It doesn't need to be contradictory to be fallacious — Wayfarer

The point is it's not a contradiction. Claiming that two things that aren't contradictory are contradictory doesn't make them contradictory.

and you've presented no argument, or any references, for why it should be considered true, beyond your belief that it must be the case. There is no evidence from you as to whether 'certain groups of particles' are conscious, or whether conscious organisms can be considered 'groups of particles'. — Wayfarer

If only I had thought to say something like

I'm just writing all this as though it's fact. It makes sense to me. But I know it's not verified, and I can't imagine how it could be. It isn't even a theory, unless someone figures out a way to test it. (Although there's no way to test String Theory.) — Patterner

in my OP.


No, I'm not claiming to have any evidence for this. I can't imagine what that could be, even if it's true. (By the same token, no other theory of consciousness has ever been proven.) And I didn't invent the idea of proto-consciousness. I'm trying to think how it might work. Maybe tied up with information. If you aren't interested in the idea, so be it.

That is not a description of the hard problem of consciousness, as described by David Chalmer's Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. It is a description of your own idiosyncratic philosophy which contains too many sweeping statements and foundational claims to respond to. — Wayfarer

What a joke. You make too many sweeping and contradicting statements yourself and then give a link with too many sweeping statements while claiming that I am making too many sweeping statements that was responding to your too many sweeping statements.

You keep ignoring the fact that you keep contradicting yourself in the same thread that you accuse others of contradicting themselves. Hypocrite.

You keep saying the mind is subjective but seem have an objective view of what Chalmers and Nagel say, and to claim that others are wrong in their understanding but yours is correct. Try addressing your own faults before spending so much time on addressing the same faults in others.

What does Nagel even mean by "what it is like"? There is a what it is like to be anything which are the properties of what it means to be that thing. There is a what it is like to be a table that distinguishes it from being a chair, there is a what it is like to be a mind which distinguishes it from being a wave in the ocean.

You're welcome. Have a nice life!

ou're welcome. Have a nice life! — Wayfarer

Translation: I'm right, you're wrong, consciousness is subjective! LALALALALA! I can't hear you!

Add immature on top of contradictory, hypocrite and intellectually dishonest to "what it is like" to be Wayfarer.


The hard problem seems to be more of a problem of language - of explaining what the actual problem is.

What does Nagel even mean by "what it is like"? There is a what it is like to be anything which are the properties of what it means to be that thing. There is a what it is like to be a table that distinguishes it from being a chair, there is a what it is like to be a mind which distinguishes it from being a wave in the ocean. — Harry Hindu

The idea is that there is something it is like to be a bat to the bat, but there is nothing it is like to be a table to the table. If there is something it is like to be something to that thing, then that thing is conscious.

The hard problem seems to be more of a problem of language - of explaining what the actual problem is. — Harry Hindu

The HP is explaining why the physical activity comes with subjective experience. Why isn't there something it is like to be a table? Or, perhaps more important, why isn't there something it is like to be a robot that has sensors that detect photons, distinguishes between wavelengths, and performs different actions, depending on which wavelength? Does the robot subjectively experience red and blue? Does it subjectively experience anything at all? Does it have a feeling of being?

A few quotes, in case someone else's wording makes it more clear.

This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an explanatory gap (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it. A mere account of the functions stays on one side of the gap, so the materials for the bridge must be found elsewhere. — David Chalmers

Donald Hoffman says it at 7:00 of those video, while talking about the neural correlates of consciousness, and ions flowing through holes in membranes:

Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience? — Donald Hoffman

Chalmers & Kuhn discuss it in this video.

Chalmers:. "The fire hurts, I take my hand away from the flame.”

Kuhn:. “But if it, if it didn’t hurt, and you had no awareness, you would’ve still taken your hand away because that’s all determined by the physical processes.” — Chalmers and Kuhn

The idea is that there is something it is like to be a bat to the bat, but there is nothing it is like to be a table to the table. If there is something it is like to be something to that thing, then that thing is conscious. — Patterner

The HP is explaining why the physical activity comes with subjective experience. Why isn't there something it is like to be a table? Or, perhaps more important, why isn't there something it is like to be a robot that has sensors that detect photons, distinguishes between wavelengths, and performs different actions, depending on which wavelength? Does the robot subjectively experience red and blue? Does it subjectively experience anything at all? Does it have a feeling of being? — Patterner

But how do we know that there isn't something it is like to be the robot? If the robot reacts to the world the same way we do, how would we know whether it has "experiences" or not? How does a physical brain have experiences? You would need to answer this question to then assert what has experiences and what does not.

The problem, that I pointed out and that Wayfarer flippantly dismissed, is that we are assuming that there is something it is like in "physical" humans but then reject the idea for other physical things. If you can't even explain how the mind interacts with your "physical" body, then you have a serious problem with this assumption.

When you assume that the world is as you see it - full of "physical" objects, then you are going to have a problem reconciling that with the nature of medium in which these objects exist (the mind). If you think of the world more like the mind - as a process - the problem disappears. Everything is a process and the mind is a process of modeling the world. The way the world is modeled is not how the world is. The world is like the process of modeling, not the model itself.

The table does not have an internal model of the world but the robot might, stored and processed in its working memory. Consciousness is a type of working memory.

Nagel uses the phrase. "What is it like to be a bat", as if the experience of the bat is all there is to being a bat. It's a misuse of language if what he really means "What it is like to have an internal model of the world relative to your position within it".

The information in a robot's memory will be based on where it is in the world and what it has interacted with in the world, does this mean that the robot possess subjective information?


Simple question: If you abandoned the idea that the world is a dichotomy of physical and non-physical in favor of a monistic view of everything is process, what would that do for the hard problem of consciousness?

But how do we know that there isn't something it is like to be the robot? If the robot reacts to the world the same way we do, how would we know whether it has "experiences" or not? How does a physical brain have experiences? You would need to answer this question to then assert what has experiences and what does not. — Harry Hindu

You're absolutely right. And my entire "theory" - the OP of this thread - is that the robot does subjectively experience. Nothing in the universe is made of special stuff. It's all the same.

Working memory is a physical process. So is the mind. Why are physical processes conscious? Why does it not take place without subjective consciousness? Why aren't we P-zombies? Nothing about physical properties or processes suggests subjective experience.

Working memory is a physical process. So is the mind. Why are physical processes conscious? Why does it not take place without subjective consciousness? Why aren't we P-zombies? Nothing about physical properties or processes suggests subjective experience. — Patterner

As I have said. The problem is in thinking the world is physical. Abandon the term. It's useless and just muddies the waters creating the hard problem. When you abandon the use of the term then you no longer have to wonder how a physical object can have consciousness. Simple. It's not a physical object. It's all process and you're confusing the map with the territory.

I don't know. We've done very well thinking the world is physical. The problem is in thinking we know all there is to know, and can rule out the possibility of anything non-physical. That attitude is what we need to abandon. If we do, there's no hard problem.

But ok, how do we abandon the term physical? What are processes? I mean, a processes of what? What is doing the processing? What is the medium?

I don't know. We've done very well thinking the world is physical. — Patterner

Thinking the world is physical is what creates the mind-body problem and humans have been grappling with this problem for a very long time. Scientists have also failed to account for the observer and the nature of observation in their explanations of what they are observing. QM has forced physicists to have to account for the observer according to some of its interpretations.

There is still the major problem of integrating QM with classical physics. How does the random weirdness of the quantum translate to the deterministic nature of the macro-sized world? I think that by providing a good definition of consciousness it will inherently solve the issue.

It's possible that that macro-sized "physical" world does not even exist except in how a mind interprets quantum processes. Are the interpretations of QM evidence that solipsism is the case?

But ok, how do we abandon the term physical? What are processes? I mean, a processes of what? What is doing the processing? What is the medium? — Patterner

Just stop using the word. If you go back and read everything you have written and look at where you've used the term you can remove the term and pretty much keep the same meaning of what you have written.

Processes are causal relations - where some cause/input produces some effect/output. What is the medium of the mind? Information.

To get a better idea of how it could be processes all the way down, think about how when we look deeper at matter and we find that particles are merely the interaction of smaller particles (process), and the smaller particles are the interaction of ever smaller "particles". You never get at any particles, only processes. Particles are mental representations of processes. The act of apprehending "particles" is a process. When you ask, "a process of what?", the answer is other processes. How is processes made of processes any more difficult to understand than particles are made of particles?

You might argue that there are particles and then processes of particles (which is essentially more dualism). But when you change your view you find that particles are actually processes when looking deeper at matter, as I have pointed out, and that when you remove yourself from the process you view the process as an object. Think about the process of someone driving to work. You might say that this process is made up of the person, their car, the road, and their destination. But if you remove yourself from the process, say you go to the Moon, you see that that process is really part of the "object" of the Earth, and as you keep removing yourself further from the processes of the solar system, Milky Way, and the universe, you make those processes objects. This is what it is like for the mind. Your mind is a process, but if you remove yourself from the process you experience a brain. This is why you experience brains and bodies when observing other people, which are just processes that you are separate from.

I like your overall view. But I don't know if I understand aspects of it, because I don't see how it solves the HP. Remove me from the process, and view the remainder as an object. Why is that object - a process that continues without my observation - not conscious?

Thinking the world is physical is what creates the mind-body problem — Harry Hindu

You may be right. But, so far, I think what creates the problem is our being so secure in our mastery of all things that we think we can know that nothing we are not aware of can exist.

You might argue that there are particles and then processes of particles (which is essentially more dualism). — Harry Hindu

Particles in motion, as opposed to particles not in motion, doesn't seem like dualism to me. How do you mean?

It does seem that energy is more fundamental than matter as energy seems more prevalent than matter as most of the universe is a vacuum (the absence of matter) yet EM energy permeates the vacuum. Matter appears to be something like energy feedback loops.
- Harry Hindu

Where are you saying information is?
— Patterner

Everywhere causes leave effects. — Harry Hindu

Can we talk about this more? I think of information as something that means something else. A mountain is a big hunk of earth rising above the earth surrounding it. A mountain doesn't mean something it is not. It doesn't even mean 'mountain'. It simply is a mountain.

In information systems, things mean other things; things that they are not. In spoken language, sounds mean things they are not. Because we have all agreed to it, a particular combination of sounds mean 'mountain'. This combination of sounds is not, itself, a mountain. It's just a combination of sounds. But we have all agreed that those sounds mean 'mountain'.

In written language, we have all agreed that squiggles of certain shapes on paper (or a computer screen) mean other things. Usually, they mean sounds; sounds which, themselves, mean something. The squiggles mountain mean the sounds most of us are now hearing in our heads, which, in turn, mean the big hunk of earth rising above the earth surrounding it.

DNA is an information system. It has meaning. It is about something that it is not. DNA is two complimentary strands of nucleotides running along sugar phosphate backbones, and joined by hydrogen bonds. DNA means chains of amino acids and proteins, which, once constructed, build living organisms.

I think your definition is different, if any cause>effect fits it. we are able to glean information from many such situations. because of what we know, we can learn things about the weather many years ago by looking at the rings of across section of a tree. However, that does not mean the rings are about the rainfall, or that the rainfall is about the rings, so it does not fit my definition.

Consciousness as Cosmic Participation: An Orodist Bridge Between Panpsychism and Property Dualism

Your case for property dualism—particularly the proto-consciousness argument—resonates with Orod Bozorg’s metaphysical framework, but I’d propose a synthesis that transcends the physical/non-physical dichotomy through cosmic relationality. Here’s how Orodism recontextualizes the debate:

1. The "Missing Property" is Relational, Not Substantial

You rightly note that physical properties (mass, charge) can’t explain qualia. But positing proto-consciousness as another intrinsic particle property risks replicating the very reductionism panpsychism seeks to escape. Orodism suggests:
"Consciousness arises not in particles but between them—like a melody between notes, or a forest between trees" (Red Book, Ch. 4).
This aligns with:

Chalmers’ "Hard Problem": The surprise of consciousness stems from ignoring relational ontologies (Whitehead’s "prehension").

Greene’s Particle Whirl: What’s missing isn’t a property but the harmonic context (Orod’s "Love for Existence").

2. DNA as Cosmic Dialogue, Not Just Code

Your insight about DNA’s role is profound, but Orodism reframes it:
"Life is the universe’s poem—written in nucleotides but sung by the stars" (Ch. 15).
DNA isn’t merely an "information processor" but a participant in cosmic meaning-making:

Proto-consciousness: The interaction of hydrogen bonds (not just bonds themselves) generates experiential quality.

Human Uniqueness: Our brains don’t just "gather information" but mirror the universe’s self-reflection (Orod’s "We are branches of the cosmos").

3. Against Brute Existence: Consciousness as Celebration

You contrast "brute existence" (rocks) with "something more" (life). Orodism rejects this duality:
"A rock’s silence is not emptiness but reverence" (Ch. 1).

Panpsychism’s Limit: Skrbina’s "memory-less moments" overlook graded participation—a photon’s experience differs from a neuron’s not in kind but in degree of cosmic engagement.

Orodist Alternative: Consciousness scales with capacity for harmony (e.g., DNA’s duplex dance vs. a quark’s solitude).

4. Testing the Untestable: An Orodist Criterion

You note theories like string theory’s untestability. Orodism proposes experiential verification:
"To know the cosmos, one must first love it" (Ch. 4).

Predictive Power: If consciousness is relational, we’d expect:

Meditative states to alter quantum coherence (as in Dean Radin’s experiments).

Ecological harmony (e.g., old-growth forests) to exhibit "group qualia" (cf. Gaia theory).

5. Beyond Property Dualism: Triune Consciousness

Orodism’s Three Loves map to consciousness layers:

Existence-Love: Proto-consciousness (particle relations).

Humanity-Love: Embodied qualia (DNA-to-brain).

Freedom-Love: Reflexive awareness ("what it’s like").
This avoids property dualism’s gap by making consciousness the universe’s self-love.

From Hard Problem to Sacred Dance
Where property dualism sees a missing property, Orodism sees a missing perspective: consciousness isn’t in particles or brains but in their cosmic choreography. As Orod writes:
"The bat’s flight, the quark’s spin, the sage’s thought—all are verses in existence’s ode to itself" (Ch. 4).

Engagement Question: Could a relational panpsychism reconcile the physical/non-physical divide better than property dualism?

I like your overall view. But I don't know if I understand aspects of it, because I don't see how it solves the HP. Remove me from the process, and view the remainder as an object. Why is that object - a process that continues without my observation - not conscious? — Patterner

It isn't conscious because there isn't a working memory establishing a sensory information feedback loop. What I mean by "working" is a system whose behavior resembles goal-directed behavior (intent).

I think consciousness evolved as a way of responding to more immediate and rapid changes in the environment rather than just relying on instinctual responses to adapt, which could take generations.

I think that only brain-like structures are conscious with the degree of consciousness commensurate with the degree of complexity of the structure. I believe that robots, not necessarily computers, could be conscious. If they are designed to take in sensory information via their camera-eyes, microphone-ears, tactile-pressure and heat sensors, air chemical sensor nose, etc. and a working memory that integrates that information into a working model of the world for planning actions and learning, observes the outcomes of it's own actions and uses it to fine-tune future actions, etc. it is conscious.

What we are basically talking about is degrees of complexity. On the smallest scales of time and space the relations are as simple as you can get and it is the compounding of these

You may be right. But, so far, I think what creates the problem is our being so secure in our mastery of all things that we think we can know that nothing we are not aware of can exist. — Patterner

Or that awareness (the observing observer) itself is being neglected as part of the explanation of the world, as if minds are separate from the world.

Particles in motion, as opposed to particles not in motion, doesn't seem like dualism to me. How do you mean? — Patterner

Those particles in motion are themselves particles in motion. Even solid objects are made of particles in motion. The difference between solids, liquids and gases is related to the strength of the bonds between the particles, allowing greater motion between them.

I think relativity plays a role in how objects appear to us. Our minds process information at a certain rate, or frequency. That frequency will be relative to the rate of change in other aspects of the environment, like the movement between particles. Slower processes will appear as solid, static objects, while faster processes will appear more fluid, or as blurs, or processes.

Can we talk about this more? I think of information as something that means something else. A mountain is a big hunk of earth rising above the earth surrounding it. A mountain doesn't mean something it is not. It doesn't even mean 'mountain'. It simply is a mountain. — Patterner

I'm saying that the mountain means it causes. The mountain is just the current observable state of the long slow process of plate tectonics. The existence of the mountain means plate tectonics is a process that still occurs, or has occurred on this planet, as well as where the plate boundaries are (where the mountain is), which direction they are moving relative to each other, etc.

The point is change your goals, or your view, to other than looking at a mountain and you will be aware of those other bits of information.

In information systems, things mean other things; things that they are not. In spoken language, sounds mean things they are not. Because we have all agreed to it, a particular combination of sounds mean 'mountain'. This combination of sounds is not, itself, a mountain. It's just a combination of sounds. But we have all agreed that those sounds mean 'mountain'. — Patterner

How can a thing mean another thing that it is not if not by causal processes? The effect is not the cause, but it means the cause because of its causal relationship. The effects of the crime (the crime scene and its observable evidence) means "<insert the name of some convicted criminal here>" committed the crime.

In written language, we have all agreed that squiggles of certain shapes on paper (or a computer screen) mean other things. Usually, they mean sounds; sounds which, themselves, mean something. The squiggles mountain mean the sounds most of us are now hearing in our heads, which, in turn, mean the big hunk of earth rising above the earth surrounding it. — Patterner

The scribbles do not mean the sounds. The sounds and scribbles are different representations of the same thing - that big hunk of earth rising above sea level. They mean the mountain because of the causal process, representative nature of language itself. Someone had to come up with the symbols to use, and we all had to agree on them - a causal process.

DNA is an information system. It has meaning. It is about something that it is not. DNA is two complimentary strands of nucleotides running along sugar phosphate backbones, and joined by hydrogen bonds. DNA means chains of amino acids and proteins, which, once constructed, build living organisms. — Patterner

Some current DNA structure of a particular species means the natural selective forces that shaped the organism and its ancestors it descended from.

I think your definition is different, if any cause>effect fits it. we are able to glean information from many such situations. because of what we know, we can learn things about the weather many years ago by looking at the rings of across section of a tree. However, that does not mean the rings are about the rainfall, or that the rainfall is about the rings, so it does not fit my definition. — Patterner

How can you say the rings are not about the rainfall if you can glean information about the rainfall from the rings? What do you mean by "about" and is it any different from what you mean by "mean"? What does "informed" mean to you? How are you informed about anything and what are you informed of if not the causal processes that preceded what it is you are talking about explaining?

Thank you for your well-considered response. I've had a very busy last few days, so haven't been able to response yet.