• vulcanlogician
    15
    In textbooks Spinoza is named a monist. At the very least, I get the impression from the Ethics that he is some kind of materialist. That's how I read him anyway.
    But after considering his "solution" to the mind body problem, namely "only one substance exists. But thought and extension are merely two different attributes of this one substance"... I wonder: How is that different from property dualism?
    I'm not saying he is or isn't a property dualist. I just don't see the specific thing that makes his theory distinct. Can anyone better versed in Spinoza explain the difference between his theory and property dualism?

    Spinoza’s Theory of Attributes
  • 180 Proof
    15.4k
    Can anyone better versed in Spinoza explain the difference between his theory and property dualism?vulcanlogician
    Property dualism accounts for mental and physical properties of any phenomenal X in order to describe / explain it exhaustively. Spinozism, however, while doing likewise, also posits that there are an infinite number of properties – "attributes" – and that (our) finite reason apprehends only two properties – "attributes of thought and extension" – with which all of our (first & second kinds of) knowing consists (re: Ethics Ip9-11, IIp1-3 ...)

    Property dualism in general is an epistemology which simply lacks – does not presuppose – any specific (e.g. Spinozist) ontology. And Spinoza's dual-aspect monism, or attribute parallelism, is an epistemological derivation from his substance ontology. (NB: I prefer plural-aspect holism instead as more descriptive label.) That's the fundamental difference as I see it.
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