RE: What is real? How do we know what is real?
SUBTOPIC: Variation on a theme...
⁜→ T Clark, et al,

(OPENING)

some claim that a belief lacks warrant unless it has that relation; others claim that a belief is not
permissibly held unless it stands in that relation; and yet others claim that it is not a properly scientific belief unless it stands in that relation. And not even this list exhausts the possibilities.

Again, the Metaphysical Baggage does not suppress any opinion on the matter. It is not a scientific entanglement with the usual associates and ramifications. The question is at the soft underbelly of what we think we "know," and the tangent knowledge yet to be gleaned in the future.

"but it raises the question of what “sufficient warrant” means.[/reply]
(COMMENT)

In this case, a “sufficient warrant” is a threshold. Some events warrant intervention → and some events are not sufficient to warrant intervention (AKA: “warranted assertability”) from the externals involving unconditional components.

Reference
__________________________________

✦ DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 2nd ed by Robert Audi and contributors, © Cambridge University Press 1995, 1999. Published in the United States by The University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org

Most Respectfully,
R

The 'why something rather than nothing' perhaps sits with the sort of metaphysics that seeks to justify or explain god rather than the world.

Wouldn't we class questions "about structure -- about how the world hangs together", as physics, rather than as metaphysics?

But yes, this is a very Wittgensteinian approach. Although perhaps in contrast to the common view, it's not that we shouldn't indulge in metaphysical speculation, but that when we do so, we fail to understand what it is we are saying.

The general form of transcendental argument is something like:

Q
The only way that Q can be true is if P
therefore, P

I suggested that the issue is it's reliance minor premise; that there may be other ways, unimagined by ourselves, in which Q can be true that are not dependent on P being true. I skated over the problems here. There is. pretty clear run through in the SEP article on the topic, if folk are interested. It's not that they are invalid - the argument form given above is certainly valid - so much as that they set up the solidity of P on the basis of the solidity of Q, which is may be as unreliable. We can't reject all transcendental arguments off hand, but we do need to evaluate them in their context.



I don't see modus ponens (or other bits of logic) as reliant on such a transcendental argument. It's more that what we mean by P⊃Q just is that if P it true, then Q is true.

This is interesting. What happens when we apply it, with some tinkering, to logical form? (in the noncontroversial, not Platonic, sense) "Modus ponens is 'how it is'; the only way this can be 'how it is' is if logical forms are necessarily valid. Hence, logical forms are necessarily valid." Is the minor premise still a problem? One wants to reply, "Yes, I am sure it's the only way. It's not simply that I can't imagine how modus ponens (given the usual stipulations) could be invalid, it's that such a thing would be like imagining a square circle." Notice that this can be said without invoking what's real and what isn't.

Right, if any role for intuition and understanding is ruled out and reason is 100% discursive, you have an infinite possibility space of possible "games" and no reason to choose one in favor of any other. The authority of reason itself rests on intuition and understanding.

Something like that . .

"The study of being qua being," and so not as any particular sort of being (as opposed to say, biology for living beings, or physics for mobile being). "The most general of all sciences." That's often how it's framed, and it has inherited this view at least as far as its "subject matter" is concerned. Hence, metaphysics is generally taken to include part/whole relationships, act/potency, universals, modality, identify, etc. These come up in every science because they are wholly general.

Q
The only way that Q can be true is if P
therefore, P

I suggested that the issue is it's reliance minor premise; that there may be other ways, unimagined by ourselves, in which Q can be true that are not dependent on P being true. — Banno

Interesting - is this it?

Reality is the case
Reality could only be possibel if God were the case.
Therefore God must be the case.

In modus tollens
If not P, then not Q.
Q is the case.
Therefore P must be the case.

I guess a famous transcendental argument for god is this one (Plantinga, I recall)
If God does not exist (¬P), then rational thought, morality, or logic (Q) is not possible (¬Q).
But rational thought (or morality, logic, etc.) is possible (Q).
Therefore, God exists (P).

Your point about the first premise holds here too- it hasn't been demonstrated that premise one is correct, so the the argument isn't sound - but it is valid.

Yep. The epitome is of course found in Kant.

The authority of reason itself rests on intuition and understanding — Count Timothy von Icarus

This cannot be true. The validity ("authority" makes no sense) of reasoning rests on consistency. In any case any authority is either imposed by force or else is normative. Intuition is subjective. There are common understandings but it is individuals that understand or fail to understand. Also many things may be understood, while remaining consonant with reason in various ways.

I'm not sure that you mean here. Following an inference rule consistently is what leads to consistency; any rule followed consistently is consistent in application. However, you cannot even make an argument that "consistency" is a good, choice-worthy metric for selecting inference rules without some intuition or understanding to start with. Consistency is, in general, considered crucial because of LNC, which is axiomatic. But if you want to elevate consistency over LNC, you will still need to assume consistency as axiomatic (from intuition) in the same way LNC usually is.

By all means, please try to demonstrate, from absolutely no first principles at all, why consistency is better than inconsistency, or truth is to be preferred to falsity.

Consistency consists in simply not saying things that are logically incompatible, mostly not saying things which contradict one another. No intuition required; it's as simple as 'yes' and 'no'. If you say both yes and no about the same subject you are contradicting yourself.

The reason consistency is better than inconsistency is that if you allow the latter you can say whatever you like and all sayings would become equal what you mean would become inscrutable. The reason truth is to be preferred over error is that basically it is a matter of survival; if you constantly believed what was false you would not survive for long.

If you say both yes and no about the same subject you are contradicting yourself. — Janus

That. Or being polite about an interlocutor's ignorance and unrefined level of understanding about a topic in a way that won't offend fragile sensibilities.

ie. "Is the Grand Canyon just a big hole?" ... "Well, actually no, it's an amazing example of nature's beauty, power, and mastery that makes us all realize just how vast this world is and as a result the knowledge yet to be known, thus empowering each day with a sense of eternal motivation and wonder" ... "So. It's a hole, though. Right?" ... "Well, yes..." ... "And it's big?" ... "Of course." ... "So it's a big hole?" ... "Right, but that's not the..." .... "Anyway, it's just a big hole". (see both people are right, but how shall we say, one is more right than the other :smile: )

Consistency consists in simply not saying things that are logically incompatible, mostly not saying things which contradict one another. No intuition required; it's as simple as 'yes' and 'no'. If you say both yes and no about the same subject you are contradicting yourself.

You're attempting to ground logic itself in a notion of what is "logically compatible." This is circular without intuition. This is just an appeal to LNC as being intuitive. This seems like: "no intuition is required because the LNC is self-evident." I agree it is self-evident. However, this is the definition of an intuition, perhaps the prime example of it historically. There are logics that reject LNC at any rate.

The reason consistency is better than inconsistency is that if you allow the latter you can say whatever you like and all sayings would become equal what you mean would become inscrutable. The reason truth is to be preferred over error is that basically it is a matter of survival; if you constantly believed what was false you would not survive for long.

This is not a demonstration without assumptions or axioms. It essentially says "consistency is better because it is better to be consistent," (circular) and "truth is better because it aids survival." I'm not even sure the latter is necessarily true (e.g. Hoffman's fitness versus truth theorem, or work on the reproductive fitness of false signals or memes versus true ones), but it is based on the intuition that survival is good.

You cannot have a logical system that is just "rule following" all the way down. If this was the case, there would be no reason to prefer any of the infinite possible logics over any others.

Wouldn't we class questions "about structure -- about how the world hangs together", as physics, rather than as metaphysics? — Banno

Only if "the world" is pre-limited (is that a word?) to the physical. Questions about structure ought to include questions about language, about thoughts, about abstracta. How do these phenomena connect with each other, and with the physical world? What grounds what? Moreover, it doesn't appear that the disciplines that study these phenomena -- math, for instance, in the case of abstracta -- can offer us what we want. We don't expect a mathematician to know how numbers relate to the physical world, or to have an opinion about whether this is a sensible question. Mathematicians do math, not philosophy.

I don't see modus ponens (or other bits of logic) as reliant on such a transcendental argument. It's more that what we mean by P⊃Q just is that if P it true, then Q is true. — Banno

I think the question is whether "just is" can be reformulated as a transcendental argument. "Just is" is, more or less, what I meant by "impossible to imagine otherwise," so I think we're talking about the same thing here. So, call P⊃Q 'w':

'w'
The only way that 'w' can be valid is if 'z'
Therefore, 'z'

But to what does 'z' refer? What makes 'w' valid? Could 'z' mean "the validity of logical form" or does this take us in a circle? The paraphrase would be, "The only way P⊃Q can be valid is if it's an instance of a valid logical form. Since it is valid, therefore it's an instance of a valid logical form."

Hmmm. There seems to be something both right and wrong about this. The part that's right is that there is no other way for any arrangement of logical symbols to be valid. If it doesn't instantiate a valid logical form, it has to be invalid (with the usual ceteris-paribus stipulations).

The part that seems wrong, though, is the circularity involved in using "valid" or "validity" this way. This can best be seen by contrasting it with the original example of "platonic form." In that example, the question was whether "the way things are" can only be explained by the premise that "forms are real." You pointed out, correctly, that we could imagine other explanations; the minor premise might not be correct. In this new case, however, we've seen that the minor premise appears to be solid: There doesn't seem to be any other way for 'w' to be valid. But is this because we have defined it thus? Aren't we importing a concept of validity that simply reduces it to "being an instance of a valid logical form"? This isn't very informative. But it may correspond to your thought that, in fact, none of this is about transcendental arguments at all. The "just is" here may not translate into an argument.

I'm uncertain about this, but maybe you have some insights.

EDIT -- I've realized that 'w' should really be 'modus ponens', not 'P⊃Q', but you probably knew what I meant.

You're attempting to ground logic itself in a notion of what is "logically compatible." This is circular without intuition. This is just an appeal to LNC as being intuitive. This seems like: "no intuition is required because the LNC is self-evident." I agree it is self-evident. However, this is the definition of an intuition, perhaps the prime example of it historically. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm with you up to a point, but this leaves out the entire difficult conversation about what might make the LNC intuitive, or self-evident. "It just is" isn't the only possibility here, nor is a direct noetic perception. The big question is how the LNC, as a description of an ideal logical intuition, corresponds to how we describe the world. "Not (A & ~A)" vs. "My mouse can't be both blue and pink at once" -- are these intuitions of the same thing? Or if not, which grounds which?

It just is" isn't the only possibility here, nor is a direct noetic perception.

Such as?

"My mouse can't be both blue and pink at once"

Probably "blue and not-blue" would work better as an example, and "without qualification or equivocation." I'm sure you know that, it's just that it's incredibly common to see facile "counterexamples" of LNC that straightforwardly involve qualification or equivocation and I figured I'd head those off. Something like the liar's paradox is at least a more robust example.

Probably "blue and not-blue" would work better as an example, and "without qualification or equivocation." I'm sure you know that — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but you're right, we shouldn't assume that everyone can fill in the ceteris-paribus qualifications.

It just is" isn't the only possibility here, nor is a direct noetic perception.

Such as? — Count Timothy von Icarus

This connects with the question about the grounding of the logical and real-world versions of the LNC. If it could be shown to be the case that "Not (A & ~A)" and "My mouse can't be both blue and not-blue at once" are what I'm calling "intuitions of the same thing", then it might follow that the only way to know this is by direct intuition or noetic perception. Indeed, it would go a long way toward answering some vexed questions about mind and the world. But that has to be determined first. Otherwise, the grounding of one or the other will provide information about why the LNC carries such apparent inviolability. For instance, if the "mouse" version depends on the "logical version", then the fact that a thing can't be both A and not-A would be a consequence of the logical premise, not an intuition or an inductive law about the world. And the reverse: if the logical version depends on the mouse version, then we have a law of thought based upon the operations of the physical world.

I'm guessing that you favor the "intuition of the same thing" approach, which I agree leads to the most plausible picture of self-evidence or direct intuition. How would you make the case for the two versions of the LNC being about the same thing? (This, as you probably remember, was a case that Irad Kimhi was also very concerned to make, in Thinking and Being.)

. For instance, if the "mouse" version depends on the "logical version", then the fact that a thing can't be both A and not-A would be a consequence of the logical premise, not an intuition or an inductive law about the world.

I don't think I followed this. This would seem to indicate that what is true is a facet of the logical premises one chooses to adopt. For example, that the Earth cannot be spherical and not-spherical would simply depend on whatever we choose to assert? Perhaps I am misunderstanding.

Were this the case, it would be impossible to explain the "choice" of these "logical premises" because whatever truth they were based on would itself vary with those same premises. Logic would be arbitrary. This is the problem of resolving logical nihilism with a bare appeal to "pragmatism." What is "useful" depends on what is true, but now we have it that what is true depends on what is useful.

And the reverse: if the logical version depends on the mouse version, then we have a law of thought based upon the operations of the physical world.

Or what is true of being qua being, which includes the physical world (mobile being) and intelligible order of thought. Although, I agree that we might be able to say that the physical world is the proximate efficient cause of the logical intuition in man (a physical being).

How would you make the case for the two versions of the LNC being about the same thing?

LNC is part of the intelligibility by which anything is anything at all. It is a precondition for finite being's existence as "this" or "that." If the number one can also be the number three, and a circle also a square, then there is no this or that. So the physical order, to be a physical order at all, requires a higher metaphysical order. There can be no "physical order" without an intelligible order by which things are what they are and not anything else.

By contrast, a defining feature of materialism is the elevation of potency over act in priority. Here, the logical reality must come from the physical reality, which itself either exists "for no reason at all" or by a sheer, inscrutable act of divine will (not really that different in the end). Or, if one keeps going in this direction, there is no intelligibility in the world, and all intelligibility comes from a sheer act of human will (or a diffuse "world will"), a bare choice of logical axioms, etc. for "no reason at all"—i.e. everything is ultimately ordered to sheer potency/power. It's essentially the inversion of the priority of pure actuality, which isn't surprising, given the political history.

But why should we presume that there is such a thing as the form of the table — Banno

There's a logical gap between “I can’t imagine it being otherwise” and “this must be how it is” that's found in transcendental arguments of all sorts.

It's a transcendental argument becasue it goes: things are thus-and-so; the only way (“I can’t imagine it being otherwise") they can be thus-and-so is if forms are real. Hence, forms are real. The minor premise is the problem - how you can be sure it's the only way?

But there is also a different criticism here, the the transcendental argument also presumes hylomorphism in the major premise - the "Things are thus and so" just is the presumption that hylomorphism is correct. — Banno

So how do you get out of the starting gate with any inquiry into anything, on any terms?

How do you avoid being one of the ones you criticize, and proceed to speak at all?

Should the most honest scientist admit there is no point to science? There is no real solution possible because there is no real problem possible.

I agree there is a gap between whatever must be and whatever I cannot imagine otherwise, but how do you even make this distinction and speak about it, without the formal, the essential, the hylomorphic identity of some thing distinguishable from the other thing?

If we throw all metaphysics out, seems to me, to be consistent, we have to throw out language. When we speak, forms and essences emerge, as do objectivity, universality, meaning, truth, in addition to all of the things we speak about. It is an unavoidable consequence of asking any question that we appeal to, or presuppose, or invoke, or construct, a metaphysic.

Why fight it, if we choose to speak and communicate our ideas at all?

This is not to say some sort of platonic form of “language” is eternally floating around waiting to be participated in when we speak “English”, but, however it works, language only seems to work, where meaning and truth and essential definition are invoked.

I don't think I followed this. This would seem to indicate that what is true is a facet of the logical premises one chooses to adopt. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not exactly. The question, remember, is about the intuitive truth of the LNC, not truth per se. I'm suggesting that, in the described case, we couldn't be said to intuit the truth of the LNC as regards the non-logical, physical world. We would claim to know (by intuition, if you like) that LNC holds for propositions, but its value as a way of understanding the world would require a further connection. Again, that's why the position that thinking and being must be somehow identical is so appealing. It provides the missing bridge.

And as to that . . .

LNC is part of the intelligibility by which anything is anything at all. It is a precondition for finite being's existence as "this" or "that." If the number one can also be the number three, and a circle also a square, then there is no this or that. So the physical order, to be a physical order at all, requires a higher metaphysical order. There can be no "physical order" without an intelligible order by which things are what they are and not anything else — Count Timothy von Icarus

The most important phrase, perhaps, is the first, since it links intelligibility with "anything being anything" -- thinking with being, in other words. I believe this is probably true, as a description of consciousness in the world. And that may be good enough, since philosophy doesn't pretend to tell us what philosophy (thinking) would be like, if no one were doing it! It does, however, often try to talk about what the world is like, unmediated by the experience of human consciousness. From that perspective, can we say that "there can be no 'physical order' without an intelligible order by which things are what they are"? We simply don't know. Could the intelligibility part survive translation into some kind of "pure," unmediated physicality? I'm willing to call this a "metaphysical speculation" in the somewhat pejorative sense, since I don't know what the evidence for or against this would look like. For better or worse, we can't seem to frame good questions about "the world" without reference to the fact of framing them, which requires, among other things, the LNC.

But I'm still drawn to the much more accessible puzzle about the objects of the LNC and other logical principles. Kimhi and Rödl again: when we say "Not (P & ~P)", what can replace 'P'? Objects? Propositions? Both? Is it about both? In the same way?

So how do you get out of the starting gate with any inquiry into anything, on any terms? — Fire Ologist

Interesting how a transcendental argument can prevent folk from seeing alternatives.

Is that supposed to answer any of my questions?

Draw a starting line without anything transcendent referenced in it and then move forward. Give me an example. You don’t even have to define anything.

I don’t think you can. Because you have to use language.

I think you were on the right track to start with. Rules such as non-contradiction are stipulated and constitutive rather than intuitions or being self-evident... whatever that might mean.

An appeal to authority is of course invalid.

So yes, being consistent consists in not saying or doing things that are contradictory. It's normative in that it's choosing classical rather than paraconsistent logic. You can have a logical system that is just "rule following" all the way down. You can choose whatever logic you prefer of any of the infinite possible logics over any others. But it's of no use unless the folk you are talking to agree.

"Is the Grand Canyon just a big hole?" — Outlander

The problem here is with the "just". As you show, it's a big hole and then some. A neat metaphor about supposing that there is One True Description. It'a a hole and...

"...as physics, rather than as metaphysics?" - well, as science, rather than meta-science. Perhaps the reason it doesn't appear that the disciplines that study these phenomena can offer us what we want is that we want more than can be done.

But that's unclear. Indeed, I'm not sure I follow what it is you are after here. The idea of applying the criticism of transcendental arguments to modus ponens is interesting - is that what you are doing? But as I said, I do not think that we accept modus ponens as a result of a transcendental argument. It's rather than if we accept modus ponens, and a fee other rules, then this will be the consequence; we might well do otherwise, with different and usually less appetising consequences. In particular, we are not obligated to accept modus ponens by some overarching authority - what could that look like?

Why must we accept modus ponens? Well, p⊃q just means that if we accept p and p⊃q then we accept q; that's all. Not accepting modus ponens just amounts to not understanding how to use p, q and p⊃q; to not playing the game. And of course, you don't have to play the game, but there will be consequences.

We are not compelled to accept modus ponens by some external justification.

Edit: , for you, too.

Getting away from the topic here, but there are various objections to the view I;ve just expressed. Here are three of the better ones:

• Pluralism threatens to undermine the normative role of logic.
• Logic might be transcendentally necessary for meaningful discourse.
• It's potentially contrary to the apparent objectivity of mathematics

But perhaps this is not the place.

Perhaps in the place of transcendence, we might use constitutive rules. Rather than saying Modus ponens is somehow transcendentally true, we just supose that accepting p and p⊃q counts as accepting q, if one is talking logically.

Of course, some folk might talk illogical, but we needn't pay them attention, any more than we ought pay attention to the birds on a football field in order to make sense of the game.

This question can be misleading, as real, in English, is an honorific term: "Here's the deal." vs. "Here's the real deal."

There aren't two deals, one false the other true, it's a point of emphasis.

Perhaps you might get more mileage out of existence and perception. Some things are anchored to the external world; some things are not.

And of course, you don't have to play the game, but there will be consequences. — Banno

Why assume that? There may not be consequences. Or must there be consequences? Must there be effects? What causes that?

if one is talking logically — Banno

How do you mean that inside of modus ponens? Where are you standing to observe “if one is talking logically”?

You can have a logical system that is just "rule following" all the way down. You can choose whatever logic you prefer of any of the infinite possible logics over any others. But it's of no use unless the folk you are talking to agree.

Why would they agree or not agree? It's arbitrary after all right? Whoever has the most power (will to power?) enforces the truth by force?

You seems to be suggesting that if one is not following an explicit rule, one is acting arbitrarily. Do you really want to make such a claim?

*

I'm not sure I follow what it is you are after here. The idea of applying the criticism of transcendental arguments to modus ponens is interesting - is that what you are doing? — Banno

Yes, but the first bit was a different reply to a different comment, sorry. The point about metaphysics as an investigation of structure was separate from my head-scratching about transcendental arguments.

It's rather than if we accept modus ponens, and a few other rules, then this will be the consequence; we might well do otherwise, with different and usually less appetising consequences. In particular, we are not obligated to accept modus ponens by some overarching authority - what could that look like? — Banno

I was all set to reply, and then saw the qualifications and objections you yourself posted. (Hat tip to your ability to see many sides here.)

Logic might be transcendentally necessary for meaningful discourse. — Banno

This is the one with the most force, I think. We say, "There is meaningful discourse. What, therefore, must be the case in order for this to be true? Answer: logic." On this construal, the idea that we "might well do otherwise," might "not play the game," becomes, if not incoherent, then at least hard to make out. I think you're right that there is no physical or ethical compulsion here that could count as an "overarching authority" -- but is there any sphere of intellectual endeavor in which we encounter such an authority? Surely that's asking for too much, and I doubt that the proponents of a more objective or certain basis for modus ponens want that. The idea as I understand it is that, to think at all, you're going to need modus ponens.

The other interesting question is about whether "to understand p and p⊃q" is to accept q. This strikes me as a version of the question, provoked by Kant, about whether arithmetic is analytic or synthetic. Have we learned anything new when we learn that 'q' follows from the first two premises? In this simple case, it may seem obvious that 'q' is somehow contained in those premises, but more complex logical conclusions have the ring of revelation, of genuine discovery, which is what Kant claimed was the case even for simple additions. What we want to know here is whether it's coherent to say (and let's imagine a more complicated set of premises), "Yes, I understand these premises, but I don't acknowledge that the conclusion must follow." Is this person refusing to play the game? I'm frankly not sure how to describe such a situation, other than to say that "refusing" seems too strong.