To my way of thinking these are very different things. — EricH

Another difference, which gets close to the issues that concern Rödl, is that "1) The oak tree is standing there" is asserted from an implied or absent point of view, whereas "2) I think that the oak tree is standing there" is as much about what I think as it is about the oak tree; it is incorrigibly 1st-person. This can be readily seen by constructing denials of the two statements.

Wolfgang Iser in The Reality of Fiction: A Functionalist Approach to Literature makes the point that fiction and reality are often very difficult to separate, as we can see in today's mainstream media.

If fiction and reality are to be linked, it must be in terms not of opposition but of communication, for the one is not the mere opposite of the other - fiction is a means of telling us something about reality. — RussellA

What does The Lord of the Rings tell us about reality? Do fictional stories mirror some aspects of reality? Of course, how else would a reader identify and understand aspects of the story if it didn't share some aspect of reality? The difference between reality and fiction is their relative locations. Fictions are located WITHIN reality. The form fictional stories take are made up entirely of scribbles on paper, or actors on sets playing out a role, or your dreams while asleep. How do you get from this reality to some fictional reality? What path do you take to get there?

Going from "The oak tree is shedding its leaves" to "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is going from thinking in the visual of an oak tree shedding its leaves to thinking in the auditory experience of hearing the words (you talking to yourself) "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves".
— Harry Hindu

It's also going from certainty to uncertainty — RussellA

So even if Pat is not aware that she is thinking the thought, the "I think" is nonetheless present. — J

If the only thing Pat can be certain of is that they have thoughts, then what use is communicating those thoughts if what she thinks she experiences might not be the case, which would be just as true for other human beings as it is for shedding oak trees? Pat could just as well say "I think J and RussellA are human beings that I met on a philosophy forum." Why learn language at all if all you have access to is your thoughts?

Isn't you learning a language and then using it to communicate with others exhibiting a degree of certainty that there are things that exist (like other human beings) independent of your thoughts?

To my way of thinking these are very different things. #2 implies that the speaker is not certain. I.e., there is an implied "But I could be wrong" that follows #2.

[Edit] Now that I've thought about this some more, it seems to me that the sentences are even more different.
#1 is not expressing a thought, it is a proposition that is either true or false via the Correspondence Theory of Truth.
#2 is a speaker expressing a proposition which they have (at least some) confidence that it is true. — EricH

Again, words are just scribbles and sounds that we experience - no different than oak trees shedding and humans typing on a keyboard. Perceiving and understanding an oak tree and what it is doing based on prior observations of oak trees, not from some use of language, and understanding the use of some scribbles or sounds based on prior observations of how those scribbles and sounds are used isn't much of a difference.

You can only learn to use scribbles and sounds by observing its use and that requires a hefty degree of certainty that those scribbles exist independent of you thinking them, or why would you believe that the scribbles you typed on the screen would be here for me to read later?

Your thoughts are not made up of scribbles and sounds. They are made up of visuals and auditory experiences of which language is a part of.

Another difference, which gets close to the issues that concern Rödl, is that "1) The oak tree is standing there" is asserted from an implied or absent point of view, whereas "2) I think that the oak tree is standing there" is as much about what I think as it is about the oak tree; it is incorrigibly 1st-person. This can be readily seen by constructing denials of the two statements. — J

A view is inherently 1st person. To say that an oak tree is standing THERE is to say it is standing relative to some point of view.

The problem with the certainty vs uncertainty argument is that you would have to apply the same level of uncertainty to language itself which is made up of scribbles and sounds that you experience. How do you know that the scribbles, or sounds you hear in your head, "I think" refer to the act of thinking? How did you come to that conclusion?

I'm going to post the following here and also in the "Question for Aristotelians" thread, because they seem to have intertwined a bit (as threads will).

This quote is from Rödl's response to the Hanks review. It presents an unusually succinct (for Rödl) explication of one of his basic positions:

I reject the idea that judgment is a propositional attitude. More generally, I reject the idea that “I judge a is F” is a predicative judgment, predicating a determination signified by “__ judge a is F” of an object designated by “I”. It is clear that, if “I judge a is F” is of this form, specifically, if it represents someone to adopt an attitude, then what it judges is not the same as what is judged in “a is F”: the latter refers to a and predicates of it being F; the former refers not to a, but to a different object and predicates of it not being F, but a different determination.

— The Force and the Content of Judgment

Now this strikes me as correct. Or, backing up just a little, I think the distinction he is drawing is meaningful, and correct to draw. I wish he had filled out "a different determination" at the end -- what exactly is the structure of "I judge a is F" if it is not understood as predication? But his larger point, I believe, is that the two statements -- "I judge a is F" and "a is F" -- have two different subjects. Rödl uses the term "object" rather than "subject," in the sense that Frege would use "object" or "argument" rather than "subject," but if my reading is correct, he's referring in each case to what we would loosely call the subject of the proposition. In the first instance, if it is a genuine predication (which Rödl denies), "judging that a is F" would be predicated of "I". In the second instance, F would be predicated of a.

This is only the first hill in Rödl's campaign to convince us of where and how Fregean logic fails, but I thought it was worth laying out as a preliminary and interesting thought.

what exactly is the structure of "I judge a is F" if it is not understood as predication? — J

Scribbles.

Now explain how scribbles become words.

Are scribbles necessary to make judgements, interpretations or understanding?

A view is inherently 1st person. — Harry Hindu

This, in a simple sentence, is the bone of contention. Our language, our choice of a metaphor like "view," certainly suggests that someone or ones must be doing the "viewing." But there is a correspondingly robust tradition that says differently. Nagel's The View from Nowhere gives the best account I know of what such a view would entail. Nagel's position is also discussed at some length in Rodl's Self-Consciousness and Objectivity.

This, in a simple sentence, is the bone of contention. Our language, our choice of a metaphor like "view," certainly suggests that someone or ones must be doing the "viewing." But there is a correspondingly robust tradition that says differently. Nagel's The View from Nowhere gives the best account I know of what such a view would entail. Nagel's position is also discussed at some length in Rodl's Self-Consciousness and Objectivity. — J

A view from nowhere is an imaginary view that only exists within the mind, and a mind has a 1st person view.

That's certainly one way to "look" at it. (Pardon the "view" metaphor!) I think the desirability of articulating a "view from nowhere" lies in helping us sort out subjectivity and objectivity. It's possible, of course, to simply declare that objectivity cannot mean what most people take it to mean -- that is, a point of view that is made true not by virtue of who has it but of what is seen -- but I think that's hasty. We can learn a lot more by wrestling with it as a genuine problem, and trying to see what would have to change in some of our basic philosophical outlooks, if traditional "objectivity" is indeed chimerical -- which it may well be. But again, the Nagel book goes into all that -- if you haven't read it, I highly recommend it.

That's certainly one way to "look" at it. (Pardon the "view" metaphor!) I think the desirability of articulating a "view from nowhere" lies in helping us sort out subjectivity and objectivity. It's possible, of course, to simply declare that objectivity cannot mean what most people take it to mean -- that is, a point of view that is made true not by virtue of who has it but of what is seen -- but I think that's hasty. We can learn a lot more by wrestling with it as a genuine problem, and trying to see what would have to change in some of our basic philosophical outlooks, if traditional "objectivity" is indeed chimerical -- which it may well be. But again, the Nagel book goes into all that -- if you haven't read it, I highly recommend it. — J

A view is information structured in a way to inform an organism of the state of the environment relative to the state of its body. A view is always relative and the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity lies in trying to separate the body from the environment - an impossible feat. How does one imagine a view from nowhere using a view from somewhere?

Did Nagel ever address or mention the Observer effect in QM?

Did Nagel ever address or mention the Observer effect in QM? — Harry Hindu

I don't recall that in Nagel, though I'm not sure.

How does one imagine a view from nowhere using a view from somewhere? — Harry Hindu

Indeed. If you're willing to regard that as an open, rather than rhetorical, question, then the Nagel book is for you. If you're already certain it's impossible, then not.

Indeed. If you're willing to regard that as an open, rather than rhetorical, question, then the Nagel book is for you. If you're already certain it's impossible, then not. — J

I don't need to read Nagel. Tell me what it is like for you to imagine a view from nowhere. How would you know when you are imagining a view from nowhere?

How would a view from nowhere differ from a view from everywhere? I wonder if what Nagel actually meant is a view from everywhere rather than a view from nowhere as a view from nowhere is non-sensical.

I don't need to read Nagel. — Harry Hindu

Well, this probably won't get anywhere -- you sound like your mind is made up -- but OK.

When I think "Water is H2O," I am imagining myself speaking objectively. Water would be H2O regardless of whether I think it, and regardless of whether anyone else does.

Don't take "view from nowhere" too literally. Any talk of "views" is metaphorical. All I mean, and all Nagel means, is that there appears to be an entire class of statements that remain true regardless of who says them, and in many cases regardless of whether anyone says them. But how can this be? We are, as you point out, individual knowers with limited consciousness. What could entitle us to claim a truth that is apart from point of view?

If your next question is, "Right, tell me how," I'll demur. It's just too big a subject to deal with on this thread, and we'd have to set it up with a lot of reading. Reams and reams have been written about it. For what it's worth, my current opinion is that we lack a good account of how to reach a so-called view from nowhere, but our entire philosophical enterprise rests on the need for one. Living in this tension seems to characterize the very core of doing philosophy as I see it.

Someone recently told me about Noesis and Noema. I have only started reading it, but I think it's relevant? — Patterner

Circling back to this . . . Yes, I agree this is a way to state some of the problem in a different vocabulary. I know Husserl from the outside, so to speak -- he's never engaged my imagination very much. I'll tap @Joshs and see if he wants to respond; I think he may have a better perspective.

What does The Lord of the Rings tell us about reality?...................The difference between reality and fiction is their relative locations. — Harry Hindu

The article Ralph Waldo Emerson: Fiction reveals truth that reality obscures explains it better than I could:

The quote by Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Fiction reveals truth that reality obscures," encapsulates the notion that fiction has the unique ability to uncover hidden truths that may be misunderstood or even obscured by reality. In a straightforward interpretation, this quote suggests that the stories we create in fiction offer a deeper understanding of human nature, societal dynamics, and the complexities of life. Fiction has the power to shine a light on truths often overshadowed or ignored in the hustle and bustle of everyday life. It allows us to explore different perspectives, question assumptions, and delve into the depths of human experience. Through narrative and imagination, fiction becomes a vehicle through which reality's intricacies can be unraveled and its truths made visible.

I agree when you say that trying to separate the body from the environment is an impossible feat, in that trying to separate the subjective from the objective is a fundamental problem within philosophy.

A view is information structured in a way to inform an organism of the state of the environment relative to the state of its body. A view is always relative and the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity lies in trying to separate the body from the environment - an impossible feat. — Harry Hindu

For example, I have the subjective experience of perceiving the colour red. But does the colour red have an objective existence in the world independent of any observer? Is the colour red part of a subjective fiction or part of an objective reality?

If the only thing Pat can be certain of is that they have thoughts, then what use is communicating those thoughts if what she thinks she experiences might not be the case, which would be just as true for other human beings as it is for shedding oak trees? — Harry Hindu

Of what use is it for Pat to say "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" if she thinks that there is a possibility that it may not be the case that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Even if the oak tree is not shedding its leaves, Pat is nevertheless still communicating a lot of worthwhile information

i) Pat thinks
ii) Oak trees have leaves
iii) Oak trees may or may not shed their leaves
iv) There are things such as oak trees
v) Pat is asking a question she is hoping will be answered
vi) Pat is an English speaker
vii) Pat probably lives in the UK, Canada, Australia or the USA
===============================================================================

Why learn language at all if all you have access to is your thoughts? — Harry Hindu

Suppose all that existed was my mind. Would I still learn a language. Probably I would, as language enables me to have more complex thoughts than I could otherwise have without language. The ability to have more complex thoughts would be an end in itself.

Perhaps this is perhaps why people learn unusual languages such as Latin, even though they are not able to use it in everyday life. It is an personal intellectual exercise rather than being of practical use.
===============================================================================

Isn't you learning a language and then using it to communicate with others exhibiting a degree of certainty that there are things that exist (like other human beings) independent of your thoughts? — Harry Hindu

I am pretty certain that a world exists independent of my mind, but am not certain beyond a shadow of a doubt. As Kant argued, what knowledge can we ever have of things-in-themselves. However, my working hypothesis is that there is a mind independent world out there, and I may as well continue under my hypothesis unless it is shown to be wrong.

Well, this probably won't get anywhere -- you sound like your mind is made up -- but OK. — J

It sounds like your mind is already made up that anything Nagel says about views is true. My experience is that people say, "read <insert your favorite philosopher here>" as a means of hand-waving another's arguments off, as if because some famous philosopher wrote something, that disqualifies my argument.

When I think "Water is H2O," I am imagining myself speaking objectively. Water would be H2O regardless of whether I think it, and regardless of whether anyone else does. — J

Again, when thinking that water is H2O, are you thinking in scribbles or sounds, or a visual of the molecular structure of water? If the latter, what side of the molecule are you viewing? If not the latter, are you saying that the fact that water is H2O is a string of scribbles or sounds? If "water is H2O" is independent of any language use, then saying to yourself "water is H2O" is only representative of some state of affairs and not an actual view of water as H2O. So again, how does one go from simply invoking scribbles and sounds in the mind, "water is H2O", to a view of water as it really is, or a view from nowhere? You seem to be confusing the scribbles, "water is H2O" with some relationship between two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, which are not scribbles.

Don't take "view from nowhere" too literally. Any talk of "views" is metaphorical. All I mean, and all Nagel means, is that there appears to be an entire class of statements that remain true regardless of who says them, and in many casesregardless of whether anyone says them. But how can this be? We are, as you point out, individual knowers with limited consciousness. What could entitle us to claim a truth that is apart from point of view? — J

Integrating multiple views over time and space, which is more akin to trying to achieve a view from everywhere, not from nowhere.

How can a statement that is never made be true or false? It seems to me that a statement has to exist to then judge it as true or false. Only people can make statements. Reality does not make statements independent of some person. It simply exists in a certain way. Statements do not exist independent of some mind. But statements (strings of scribbles and sounds) are not what the statement is about (molecules and oak trees). They are representative of what they are about, so thinking about an oak tree is a separate thought than thinking in scribbles that refer to an oak tree. One is about an oak tree, and the other is about scribbles. One takes the form of a visual of an oak tree shedding its leaves, and the other takes the form of scribbles, or sounds in your head.

This quote is from Rödl's response — J

I reject the idea that judgment is a propositional attitude.

From Wikipedia - propositional Attitude

a propositional attitude is a mental state towards a proposition, such as "Sally believed that she had won"

From the Merriam Webster, the word "judge" includes: to hold as an opinion : guess, think
"I judge she knew what she was doing"

From this it seems that the word "judge" can be a mental state towards a proposition, and could be a propositional attitude.

But is Rodl using the word "judge" in a particular way?

The quote by Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Fiction reveals truth that reality obscures," encapsulates the notion that fiction has the unique ability to uncover hidden truths that may be misunderstood or even obscured by reality. In a straightforward interpretation, this quote suggests that the stories we create in fiction offer a deeper understanding of human nature, societal dynamics, and the complexities of life. Fiction has the power to shine a light on truths often overshadowed or ignored in the hustle and bustle of everyday life. It allows us to explore different perspectives, question assumptions, and delve into the depths of human experience. Through narrative and imagination, fiction becomes a vehicle through which reality's intricacies can be unraveled and its truths made visible.

It makes no sense to say that "fiction" is representative of some truth in reality. If it did, it wouldn't qualify as "fiction". Ralph seems to like to play games with words.

In what ways does some work of fiction shed light on reality that some work of non-fiction does not? What does the relationship between Frodo and Gandalf, and Frodo's struggles with the ring, shed light on that some book on sociobiology and psychology would not?

Of what use is it for Pat to say "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" if she thinks that there is a possibility that it may not be the case that the oak tree is shedding its leaves. — RussellA

Right, so Pat is making a statement about their uncertainty, not about the actual state of some oak tree.

Even if the oak tree is not shedding its leaves, Pat is nevertheless still communicating a lot of worthwhile information — RussellA

It is only useful if I'm not there looking at the same tree Pat is, or if I'm interested in what Pat is thinking, not what the oak tree is doing.

Suppose all that existed was my mind. Would I still learn a language. Probably I would, as language enables me to have more complex thoughts than I could otherwise have without language. The ability to have more complex thoughts would be an end in itself.

Perhaps this is perhaps why people learn unusual languages such as Latin, even though they are not able to use it in everyday life. It is an personal intellectual exercise rather than being of practical use. — RussellA

But, as I have said numerous times, language is just scribbles and sounds. You need to have a mind that already is capable of categorizing and interpreting visual and auditory experiences to be able to learn a language in the first place - to learn how to use the scribbles in meaningful ways. Therefore, language is simply a way for the mind to do what it already does in a more efficient way - reflect on the world visually. You can only think in visuals and sounds, of which language is part of. Which thought bears more truth, a visual of an oak tree shedding its leaves, or scribbles of your own voice in your head saying, "I think the oak tree shedding its leaves."

If thinking something is equivalent to expressing some uncertainty, then why would I use your thoughts, or your statement to get at some state-of-affairs, instead of just looking at the oak tree for myself?

How do you determine if some string of scribbles bears truth?

There’s no need for a clarifying statement as it is obvious by the plain language reading. I’m a plain language person. As an aside, I can’t remember the exact quote but didn’t someone once say something to the effect that philosophy takes things that are obvious and tries to make them seem more complicated than they are?

Given the sentence "I think I think the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall" — RussellA

It seems to be an obscure sentence on its own. From the sentence only, we don't know whether,

1) you are saying that you are not sure on what you are saying, or
2) you mean that you are sure on what you are saying, or
3) you mean you are reporting the fact based on your direct observation and apprehension, or
4) you mean you have seen the object in your dream, and you are trying to recall the image
etc etc.

You would usually add supporting sentence(s) to clarify what your exact sentence means after a sentence starting with "I think" . Therefore adding "I think" to a statement seems to contribute in making the statement obscure in its exact meaning.

It sounds like your mind is already made up that anything Nagel says about views is true. — Harry Hindu

Oh gosh, no. I just think his book does the best job I know of laying out the problem. That's the thing . . . he isn't trying to settle the issue at all, one way or another. He's trying to show why we should worry about it!

My experience is that people say, "read <insert your favorite philosopher here>" as a means of hand-waving another's arguments off, as if because some famous philosopher wrote something, that disqualifies my argument. — Harry Hindu

I know what you mean, but hopefully that's not what I'm doing. (And besides, any number of "famous philosophers" disagree completely with Nagel, so I'd need a better reason to agree with him than because he was famous and wrote something!). It's just really hard to summarize what an excellent book-length piece of philosophy says, or hard for me, at least.

the scribbles, "water is H2O" — Harry Hindu

statements (strings of scribbles and sounds) — Harry Hindu

etc.

I can see that "scribbles" is doing the work of a technical term for you, but I'm honestly not sure what you mean to be contrasting "scribbles" with. Possibly that's why I'm having trouble understanding your argument.

But is Rodl using the word "judge" in a particular way? — RussellA

No! -- or at least that's how I read him. He's really saying judgment shouldn't be called a propositional attitude, despite what all the traditional sources maintain. The entire separation of force (judgment, attitude) and content is off base, according to him. That's why it's kind of an outrageous viewpoint on the face of it.

You would usually add supporting sentence(s) to clarify what your exact sentence means after a sentence starting with "I think" . Therefore adding "I think" to a statement seems to contribute in making the statement obscure in its exact meaning. — Corvus

I agree. In the context of this thread, the relevant rephrasings are probably:

a) I think: "The Eiffel Tower is 400m tall".
b) I think: "I think the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall".

a) is now clear, if we take it as a report about a mental event, a particular thought the speaker is having. b) remains ambiguous. The first "I think" can also be taken as a report about a thought, but then we don't know whether that thought -- the thought that "I think the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall:" -- is expressing meanings 1, 2, 3, or 4, above.

I've read a bit more of Rödl the last few days (although hardly the ideal summertime reading, as it is here.) The thing I'm struggling with is not what I think he means, but why he goes to such lengths to make the case.

I thought one way of interpreting his central argument is that it's an argument against abstraction. What do I mean by that? Well, according to Frege, who is the main foil for many of his arguments, propositions have meaning irrespective of whether anyone grasps them or thinks them. The Tyler Burge essay on Frege quotes him thus:

The picture of grasping is very well suited to elucidate the matter. If I grasp a pencil, many different events take place in my body... but the pencil exists independently of them. And it is essential for grasping that something be there which is grasped... In the same way, that which we grasp with the mind also exists independently of this activity... and it is neither identical with the totality of these events nor created by it as a part of our own mental life. — Tyler Burge, Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, p639

So here Frege is presenting something like absolute objectivity - that what he calls metaphysical primitives such as real numbers, logical laws and the like, are real irrespective of whether anyone is thinking them, or what we think about them.

Why I say that is an abstraction, is because all such facts are, at least, expressed in symbolic form (3>2, A=A, etc). So Frege is claiming such facts have a kind of mind-independent validity. But what has always seemed fairly clear to me, is that they can only be grasped by a mind. I mean, you're not going to find any 'metaphysical primitives' in the phenomenal world - they all rely on the ability of a rational observer to discern them.

So isn't Rödl arguing, on this basis, that you can't really show the mind-independent nature of metaphysical primitives in the absence of a mind, which can only be that of the knower of the proposition?

. For what it's worth, my current opinion is that we lack a good account of how to reach a so-called view from nowhere, but our entire philosophical enterprise rests on the need for one. — J

I'm laboriously drafting an essay on the distinction between scientific objectivity and philosophical detachment. It mentions Nagel. I'll PM you the link if you'd like to see it.

hardly the ideal summertime reading, as it is here. — Wayfarer

Oh stop! We're snowed in where I live.

So isn't Rödl arguing, on this basis, that you can't really show the mind-independent nature of metaphysical primitives in the absence of a mind, which can only be that of the knower of the proposition? — Wayfarer

I’m not sure. Do you mean that, because it would take a mind to demonstrate the mind-independent nature of metaphysical primitives, this represents a sort of contradiction? Or more like, Abstractions can't exist in the phenomenal world, and therefore anything we discover about them is a discovery about our world, the subjective and/or World 3 world? Or neither . . . Everything else you and Burge say about Frege seems correct, and definitely the focus of Rödl's challenge.

Yes by all means. I PM'd you about format.

Abstractions can't exist in the phenomenal world, and therefore anything we discover about them is a discovery about our world, the subjective and/or World 3 world? Or neither . . . Everything else you and Burge say about Frege seems correct, and definitely the focus of Rödl's challenge. — J

Something along those lines. I’ll keep at it.