p and "I think p"

This follows up on some issues in recent threads about Descartes, Sartre, Kimhi, and the nature of philosophical thought.

The “I think” accompanies all our thoughts, says Kant. Sebastian Rödl, in Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, agrees with this but points out that “this cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p.” He calls this a confusion arising from our notation, and suggests, not entirely seriously, that we could devise a more accurate notation “that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think.” He interprets Kant as saying the same thing: for Kant, “the I think is not something thought alongside the thought that it accompanies, but internal to what is thought as such.”

This has some obvious relevance to the debate about the force/content distinction in Frege, which we discussed at length in an earlier thread, inspired by Kimhi. But for now . . .

Suppose my friend Pat replied as follows:

“Sorry, but I don’t have this experience. When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ Please don’t misunderstand me as saying that I’ve never had such a thought, or wouldn’t know what it was to experience such a thought. There are indeed circumstances under which I may additionally reflect ‛And I am thinking thought p at this moment’ or ‛Thought p is my thought’ or ‛I judge that p’. But I disagree that this characterizes my experience of thinking in general.”

Which of these responses do you think would be appropriate to make to Pat?:

1. You've misunderstood. The thesis of the ubiquity of the “I think” is not based on empirical observation. It’s not about what you experience; whether you are aware of having such an experience is not decisive either way. Some people are aware of it, some are not. But we’re not relying on personal reports when we claim that the “I think” must accompany all our thoughts.

2. The “I think” is an experience of self-consciousness, and requires self-consciousness. When you say you are “not aware of it,” you are mistaken. But you can learn to identify the experience, and thus understand that you have been aware of it all along.

3. The “I think” is not experienced at all. It is a condition of thought, a form of thought, in the same way that space and time are conditions of cognition. Self-consciousness, in Rödl’s sense, is built in to every thought, but not as a content that must be experienced.

4. If your report is accurate, then the thesis that “the ‛I think’ accompanies all our thoughts” has been proven wrong.

Or is there another response that seems better? I mean these four responses to be mutually exclusive, but if you think they need sharpening in order to achieve that, go for it. (And I suppose if your response tends toward "5. WTF?" then this isn't the thread for you. :wink: )

Depending on what sorts of posts people make about this, I hope to explore the question of how objectivity (“p”) relates to subjectivity (“It is I who thinks p”). This can lead us into some considerations of Rödl’s book, but I don’t want to narrow it down to that.

Banno

Or is there another response that seems better? — J

Yep - that Pat is right.

Is this in part a response to Davidson's argument against conceptual schema?

↪Banno

Good start! Re Davidson, I'm not sure. But since I'm more or less thinking about three phil topics at once these days, I wouldn't be surprised

So, if Pat is right, #4 is a good response?

T Clark

Yep - that Pat is right. — Banno

Another one of those rare occasions when you and I agree.

Banno

So, if Pat is right, #4 is a good response? — J

I'm not sure.

4. If your report is accurate, then the thesis that “the ‛I think’ accompanies all our thoughts” has been proven wrong. — J

To be sure, there are no thoughts that could not be prefixed by "I think..."; but that is a very different point to the suggestion that all our thoughts are already prefixed by "I think...". That just looks muddled.

That there is a difference between a proposition and one's attitude towards that proposition - thinking it, believing it, asserting it, doubting it - is so ingrained that I have difficulty making sense of the alternatives.

Wayfarer

I vote '1'. Just as Kant (and Husserl) say, 'transcendental' means 'necessary for thought but not accessible to it'. We're generally *not* self-conscious in that we take 'the world' to exist independently of us, not seeing the way in which the mind itself has constructed the framework within which that idea is meaningful. That kind of introspective self-awareness is hardly prized by our consumerist culture.

Some people are aware of it, some are not. — J

Those who are, possess a finer sense of self-awareness than those who don't. It's called 'discriminative wisdom'.

The “I think” accompanies all our thoughts, says Kant. — J

...whatever judgements are made about the world, the mind provides the framework within which such judgements are meaningful. So though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. — Wayfarer

That 'implicit perspective' is the same as what Rödl argues for, I suspect, although I'm still taking it in.

Banno

Those who are, possess a finer sense of self-awareness than those who don't. It's called 'discriminative wisdom'. — Wayfarer

Hmm. I can think that I am thinking the Oak is dropping its leaves. Or I can think that the oak is dropping its leaves. Surely being able to either at will shows a higher degree of discrimination than those who are stuck only on "I think..." :wink:

Wayfarer

↪Banno

Yes, you can see it, and report accordingly, as a rational sentient being.

To be sure, there are no thoughts that could not be prefixed by "I think..."; but that is a very different point to the suggestion that all our thoughts are already prefixed by "I think...". — Banno

Right. And for Rödl (and I think Kant and Sartre) it isn't even a matter of "prefixed"; the "I think" is supposed to be structural or internal. That's why the question of whether this "I think" is experienced comes to the fore.

That there is a difference between a proposition and one's attitude towards that proposition - thinking it, believing it, asserting it, doubting it - is so ingrained that I have difficulty making sense of the alternatives. — Banno

Me too. It's almost like a phase shift, a new way of conceiving something that had always seemed obvious. Both Kimhi and Rödl are asking us to rethink what we thought we knew. The issue is difficult enough (and technical enough) to preclude just waving it away, though I wanted to when I started reading Kimhi.

What is the relationship of "p" and "I judge that [think/believe/propose etc.] p"? That's the most bare-bones way of posing the question.

I vote '1'. — Wayfarer

Yes, #1 has its attractions, but notice that, in its entirety, it commits us to the belief that the "I think" can be experienced. This may be hair-splitting, but the kind of self-awareness you're describing sounds less like an experience and more like an understanding, an enlightenment about what thought is. That would be closer to the spirit of #3, as I intended it. I wanted #3 to be the thoroughgoing transcendentalist position.

Wayfarer

↪J

Yes, agree! I didn’t read it carefully enough. I read one, and then four, but now you mention it, 3 hits the nail on the head.

Banno

...a new way of conceiving something... — J

New?

It's just (illocutionary force(predicate(subject)), what is done with the proposition, or Frege's judgement stroke.

But it remains that we can consider the propositional content apart from the judgement stroke.

Janus

3. The “I think” is not experienced at all. It is a condition of thought, a form of thought, in the same way that space and time are conditions of cognition. Self-consciousness, in Rödl’s sense, is built in to every thought, but not as a content that must be experienced.

4. If your report is accurate, then the thesis that “the ‛I think’ accompanies all our thoughts” has been proven wrong. — J

3. seems to be a post hoc judgement. Of course every thought is thought by me, because they are my thoughts, right? But what am I? It's like the cogito: I think therefore I exist—and further— I exist in every thought. But 'I' is really just another thought, even if some would like to paint it as the transcendental master thought if not as some substantive entity.

4. is right because there is no clear sense in which the so-called "I think" could be present in or inherent in every thought.

Wayfarer

It's almost like a phase shift, a new way of conceiving something that had always seemed obvious. Both Kimhi and Rödl are asking us to rethink what we thought we knew. — J

I probably should not leap into this breech, but I think I understand the meta-philosophical reason for this. I think it's linked to something which John Vervaeke calls 'participatory knowing':

Participatory Knowledge

Participatory knowledge is the knowledge of what it’s like to play a certain role in your environment or in relationships.

Vervaeke considers this to be the most profound of the four types of knowledge. It involves being in a deep, transformative relationship with the world, participating fully in something that is wider than you.

It is not just knowing about, but knowing through active engagement and transformation within specific contexts or environments. It shapes and is shaped by the interaction between the person and the world, influencing one’s identity and sense of belonging.

This kind of knowledge is experiential and co-creative, often seen in the dynamics of relationships, culture, and community participation.

With the advent of liberal individualism, the individual becomes 'atomised' and knowledge becomes increasingly propositional and procedural. The participatory nature of 'know-how' (Kant's 'practical reason?' Aristotle's 'phronesis'?) becomes occluded or reduced to the propositional. The existential dimension is obscured, an insight which is associated more with continental than analytic philosophy.

Mww

↪J

I offer only that 3 is the least wrong.

The reason for my choice is that Kant says “I think” must accompany all my representations (B133, in three separate translations), not my thoughts. Some representations are not thought but merely products of sensibility, re: phenomena.

Thought is “….cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions…”, conceptions are the representations of understanding. “I think” is not part of, nor is it necessary for, the synthesis by which thought is possible, but merely represents the consciousness that there can be one.

There’s a reason why “I think” is written that way when considering the systemic modus operandi, but not written that way when considered within a post hoc linguistic array.

But I know nothing of those other guys, so, there is that……

Kant says “I think” must accompany all my representations (B133, in three separate translations), not my thoughts. Some representations are not thought but merely products of sensibility, re: phenomena. — Mww

This is a good clarification. Do I think a representation? German-to-English may be an issue here. Kant uses the "I think" to structure all mental representations; Rödl probably means only propositions -- I say "probably" because I'm still in the middle of reading the book so there may be further discussion about that. (Note: Although Rödl is German, he appears to have written S-C & O in English. Anyone know if that's true?)

T Clark

I vote '1 — Wayfarer

The usual response to ‘1’ is “p and I think p and I think that I think p.”

...a new way of conceiving something...
— J
New?

It's just (illocutionary force(predicate(subject)), what is done with the proposition, or Frege's judgement stroke. — Banno

Well, the new way, if Kimhi and Rödl are on target, would deny the force/content distinction, as we know from that earlier thread about Thinking and Being. Another way of putting it: There is no way of stating p without stating p. Someone has to be doing the stating. Even reserving any judgment of p doesn't get you off the hook from having thought it, in some sense, to begin with.

In what sense, is the question. Are all propositions first-person propositions? Does it make a difference that a proposition can only occur as someone's thought? According to Kimhi, that makes a big difference in what "propositional content" means. Rödl looks to be going about the argument in a different way to get to the same place, but more of that later. For right now, let's just say that this possible "new way" is either genuinely new and useful, or a somewhat perverse misunderstanding about how logical language works. I am not sure, yet, which view is correct. Like you, like all of us, I'm super-trained in the "old way" -- which is enough to make me wonder if there's more to it.

↪T Clark

Meaning it's a regress, and therefore untenable?

T Clark

Meaning it's a regress, and therefore untenable? — J

Yes, that was my point. I don't get from the discussion where this "I think p" resides.

Mww

Do I think a representation? — J

I’m pretty sure the thesis says, not that we think them, but we think by means of them. Personally, I hold with the notion humans think in images, which are called representations, merely as a way to talk about what’s happening. I mean…we can’t express ourselves in image format, hence, we invent words in order to represent their fundamental composition or constituency objectively.

Anyway….that’s all I got.

Wayfarer

I know nothing of those other guys, so, there is that… — Mww

Sebastian Rödl is Professor of Practical Philosophy at Leipzig University and an advocate of absolute idealism, associated with G W Hegel:

“According to Hegel, being is ultimately comprehensible only as an all-inclusive whole (das Absolute). Hegel asserted that in order for the thinking subject (human reason or consciousness) to be able to know its object (the world) at all, there must be in some sense an identity of thought and being.”

Perhaps Rödl could be seen as resuscitating German idealism.

Philosophim

He calls this a confusion arising from our notation, and suggests, not entirely seriously, that we could devise a more accurate notation “that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think.” He interprets Kant as saying the same thing: for Kant, “the I think is not something thought alongside the thought that it accompanies, but internal to what is thought as such.” — J

This would be incorrect, as there are thinking things that do not have a sense of self. Kant really means, "I think, therefore I am." If one realizes they have a sense of self through thought, that is the very definition of self. Kant is not saying, "I think p, therefore p". He is stating "I think, therefore I am".

Wayfarer

there are thinking things that do not have a sense of self — Philosophim

Any examples come to mind?

Srap Tasmaner

3. The “I think” is not experienced at all. It is a condition of thought, a form of thought, in the same way that space and time are conditions of cognition. Self-consciousness, in Rödl’s sense, is built in to every thought, but not as a content that must be experienced. — J

I'd be reluctant to call this self-consciousness, but maybe ...

Imagine a slightly more schematic version: there's the tree, leaves falling from it, a great light on the far side of it. Until that light strikes another surface, there is no shadow. When it does strike another surface, the shadow is formed not just by the tree and the leaves falling, but also takes on the shape of the surface that hosts the shadow. If that surface is angled or curved or bumpy or fractured, so will the shadow be.

In this case, the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves is me-shaped. There was no thought until something passed from the tree to me, and if it had not found me, it would not be thought. Thoughts have such shapes, as shadows do. If you consider a shadow, and imaginatively remove it from its host, in the shape of the shadow there would be an impression of that host, just as there is an impression of the scene projecting the shadow. Since you are similar to me, a thought that fits me would come pretty close to fitting you.

But at the moment, it's me. So I would say I am implicated in the thought; it has my shape, after all. But is Rödl saying I am implicitly "aware" of this? Or is he only saying something like I've said, that besides the "content" of the thought ― like the projected shadow ― there is something like a form of the thought, and that form is of me?

fdrake

2. The “I think” is an experience of self-consciousness, and requires self-consciousness. When you say you are “not aware of it,” you are mistaken. But you can learn to identify the experience, and thus understand that you have been aware of it all along. — J

I'm not responding to your exact words, I'm responding to what I see as the construal of consciousness in it.

The construal of "I think" as a universal mental surveyor is an odd one. The mental image of it is that there's a bunch of sentential content bubbling up from/in the mind, some surveyor partitions it into A-OK and "dump it" - the latter of which is discarded somehow. The A-OK stuff gets labelled/willed as "I think", associated with the selfhood/subjectivity of that person, and that stuff can get asserted by that person. Call that account A.

Alternatively the "I think" is what takes mental/bodily gubbins and puts it in sentence form and filters it into A-OK and "dump it". Then the remainder of the first account holds of the sentence forms. Call that account B.

A and B have different qualitative characters, the A would be an experience similar to finding clarity in an encapsulation of an idea, B would be similar to having an idea or having a particularly arresting idea and discarding preformed bollocks at the same time.

The B would have an intentional object different from a sentence though, it's even hard to say the quale is affiliated with an intentional object

*

{well it probably has one, just it's directed toward an awareness of one's forming mental states, it's some noematic thingybob}

, as it's an experience of generating/forming a distinct sentence which could be thought and discarding others. The qualia associated with it are thus at best awareness of sentence fragments and fleeting perceptual impressions, being combined together into a more definite and unitary state.

So I think the latter form doesn't behave like the "I think" seems to, since "I think" has an implicit sentence placeholder which it would be directed toward, but the quale is associated with the genesis of what a state may be directed towards as part of the sentential content/sentence's emerging mental landscape.

I'm not sure the former construal makes much sense phenomenologically either, it's purportedly a state of universal meta-awareness of every part of one's state which has been flagged as assertible. I, personally, am just not aware of a cloud of sentences associated with environmental objects and my own thoughts. The majority of my meta-awareness is perceptual rather than sentential, and the parts of it which are linguistic are more broadly narrative than declarative. The thing which makes "I think" as a form of self consciousness implausible to me is its scope, and the image of awareness it has - I'm just not constantly experiencing sentences.

Though when I'm writing, like this post, there might be a quale similar to the fragments stitching themselves together. But I wouldn't call the state of awareness in it exclusively directed toward a sentence like "I think" construes, the overall directedness of the state is toward the expression of an idea rather than a particular sentence, the sentences are more like a vehicle for it

**

{I say "it" like I know what it is before I write it, and that I've been expressing the same ideas throughout the post, and not getting off track or changing my conception under the hood through the whole post}

Moreover, if "I think" was required for self consciousness, it would be odd, right? Because some animals are definitely aware of themselves but don't have language. And not all aspects of one's self awareness are sentence-y and intention-y to begin with. Like sensations, I'm aware of them but I'm not typically directing my consciousness toward them.

RussellA

Or is there another response that seems better? — J

The easiest solution is that I am what I think, in that "I" am my thoughts. None of 1 to 4 apply.

I am neither external nor internal to my thoughts, nor accompany my thoughts, in that I am my thoughts. If I had no thoughts, "I" would not exist. "I" could not exist if I had no thoughts.

"I" am the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Our subjective thoughts "I think p" cannot be about objective facts "p", as objective facts are unknowable, and are in Kant's terms, unknowable things-in-themselves. P, that an oak tree is shedding its leaves, exists in the mind as a thought, where "I" am the thought p.

This idea goes back to at least Aristotle's Material Cause, where, for example, if a table is made of wood, the wood is the Material cause of the table. The wood is neither internal nor external nor accompanies the table, but rather the table is wood.

Similarly, what is being thought about is the Material Cause of the thought. A thought is neither external nor internal nor accompanies what is being thought about, but rather the thought is what is being thought about.

I am what I think.

Patterner

↪RussellA

So then is the question "Can you think A and B at the same time?" rather than "Can you be A and B at the same time?"?

“Sorry, but I don’t have this experience. When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ Please don’t misunderstand me as saying that I’ve never had such a thought, or wouldn’t know what it was to experience such a thought. There are indeed circumstances under which I may additionally reflect ‛And I am thinking thought p at this moment’ or ‛Thought p is my thought’ or ‛I judge that p’. But I disagree that this characterizes my experience of thinking in general.” — J

A cat is thinking about the leaves falling off the tree as it playfully leaps up to attack them as they're falling. But I do not believe a cat is capable of thinking about thinking about the leaves falling off the tree. That's a different level of thought, of which cats are not capable. (I don't know terminology. Levels? Kinds? Types?)

Is this an example of nested thoughts? Is it possible to think ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ without thinking ‛The oak tree is shedding its leaves.’? The words are actually in the sentence, after all. The higher level thought cannot exist without the lower level thought. How would I know the difference between ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ and ‛I think that the chair is broken.’ if I wasn't thinking the lower level thought within the higher level thought?

However, i also understand the difference. And i agree with Pat. Even if I can't think the higher level thought without the lower level though, I can think the lower level thought without the higher.

Mww

↪Wayfarer

Schelling,1795, was right, in saying “…thinking is not my thinking…”, insofar as thinking, in and of itself, is the systemic modus operandi of human intelligence, whereas my thinking is merely to represent that system in some specific metaphysical form. Kant, on the other hand, left all that as a unbespoken superfluous necessity with respect to his brand new paradigm-shifting metaphysical doctrine incorporating pinpoint focus on abstract subjective conditions.

At the time, of course, there being no proper science regarding the matter, the natural philosophical progression centered around the relative emptiness of the Kantian “transcendental subject”, simply referenced as “I”, and upon which is constructed an arguably unjustified theoretical system, itself centered around the related Cartesian cogito.

“…. Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation “I” which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this “I,” or “He,” or “It,” who or which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception….” (A346/B404)

From there it’s an easy jump to absolute idealism as a logical consequence, insofar as the concept-which-isn’t-a-concept, transcendental subject, doesn’t help us with what we really want to know.

But then, it’s reallyreallyREALLY hard to substitute an allegedly phantasmic transcendental subject, with a (gaspsputterchoke)…..phenomenological spirit.

Anyway, typically me, I’ve said more than the simple “thanks for the info” obliged.

RussellA

So then is the question "Can you think A and B at the same time?" rather than "Can you be A and B at the same time?"? — Patterner

As you say:

I can think the lower level thought without the higher. — Patterner

The lower level thought is "the oak tree is shedding its leaves". Let A be "the oak tree" and let B be "is shedding its leaves"

Then yes, one can think A and B at the same time.

Because if you only thought A, "the oak tree", then you couldn't have the thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", and if you only thought B, "is shedding its leaves", then also you couldn't have the thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

To have the thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" requires thinking about not only "the oak tree" but also "is shedding its leaves" at the same time.

Patterner

↪RussellA

And then there's the added "I think..." Which raises it to a different (what I'm calling) level. Whereas "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is a combination of two lower level thoughts.

p and "I think p"

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