In the cause of physical brains, the brain state will be the configuration required to instantiate non-physical mental content. — Mark Nyquist

Not what I had in mind. The philosophical question is, how could you account for propostional content in terms of brain-states. The brain-mind identity theorists hold that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. It's a complicated subject in philosophy of mind (Stanford article).

One line of argument against that is a variation of what is known as 'the argument from reason'. This says that, whatever we understand 'brain states' to be, if we are arguing that they are physical in nature, then they're incommensurable with propositional content (incommensurable meaning not able to be judged by the same standards; having no common standard of measurement.) Why? Because propositional content is wholly dependent on the relationship of ideas and if-then statements - if this is the case, then that is so. Any arguments relying on rational inference or logical syllogisms make use of something like this, and are instances of logical necessity - that is [x] is the case, then it must also be that [y]. But physical causation is of a different order to logical necessity. This is the subject of this thread from about a year ago.

Back on the topic of monism - I'm convinced that the original monist systems were derived from 'the unitive vision' in, for example, Plotinus. It is a fact that the word 'Cosmos' means 'ordered whole', and it was the conviction of many pre-modern cultures that the Universe functions as an ordered whole. Cosmology began as an attempt to conceive of the nature of that order. But the prospects of seeing the universe as an ordered whole in our day and age are very slight indeed, what with the multiverse conjecture and the realisation of the inconceivable vastness of the Universe. Maybe is beyond the intellectual powers of anyone to imagine the cosmos in those terms any more. 'All the kings horses and all the kings men, couldn't put Humpty together again.'

.. informed by modern information / computational theory. I stand by my earlier dismissal of Aristotle's cosmological argument as a pedantic aside by you, MU, that misses Fooloso4's conceptually salient forest for your anachronistic trees. — 180 Proof

I think you got lost in mixed metaphors Rig Hand (I hope you don't mind me calling you that). An anachronistic tree cannot be part of the modern day forest. So the fault is really Fooloso4's who tries to fit the anachronistic tree into the modern day forest, and in so doing kills the tree. Regardless of how conceptually salient Fooloso4's forest is, it only consists of pretend trees which are really dead, so it's all imaginary.

Back on the topic of monism - I'm convinced that the original monist systems were derived from 'the unitive vision' in, for example, Plotinus. — Wayfarer

Yes, I think there was a form of Neo-Platonism which denied the reality of matter, making it monist idealism. I don't think Plotinus would quite fit that bill though. But I think monism was prevalent in philosophy before this, Parmenides being monist idealist (all is being), and Heraclitus being monist materialist (all is flux).

The argument against it is that it somehow has to posit that these neuological states are at once physical and semantic, i.e. meaning-encoding. — Wayfarer

If microphysical entities can be both particle and wave why could not neurological states be both physical and semantic. Perhaps your unexamined preconceived notion of what it means to be physical is blinding you to the possibility.or perhaps it just doesn't suit you to believe suvh a thing is possible.

The wave particle duality may well be an heuristic device, but anyway, doesn’t have any bearing.

It has a bearing because things can actually be, counter intuitively, two things that seem incompatible. Do you think your intuitive preconceptions about how things must be are the last word on how things actually are?

Do you think your intuitive preconceptions about how things must be are the last word on how things actually are? — Janus

I actually offered an argument, not an 'intuitive preconception'. If you would like to address the argument, then I might respond.

If you point me to the argument, I'll be glad to address it, even though "might respond" does not sound very promising, and I dislike expending effort for nothing.

One line of argument against that is a variation of what is known as 'the argument from reason'. This says that, whatever we understand 'brain states' to be, if we are arguing that they are physical in nature, then they're incommensurable with propositional content (incommensurable meaning not able to be judged by the same standards; having no common standard of measurement.) Why? Because propositional content is wholly dependent on the relationship of ideas and if-then statements - if this is the case, then that is so. Any arguments relying on rational inference or logical syllogisms make use of something like this, and are instances of logical necessity - that is [x] is the case, then it must also be that [y]. But physical causation is of a different order to logical necessity. — Wayfarer

That neural states are causality-driven and/ or exclusively causality driven is an assumption which cannot be tested empirically, and that also does not involve a logical contradiction. Another point is that even though causality and propositionality (or causes and reasons) might seem incommensurable to us that can be, as Spinoza says, on account of looking at the one thing from two different incommensurable perspectives and may not reflect on the nature of physical processes, but rather on our naive understanding of them, or our dualistic "either/ or" kind of thinking.

But the challenge is, how can any kind of 'either/or' thinking or logical argument, in general, be explained in terms of the kinds of physical causation that characterises brain states? What I was challenging was the assertion that:

In the cause of physical brains, the brain state will be the configuration required to instantiate non-physical mental content. — Mark Nyquist

So, how to validate that statement is what is at issue. How do you think you could ascertain the empirical fact of that statement, on the basis of neuroscience.

But the challenge is, how can any kind of 'either/or' thinking or logical argument, in general, be explained in terms of the kinds of physical causation that characterises brain states? — Wayfarer

Well, it can't if the nature of our thinking makes it impossible to explain. It does not follow that because we cannot explain it, it must be impossible.

In the cause of physical brains, the brain state will be the configuration required to instantiate non-physical mental content.
— Mark Nyquist

So, how to validate that statement is what is at issue. How do you think you could ascertain the empirical fact of that statement, on the basis of neuroscience. — Wayfarer

I don't think we can, with the present state of our knowledge and understanding, validate that statement either.

Oh, ok. Promissory materialism, then.

Another point is that even though causality and propositionality (or causes and reasons) might seem incommensurable to us that can be, as Spinoza says, on account of looking at the one thing from two different incommensurable perspectives and may not reflect on the nature of physical processes, but rather on our naive understanding of them, or our dualistic "either/ or" kind of thinking. — Janus

:up: :up:

Promissory materialism, then. — Wayfarer

Well, they don't cash counterfeit idealism at my local bank. :smirk:

Right, it seems that both sides of the argument, both positions, are promissory. People adopt them on account of what seems most plausible to them, but as I keep saying, that will depend on what one's own set of unargued premises or presuppositions are. That's why I don't take a position on it, although to be honest I lean towards physicalism, since I believe physics is the closest thing, we have to being a pertinent source of information regarding the ultimate constitution of what-is.

People adopt them on account of what seems most plausible to them, but as I keep saying, that will depend on what one's own set of unargued premises or presuppositions are. — Janus

Not unargued. The argument is that logical necessity can't be accounted for in terms of physical causation as a matter of principle.

Yes but that speaks to our thinking, not to what-is. We already know that thinking in terms of causes and thinking in terms of reasons cannot be made commensurable with one another at this stage of our understanding; I can't imagine anyone claiming that they are. So if that is acknowledged, as it should be since it seems unarguable, it will depend on what conclusions, if any, you draw from that fact.

You seem to be pressing some point of logic that I don't see as relevant.

Maybe explaining my method would help. For some problems you can start with initial conditions and work all the way through to the end point. In philosophy we have this problem where we know something about our physical world but we inhabit a mental world. I think my best effort is placed in starting at the ends and working to the middle to find a solution.

I mentioned a couple days ago about the irrational number pi being an example of something immaterial that we encounter.

So pi doesn't physically exist but there is a history of mathematicians finding it's value to more and more decimal points (accuracy, fractional value). To me it seems like a good example of were physical brains and the immaterial meet. Of course the immaterial does not exist but also pi is not dependent on some preexisting state of brains either. It has to be discovered.

My guess to find pi was to use isosceles triangles but then I looked it up and it's not so easy. The first to do this used polygons but no trig or calculus. They made slow progress. And just to remind ourselves, trig values and pi are fixed relative to each other so you need to know one or the other first. You can't just calculate pi if you don't have the trig values.

Isaac Newton made the most progress on pi but you need to check that yourself. I've just read it for the first time. Of course, calculus methods and a few original tricks, I think.

Anyway. I'm critical of Monism that only goes so far and doesn't get into the environment that brains operate in, such as advanced maths.

Since Monism, as it exists on this forum, has failed to provide any coherent theory of information, a test of functionality should by applied.

Something like the ability to derive pi could be used.

Human brains can derive pi and I consider that a demonstration of the ability to hold, process and apply information.

So if deriving pi is the litmus test, then human brains pass.

Shannon information fails.

DNA information fails.

Quantum information fails.

Information as energy fails.

This actually makes things easier for the Monism model to deal with. No longer do you have multiple definitions of information but only one.
At this point, Monism only has the single problem of how brains do it.

Since Monism, as it exists on this forum, has failed to provide any coherent theory of information, a test of functionality should by applied.
Something like the ability to derive pi could be used. — Mark Nyquist

Monism is the belief that the variety of things in the world can be traced back to a single Origin or Substance or Cause. That is exactly what the Enformationism thesis attempts to do. The First Cause in that case is, not a person, place, or thing, but the creative power to enform. Presumably, it is empowered to create both material forms, such as stars, planets & rocks; and immaterial forms, such as rational minds --- from the same original source : Unrealized Potential. Since UP is not something that we experience in the real world, we can only conjecture about it. That's what Plato & Aristotle did with their First Cause (creator) and Prime Mover (causal energy) theories. It's something to think about, but being un-real, any such Monistic Origin cannot be scientifically-proven to exist, only philosophically shown to be plausible.

One "functional test" of such an un-real (ideal) Potential --- ability to create from scratch*1 (perhaps even via the gradual evolutionary process of en-formation*2) --- is the emergence of creatures that are more than just material real objects, but also immaterial ideal minds. And the primary function of a Mind is to see what is not obvious to the physical eye. For instance, the mathematical function PI is not a thing, but a relationship between two ways of measuring circular objects : circumferences & diameters. Any animal with eyes can see round objects. But perfect circles & circumferences & diameters are invisible to the eye. So the irrational ratio we call PI is only apparent to rational minds. How could such an abstract function arise from a merely material origin? :nerd:

*1. Create from scratch :
from the beginning, without using anything that already exists
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/from-scratch

*2. Enformation :
to form (fashion ; create) something new from something old, or from unrealized potential

This actually makes things easier for the Monism model to deal with. No longer do you have multiple definitions of information but only one.
At this point, Monism only has the single problem of how brains do it. — Mark Nyquist

One definition of Monism is "a theory or doctrine that denies the existence of a distinction or duality in some sphere, such as that between matter and mind, or God and the world". If there is no ultimate distinction between Matter & Mind, then the duality we conceive must be missing some essence that is the same in both aspects of the world. In the Enformationism thesis, that ultimate essence is the power to create from scratch : to Enform (to give Actual form to formless Potential). We get glimpses of that creative power in : a> information as Energy ; DNA information ; Quantum information ; and Shannon information*3. All are capable of transforming one thing into another : Energy into Mass ; DNA into proteins ; Quantum fields of potential into actual particles of matter ; and meaningless Shannon information (data) into meaningful concepts (ideas) in human minds.

Monism is a holistic philosophical problem, not a reductive scientific project. So, the "how" of Monism is not subject to empirical evidence; only theoretical argument*4. In the Enformationism thesis the single definition of Monism is "The Power to Enform". :smile:

*3. Multiple definitions of Information :
Knowledge ; Intelligence ; meaning ; Energy ; DNA ; Qbits ; Shannon data ; Deacon "causal absence" ;
Note --- "Shannon information is not a semantic item: semantic items, such as meaning, reference or representation, are not amenable of quantification." https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10911/1/What_is_Shannon_Information.pdf

*4. How does Information transform Matter into Mind? By the reverse of Energy into Mass. In that case, Mind is not a physical Thing (brain), but a non-physical Power (potential) : to conceive of immaterial Ideas from experience with Real material objects.