I agree. In the context of this thread, the relevant rephrasings are probably:

a) I think: "The Eiffel Tower is 400m tall".
b) I think: "I think the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall". — J

Yes, fair enough.  It looks clear if it were written in a message, diary or report of some sort.  However I am not sure if it would be correct under the view of logical statement form.

 I have never seen statements or propositions  in colons and quotes in logical WFF.  So, if you meant to just communicate what you thought to other folks, maybe it would be ok.  But if you were trying to make up philosophical statements for analysis and debates, then those writings wouldn't be accepted as logical statements.

They don't look WFF to start with, and you cannot use them in the proofs or axiomatization. Hence they wouldn't fit into P and I think P of the OP title. So, I wouldn't use them as philosophical statements or propositions for logical analysis or reasoning.

As you indicated the 2) seems still ambiguous in what it is trying to suggest or mean.
Let's try with different example statements.

a) The Earth is round.
b) I think the Earth is round.

Both a) and b) are not much different in the meanings they deliver.  So why add "I think"?  That was my point. 

c) I think the Earth is round, because the scientists say so. This seems to deliver clearer meaning, if "I think" is used.

Just after that passage I quoted from Tyler Burge, we read:

All these comparisons suggest (and those of 1967a, pp. 23-24; 1962, p. xxiv; 1984, pp. 363, 369; 1967b, p. 354, 359 explicitly state) that numbers, functions, and thought contents are independent of thinkers "in the same way" that physical objects are.

Schopenhauer would say the confusion arises from believing that physical objects are mind-independent, when in reality, they invariably occur to us as ideas.

In what ways does some work of fiction shed light on reality that some work of non-fiction does not? — Harry Hindu

As The Lord of the Rings is one of the best-selling books ever written, with over 150 million copies sold, more people have learnt about the nature of friendship and struggle from the Lord of the Rings than the relatively small number of people who read books on sociobiology and psychology.
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Right, so Pat is making a statement about their uncertainty, not about the actual state of some oak tree. — Harry Hindu

No, She is making a statement about her uncertainty about a fact.
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It is only useful if I'm not there looking at the same tree Pat is, or if I'm interested in what Pat is thinking, not what the oak tree is doing. — Harry Hindu

Most of what we hear and read is about things we were never present, whether about Caesar or events in Alaska.
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Which thought bears more truth, a visual of an oak tree shedding its leaves, or scribbles of your own voice in your head saying, "I think the oak tree shedding its leaves." — Harry Hindu

Truth is about the relationship between language and the world, such that language in the absence of a world can be neither true nor false, and the world in the absence of language can be neither true nor false.

We can think about the meaning of words such as "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", and we can think about what we see, such as the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Language is useful in that most of language refers to things and events we could never be present for, such as Kant's thoughts, the moon landing or Caesar's march into Rome

There is no truth or falsity in my seeing an oak tree shedding its leaves. There is no truth or falsity in the sentence "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

There is only truth if the sentence is "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" and I see the oak tree shedding its leaves.
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How do you determine if some string of scribbles bears truth? — Harry Hindu

"The oak tree is shedding its leaves" is true IFF the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

"x" in language is true IFF x in the world

The problem is in knowing what exists in the world.

For Kant, what exists in the world are things-in-themselves which are unknowable, meaning that truth as a correspondence between language and the world is unknowable.

For Wittgenstein, there is language and the world, but he never specifies where this world exists, inside or outside the mind. Wittgenstein can be read both as an Idealist and a Realist. Therefore, for Wittgenstein truth is a vague concept.

Consider "the postbox is red" is true IFF the postbox is red. For the Indirect Realist, the objective colour red in the world is no more than a projection of the subjective colour red onto the world. The colour red only exists in the mind and not the world, meaning that truth becomes a relation between a language that exists in the mind and a thought that also exists in the mind.

If truth is a relation between language in the mind and a mind-independent world, the fundamental problem is how a mind can know about something that is mind-independent.

Therefore adding "I think" to a statement seems to contribute in making the statement obscure in its exact meaning. — Corvus

Yes, which is the problem when Pat says:

When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ — J

Yes, which is the problem when Pat says:

When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ — J — RussellA

Would you say that the sentence "I think P", is actually two sentences?

I think.
P

Could it be modified to,

1) I think, and P
2) I think therefore P
3) I think, or P
4) If I think, then P

to any of the above sentences?

He's really saying judgment shouldn't be called a propositional attitude, despite what all the traditional sources maintain. The entire separation of force (judgment, attitude) and content is off base, according to him. That's why it's kind of an outrageous viewpoint on the face of it. — J

As an Indirect Realist, I would probably agree with Rodl.

Consider the sentence "I believe that the postbox is red". This illustrates a propositional attitude, a mental state towards a proposition, namely, my mental state of believing that the postbox is red.

Frege distinguishes the force of the judgement, I believe, from the content judged, the postbox is red.

However, for Bertrand Russell, it is not the case that redness is predicated of the postbox, but rather there is something that is both a postbox and red, where the postbox is predicated of something and redness is predicated of the same something.

For Russell, existence is a second order concept, such that the existence of being a postbox and the existence of being red are concepts that exist in the mind rather than the world.

For Kant, the something in the world is an unknown thing-in-itself that we only know through the phenomenological predicates "being a postbox" and being red", which are concepts which exist in the mind.

Speaking as an Indirect Realist, the content of the sentence "I believe that the postbox is red" is "the postbox is red". However, "the postbox is red", as Russell shows, means that there is something that is a postbox and is red, where the predicates "is a postbox" and "is" red are second order concepts that exist in the mind. As Kant showed, the something is an unknowable thing-in-itself.

Therefore, the content of the sentence "I believe that the postbox is red" is an unknowable something in the world that can only be known as predicated concepts that exist in the mind as phenomenological experiences.

The content of the sentence is not knowable in the world but is only knowable in the mind as a belief.

In other words, the content of the sentence "is" the force of judgement by the thinker, where "is" is used to signify identity.

As Rodl says, for me as an Indirect Realist, there is no separation of force from content.

I can see that "scribbles" is doing the work of a technical term for you, but I'm honestly not sure what you mean to be contrasting "scribbles" with. Possibly that's why I'm having trouble understanding your argument. — J

When you are thinking, "water is H2O", or "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", what is it like for you? What form do these thoughts take in your mind? How do you know you are thinking these things? What exactly is present in your mind, and that you are pointing at when telling me what you are thinking, when thinking these things?

Is it a visual of the scribbles, "water is H2O" in your head, or the sound of your voice saying , "water H2O", in your head, or is it the visual of the molecular structure of water, or something else?

Is it a visual of the scribbles, "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves", the sound of your voice saying those words in your head, or actual visual of an oak tree shedding leaves, or something else?

Why I say that is an abstraction, is because all such facts are, at least, expressed in symbolic form (3>2, A=A, etc). So Frege is claiming such facts have a kind of mind-independent validity. But what has always seemed fairly clear to me, is that they can only be grasped by a mind. I mean, you're not going to find any 'metaphysical primitives' in the phenomenal world - they all rely on the ability of a rational observer to discern them. — Wayfarer

or a measurer to measure them? The observer effect?

Would you say that the sentence "I think P", is actually two sentences? — Corvus

Yes, "I think p" has several different meanings.

For Frege, "I think" is the force of judgement and "p" is the content judged.

Sebastian Rodl rejects Frege's distinction between force and content.

My personal belief is that rather than it being the case that "I have the thought p", it is more the case that "I am the thought p".

The problem with "I have the thought p" is that this leads into the infinite regress homuncules problem.

If it is the case that "I am the thought p", then this agrees with Rodl's rejection of Frege's distinction between force and content.

I would add 5) I think and I am p.

As The Lord of the Rings is one of the best-selling books ever written, with over 150 million copies sold, more people have learnt about the nature of friendship and struggle from the Lord of the Rings than the relatively small number of people who read books on sociobiology and psychology. — RussellA

Probably because the former is a much easier read and provides some escapism. Are you not more capable of learning about friendship by having friends in reality?

Right, so Pat is making a statement about their uncertainty, not about the actual state of some oak tree.
— Harry Hindu

No, She is making a statement about her uncertainty about a fact. — RussellA

That's what I said. Pat is referring to their state of mind of being uncertain, not referring to the state of an oak tree.

Most of what we hear and read is about things we were never present, whether about Caesar or events in Alaska. — RussellA

Yes, but you are saying that thinking is expressing uncertainty. So why would I read about things that other people thought if they were uncertain? When reading books about Caesar and events in Alaska, the writer does not seem to be uncertain to me. You don't seem to be uncertain that thoughts express uncertainty. You seem to be certain about some thoughts but not others. Why? Is every thought uncertain?

Truth is about the relationship between language and the world, such that language in the absence of a world can be neither true nor false, and the world in the absence of language can be neither true nor false. — RussellA

Agreed.

We can think about the meaning of words such as "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", and we can think about what we see, such as the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Language is useful in that most of language refers to things and events we could never be present for, such as Kant's thoughts, the moon landing or Caesar's march into Rome

There is no truth or falsity in my seeing an oak tree shedding its leaves. There is no truth or falsity in the sentence "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

There is only truth if the sentence is "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" and I see the oak tree shedding its leaves. — RussellA

This part is confusing. Are not your thoughts part of the world? As such, is not some language that points to your thoughts either true or false? If I were to say, "RussellA is thinking about skinny dipping at the lake", wouldn't that be either true or false? I need to understand why you think that thoughts are not part of the world when they are about the world like language is.

If you thinking something is exhibiting some form of uncertainty doesn't that mean that you have a sense that your thoughts might be false?

Language can only ever point at your thoughts and feelings and observations. The question is does your thoughts, feelings and observations ever point to states of the world that is external to them?

"The oak tree is shedding its leaves" is true IFF the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

"x" in language is true IFF x in the world

The problem is in knowing what exists in the world. — RussellA

That is the same conclusion I came to above, but you have now moved the goal posts to where the relationship between the world and truth exists as knowledge. The question now is, what form does knowledge take in your mind? Does everything you know take the form of scribbles and the sound of your voice making truth statements, or do you have other types of visual and auditory experiences that are not words, but the actual things themselves? For instance, when reading the Lord of the Rings and reading a description of the characters, does the visual of Frodo and Gandalf take the shape of more scribbles and sounds, or a visual of what these characters look like? When a movie was made, was the movie all in scribbles and a voice narrating the story, or was it moving pictures and sounds of swords clashing against armor and other sound effects?

When you are thinking, "water is H2O", or "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", what is it like for you? What form do these thoughts take in your mind? How do you know you are thinking these things? What exactly is present in your mind, and that you are pointing at when telling me what you are thinking, when thinking these things? — Harry Hindu

These are excellent questions. I believe it was Keynes who, when asked whether he thought in words or images, replied, "I think in thoughts." Is there such a thing? And what accounts for the (apparently) self-validating quality of the experience -- this ties to your question "How do you know you are thinking these things?"

For myself, I can only say that my experience of thinking is an inchoate mish-mash of words, images, sounds, and "thoughts" (which seem to go much faster than any of the others but which I find almost impossible to describe, other than to say they have "content," which isn't much help). Probably there are other modalities in the mix too.

Not to harp on "scribbles," but I think you mean the equivalent of what a piece of written-down language would look like to someone who didn't know that language? Is that about right?

Are you not more capable of learning about friendship by having friends in reality? — Harry Hindu

Yes, but they may have have the same sophistication of thought about friendship as Tolkein.
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Yes, but you are saying that thinking is expressing uncertainty. — Harry Hindu

If someone told me that they knew without doubt that something was true, I would be very doubtful about their opinion.
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I need to understand why you think that thoughts are not part of the world when they are about the world like language is...If you thinking something is exhibiting some form of uncertainty doesn't that mean that you have a sense that your thoughts might be false? — Harry Hindu

I hear a sound and immediately think that the sound came from a motor car, but in fact it actually came from a motor bike.

I have the sense that my thought may be false, so am uncertain about it

Being a thought that was false, my thought was not about the world. It was not a part of the world.
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The question now is, what form does knowledge take in your mind? — Harry Hindu

As an Indirect Realist, I only have knowledge of what I perceive in my five senses. If I hear a sound, I have the knowledge that I have heard a sound. I may believe that the sound was caused by a motor bike, and I can find reasons to justify my belief that the sound was caused by a motor bike, but I can never know that the sound was not caused by a motor car.
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For instance, when reading the Lord of the Rings and reading a description of the characters, does the visual of Frodo and Gandalf take the shape of more scribbles and sounds, or a visual of what these characters look like? — Harry Hindu

When I read the word "Gandalf", I picture in my mind "Gandalf" from the movie.

My personal belief is that rather than it being the case that "I have the thought p", it is more the case that "I am the thought p". — RussellA

But surely you are more than "the thought p", aren't you? I am guessing that you have a physical body, feelings, emotions, consciousness as well as the thoughts too with very high probability. Would you agree?

I have never seen statements or propositions  in colons and quotes in logical WFF.  So, if you meant to just communicate what you thought to other folks, maybe it would be ok.  But if you were trying to make up philosophical statements for analysis and debates, then those writings wouldn't be accepted as logical statements.

They don't look WFF to start with, and you cannot use them in the proofs or axiomatization. Hence they wouldn't fit into P and I think P of the OP title. So, I wouldn't use them as philosophical statements or propositions for logical analysis or reasoning. — Corvus

Right, it's a puzzle knowing what to do with them. Rödl calls 1st person statements like these "a thorn in the flesh of the friends of propositions." Leontiskos and I posted about something similar in the "Question for Aristotelians" thread: et seq.

It looks clear if it were written in a message, diary or report of some sort. — Corvus

So, if you meant to just communicate what you thought to other folks, maybe it would be ok. — Corvus

Agreed. That was what I intended with my statement a), which I said was unproblematic. If I'm just mentioning a thought as something "I had" -- an event -- then its content doesn't affect the logical status of the report.

That might be satisfactory to Rödl as an idealist. I don't know his position on the physical world.

numbers, functions, and thought contents are independent of thinkers "in the same way" that physical objects are.

Just to note that "in the same way" could use a little work, even if physical objects are independent, pace Schopenhauer. Does Burge mean the "same way" in terms of the origins of this independence -- neither thoughts nor objects are mind-created -- or does he mean the "same way" that we relate to them in the world, regardless of the question of their origin?

Speaking as an Indirect Realist, the content of the sentence "I believe that the postbox is red" is "the postbox is red". — RussellA

So "I believe" wouldn't be a separate fact that could appear in a predication? Just asking . . . I think this is pretty close to Rödl, yes.

Saying "I am the thought p." sounds even more unclear, mysterious and even spooky. — Corvus

A thought of a tree
There is the physical body of which the physical brain is a part. The mind is somehow part of the physical brain.

One aspect is what the mind is, such as the self, consciousness, the "I". Another aspect is what the mind does, such as has thoughts, ideas, feelings and emotions.

How are these two aspects connected?

A photograph of a tree
What is the connection between a photograph representing a tree and the representation of a tree.

Take away the photograph that represents a tree, and there will be no representation of a tree. Take away the representation of a tree and there will be no photograph that represents the tree.

Rather than the photograph representing a tree, perhaps the photograph IS the representation of a tree.

Rather than "I" thinking of a tree, perhaps the "I" IS the thought of a tree.

Agreed. That was what I intended with my statement a), which I said was unproblematic. If I'm just mentioning a thought as something "I had" -- an event -- then its content doesn't affect the logical status of the report. — J

:ok: But how do you verify the "I think: P" for truth or falsity in formal logic?

The mind is somehow part of the physical brain. — RussellA

The mind is part of the physical brain? Exactly which part in the brain?

One aspect is what the mind is, such as the self, consciousness, the "I". Another aspect is what the mind does, such as has thoughts, ideas, feelings and emotions. — RussellA

So when you say that you are the thought of p, you seem to be reducing yourself to only one aspect of the mind leaving out the rest of the mind and physical body.

How are these two aspects connected? — RussellA

I understand mind as a function of the brain and sensory organs of the body. You sound like a dualist i.e. mind and body as separate entities - mind residing in the brain somewhere. Would it be the case?

So "I believe" wouldn't be a separate fact that could appear in a predication? Just asking . . . I think this is pretty close to Rödl, yes. — J

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that both "I believe" and "the postbox is red" only exist in the mind.

For someone who believes that "I have thought x", where "I" and "thought x" are separate, then "thought x" is predicated of "I". For example, a table may be made of wood, meaning that "wood" can be predicated of "a table".

For someone who believes that "I am thought x", where "I" is "thought x", then "thought x" cannot be predicated of "I". For example, a wooden table is made of wood, meaning that "wood" cannot be predicated of "a wooden table".

The mind is part of the physical brain? Exactly which part in the brain? — Corvus

If your brain moves from the living room to the kitchen, does your mind remain in the living room?

A tree has the form of a tree. What is the content of a tree? It can only be the tree itself.

As with the tree example, the brain as form and mind as content cannot be separated.
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So when you say that you are the thought of p, you seem to be reducing yourself to only one aspect of the mind leaving out the rest of the mind and physical body. — Corvus

If "I" was not thought p, how could "I" ever know about thought p?
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I understand mind as a function of the brain and sensory organs of the body. You sound like a dualist i.e. mind and body as separate entities - mind residing in the brain somewhere. Would it be the case? — Corvus

No. As I think of "I" as my thoughts, I think of my mind as my brain.

Kant's failure to draw and maintain the distinction between thought and thinking about thought.
— creativesoul

Truly, I wasn't aware there was a problem... — J

The conversation you are currently having with Russell as well as the last few days' worth of discussion in this thread ought to make you aware. To be clear, neglecting the distinction between thought and thinking about thought is not just and only a problem in Kant's view. The scope of that neglect spreads across the conventional board. It manifests in all sorts of ways within all sorts of very different philosophers' views from the Greeks through postmodernism and everything in between.

"I think" is always metacognitive. The thought/belief(p) that it prefixes is not.

Think about children's thought prior to their ability to think about other minds as well as their own. Their thought is most certainly not prefixable with "I think". When they say "That is a tree" it is not accompanied by any sort of unspoken or implied "I think". It is their thought nonetheless. It is only after we begin to realize that other people have minds that we can begin to think about minds/thoughts as a subject matter in its own right. Last I checked there is an age range spanning a few years when that begins happening. If memory serves me, it's between 3 and 7 years of age. There are several experiments showing that some children in the age range have yet to have drawn a distinction between their own minds and others. Until that happens, there is no "I think" accompanying that mind.

Think about children's thought prior to their ability to think about other minds as well as their own. Their thought is most certainly not prefixable with "I think". When they say "That is a tree" it is not accompanied by any sort of unspoken or implied "I think". It is their thought nonetheless. — creativesoul

Yep. :up:

I think developmental considerations often give the lie to these theories. When a child runs up to a puppy to pet it, upon recognizing a puppy they are not saying to themselves excitedly, "I think puppy! I think puppy!" This seems fairly uncontroversial. — Leontiskos

What's interesting is that, even for adults, the "I think" is quite difficult. Most people have difficulty understanding how others could think differently than they do precisely because there is no recognition of their own act of thinking.

Yes. I deal with a number of people on a daily basis that do not seem to understand how worldviews form, grow, and evolve over time and/or how they work.

One reason I opted out of further explanation earlier was based on the succinct manner in which you drew the distinction between self-conscious thought and conscious thought. That was enough to make the basic case against the claim at the heart of the OP.

Yes. I deal with a number of people on a daily basis that do not seem to understand how worldviews form, grow, and evolve over time and/or how they work. — creativesoul

Right. And we didn't really have developed theories on that score until the 19th and 20th centuries.

One reason I opted out of further explanation earlier was based on the succinct manner in which you drew the distinction between self-conscious thought and conscious thought. That was enough to make the basic case against the claim at the heart of the OP. — creativesoul

Thanks. :smile:

If your brain moves from the living room to the kitchen, does your mind remain in the living room? — RussellA

My brain never moves alone from the livingroom to the kitchen. The brain moves with the body located in the head physically altogether. So your premise "If your brain moves" is not accepted, hence your argument is invalid.

A tree has the form of a tree. What is the content of a tree? It can only be the tree itself. — RussellA

Tree has water and wood fibre in the content. Tree itself dies without water and the nutrients fed from the root.

As with the tree example, the brain as form and mind as content cannot be separated. — RussellA

Mind as content sounds vacuous. Mind is a function of the brain and body. It feels, senses, perceives, believes, reasons, remembers and thinks. Mind itself is not content. Mind has contents.

No. As I think of "I" as my thoughts, I think of my mind as my brain. — RussellA

It sounds like unnecessary over reduction of "I" into a physical organ.

I hadn’t responded to this and similar points earlier because it seemed to be based on a misunderstanding and I wasn't sure how to clarify it. The "I think" is not supposed be some simultaneous, conscious "thinking about thought" or "thinking that I am now having thought X." (Maybe the term "the I think" is ill-chosen, since it can suggest that misapprehension.)

But now this occurs to me: Is it possible that you don’t countenance the idea of any thoughts that are not conscious? So therefore the “I think”, on that understanding, would be either present to consciousness or nonexistent? Or another possibility: You countenance the idea of various un- or subconscious processes that accompany thinking, but want to reserve the word “thought” for what happens consciously?

Is any of this close to how you see it?

The "I think" is not supposed be some simultaneous, conscious "thinking about thought" or "thinking that I am now having thought X." — J

I am wondering what it is supposed to be.

But now this occurs to me: Is it possible that you don’t countenance the idea of any thoughts that are not conscious? — J

Again, as I understand it what is at stake is self-conscious thought, not conscious thought:

Thinking p requires thinking p. No one disputes this. The question of the OP is whether thinking p requires self-consciously thinking p; whether it requires thinking "I think p." — Leontiskos

-

So therefore the “I think”, on that understanding, would be either present to consciousness or nonexistent? — J

See:

And what is that supposed to mean? "I think" is a self-conscious, intentional act. Does Rödl think people engage in self-conscious, intentional acts un-self-consciously and unintentionally? Do they think "I think" without realizing that they think "I think"? — Leontiskos

So the claim of the OP by Rodl is <Every time p is thought, I think p is thought>. And I don't think it makes sense to say, "You are thinking <I think p> but you don't know you are thinking <I think p>." Or more succinctly: self-conscious thought is self-conscious, and if a thought isn't self-conscious then it isn't a self-conscious thought.

OK, that helps some.

So the claim of the OP by Rodl is <Every time p is thought, I think p is thought> — Leontiskos

Well, no. Rodl specifically says, "This cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p."

Again, as I understand it what is at stake is self-conscious thought, not conscious thought — Leontiskos

Sure, but again, Rodl is asking us not to assume that being self-conscious means having two simultaneous thoughts, as above. I raise the issue of un- or sub-conscious thoughts because understanding their role in mentation, if you countenance their existence, may help us understand what Rodl has in mind when he describes an item -- the "I think" -- which is clearly mental but just as clearly isn't present to consciousness.

I hate to say it, but a great deal of this comes down to how we want to use very ordinary words like "thought" and "accompany."

"I think" is a self-conscious, intentional act. — Leontiskos

See my comment in the previous post about the possibly unfortunate choice of this term by phenomenologists. Most of our uses of "I think" are indeed conscious and intentional. (Not sure if they're also self-conscious, but often enough, I suppose.) But "the I think" is, or may be, different. It's a highly technical usage that points to structure and transcendental conditions for thought, not just "some thought that comes along when we think anything."

We can say this, though: If "thought" is by (someone's) definition a phenomenon necessarily present to consciousness, then there is no "I think" that is also a thought. We've agreed that Pat is right about that -- no mysterious "thought of thinking" that accompanies our thoughts.

PS -- As the writer of the OP, I officially declare that we no longer have to use the umlaut when referring to Rodl. What a pain in the ass :wink: .

As the writer of the OP, I officially declare that we no longer have to use the umlaut when referring to Rodl. — J

Mac users - if you go to Control Panel>Keyboard>Text Replacements, you can enter Rödl with the umlaut to replace every instance of the name typed without it. (And it will also work on your other iOS devices should you have any e.g. iPad, iPhone using same Apple ID.)

For Windows 10/11 - Go to Settings > Devices > Typing > Text Replacement.

Useful for diacriticals of all kinds, other examples being agapē, epochē, and saṃsāra.