering an accurate account of nonlinguistic belief by means of art, music, poetry, and/or metaphor qualifies as 'capturing nonlinguistic belief', then I may actually agree...

I mean, I could put my own words to music or in poetic verse...

Metaphor can't do it though.

Art has a broad enough definition of what qualifies as art than I could envision some forms of art(music and poetry) doing it too...

Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is? — javra

Well, I've already set out my position on this... all belief is existentially dependent upon and consists of correlations. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.

On my view, the belief content is the content of correlation. This seems to be in agreement with your framework, aside from the equation you've drawn between trust and belief, which causes me pause...



Trust, to me, is pivotal though. I mean, we both place tremendous value upon trust. On my view, it is best understood as an unavoidable human condition arising from our being interdependent social creatures.

By my lights, you're attempting to situate trust into the timeline before it can be rightfully accounted for. The criterion for it seems to be so minimal that trust could be had by a creature that is completely incapable of doubting anything at all.

That seems problematic.

Well, again, for me to believe is to trust that; and a belief is the contents of that which is trusted... — javra

This seems to be the basis for the belief that approach. It certainly lends support to the method, regardless of whether it is intentional or accidental.

Typically, when we talk about one believing something, we're saying that one believes that X is true; is the case at hand; is the way things were, are, and/or will be; corresponds to fact/reality; etc.

Let X be a statement or proposition.

Here, it makes perfect sense to draw an equation between trust and belief, for the two terms are easily interchangeable without self-contradiction.

How does one trust something that it has never thought about? Your framework admits of this, doesn't it?

Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity.

Familiarity(the kind that produces trust) requires a succession of the same or similar enough belief about that which is trusted. This familiarity cannot be had if innate fear takes hold of the creature. One cannot trust that which aggravates instinctual/innate fear, at least not one at a language less level.

Here, the two terms are not so freely interchangeable.

Familiarity(the kind that destroys trust) also requires a succession of the same or similar enough belief about that which is not trusted.

Thought and belief are indistinguishable at this level. The only difference between the two happens on a metacognitive level. Non linguistic creatures are incapable of deliberately suspending their judgement about whether or not to believe something. Being able to do that requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. It is a precautionary measure that can only be taken by a creature with written language that has become painfully aware of it's own fallibility.

Aside from thought like that... there is no difference between thought and belief.

Trust is most certainly being built during the formative years of initial language acquisition. Contentment and familiarity with one's caregivers. That is prior to language acquisition. That seems to be where knowingly relying upon something comes from...

To answer all relevant points in all your posts would require a very long essay. I’ll try to focus attention of issues of belief and thought in non-linguistic lesser animals.

A sure sign that we've gotten something wrong here - when discussing non linguistic thought and belief - is if and when it is too complicated. Simply put, non linguistic thought and belief cannot be that complicated. — creativesoul

You’re forgetting the mind is a very complex thing. It includes, for example, unconscious processes that always effect, affect, entwine with, and bring about the consciousness’s form. And we do not hold conscious awareness of all our beliefs at any given time. At any given time, most of our beliefs are unconsciously held—staying there till they're brought up into conscious awareness for purposes of deliberation. And the assumption that non-linguistic thought and belief is somehow simple is, to me, very erroneous. I’ll give some data below to better illustrate my point.

I'm talking very specifically - as precisely as possible - about what it takes to become aware of one's own fallibility, which is a much 'cleaner' way to say "become aware of one's capacity to be right/wrong". — creativesoul

I’m not talking about a conscious awareness of an abstraction/thought concerning the possibility of being wrong. I’m talking about an innate, inborn, unlearned, not consciously contemplated, Kantian-like (if you will) mental capacity to distinguish the category of right/correct/etc. from the category of wrong/incorrect/etc.

Some data. Taken from https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/08/090810025241.htm

Dogs can also count up to four or five, said Coren. And they have a basic understanding of arithmetic and will notice errors in simple computations, such as 1+1=1 or 1+1=3. — APA

Yes, it’s very rudimentary arithmetic ability. However: Here is found the capacity to discern error in matters of fact—which would not be possible devoid of a complimentary capacity to discern non-error in the same givens. To whatever extent this capacity might be learned, if any, it is not contingent on language use.

I offered an argument for the position I hold. It's been sorely neglected. That argument is based upon something very important. The distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief that the whole of philosophy has neglected to draw and maintain... — creativesoul

You can maybe see how your argument is in contradiction to the data. Your argument's premise that awareness of right/wrong requires thought about thought and belief is faulty; it only requires belief and thought (without requiring thought about either).

Uncertainty is the mechanism. It is fear based. — creativesoul

I disagree, but this will be a long argument and relatively tangential to what we're focusing on. Still, dogs can be curious, and curiosity cannot occur when there is full psychological certainty relative to all matters regarded. So curiosity to me requires uncertainty--one that is obviously not fear based. All the same, trying to keep my reply focused ...

So, that's three different elemental constituents that have been identified. Namely... 1.being existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between things, 2.being meaningful, and 3.presupposing it's own correspondence. — creativesoul

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dog_intelligence#Theory_of_mind (its not a long read):

Dogs are relatively good at deceiving others, and this requires that dogs hold a rudimentary theory of mind. This understanding of other minds is not learned via language, nor is it likely to in any way be thoughts about thoughts and beliefs. It is also likely not something learned but something innate, inborn, Kantian-like, etc. that only gets refined via experience. Here there is a belief of what the other will believe when deceived. But it seems obvious to me that this belief of other minds' capacities is not acquired via correlations between things (for it is not held as a result of learning about other minds; puppies will hold such belief of other minds).

Remember that I uphold a difference between innate beliefs (beliefs we're birthed with), learned beliefs (stored in our unconscious after having been acquired till brought up into consciousness), and enactive beliefs (e.g. beliefs we actively deliberate upon consciously). Correlations will be one means of acquiring learned beliefs, but they cannot account for innate beliefs. So I strongly disagree with all beliefs being dependent on correlations in order to manifest.

Thought and belief are indistinguishable at this level. The only difference between the two happens on a metacognitive level. — creativesoul

To me not at all. If all belief (innate, learned, and enactive) is a form of trust for what in fact is, then thought is a process of relating various beliefs--especially those that are innate in less intelligent living beings. The two processes are to me therefore distinct, and their ontological differentiation in lesser beings is not contingent on lesser beings' meta-cognition. (see again the two examples of dog intelligence, neither of which are contingent on a dog's capacity of metacognition).

There's again a lot here that could be disagreed with. So I'll stop here and see where the reply leads to.

If offering an accurate account of nonlinguistic belief by means of art, music, poetry, and/or metaphor qualifies as 'capturing nonlinguistic belief', then I may actually agree... — creativesoul

groovy :smile:

BTW, it's not an ideal time for me to be hanging out on the forum. Can't say when my next reply will be. But I would like to focus on the two empirical data addressed: that of dogs' capacity to discern error in 1 + 1 = 1 and that of dogs' having a very rudimentary theory of mind (more specifically, both belief and thought as regards other minds when these other minds are deceived).

Can't say when my next reply will be. But I would like to focus on the two empirical data addressed: that of dogs' capacity to discern error in 1 + 1 = 1 and that of dogs' having a very rudimentary theory of mind (more specifically, both belief and thought as regards other minds when these other minds are deceived). — javra

I would need to see the actual studies and experiments that these conclusions were based upon in order to offer a more informed opinion of the reliability of those conclusions. However, some things can be said without my having access to that.

There is a remarkable difference between noting differences and noting errors.

I would be willing to bet that there is nothing in either experiment or study to justify saying that the dog noticed an error rather than saying that it noticed a difference between the equations it was presented with. Recognizing differences doesn't equate to recognizing errors.

Counting is not the same thing as recognizing different quantities. Again, I do not have the studies or experiments on hand, however, I would be willing to bet that the dog drew correlations between some symbol or sign and a quantity.

That said...

It seems that there is a fundamental difference between our views here. It may prove to be irreconcilable. In addition, you've now presented a strawman argument on multiple occasions. You've adamantly rejected things that I've not claimed. It is always better to actually present the argument and then clearly express which premisses or conclusions you disagree with and offer some valid objection for that disagreement.

I do not want to get into yet another discussion where one participant is criticizing another's position/argument without first granting the terms. That is the bane of philosophy.

...mental capacity to distinguish the category of right/correct/etc. from the category of wrong/incorrect/etc. — javra

I've yet to see you present an argument for this capacity to be innate. You asserted it multiple times. That is to presuppose precisely what needs argued for.

I've presented an argument which negates that ability, and situates it at a minimum level of written language. That argument has not been directly addressed, although you've openly expressed your disagreement with it, and even 'strongly' disagreed with it calling it "in error" or words to that affect/effect.

That's not acceptable to me at this juncture...

I would need to see the actual studies and experiments that these conclusions were based upon in order to offer a more informed opinion of the reliability of those conclusions. — creativesoul

Hey, I’m trusting the info based on what I take to be the fact that the information on both sciencedaily and Wikipedia would not be up there were it to be uncorroborated, merely anecdotal, or hearsay. Both sources heavily rely upon peer-review, after all.

In addition, you've now presented a strawman argument on multiple occasions. You've adamantly rejected things that I've not claimed. It is always better to actually present the argument and then clearly express which premisses or conclusions you disagree with and offer some valid objection for that disagreement.

I do not want to get into yet another discussion where one participant is criticizing another's position/argument without first granting the terms. That is the bane of philosophy. — creativesoul

Hm. Whatever I might have either not addressed or, else, poorly represented was unintentional on my part. I’m more than OK with simply agreeing to disagree at this point. I’ll leave it at that.

It's just now getting to the important bits...

Ah well, if you ever want to do some philosophy here on this topic, I'll gladly re-join.

We've not even gotten to the point where we know what the disagreements are.

Hey, I’m trusting the info based on what I take to be the fact that the information on both sciencenews and Wikipedia would not be up there were it to be uncorroborated, merely anecdotal, or hearsay. Both sources heavily rely upon peer-review, after all. — javra

There's a reason why psychology is called a 'soft' science, and an appeal to authority is rather unconvincing, particularly nowadays given the way science is funded...

There is a remarkable difference between noting differences and noting errors.

I would be willing to bet that there is nothing in either experiment or study to justify saying that the dog noticed an error rather than saying that it noticed a difference between the equations it was presented with. Recognizing differences doesn't equate to recognizing errors.

Counting is not the same thing as recognizing different quantities. Again, I do not have the studies or experiments on hand, however, I would be willing to bet that the dog drew correlations between some symbol or sign and a quantity. — creativesoul

Do you not even grant these points?

There's a reason why psychology is called a 'soft' science, and an appeal to authority is rather unconvincing, particularly nowadays given the way science is funded... — creativesoul

Having both engaged in independent psychological (cognitive science) experiments (particularly, in the importance of eyes v. mouth in human non-linguistic communication concerning emotions) as well as in a neuroscience lab (experiments on zebra finches learned capacities to recognize and produce song patterns via brain lesion to critical areas in chicks, etc.)—both some twenty years ago—my personal experience illustrates to me that well done psych. research can hold far, far fewer confounding variables and, therefore, far greater statistical integrity than the often termed “hard sciences” of biology/neuroscience. Take it or leave it. They’re nevertheless my experiences.

Do you not even grant these points? — creativesoul

No, actually. But I'm feeling there's often differences with the semantics of the words we're both using. And to get to the bottom of it would most likely be very time consuming.

At any rate, it was nice engaging in this overall debate with you. But I’ll leave it where we’re at. Till the next time. :up:

An awareness for the capacity to be right/wrong requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires the ability to become aware of, isolate/identify, and subsequently further consider one's own pre-existing thought and belief. That requires written language. Thus, an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as an awareness of the capacity to be right/correct requires written language.

A language less creature does not have what it takes to be aware of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken or right/correct.





You've disagreed with the first claim above, which was being used as a premiss. It needs set out so that you can address it's ground, prior to it's being used as a premiss.

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief.

Having both engaged in independent psychological (cognitive science) experiments (particularly, in the importance of eyes v. mouth in human non-linguistic communication concerning emotions) as well as in a neuroscience lab (experiments on zebra finches learned capacities to recognize and produce song patterns via brain lesion to critical areas in chicks, etc.)—both some twenty years ago—my personal experience illustrates to me that well done psych. research can hold far, far fewer confounding variables and, therefore, far greater statistical integrity than the often termed “hard sciences” of biology/neuroscience. Take it or leave it. They’re nevertheless my experiences. — javra

Look javra I can more than appreciate that experience, and don't take the "soft science" comment personally, it wasn't about you. It was about the fact that there are several equally compelling equally valid explanations for any given set of non linguistic behaviours. Hence... the crucial need for a sound philosophical approach to what counts as thought and belief, particularly what counts as non-linguistic thought and belief.

Surely you can understand my trepidation regarding the conclusions in that article, given that I do not have access to the details of the experiments performed?

You've disagreed with the first claim above, which was being used as a premiss. It needs set out so that you can address it's ground, prior to it's being used as a premiss.

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief. — creativesoul

OK

P3 is to me not true/right/correct.

By analogy: I can be aware of time (as can most any lesser mammal, for example) without needing to have an awareness about me having a belief about time. Same with space. Same with quantity and rudimentary arithmetic. Same with the law of noncontradiction. Same with values we term “bad” and “good”. Don’t tell me we humans now have a conclusively definitive understanding of what time, space, mathematics, laws of thought, and the meta-ethical reality of bad/good are … Nevertheless, we now as adults—just as we did as infants—hold an awareness of them … one that does not existentially require a belief/thought about our belief/thought prior to the very awareness being present.

Same type of pre-linguistic, pre-meta-cognitive awareness can be had in relation to error/non-error in manners a priori to an awareness about the belief that one can be erroneous/non-erroneous.

... as evidence, there's again the addressed empirical research into dog intelligence showing that dogs can find 1 +1 = 1 erroneous. I don't have access to the original experiment(s). But, the way I understand and know this ethological research to be, those who express human-like abilities in lesser animals are viciously assaulted by others in related fields. So I'm inferring that where this statement to not be well-justified/grounded, it would never have been published by the APA.

No, I wasn't taking it personally. Basically giving a shout-out to good quality research in the fields of psychology / cognition.

There are two veins of thought here...

One about the experiments, the other about what awareness takes...

I want to continue, but keep them in separate posts. I'd like for you to continue here. Would you, could you, in a box? Would you, could you, with a fox? On a boat, with a goat?

Don't mind my silliness. It's a coping mechanism. :wink:

I want to continue, but want you to trust that it's worth it. It is to me.

Basically giving a shout-out to good quality research in the fields of psychology / cognition. — javra

Yeah well... without access to the details of the experiment, I cannot know if it's good quality or not. Do you have access to the details?

Recognizing differences doesn't equate to recognizing errors.

Counting is not the same thing as recognizing different quantities. — creativesoul

Do you agree with these two claims?

You've disagreed with the first claim above, which was being used as a premiss. It needs set out so that you can address it's ground, prior to it's being used as a premiss.

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief.
— creativesoul

OK

P3 is to me not true/right/correct.

By analogy: I can be aware of time (as can most any lesser mammal, for example) without needing to have an awareness about me having a belief about time. Same with space. Same with quantity and rudimentary arithmetic. Same with the law of noncontradiction. Same with values we term “bad” and “good”. Don’t tell me we humans now have a conclusively definitive understanding of what time, space, mathematics, laws of thought, and the meta-ethical reality of bad/good are … Nevertheless, we now as adults—just as we did as infants—hold an awareness of them … one that does not existentially require a belief/thought about our belief/thought prior to the very awareness being present.

Same type of pre-linguistic, pre-meta-cognitive awareness can be had in relation to error/non-error in manners a priori to an awareness about the belief that one can be erroneous/non-erroneous. — javra

That seems to be where(and/or what) the bulk of our disagreements rest(upon).

:blush: ... well. Yea, but I make an big effort to prioritize the stuff that ought to be prioritizing right now. So ... not that my word is in any way absolute ... but, I'd like to not reply until after this weekend my time.

Yeah well... without access to the details of the experiment, I cannot know if it's good quality or not. Do you have access to the details? — creativesoul

no, but see my reasoning in what I added/edited in my previous post.

Do you agree with these two claims? — creativesoul

I agree with them, but they're not essential to the issue of recognizing 1 + 1 = 1 to be erroneous/incorrect/wrong/etc. This does require the recognition of error and different quantities.

I'd like to not reply until after this weekend my time. — javra

Take your time. I'll be much less wordy in what I offer between now and then. It seems we've reached a point that we can discuss where our differences lie. I want to do that in the best possible way.

Enjoi your weekend, my friend.

I do not agree that art, poetry and music are a language, for they do not adhere to a set of rules or organized structure. There is abstract art, music and poetry, as well as surrealism, cubism... And what about William Blake? What about Aphex Twin? These forms of expression, though akin in this regard to language which expresses, is not a language. Language is of sign, symbol and example. In an art piece or line of poetry, you have an ambiguousness that transcends what would be a language. You have a communicability but this does not mean language. I am reminded of Marina Abramovic when she would sit down and allow random people to sit in the chair across from her and look into her eyes as long as they want. Often people would cry or experience all kinds of things from this simple act, and therefore there is a communicability. This is performance art. It is not language and it does not require language. Furthermore, art (which includes poetry) establishes truth. Language can never produce truth, for it is always designated by an ever-reaching truth that is lacked. (Notice that something is finite [in language] only with an infinite reference point)

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief.[/quote]
I have a small issues with p1 and c2

What is the difference between an opinion and a fact? If I think I am right saying abortion is wrong, how would there be a real effort in determining what is true or false about that belief?
Two people could be right and differ completely about the same thing.

If I believe I love someone, having that belief is not in thinking it is a belief but thinking it is a fact. If I have a belief and maintain that it is a belief then it must be still undetermined whether or not whatever the belief is to posit is a fact, and therefore I would not have a belief at all but a skeptical opinion.

I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability.
— Cheshire

The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: — javra

Well, there's certainly a difference between "nothing ontic" and lacking the knowledge that a thing is ontic. So, the explanation that follows doesn't really fit the claim I'm making here.

Are we trying to sort out whether knowledge exists without language; by determining whether a belief can exist without language? So, we started talking about dogs? Last time I ran into this quandary it pages on children burning themselves. How about a kill shot;

Do you have any beliefs you've never bothered to formulate? I think I do. What am I drawing from by stating my belief's if not from a source of unspoken things. The belief doesn't come into my mind after I've said it.

Or I could join the party arguing that unconscious realization of object permanence is direct evidence of knowledge without language.

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief. — creativesoul

P3 is to me not true/right/correct.

I can be aware of time (as can most any lesser mammal, for example) without needing to have an awareness about me having a belief about time. Same with space. Same with quantity and rudimentary arithmetic. Same with the law of noncontradiction. Same with values we term “bad” and “good”. — javra

False analogy.

You've offered purported examples of things that one can be aware of without being aware that it has thought or belief about those things. What's being discussed here - what you've objected to - is what it takes to be aware that one is right/wrong.

So the relevant question is...

Can any creature be aware that it is wrong/right about those things without being aware that it has true/false belief about those things?

I think not.

There's a remarkable difference between being right/wrong and being aware of that. Being wrong/right is having true/false belief. Given that, being aware that one is wrong/right is being aware that one has true/false belief. Nothing else suffices.

A language less creature can form and have true/false belief without being aware of it. It can experience unexpected events(and confusion) as a result. I'm not arguing against the notion of a non-linguistic creature having true/false belief. Thus, I'm agreeing that such a creature can be right/wrong. I'm arguing that such a creature cannot be aware that it is right/wrong without being aware that it has true/false belief.

You've not offered a valid objection to that. I'm fully aware that you disagree. However, your disagreement alone does not make my position erroneous. Nor does your position on the matter serve to be very convincing when it is stated without supporting argument. That's gratuitous assertion, and obviously unacceptable as a means of objection.

The conversation has gotten of the OP. It still applies. None of us are applying it.

You're missing the point.

We're talking about, and fleshing out the details for a criterion; what counts as thought and belief that is not existentially dependent upon language.