While I'm waiting, please remember to answer this issue:

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not? — javra

It strikes me as putting the cart before the horse. Else as tautological and hence as much ado about nothing: "everything this is an unreflective belief as per some definition qualifies as being an unreflective belief per stated definition

If not, explain. — javra

Explain what? Tautological is a derogatory charge meant to be applied when discussing purely inductive reasoning(arguing by definitional fiat). The method which you're calling 'tautological' is deductive, and is no such thing. It's common sense based, has the strongest possible justificatory ground, and works from the fewest unprovable assumptions.

I suspect that you're aware of this...

I'm working upon the explanatory power.

While I'm waiting, please remember to answer this issue:

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not?
— javra — javra

What makes a "learned belief" different than other kinds of belief? More importantly what makes them similar enough to still qualify as belief?

What are you waiting for?

I'm waiting on your criteria.

Prior to sensibly discussing unreflective belief, we must first have some clue what that is. I'm offering a method, which if followed, provides the strongest possible justificatory ground for arriving at just such a criterion.

The following bears repeating...

Here's something that looks quite promising...

"Un-reflective belief"...

I believe that there is such a thing. I'll go first. As always, we look to set out a minimalist criterion, which when met by some candidate or other, serves as a measure of determination. All things that meet this criterion qualify as being an unreflective belief. That criterion is evidence of our knowledge about unreflective belief. That criterion needs to be properly accounted for. I say "accounted for" here quite intentionally. Because we are reporting upon thought and belief, we must keep in mind that our account can be wrong when it comes to that which is not existentially dependent upon our account. Un-reflective belief is one such thing.

We're reporting upon that which existed - in it's entirety - prior to our account/report.

Unreflective belief is a particular specifiable kind of belief. Our knowledge of it is existentially dependent upon written language. It is not. To be a kind of belief, is to be one of a plurality of different kinds of the same thing. This necessarily presupposes a universally applicable and/or extant set or group of common denominators. These can be thought of as individual elemental constituents. Perhaps "ingredients" is best? Each of these are an irrevocable element, for they all play their own role in all belief... statements thereof notwithstanding.

So again... as always, we look to set out a criterion...

What counts as belief? What is the criterion which, when satisfied by a candidate, offers us the strongest possible justificatory ground for saying that that candidate is belief? This criterion must be met by any and all sensible; consistent; coherent usage of the term "belief". I say that that criterion must set out the aforementioned group of common denominators that all belief share, and that none of these ingredients can be existentially dependent upon written language, for all reflection is to think about one's own thought/belief, and that is existentially dependent upon written language. — creativesoul

↪creativesoul

Are we of a sudden skipping back to the issue of pre-linguistic justification? — javra

Oh no. Pardon my spaciness...

Upon perusing the thread... I just found that that question had went otherwise unanswered. It deserved to be answered.

Innate beliefs, learned beliefs, metacognitive beliefs, unreflective beliefs...

The number of different kinds of belief is growing quickly.

Remove all of the individual particulars(that which makes them all different from one another) and then set out what it is that they all have in common that makes them all what they are... beliefs... aside - that is - from our just calling them all by the same name...

The following bears repeating... — creativesoul

Bears repeating, huh?

To alleviate some potential ambiguity: In my experience beliefs can decay just as easily as they can be gained. My former belief that this debate between us has been one of honestly reasoned enquiry has now eroded. On account of this, I will no longer be debating this subject with you.

Time for a new thread...

I've enjoyed this one for the most part. Unfortunately though, I am left with the faint impression that I've done it yet again. I apologize if I've caused you to take a fighting stance.

That was a crosspost from my seat. I'll leave my latest post untouched.

Thank you for the time and attention.

My former belief that this debate between us has been one of honestly reasoned enquiry has now eroded. — javra

This presupposes that you believe that I'm not speaking sincerely. That's too bad. I am many things, but dishonest ain't wunuvem. Tactless??? Sure. Having 'no filter'??? Certainly. Dishonest? Only on very very rare occasions...

You've conflated your thoughts about me with me...

But in short, you believe that infallible knowledge is possible to obtain; I don’t. We might be at a standstill on account of this disagreement. — javra

Perhaps, but we will at least know why.

Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. — javra

Isn't this being put forward as infallible knowledge, because its so well evidenced to render any counter argument baseless and untenable. If so, it proves itself wrong.

more to follow.

I am many things, but dishonest ain't wunuvem. — creativesoul

Glad to hear. Still, I have no interest in rereading the entire thread on a daily basis to see which newly lengthened posts require my re-reading due to me not being informed of the lengthy additions in a timely manner—and this after I’ve already taken time to reply to them. Ya know? I get it. It was a lack of ideal tact—something which I obviously lack as well. Nevertheless, that and a lot that I’ve addressed and/or asked which has not been addressed in turn presently leaves me wanting to leave our discussions as-is.

Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. — javra

Isn't this being put forward as infallible knowledge, because its so well evidenced to render any counter argument baseless and untenable. If so, it proves itself wrong. — Cheshire

If I haven’t mentioned it in a super-explicit form before, I will now: my stated affirmation is itself fallible; i.e., not perfectly secure form all possible error. Here is not addressed “infallible for all practical purposes” or “so close to being infallible that it makes no difference in everyday life”—but, again, technically infallible in its being perfectly secure form all possible error. And again: A fallibilist will fallibly know that he/she holds no infallible knowledge (not even in this affirmation).

Hence, no contradiction, not for the fallibilist. Contradictions only appear when an infallibilist account of knowledge is taken into consideration.

And, as previously discussed by me, just become X is liable to error (i.e., less than perfectly secure from all possible error) does not in any way signify that it is therefore erroneous.

Glad to hear. Still, I have no interest in rereading the entire thread on a daily basis to see which newly lengthened posts require my re-reading due to me not being informed of the lengthy additions in a timely manner—and this after I’ve already taken time to reply to them. Ya know? I get it. It was a lack of ideal tact—something which I obviously lack as well. Nevertheless, that and a lot that I’ve addressed and/or asked which has not been addressed in turn presently leaves me wanting to leave our discussions as-is. — javra

That's too bad. I'm not sure which posts I've altered after you replied to an extent that would've changed anything you may have gleaned from it. I certainly haven't attempted to do anything deceptive.

As a measure of good faith(a gesture of good-will), I woud be glad to address anything that you've written that you do not feel has been given due attention.

And, as previously discussed by me, just become X is liable to error (i.e., less than perfectly secure from all possible error) does not in any way signify that it is therefore erroneous. — javra

And I'm arguing this is the reason infallible knowledge must possibly exist. What is infallible knowledge, but knowledge without error?

Before you answer I still have a lot to respond to from above.

If I haven’t mentioned it in a super-explicit form before, I will now: my stated affirmation is itself fallible; i.e., not perfectly secure form all possible error. Here is not addressed “infallible for all practical purposes” or “so close to being infallible that it makes no difference in everyday life”—but, again, technically infallible in its being perfectly secure form all possible error. And again: A fallibilist will fallibly know that he/she holds no infallible knowledge (not even in this affirmation).

Hence, no contradiction, not for the fallibilist. Contradictions only appear when an infallibilist account of knowledge is taken into consideration. — javra

You literally stated it was both perfectly and not perfectly secure. It's a direct contradiction, unless one just chooses to ignore it to maintain a position.

In a further argument:

1. Infallible knowledge is possible or not.
2. Premise 1 is infallibly correct.
3. Infallible knowledge is possible.

OK, chap.

To first get this out of the way:

Innate beliefs, learned beliefs, metacognitive beliefs, unreflective beliefs...

The number of different kinds of belief is growing quickly.

Remove all of the individual particulars(that which makes them all different from one another) and then set out what it is that they all have in common that makes them all what they are... beliefs... aside - that is - from our just calling them all by the same name... — creativesoul

I've provided definitions for all belief types I've utilized and support. As to defining belief in general, I’ve already done that as well: trust-that. If you have objections to any of my definitions then so state with reasons for your objection. Otherwise, this post of yours to me looks like an example of spin.

You, however, have not provided a single interpretation of what belief is. Describing that a belief about belief is not the belief itself does not define what you mean by belief. Give it a go. What is belief to you?

As per the issue of dogs’ ability to discern errors, you have fully overlooked dogs’ ability to deceive and its implications of discerning errors of belief. I find that the following deserves to be addressed rather than ignored or evaded via spin:

Dogs are relatively good at deceiving. This, again, requires a belief about the beliefs of others when they are being deceived. For willful deception to be at all effective, the dog then must hold a certainty that engaging in behaviors X will (or at least is very likely to) create an erroneous belief in the other which—simultaneously—the deceiving dog apprehends to be an erroneous belief and, therefore, not a correct belief. Wikipedia gives the example of a dog that sits on a treat to hide it till the other leaves the room. I’ve got plenty of anecdotal accounts of my own (e.g., with a very intelligent shepherd dog I had as a kid), but let’s go with the Wikipedia example. The dog must be aware that the treat really is beneath its bum. It must also be aware that by concealing it this way the other will then hold an erroneous belief that there is no treat in the room. Here again, I argue, is required an awareness of error and non-error regarding that which is—an awareness that is not dependent on abstract thoughts/beliefs regarding the concepts of right/wrong, or true/false, or error/non-error, etc. A belief-endowed awareness that can well be non-reflective (though in this case likely does contain some inference and, hence, reflection regarding what's going on in the mind of the other). — javra

I’ve asked you to answer this:

While I'm waiting, please remember to answer this issue:

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not?
— javra — javra


What makes a "learned belief" different than other kinds of belief? More importantly what makes them similar enough to still qualify as belief?

What are you waiting for? — creativesoul

The questions you pose have already been addressed by me in previous posts. Your questions are also purely tangential to the issue at hand: that of whether the property of being "well-grounded" must be arrived at via some form of substantiation, or is a matter of happenstance, or something other?

The issue I've asked you of remains unaddressed.

And I'm arguing this is the reason infallible knowledge must possibly exist. What is infallible knowledge, but knowledge without error? — Cheshire

In laconic review of what you have yet to reply to: Operational knowledge cannot be demonstrated to be devoid of all possible error; ideal knowledge is devoid of all possible error, but it is only a conceptual ideal and not that which can be utilized in practice. I've argued why this is so at length in previous posts.

Hence, I view your quoted statement as category error, for infallible knowledge would need to be proven in practice in order to be obtained. And to prove it in practice requires infallible justifications for the given belief in fact being true. Explain why it is not the case if you disagree.

You literally stated it was both perfectly and not perfectly secure. It's a direct contradiction, unless one just chooses to ignore it to maintain a position. — Cheshire

I disagree and will try again:

• Infallible: perfectly secure form all possible error
• Fallible: not perfectly secure form all possible error

“All my beliefs—including this one—are not perfectly secure from all possible error.”

Where is the contradiction?

BTW, just in case: If no contradiction can be discerned by you and me and if this is offered as “proof” of infallibility: Can you prove that for all remaining time no justifiable alternative to what is affirmed will ever be discovered? You'd have to be omniscient to do so. If not, then even this lack of contradiction will remain less then perfectly secure form all possible error—for any justifiable alternative, even those that might exist only in principle, introduces some measure of possible error. And one cannot prove that no justifiable alternatives exist in principle; again, not without being omniscient. ... This even when no justifiable alternatives can be found in practice.

To sum the just stated, one has to be omniscient to have infallible knowledge. (And I uphold that no psyche is capable of omniscience due to its intrinsic duality between self and other.)

In a further argument:

1. Infallible knowledge is possible or not.
2. Premise 1 is infallibly correct.
3. Infallible knowledge is possible. — Cheshire

Are you ready to prove how the law of noncontradiction is perfectly secure from all possible error? If yes, please do so. If you can’t then (1) is not infallible (this as per the aforementioned definitions).

In laconic review of what you have yet to reply to: Operational knowledge cannot be demonstrated to be devoid of all possible error; ideal knowledge is devoid of all possible error, but it is only a conceptual ideal and not that which can be utilized in practice. I've argued why this is so at length in previous posts. — javra

I mostly nearly agree. I just prefer to leave the door cracked instead of closed. True, no demonstration may be possible, but this doesn't mean ideal knowledge is impossible - only not demonstrable.

Hence, I view your quoted statement as category error, for infallible knowledge would need to be proven in practice in order to be obtained. And to prove it in practice requires infallible justifications for the given belief in fact being true. Explain why it is not the case if you disagree. — javra

Gladly, you don't have to prove you have infallible knowledge in order for it to be obtained. I concede I can't prove when or if I obtained infallible knowledge and yet I maintain its possible that I do and do not know it.

Are you ready to prove how the law of noncontradiction is perfectly secure from all possible error? If yes, please do so. If you can’t then (1) is not infallible (this as per the aforementioned definitions). — javra

If the strength of my argument rests on my ability to doubt the law of non-contradiction, then I would get a new argument. I'm sorry, my position presupposes logic.

“All my beliefs—including this one—are not perfectly secure from all possible error.” — javra

No, this I like. I agree.

To sum the just stated, one has to be omniscient to have infallible knowledge. — javra

The conclusion I do not share. I don't have to prove how impossibly correct I am in order to have infallible knowledge. In order to prove this or that is infallible knowledge is another issue entirely.

I mostly nearly agree. I just prefer to leave the door cracked instead of closed. True, no demonstration may be possible, but this doesn't mean ideal knowledge is impossible - only not demonstrable. — Cheshire

Yea, these are among the more fine tuned issues concerning the matter: but of course fallibilism leaves the proverbial door open. To affirm an infallible knowledge that infallible knowledge is impossible is, of course, a blatant contradiction. One can only fallibly affirm this, if one so cares to.

Gladly, you don't have to prove you have infallible knowledge in order for it to be obtained. I concede I can't prove when or if I obtained infallible knowledge and yet I maintain its possible that I do and do not know it. — Cheshire

To refresh a previous argument of mine, operational knowledge can well be, ontically, not erroneous. Nevertheless, this is not currently possible to prove epistemically.

Are we not somehow agreeing to this? My only issue here is that infallibility to me is an epistemic property. My bad if I didn’t make that explicit previously. Maybe this facet makes a notable difference? If not, then we indeed disagree. Call it a day?

If the strength of my argument rests on my ability to doubt the law of non-contradiction, then I would get a new argument. I'm sorry, my position presupposes logic. — Cheshire

:razz: Well, I never once said anything about doubt. One does not need to doubt the law of noncontradiction, as one example among many, to understand that is not something which can be demonstrated perfectly secure from all possible error. There are strengths of operational knowledge, and the law of noncontradiction is pretty high up there in its strength.

OK, chap.

To first get this out of the way:

Innate beliefs, learned beliefs, metacognitive beliefs, unreflective beliefs...

The number of different kinds of belief is growing quickly.

Remove all of the individual particulars(that which makes them all different from one another) and then set out what it is that they all have in common that makes them all what they are... beliefs... aside - that is - from our just calling them all by the same name...
— creativesoul

I've provided definitions for all belief types I've utilized and support. As to defining belief in general, I’ve already done that as well: trust-that. If you have objections to any of my definitions then so state with reasons for your objection. Otherwise, this post of yours to me looks like an example of spin. — javra

From earlier because it is relevant here...

Well, again, for me to believe is to trust that; and a belief is the contents of that which is trusted... — javra

This seems to be the basis for the belief that approach. It certainly lends support to the method, regardless of whether it is intentional or accidental. Typically, when we talk about one believing something, we're saying that one believes that X is true; is the case at hand; is the way things were, are, and/or will be; corresponds to fact/reality; etc. Let X be a statement or proposition.

That is all perfectly understandable and acceptable at the level of reporting upon belief. Here, the content of our report is propositional. X is equal to some proposition/belief statement. This method shows us that belief presupposes it's own truth, and that adding "is true" to a belief statement adds nothing meaningful to it. Here, it makes perfect sense to draw an equation between trust and belief, for the two terms are easily interchangeable without self-contradiction.

However, we are talking about belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. Such belief can be reported upon. Our reports will have propositional content. The kind of belief that we're reporting upon cannot. Belief that is not existentially dependent upon language must consist of something other than propositional content, even though our report of it must. All this must be kept in mind when using the belief that approach as a means to take account of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language...





How does a creature believe/trust something that it has never thought about?

You've actually posited trust/belief at the genotype level of biological complexity. That would require that the content of what's being trusted(belief on your view) is something that exists in it's entirety at that level and can transcend the believer on a physical level through reproduction. That's a big problem for your notion of belief for all sorts of reasons. We could explicate those consequences if you'd like...





Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief.

Familiarity requires a succession of the same or similar enough belief about that which is trusted. Trusting the content of thought/belief cannot be had if innate fear takes hold of the creature. One cannot trust that which aggravates instinctual/innate fear, at least not one at a language less level.

Here, the two terms are not so freely interchangeable. Trust is not equivalent to belief.

Familiarity requires a succession of the same or similar enough belief about that which is not trusted. So it is clear that trust and belief are distinct.

Trust is most certainly being built during the formative years of initial language acquisition. Contentment and familiarity with one's caregivers. That is prior to language acquisition. That seems to be where knowingly relying upon something(trust) comes from...

Firstly, thanks for this reply. I would also like to learn of your views regarding dogs' deception and the nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about.

However, we are talking about belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. Such belief can be reported upon. Our reports will have propositional content. The kind of belief that we're reporting upon cannot. Belief that is not existentially dependent upon language must consist of something other than propositional content, even though our report of it must. All this must be kept in mind when using the belief that approach as a means to take account of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language... — creativesoul

Can you provide, or point to, a concrete example of such belief-that which is not propositional?

This ties into what I address below.

You've actually posited trust/belief at the genotype level of biological complexity. That would require that the content of what's being trusted(belief on your view) is something that exists in it's entirety at that level and can transcend the believer on a physical level through reproduction. That's a big problem for your notion of belief for all sorts of reasons. We could explicate those consequences if you'd like... — creativesoul

For the record, though I too hold an ego, I have no problem in being shown how my beliefs could be improved upon or else how they are wrong.

Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief. — creativesoul

On what grounds do you affirm this?

Example: I see an odd shaped red apple on the table for the first time. I'm not at all familiar with this type of apple. I either trust that it is there as seen, trust that it is not as seen, or trust that both possibilities might be valid; the latter being an instance of uncertainty while the two former cases are instances of certainty. Regardless, all three scenarios are initially experienced by me without without a sense of familiarity, without thought, and without beliefs about beliefs (belief is what we're addressing to begin with, so I'm assuming you were here addressing beliefs about beliefs).

I'll posit a facet of trust to make this easier:

Trust: (1) confidence in or reliance on some person or quality. — Wiktionary

From this I extrapolate the following as a cogent facet of trust: To act and/ or react (either physically or mentally such as via intentions) to something being ontic devoid of rationality for the given something in fact being ontic is, in itself, a process of trust. The quality one here has confidence in or reliance on is property of being ontic.

On what grounds would one disagree with this extrapolation?

If the extrapolation is valid, then trust can be non-linguistic, genetically inherited, and does at all times affirm (else, makes firm within the respective mind) that which is true—but this without a necessary conscious understanding of the relation implied by notions of truth as we linguistically express it. Trust's contents, then, form the given belief.

Trusting the content of thought/belief cannot be had if innate fear takes hold of the creature. One cannot trust that which aggravates instinctual/innate fear, at least not one at a language less level. — creativesoul

I thought we weren't addressing belief about belief. Be this as it may:

Innate fear-based mistrust requires a more primary trust; namely a confidence about that which is feared being deserving of fear. It has to do with trust for optimal benefit to self in the face of that which is feared, or mistrusted.

Still, all this is, here, in large part contingent upon the facet of trust which I've explicitly extrapolated above.

However, we are talking about belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. Such belief can be reported upon. Our reports will have propositional content. The kind of belief that we're reporting upon cannot. Belief that is not existentially dependent upon language must consist of something other than propositional content, even though our report of it must. All this must be kept in mind when using the belief that approach as a means to take account of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language...
— creativesoul

Can you provide, or point to, a concrete example of such belief-that which is not propositional? — javra

No. It cannot be done. Nor does it need to be. The question doesn't help.

We're looking to take proper account of something that is not existentially dependent upon language. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which exists prior to language cannot consist of propositional content.

I can provide you with an example of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. It will not follow the belief-that format. It will put the otherwise useful knowledge gleaned from that approach to good use. The belief will consist of correlations drawn between different things. It will presuppose it's own correspondence to fact/reality. It will effectively attribute meaning. It will be meaningful to the creature.

You've actually posited trust/belief at the genotype level of biological complexity. That would require that the content of what's being trusted(belief on your view) is something that exists in it's entirety at that level and can transcend the believer on a physical level through reproduction. That's a big problem for your notion of belief for all sorts of reasons. We could explicate those consequences if you'd like...
— creativesoul

For the record, though I too hold an ego, I have no problem in being shown how my beliefs could be improved upon or else how they are wrong. — javra

All belief presupposes it's own correspondence somewhere along the line. Positing belief at the genotype level is to posit belief that is inherently incapable of presupposing it's own correspondence.

All belief is meaningful to the creature. All attribution of meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between the two. Positing belief at the genotype level is to posit belief that is inherently incapable of being meaningful to the creature.

Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief.
— creativesoul

On what grounds do you affirm this? — javra

On the ground that any and sensible notions of trust must include - in some fundamental sense - what our everyday notions of trust include.

Trust: (1) confidence in or reliance on some person or quality.
— Wiktionary

From this I extrapolate the following as a cogent facet of trust: To act and/ or react (either physically or mentally such as via intentions) to something being ontic devoid of rationality for the given something in fact being ontic is, in itself, a process of trust. The quality one here has confidence in or reliance on is property of being ontic.

On what grounds would one disagree with this extrapolation? — javra

The same grounds as above, and on the ground that that definition inevitably leads to aburd consequences(reductio ad absurdum).

The performance of a vehicle relies on all sorts of different qualities and people. It does not trust.

If the extrapolation is valid, then trust can be non-linguistic, genetically inherited, and does at all times affirm (else, makes firm within the respective mind) that which is true—but this without a necessary conscious understanding of the relation implied by notions of truth as we linguistically express it. Trust's contents, then, form the given belief. — javra

No.

If the extrapolation is valid, then it follows from it's premisses. That does not make it true. The definition has consequences that are unacceptable. Therefore, the definition is unacceptable. The definition is a premiss of the extrapolation. False premisses cannot validly lead to true conclusions...