Property Dualism

Patterner

MoK's Substance Duslism thread was getting filled with talk of monism, Annaka Harris, etc. I didn't want to mess it up any further, so figured I'd start this thread.

I'm just writing all this as though it's fact. It makes sense to me. But I know it's not verified, and I can't imagine how it could be. It isn't even a theory, unless someone figures out a way to test it. (Although there's no way to test String Theory.)

And yeah, a little wordy. Heh

Here's why I think property dualism is the explanation for consciousness.

First, there is no physical explanation. At the micro level, matter has various physical properties. Mass, charge, spin, color, whatever else we're aware of. These properties determine how particles combine and interact, which determine the physical objects, energy fields, and everything else we see all around us, and their macro characteristics.

These properties do not have any obvious connection with subjective experience. The "what it's like" that Nagel used to define consciousness in What is it like to be a bat? :

...an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism. — Thomas Nagel

In The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers writes:

Why should there be conscious experience at all? It is central to a subjective viewpoint, but from an objective viewpoint it is utterly unexpected. Taking the objective view, we can tell a story about how fields, waves, and particles in the spatiotemporal manifold interact in subtle ways, leading to the development of complex systems such as brains. In principle, there is no deep philosophical mystery in the fact that these systems can process information in complex ways, react to stimuli with sophisticated behavior, and even exhibit such complex capacities as learning, memory, and language. All this is impressive, but it is not metaphysically baffling. In contrast, the existence of conscious experience seems to be a new feature from this viewpoint. It is not something that one would have predicted from the other features alone.

That is, consciousness is surprising. If all we knew about were the facts of physics, and even the facts about dynamics and information processing in complex systems, there would be no compelling reason to postulate the existence of conscious experience. If it were not for our direct evidence in the first-person case, the hypothesis would seem unwarranted; almost mystical, perhaps. — Chalmers

In Until the End of Time, Brian Greene wrote:

And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings? — Greene

So we need another explanation.

Second, big things are made of little things. And the big things have the characteristics they have because of the properties of the little things. Although liquidity is not a characteristic of particles, the properties of particles are responsible for liquidity, once enough particles of certain types join together in certain ways. The fact that particles join together in certain ways at all, so we have physical objects with any characteristics, is due to the properties of the particles.

The solution I like is that there is another property of particles, in addition to those science has discovered. A property that does have a connection with consciousness. A property that is not physical, but experiential. I rather like the term proto-consciousness. The evidence for this non-physical, experiential, micro property is the existence of the non-physical, experiential, macro thing that emerges with characteristics that are not explained by the physical micro properties.

Proto-consciousness is not consciousness, as the "proto" should make clear. Still, what does it mean? Here are some quotes.

In this article, Philip Goff writes:

Panpsychism is sometimes caricatured as the view that fundamental physical entities such as electrons have thoughts; that electrons are, say, driven by existential angst. However, panpsychism as defended in contemporary philosophy is the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, where to be conscious is simply to have subjective experience of some kind. This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts.

Of course in human beings consciousness is a sophisticated thing, involving subtle and complex emotions, thoughts and sensory experiences. But there seems nothing incoherent with the idea that consciousness might exist in some extremely basic forms. We have good reason to think that the conscious experiences a horse has are much less complex than those of a human being, and the experiences a chicken has are much less complex than those of a horse. As organisms become simpler perhaps at some point the light of consciousness suddenly switches off, with simpler organisms having no subjective experience at all. But it is also possible that the light of consciousness never switches off entirely, but rather fades as organic complexity reduces, through flies, insects, plants, amoeba, and bacteria. For the panpsychist, this fading-whilst-never-turning-off continuum further extends into inorganic matter, with fundamental physical entities – perhaps electrons and quarks – possessing extremely rudimentary forms of consciousness, which reflects their extremely simple nature.

In this Ted Talk, Chalmers says:

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

In Panpsychism in the West, Skrbina writes:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

Just raw experience. A key ingredient of consciousness.

The other key ingredient is what is being experienced. All particles are experiencing at every moment. But what are they experiencing?

Teeeeeechnically, a rock experiences. Or, rather, each of its particles experiences its own instantaneous, memory-less moments. But what they are all experiencing isn't anything to write home about. There's nothing going on. Particles on the surface might experience more light, warmth, physical contact with things that are not part of the rock, and other things that particles in the interior are experiencing. But it's all just physical existence. There's nothing going on to raise proto-consciousness up to something more.

I don't think any purely physical things or events can take proto-consciousness to consciousness. Not avalanches, or hurricanes, or stars. It's all just brute existence. I think something more than that is needed.

I think information processing is needed. All starting with the granddaddy of all information processing systems - DNA. It's the beginning of life, and the beginning of consciousness. DNA is two complimentary strands of nucleotides running along sugar phosphate backbones, and joined by hydrogen bonds. DNA means chains of amino acids and proteins. It was the first time proto-consciousness experienced something beyond brute existence. The first tiny hint of a rise toward consciousness.

Life evolving means more coding added to DNA. More amino acids and proteins being coded for.
And many of those proteins build more information processing systems. One living organism is a conglomerate of information processing systems. DNA in every cell. Senses. Immune system. Healing. Homeostasis. On and on and on. So filled with information processing systems that we can't even grasp it.

And the brain. The thing that gathers the information from all the other information systems, and coordinates it all, so they are one. One organism.

Then the human brain, which is obviously capable of thinking things, and kinds of things, no other species is. Even thinking about information. Even thinking about information just for the sake of thinking about information.

The proto-consciousness in every particle of all that is subjectively experiencing being a part of all that. There is something it is like to be a human.

180 Proof

↪Patterner

Seems like a (grandiose) composition fallacy to me: atoms which constitute strawberries do not themselves in any way taste, smell or feel like strawberry, for example ... just as particles of (any) X are not "proto-conscious". To me it makes more sense – is more parsimonious – to conceive of property dualism as a descriptive-modeling complementarity of – bodily & mental (kinetic & affective) ways of talking about – the exhibited / manifest predicate(s) of any concrete object (or system). E.g. 'a bowl of strawberries' exhibit kinetic properties but not affective properties and are adequately described by without affective properties; by contrast, 'a kitten' exhibits both bodily (such as chasing string, meowing/purring) & mental (such as instincts, playfulness) properties, so that describing 'a kitten' without both manifest properties is inadequate.

There is something it is like to be a human.

Insofar as "like" denotes a comparison, a human being cannot say what "it is like to be human" because s/he has never been – can not be – in fact, anything other than a human being. One / unique data point, no comparisons (i.e. subjectivity, first-person ephemera).

bert1

'a kitten' exhibits both bodily (such as chasing string, meowing/purring) & mental (such as instincts, playfulness) properties. — 180 Proof

So does a zombie kitten

bert1

↪Patterner

You've set out your view well. What do you want us to talk about? Anything in the OP?

bert1

Proto-consciousness is not consciousness, as the "proto" should make clear. Still, what does it mean? — Patterner

That's a good question. I can find no coherent difference. If something experiences anything, however 'proto', it's fully and totally conscious in the phenomenal sense. Differences are always a matter of content, not degree of consciousness.

180 Proof

zombie kitten — bert1

In fiction ...

Patterner

Proto-consciousness is not consciousness, as the "proto" should make clear. Still, what does it mean?
— Patterner

That's a good question. I can find no coherent difference. If something experiences anything, however 'proto', it's fully and totally conscious in the phenomenal sense. Differences are always a matter of content, not degree of consciousness. — bert1

Ha! I completely agree. I think this requires a pretty extensive rewrite. I wrote all of this over a fairly long period of time. My views of consciousness changed in ways over that same period of tim, but I didn't change what I had written in the earlier days. Didn't even notice it needed changing, having moved on in my head. Thank you very much.

My views changed as I contemplated the idea of higher consciousness, as it relates to various fantasy/sci-fi beings. Like Star Trek's Organians, Metrons, Q, Prophets of Bajor, etc. Such beings are often said to be of higher consciousness. I wondered what that might mean. Greater intelligence doesn't seem to equal greater consciousness. Nor do more extensive sensory capabilities, abilities to mentally manipulate reality, or an awareness that might be said to encompass a larger area.

I came to think there's no such thing as higher consciousness, and I don't think I have higher consciousness than anything else. I am just conscious of things, capabilities, I possess that other things do not.

Anyway, parts of my OP were written back when I equated consciousness with things like mind and intelligence. Having a different idea in my head, I moved on without changing what I had written. And, truth be told, I probably need to shake off some remnants of that kind of thinking.Again, very sloppy. Again, thank you.

You've set out your view well. What do you want us to talk about? Anything in the OP? — bert1

You're doing great! :grin: Anything that helps me clarify my thinking, or even my writing. I don't know if there are ways to prove or disprove various theories of consciousness. But any theory should at least be internally consistent. Pointing out anywhere that I am not is appreciated.

flannel jesus

Seems like a (grandiose) composition fallacy to me: — 180 Proof

I think this is really at the center of a lot of disagreement in these types of conversations. Things often are very much unlike the things that make them up.

Patterner

Seems like a (grandiose) composition fallacy to me:
— 180 Proof

I think this is really at the center of a lot of disagreement in these types of conversations. Things often are very much unlike the things that make them up. — flannel jesus

I don't currently have the time to respond to you

↪180 Proof

. Work is insane. But I just want to quickly respond to this. Although things are often much unlike the things that make them up, what they are like is always because of the qualities of the things that make them up. The emergence of any macro characteristic is always explained by the properties of what it's made of. How can it be otherwise? Macro things cannot be explained by properties the building blocks do not possess.

flannel jesus

↪Patterner

"explained by properties" isn't it I don't think. The properties, on their own, explain next to nothing.

Instead, I think a lot of high level things are explained by the processes that are happening at a lower level, processes that are enabled perhaps in part by properties.

But it's not just a raw properties -> properties relation. "Properties" doesn't really properly communicate what's actually going on there.

wonderer1

Macro things cannot be explained by properties the building blocks do not possess. — Patterner

Macro things are regularly explained by properties that the building blocks do not possess. For example bits of iron don't float on water, yet iron (as steel) is regularly formed into ships that float on water.

Perhaps the fallacy of division is more apropos to panpsychist thinking than the fallacy of composition?

Patterner

Instead, I think a lot of high level things are explained by the processes that are happening at a lower level, processes that are enabled perhaps in part by properties. — flannel jesus

Yes. Processes cannot take place if the properties do not allow them. The properties of iron do not allow it to burn if you put it in your fireplace. The properties of wood do not allow it to be magnetized.

Macro things are regularly explained by properties that the building blocks do not possess. For example bits of iron don't float on water, yet iron (as steel) is regularly formed into ships that float on water. — wonderer1

The properties of iron don't allow it to float when it is formed into certain shapes and sizes. But its properties allow it to float when it is formed into other shapes and sizes. A ship does not float in violation of iron's properties.

javra

My views changed as I contemplated the idea of higher consciousness, as it relates to various fantasy/sci-fi beings. Like Star Trek's Organians, Metrons, Q, Prophets of Bajor, etc. Such beings are often said to be of higher consciousness. I wondered what that might mean. Greater intelligence doesn't seem to equal greater consciousness. Nor do more extensive sensory capabilities, abilities to mentally manipulate reality, or an awareness that might be said to encompass a larger area.

I came to think there's no such thing as higher consciousness, and I don't think I have higher consciousness than anything else. I am just conscious of things, capabilities, I possess that other things do not. — Patterner

Wanted to address this notion of higher consciousness.

An intrinsic aspect of consciousness – at the very least as we humans experience it – is that faculty of understanding via which information becomes comprehensible. It is not that which is understood, like a concept, but instead that which understands. And can be deemed a synonym for the intellect, that to which things are intelligible. This faculty of consciousness, the intellect, can at least metaphorically be stated to have its non-quantitative contents – non-quantitative because in truth all such contents which could be individually addressed are unified in a non-manifold manner.

As an example of such content, one which typically remains tacit within our consciousness but is nevertheless understood or else known: we all understand, else know, ourselves to be human Earthlings, rather than Martians or some other type of extraterrestrial alien. (This again, is typically not declarative knowledge but, instead, an understanding intrinsic to us as conscious beings.) Likewise can be said of our not being brains in vats, or our being of this or that ethnicity, of this or that gender, etc. Most of the time all these are tacitly understood without being declaratively, else explicitly, known.

A frog, too, will have this faculty of understanding – such as might regard what is food and what is not.

And, when contrasting a frog’s faculty of understanding and a typical human’s – both of which are intrinsic to the consciousness of each – the human’s consciousness will be far greater in a) its capacity of such understanding and b) its contents of such understanding.

In so being, a human will then have what goes by the name of “a higher (more technically, greater) consciousness” than will a frog. And this notwithstanding that a frog might have intelligences of its own that humans might not be aware of, might have capacities of sensory experiences that exceed those of humans, and so forth.

An AI program could well be argued to be of greater intelligence than a human, to at least have the capacity to simultaneously apprehend far more information than a human, and so forth … but, until it obtains the faculty of understanding, if it ever will, it will not be defined by consciousness. Thereby making the human of a far greater higher consciousness than the AI program, despite having a lesser intelligence, etc.

Or, as another example, a good Jeopardy player might be of far greater encyclopedic intelligence than a bad Jeopardy player, while it is at least conceivable that the bad Jeopardy player might yet be endowed with a far greater capacity of understanding than that of the good Jeopardy player – here, then, denoting the bad player to be of a (at least somewhat) higher consciousness than the good player.

And this same faculty of understanding can fluctuate in magnitude within any single human. Contrast the difference in acuteness of understanding when one is “healthy, full of vitality, and in the zone experiencing cognitive flow” and when one is bedridden with migraines and stomach aches (or such) from a flu virus. Most always, one will be of higher consciousness in the first scenario but not in the second.

For reasons such as these, I don’t think the notion of “higher consciousness” – when understood as the non-quantitative content and capacity of understanding, which can hence be of greater magnitude in one being by comparison to some other – can be easily ruled out.

And, of course, unless one views humans as the end all and be all of this very faculty of understanding, more evolved species of life can well then be postulated to potentially hold far greater magnitudes of consciousness than any human has ever been endowed with. Just as a frog from the distant past could not fathom its future evolution into a human, so too can a human not fathom his/her future evolution into a being of significantly greater consciousness (forethought will always have its limits).

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪Patterner

Second, big things are made of little things. And the big things have the characteristics they have because of the properties of the little things. Although liquidity is not a characteristic of particles, the properties of particles are responsible for liquidity, once enough particles of certain types join together in certain ways. The fact that particles join together in certain ways at all, so we have physical objects with any characteristics, is due to the properties of the particles.

Sounds like "smallism" to me. The problem is, there is no prima facie reason for smallism to be true. A sort of "bigism" where parts are only intelligible and definable in terms of the whole seems to have at least as much to recommend itself.

But there is perhaps a more immediate problem in the real of physics. Are the fields in which particles emerge nothing but the sum total of particles involved? This is not how quantum field theory describes things. Indeed, it's the opposite, the fundamental "building block" can be seen as merely a measurable activity of the whole and is only definable in terms of the whole. Or, on accounts in physics that make information ontologically basic (matter and energy emerge from information), we face the problem that information in fundamentally relational and dependent on context.

So, "'what a thing is' is what it is made of," might be replaced with (at least with some justification) "'what a thing is' is what it does" which always brings in context and suggests a process metaphysics instead of a substance metaphysics.

Or we might want a middle path here, one with relatively self-determining/self-organizing/discrete wholes at different scales.

wonderer1

Sounds like "smallism" to me. The problem is, there is no prima facie reason for smallism to be true — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is the fact that our communicating as we are is rather dependent on our ability to build computers based on understanding the way small things (e.g. transistors) can be interconnected to result in the behavior of bigger things (e.g. computers). We can see similar things in all sorts of fields, e.g medicine.

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪wonderer1

Sure, but it works the other way too. Our ability to communicate in this way also requires an understanding of EM fields, which are universal and not "composed of electrons" (rather electrons are the activity of the field, at least on many understandings). And everything on the internet is born of an understanding of the principles of information theory, which are substrate independent, while information is itself relational and not "composed of bits," at least not as a sort of "building block." That is, information theory is not the study of some ontic component, "the bit." A bit requires some minimal variance, some ability for a measurement to standout from its background, a background that is necessary to understanding the message encoded.

Likewise, understanding the function of eyes, that they are for seeing, or of a heart, requires an understanding of the goal-directed whole. Whereas biologists who are committed to extreme reductionism often feel forced to deny function as a sort of illusion.

Patterner

Sounds like "smallism" to me. The problem is, there is no prima facie reason for smallism to be true. A sort of "bigism" where parts are only intelligible and definable in terms of the whole seems to have at least as much to recommend itself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

While that's true, do you think those big things would have the specific parts that are only intelligible and definable in terms of the whole if the atoms and molecules they are made of did not have the specific properties they have? That would be the same as being made of different atoms and molecules. Either way, those "parts of the whole" would not exist. An iron rod can be heated and bent. Although you can't do that with iron atoms, it is some of the specific properties of iron atoms that make it possible with the rod. If iron atoms did not have those specific properties, you wouldn't be able to heat and bend the rod. You might not be able to make a rod at all.

bert1

Anything that helps me clarify my thinking, or even my writing. I don't know if there are ways to prove or disprove various theories of consciousness. But any theory should at least be internally consistent. Pointing out anywhere that I am not is appreciated. — Patterner

The closest I've come to a forceful proof of panpsychism is the argument from the non-vagueness of consciousness. Michael Antony and Philip Goff both make this argument. I talked about it quite a lot on this forum before. It's based on the idea that consciousness does not admit of borderline cases. Combine that fact with the hypothesis that consciousness emerges from structure and function, you generate a massive problem of trying to find a physical event that is sharp enough for consciousness to plausibly emerge in. Take the development of an embryo. When does it start feeling things? How many neurons, what function are they performing, exactly which molecule hitting which receptor is the tipping point? Etc etc. Same with waking up. If we go from unconscious dreamless sleep to dreaming, what micro-event in the brain accomplishes this, and why that one exactly? If this rules out emergence, and if I know that I am conscious, I know that there must be a continuum of consciousness right back to the big bang.

Patterner

Seems like a (grandiose) composition fallacy to me: — 180 Proof

At least I get credit for grandiose! :grin:

atoms which constitute strawberries do not themselves in any way taste, smell or feel like strawberry, for example — 180 Proof

I agree. But I don't see how's that's counter to anything I said.

just as particles of (any) X are not "proto-conscious". — 180 Proof

Well, maybe this has to do with the rewrite I need to do. No, they are not proto-conscious. One of their properties is proto-consciousness, which means they have subjective experience. Just as another of their properties is mass, which means they produce and respond to a gravitational force.

180 Proof

No, they are not proto-conscious. One of their properties is proto-consciousness, which means they have subjective experience. — Patterner

:roll:

Patterner

↪180 Proof

What I'm thinking is, you wouldn't say:
just as particles of (any) X are not "mass".

"Proto-consciousness" is the name of the property; not what it does. What it does is subjectively experience.

"Mass" is the name of the property; not what it does. What it does is produce and respond to a gravitational force.

The difference between proto-consciousness and consciousness is this: Proto-consciousness is the subjective experience of an individual particle.

Consciousness is the collective subjective experience of information processing systems. The particles act as a unit to physically process the information, so their subjective experience is also a unit. Just as their collective mass generates gravity that can be measured as one unit.

180 Proof

↪Patterner

Semantics.

wonderer1

Our ability to communicate in this way also requires an understanding of EM fields, which are universal and not "composed of electrons" (rather electrons are the activity of the field, at least on many understandings). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, our understanding that those understandings are required for deeper understanding of our environment, has been greatly informed by people looking at things from a smallist perspective. Perhaps, as a pragmatic matter, it is wise to recognize the value of such an epistemological perspective?

Patterner

Semantics — 180 Proof

I suppose. But I'm trying to explore my thinking, and think being precise will help me do that.

JuanZu

↪Patterner

For me it is simply necessary to accept that irreducibility is a fact. The contents of consciousness are not reducible to the contents of physics, but just as the contents of sociology are irreducible to psychology. I think that we have the faculty that many things we perceive are given to us in irreducible ways. But in such a way that the genesis of these things is a closed path for us, but not absolutely closed, since there are connections such as the associations of the brain to thought (but associations), or of the brain to society.

Given the irreducibility, the image that we must have cannot be hierarchical between the different dimensions of reality. But more horizontal, in such a way that it does not necessarily imply the construction thinking from the smallest to the largest. There are times when we can make reductions of the type: we know the building bricks and their relationships and with this we can reconstruct the whole; but there are times when we can go to the building bricks but we cannot reconstruct the whole. The need for a conception of the dimensions of reality cannot be in the form of a pyramid, but in another form, like a rhizome a la Deleuze.

RogueAI

The difference between proto-consciousness and consciousness is this: Proto-consciousness is the subjective experience of an individual particle. — Patterner

Isn't mind a necessary condition for subjective experience?

Patterner

Perhaps the fallacy of division is more apropos to panpsychist thinking than the fallacy of composition? — wonderer1

Finally got to read your link. No, many things that are true for a whole are not also true of all or some of its parts. But what is true for a whole is due to the properties of all or some of its parts.

H2O is one of the rare things that is less dense in its solid form than its liquids form. The hydrogen bonds between molecules are weak. In liquid form, they break easily, and the molecules move around and pack together.

Less heat means less motion, and the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily. So it freezes. And, because of the properties of the electron shells, and the "empty spaces" on the oxygen atom where the hydrogen atoms bond, the molecule has a 104.5 degree angle. SO! When it freezes, the molecules form a lattice that is less dense than the jostling molecules in liquid form.

So ice floats. Surfaces of bodies of water freeze, and, instead of sinking in it's liquid form like most solids, it stays on top insulating the water beneath, where life goes on.

Can you think of an example of anything that is composed of other things that has characteristics that cannot be explained by properties of those other things?

Wayfarer

↪Patterner

Good post and especially the citations which make your point well. One thing I would note, is that the background assumption behind all of it is still reductionist, in the sense that it is assumed that the fundamental constituents of beings exist on the micro level, and gradually combine to form greater levels of complexity. Still a shadow of atomism there - recall that the origin of atomism was the search for how the eternal and immutable could give rise to the perishable and changing. That eventually became combined with the principles of scientific laws, believed to be universally applicable (this is all pre-quantum, of course) as the basis for Enlightenment materialism. To my mind, this is still very much the background of Goff’s style of panpsychism. ‘We know that spin, mass, etc are fundamental, so if consciousness is fundamental, then it must be viewed on the same ontological level. Just as there are physical properties, so too there must be mental properties.’ Hence, dual properties.

I once (8 years ago, I’ve been at this far too long :roll: ) commented on a Philip Goff article and was surprised and delighted when he actually signed up to the Forum to rebut my argument. He only ever entered one post, but still…..

Anyway, what I said at the time was this, and I think it still follows:

I think his mistake is to believe that 'experience' is something that can be known in the third person. In other words, experience is not an object of cognition, in the way that an electron or particle or other object can be. We don't know experiences, we have experiences; so any experience has an inescapably first-person element, that is, it is undergone by a subject. So we can't objectify 'the nature of experience' in the way we can the objects and forces that are analysed by the natural sciences.

Now, in one sense we can be very clear about our own experiences - we certainly know what an unpleasant or pleasant experience is, and we know that some experiences have specific attributes, across a vast range of experiences. But in all cases, we know those things experientially - we know about those attributes, because they are the constituents of our experience, in a way very different from how we know and predict the behaviour of objects according to physical laws.

We can see others having experiences, and infer what they're experiencing, but again, we only know experience by experiencing. Experience is never a 'that' to us. — Wayfarer

Since writing that I’ve become a lot more familiar with phenomenology, which is explicitly about recognising the fundamentally first-person nature of experience (and therefore existence). But doesn’t add anything to the inventory of objective existents. It’s more a perspectival shift.

Patterner

The difference between proto-consciousness and consciousness is this: Proto-consciousness is the subjective experience of an individual particle.
— Patterner

Isn't mind a necessary condition for subjective experience? — RogueAI

My position is that it is not. I'm saying subjective experience is in all things. But a rock, for example, doesn't have a mind, so the subjective experience isn't noticed.

The reason I go this route is, of course, that the particles we are made of are indistinguishable from any other particles in the universe. So what is in us that makes us conscious must be in all the other particles.

180 Proof

The reason I go this route is, of course, that the particles we are made of are indistinguishable from any other particles in the universe. So what is in us that makes us conscious must be in all the other particles. — Patterner

Hasty generalization & compositional fallacies. :eyes:

What "makes us conscious" is the (rare) arrangements of our constituent "particles" into generative cognitive systems embedded-enactive within eco-systems of other generative systems. Afaik, all extant evidence warrants that 'consciousness' is an emergent activity (or process) of complex biological systems and not a fundamental (quantum) property like charge, spin, etc.

flannel jesus

The reason I go this route is, of course, that the particles we are made of are indistinguishable from any other particles in the universe. So what is in us that makes us conscious must be in all the other particles.
— Patterner
Hasty generalization & compositional fallacies. :eyes: — 180 Proof

This is exactly why earlier in the thread, I disagreed with the idea that it's simply the properties of particles that explain the properties of higher level things.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/980415

Patterner seems to want to leap from low level properties to high level properties, that there's some direct correspondence there. The problem with that is, there's intermediate steps that are super important that get missed by that approach.

A high level object doesn't just automatically follow from the properties of the things that make it up.

Take carbon for example. Graphene is made of carbon. So are diamonds. Carbon as an element has various chemical properties that allow for certain arrangements to happen, and those possible arrangements, because of the physical processes that happen in those arrangements, result in very different high level properties.

So it's not just "the properties of carbon produce the properties of the high level thing made of carbon", you can't skip that in between step, it's "the properties of carbon allow for various arrangements, and some of those arrangements result in the high level properties we observe in this object or in that object".

So when he says "So what is in us that makes us conscious must be in all the other particles.", he's making the same mistake. He's skipping the middle step, he's going low level properties to high level properties and completely ignoring the extremely relevant fact that it's not just the properties of the low level thing that determines the properties of the high level thing, it matters how those low level things are arranged.

You're not intelligent because of the properties alone of the chemicals in your body. You can't skip the middle step. You're intelligent because of the processes that that specific arrangement of chemicals allows to happen. And those processes AREN'T in all the particles. Those processes aren't in any individual particle at all.

Property Dualism

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