My point is, that when there is no one who has to born, there is no one who has to suffer.
— Antinatalist

This is where I’m curious. This is stating the obvious. Why are you focused on the ‘suffering’ though? Why do you think this justifies stating it is ‘bad’/‘wrong’ to have children. This really doesn’t make sense to me.

It is the parents choice. It is neither ‘right’ nor ‘wrong’. I can certainly imagine individual situations where circumstances may shift someone’s perspective though. — I like sushi

I agree with David Benatar with his asymmetry argument. If not having a child will prevent some good to happen for the child, it is neutral. It is not bad, because she/he will not exist. And if somebody will never exist, I can´t see we have obligation as a giving a life for a future possible child. But if someone is going to have a child and her/his life is bad, it is a bad thing and her/his parents are at least partly responsible for that. (I don´t want to mock too much parents, because I believe, after all, most of them want to good things happen for their child. And on the other hand, people are strongly affected by evolution and selfish gene. It doesn´t make having a child right, but those things make it quite understandable).

You might say for that your crossing the road -example. Suffering is part of life, and some choices prevent suffering here and might add suffering there. All suffering ain´t so bad, but some definitely is.
Fundamental difference of having a child and that crossing the road -example is that if it´s your life, cross the road or don´t, but having a child is deciding for other person´s life, without her/his consent.
Other difference is that non-existing creature does not have to make choices between bigger and smaller risks.

I understand that at times life seems terrible.

A parent who actually thinks about these things and decides to have a child is taking a risk to some degree. Most/any parents will tell you that they want to better themselves for their child. The child also reaps this benefit. It is more of a win win situation than a use use situation.

It is ‘right’ - in terms of ‘selfish’? I don’t think that measures up tbh. In terms of anthropology and modern society children were certainly ‘used’ to look after parents and such in old age. Child mortality was high too. Do we have the right to bring children into the world … sure, as much as we have the right to walk, pee and eat. — I like sushi

That is natural way to think. But you do not provide very convincing arguments for this. In matter of fact not a one.

If life is valued/celebrated (as it is by myself and yourself) then I don’t see how arguing that we have an obligation to nurture life as any worse of an argument. I don’t believe either is ‘better’ - so to speak - because I’m some kind of absurdist I guess. — I like sushi

I value life, but it is not just about life, it is highly about the existing, living person who lives that life.
And this existing person is highly valuable.

I guess all this boils down to is you must think more people suffer a substantial amount more in their lives than those who don’t AND that such suffering is intrinsically ‘bad’. I admit that last part sounds weird because ‘suffering’ isn’t generally thought of as ‘good’, but I mean something more like the use of suffering to fortify yourself for future misfortunes.

A would imagine if we could do a worldwide survey and ask every single human if they wished they’d never been born we’d find those who said ‘yes’ would likely live in a more ‘privileged’ demographic. Who knows though? I would expect most would prefer to have had a life than none at all. — I like sushi

If you are right - and let´s exclude human factor, Pollyanna principle, the ultimate empirical non-possibility to compare non-life and life (you can grab this topic if  you want, I´ve been thinking about that aspect for three decades) - that sounds utilitarian to me. And I don´t think it´s an ethical theory at all.

Why is life valuable is kind of a ouroboros. Absurdism it generally where I go.

That´s how people usually think, that it's parents´ choice. But that doesn't make it right.
— Antinatalist

As stated above. Circumstance will lean people more one way than the other. It isn’t right or wrong, any more than being hungry is right or wrong, it is just the state of affairs of humans living a life. We have moved beyond more, how should I put it, more ‘animalistic’ tendencies … or rather we’ve imbued ourselves with certain psychological restraints. I think, for the most part, we’ve learnt to make life better.

I would like to emphasise that a life without suffering (as stated by someone previously) is more cruel than a life with suffering because life requires hardships and strains, humans basically need to strive forward like Sisyphus in order to inhabit what we loosely refer to as ‘meaning’. — I like sushi

Let´s assume you are right on that. I simply can´t think any cruel acts/things etc., which does not involve suffering, which makes your assertion kind of absurd.
But let´s still assume that I am wrong on that. If you mean some suffering will prevent some other suffering (like a boxer, who will strengthen his/her abdominals that he/she will not tear apart when facing body punches in a real fight).
But that doesn't answer the question, why there have to be life in the first place.

Your new comment above about stakes being so high for a new life. This doesn’t add up if you agree that life is valuable and that suffering is a necessary part of life (from my perspective this doesn’t add up at least).

What stakes are high? The chance of suffering? Suffering is inevitable. Life (you agree?) is valuable. Is the value of life to you determined purely by the amount of suffering involved? — I like sushi

Stakes are high, when making decision for someone else's life, like I said before.
The suffering is inevitable, I agree with you on that. And some of it is just horrible. I mentioned before that I value life, but an essential factor from which perhaps all value springs is the person existing, the one who lives the life.
Like I said one previous post, I think life can have also negative value (and those, who support euthanasia agree with me on that). But the right to end will belong only to the one who lives, it´s her/his life and other people should respect her/his sovereignty.
At suffering, I don´t value purely by the amount of its suffering; but to some degree it certainly correlates. Essential other factors are how the suffering person reacts to suffering, and how she/he can affect the situation and what are her/his possibilities, and also are there some good, balancing things (I never said that good could not balance the bad to at some degree (to someone who have already born), and the good/bad -balance is different in this kind of situation than having a child, when there have not be the bad in the first place. My point of view is also that preventing harm is greater value than bringing happiness).

My throw away comment about buddhism and nihilism is an obscure view of mine. Fro what I can tell they are two extremes of the same beast. The nihilist perspective expected more from life and then ended up staring down into the abyss. The ‘buddhist’ (loose term) expected nothing of life and stare out of the abyss. Both essentially view the world through the lens of suffering and pain. — I like sushi

And both live in this world.

Striving is good. Striving requires ‘suffering’. Life requires suffering. Bringing life into the world is for gods/whatever, we merely exist and strive hoping for more tomorrow. Unfounded hope? Possibly … I’d rather not gamble when the stakes are so high (ie. the ‘value’ I habour in life).

Anyway, thanks for persisting. Not sure if you can offer up much more but hope you surprise me. I’m a pessimist so I’m always happy with what comes my way because I’ve learnt to expect far worse :D — I like sushi

I don´t know am I pessimist, optimist or something between. Maybe I haven't decided yet.

So now you say that there is no need for content in your case. But you need a "yes" as to bring someone in life?? So you want it all your way! Cool!
So it's OK to take a "no" answer granted but not OK to take a "yes" for granted. Nice whatever suits your arguments better. — dimosthenis9

You cannot GET content!! And that's the point of the Benatarian asymmetry (look it up if you have to).. When someone is not born, there is no one to be "deprived" of happiness. Only creating them would create this situation. But what is good is no person is suffering. Yay.

Cause that harm that you keep mention might be way less than happy moments. Who told you that the unborn kid wouldn't want to come to life as to even experience that?? You just suppose that it wouldn't cause that's what fit your arguments better. Well no it's not the case at all though. — dimosthenis9

The problem with your argument is no one would be around to be deprived if they weren't born. No one is sitting there feeling deprived in the realm of unborn. However, certainly it is good no one has been harmed, collateral or otherwise.

To recognize that?! That existing harms everyone!?!Are you serious really??
No way! I would never recognize such a lame statement. Cause you believe life is an endless suffering that doesn't mean that everyone thinks the same! — dimosthenis9

I didn't say "endless suffering" just that everyone experiences non-trivial harm. Though, yes, I also think (as a less evidentiary case) that burdens and impositions on people are always wrong, even if someone reports that they post-facto were okay with it. I actually consider that as part of the non-trivial harms as there is a force of limited choices which makes "going along with the game" the only option other than suicide or very sub-optimal choices (depredation and free riding). Anyways, that specific example is much more in depth than simply the need to not want to create conditions of unnecessary harm for others. That's all that's needed. That, and understanding that no ONE suffers by not experiencing happiness (if there is no "they" to be born in the first place).

And at the very end how the fuck you know that in all humanity existence there was not even one person who had that kind of charming life?!?! — dimosthenis9

Yep, so you are hanging your argument on this guy?

The most possible thing is that there have been more than one!! It is statistical impossible not even one to existed!
And I told you that I don't even support my arguments in that extreme cases(which STILL exist though)!! — dimosthenis9

Even Buddha suffered before Enlightenment :D.

It's only enough in your mind. — dimosthenis9

Anyone can agree or disagree with an ethical argument. As my meta-ethical statement said from the beginning... Ethics can never be evidently "right" from simply the course of logic or conclusion. It may be right, but I can never definitively point to it in the universe.

It's statistically impossible as not even one case(for sure not only one) to exist throughout humanity's history.
And guess what? Even that rare cases make your theory totally invalid!
Not only that of course, but one more reason that make your position irrational. — dimosthenis9

Ah, so looking for that diamond in the rough I see. As long as one case of a charmed life exists, all other unnecessary harm is permissible. Please. Rather this is more your burden in the argument. That is to say, unless every life is charmed, then it would not be permissible. Not even close to that, let alone all.

You explained and I didn't agree at all. So let's drop it. — dimosthenis9

You didn't explain why happiness is morally obligatory, more so than preventing harm is morally obligatory in this situation of procreation (not after born as that situation may change things). That's your core argument, is it not?

You cannot GET content!! — schopenhauer1

That's exactly what makes it a NO moral matter at all. Cause you expect a content from a Non existing creature! A 0!You just can't do that. Impossible. So it's totally parents choice. And not a moral issue at all. You just can't accept that simple thing.

However, certainly it is good no one has been harmed, collateral or otherwise. — schopenhauer1

Not even letting kids experience life but to prefer not to start it at all IS bad in my eyes! You deprive them from an amazing experience! Even if you see only suffering in life.

Yep, so you are hanging your argument on this guy? — schopenhauer1

It's just one more reason that cancels your theory. Whether you like it or not.
I presented here many others too:

1.the way you measure harm and happiness
2.the harm you create into already living parents by depriving them the joy of having the kid for shake of the "potential" harm of a non existing creature.
3.the irrational outcome of your theory that is to end humanity existence.
4.that the unborn kid has no choice! So it simply isn't a moral matter for parents!!
5.that the unjust issue that you protest giving to someone life without asking him is equalized for me with the suicide option each individual has.

So please please, don't tell me that I just hang my argument there,when your argument is only one. But you know why you insist so much on that latest argument?? Cause these exact rare cases make the ONLY argument that you keep repeating (the non trivia harm one) totally invalid simply!! That's why you stuck in it! Cause it makes it even more obvious how false it is. It exposes it.

Whether you like it or not your only one argument of non trivial is so weak that could never apply and cover all possible cases. Whether you like it or not! Simply can't.

That's your core argument, is it not? — schopenhauer1

We exchanged all these posts and you still ask me if that's my core argument?? I wrote you for last time above some of my already presented arguments.
Sorry I can't add anything else into that discussion. I feel we keep repeating the same things. It doesn't make sense anymore. So I am out . Thanks for your time.

That's exactly what makes it a NO moral matter at all. Cause you expect a content from a Non existing creature! A 0!You just can't do that. Impossible. So it's totally parents choice. And not a moral issue at all. You just can't accept that simple thing. — dimosthenis9

We already covered this. If the parent was choosing to have a child in a known horrible condition, is this permissible? of course not. Not all morality is off the table because a person does not exist yet. What you can't accept is there is an asymmetry for that future child. A harm is prevented which is good, whether it exists or not. The fact that someone could have been harmed but was not, is the moral act. The fact that someone could have experienced happiness but did not, matters not. Harm is always what matters for the moral decision. We are not obligated to make happy people from scratch.

Not even letting kids experience life but to prefer not to start it at all IS bad in my eyes! You deprive them from an amazing experience! Even if you see only suffering in life. — dimosthenis9

You deprive no one from nothing. You don't get that? No one is deprived, that is the point. Deprived happiness seems to depend on someone existing to care. Prevented harms though seems to be universally a good thing. In other words, harm seems to be weighted more than happiness in procreative moral decisions. Not having happiness is NEITHER good nor bad (if a person is not around to be affected by the deprivation). Not having unnecessary, non-trivial harm is ALWAYS good (even if there is no person affected.. the very fact of prevented harm is good).

2.the harm you create into already living parents by depriving them the joy of having the kid for shake of the "potential" harm of a non existing creature. — dimosthenis9

Does it matter if someone gets happiness from something that unintentionally or ignorantly is creating harms for others? Happiness derived from (even ignorant understanding of) someone else's harm, is not an excuse to cause the harm.

.the irrational outcome of your theory that is to end humanity existence. — dimosthenis9

As someone else was saying, humanity is not a target for morality, other actual persons are.

.that the unborn kid has no choice! So it simply isn't a moral matter for parents!! — dimosthenis9

Creating situations of harm for others forces the situation to be a moral one. At least, if not "moral" than value-based.

that the unjust issue that you protest giving to someone life without asking him is equalized for me with the suicide option each individual has. — dimosthenis9

I am actually not presenting the consent theory though I support it too. So, I think your suicide idea is the worst excuse actually. It's like forcing someone into a game and then saying, "You can always kill yourself!" (cue maniacal laughter).

Tried to keep it short and answer in order:

I agree with David Benatar with his asymmetry argument. — Antinatalist

Maybe I only understand the surface details. On the surface it looks overly simplistic. I'm even slightly convinced by it. If you could indulge me and explain it further than the not this then x not that then y (or is that all there is to it? I hope not).

I'm interested by your view of what 'consent' means here. All living people can kill themselves. Non-existing people cannot choose to exist nor can they argue for 'lack of consent' because they don't exist. You come to exist by the acts of others (right or wrong doesn't seem to have much of a place here does it?). Once you're born you are nurtured and grow, without consent. I do think children should be given more freedom to choose when younger (specifically in education), but this would have to be a global phenomenon so in actuality such a revolution in education would be hard to impliment (not that I'm against attempts ... even though they may very well lead to worsening the situation).

Anyway, you seem to have a different use of the term 'consent'. If you can explain further it might help. I don't see how 'consent' has any application to things/people that don't exist. Neither do I think parents ask for consent to raise their children ... that would be quite strange.

Fundamental difference of having a child and that crossing the road -example is that if it´s your life, cross the road or don´t, but having a child is deciding for other person´s life, without her/his consent.
Other difference is that non-existing creature does not have to make choices between bigger and smaller risks. — Antinatalist

As stated above you'll have to explain how you're using 'consent' for a non-existing being? It doesn't make sense to me. Also, non-existing creatures don't have to make choices implies they can make choices. They cannot make choices. Subtle aspects of language can sneak in unsuspecting ideas without notice (the two meanings of 'don't have to' is one of these cases). I assume you meant cannot btw but such things can make a difference to someone's perspective :)

That is natural way to think. But you do not provide very convincing arguments for this. In matter of fact not a one. — Antinatalist

I'm not here to present any argument to say that bring life into the world is 'better'/'good'. It's your position that's up for debate right? I have discussed ethics elsewhere with points I find to be of more import. I've yet to be convinced this is a matter of much import to my view but I'm intrigued.

I value life, but it is not just about life, it is highly about the existing, living person who lives that life.
And this existing person is highly valuable. — Antinatalist

Sounds like you're refusing to call an Orange an Orange and instead refer to it as a Round Fruit. I fnot I don't quite get this. I'm not trying to catch you out just want to understand what these terms mean for you. What is the difference between a person existing and a person living? Is a person living more important than a bird or plant living? Do those questions matter to your position? (if not ignore).

Regarding Pollyanna principle I do have some thoughts there but they're based on empirical evidence and neurological studies.

Basically we know that humans are 'wired' to be optimistic. We also have good evidence (psychological not neurological last time I looked) that we feel worse about loss more than we feel about a gain - hence humanity's general aversion to 'loss'. I think these items kind of do something to balance out our attitudes towards ideas/concepts ot 'pleasure'/'pain'.

Note: referring back to David Benatar I'd have to grasp his use of the terms 'pain' and 'pleasure'. I think viewing something as 'absence' of is perhaps related to the above^^

You've mentioned 'utilitarian' twice in quick succession now. You have problems with that perspective? If so what are they (beyond the obvious)?

Let´s assume you are right on that. I simply can´t think any cruel acts/things etc., which does not involve suffering, which makes your assertion kind of absurd.
But let´s still assume that I am wrong on that. If you mean some suffering will prevent some other suffering (like a boxer, who will strengthen his/her abdominals that he/she will not tear apart when facing body punches in a real fight).
But that doesn't answer the question, why there have to be life in the first place. — Antinatalist

For reference ASSUME I am right that it is neither right nor wrong. If that is the assumption there is no argument is there? To be clear I view 'right' and 'wrong' as situational. Sitting on a chair could be right or wrong (highly) in various situations and extremities. By choosing, or through happenstance, we 'have' children I don't see this as starting from a position of justification. the justification comes in the choice to have children or in the choosing not to have a child that is expected/possibility in the future.

I have no issue with questioning the why/how/what of the sitiuation. It is not a one size fits all thing though. I would not travel back in time and tell some peasant to have less children to avoid burdening their offspring with pain and suffering and to suffer more themselves in the longrun in both terms of personal and family striving (not necessarily 'happiness' which is certainly a whole other topic worthy of consideration ... I just find 'happy' to be a little off). I'm sur eyou're familiar with De Botton in this area. He has some nice ways of conveying these things, but I'm not by any means completely in agreement with everythign he says.

WHy we have life in the first place? I don't think it is a 'why?' question tbh. In the same light I don't understand the 'why?' in the 'consent' and having childrenfalls into the 'why?' category either. All questions are 'what?' underneath. Reframing such 'whys' as 'whats' in numerous ways can help pick apart the underlying mechinations .. sometimes! :D

Stakes are high, when making decision for someone else's life, like I said before. — Antinatalist

Before they are born they have no life. Bringing a life into the world doesn't require what we colloquially refer to as 'consent'. This seems to be a running theme so I'll wait for your explanation of 'consent' in the terms you mean it to be used.

Like I said one previous post, I think life can have also negative value (and those, who support euthanasia agree with me on that). But the right to end will belong only to the one who lives, it´s her/his life and other people should respect her/his sovereignty. — Antinatalist

Agreed. But again ... there are 'cirumcstances' that can alter these things. I'm not for a one size fit sall attitude. The individual case is, correct me if I'm wrong, far more important than a universal 'law' for singular people (ie. killing someone in a crazed murderous frenzy for the sake of saving others is not 'bad' but it doesn't make killing 'good'). My ethical view is about the unwilling need to explore the extreme fringes of our natures, but it is dangerous so I am not impelled to 'recommend' it for any/everyone.

But the right to end will belong only to the one who lives, it´s her/his life and other people should respect her/his sovereignty. — Antinatalist

To what degree does a newborn possess 'sovereignty'? In terms of consciousness and being a fully enough fledged human being? Again, this is certainly where the whole abortion debarcle emits something wonderful about humanity. We care about it - right or wrong - and that is human. I like humans ... mostly on an individual basis though :D

At suffering, I don´t value purely by the amount of its suffering; but to some degree it certainly correlates. — Antinatalist

Good. And I agree. It is a singular perspective to consider amoungst others. I'm inclined - for various manifest reasons - to favour some perspectives over others and undoubtedly delude myself to some degree ... such is life :) Currently here guarding against delusions but not because delusions are necessarily 'bad' I just favour lessening them to some healthy degree ... I hope! ;)

My point of view is also that preventing harm is greater value than bringing happiness — Antinatalist

I don't see the intrinsic difference between reduction of 'pain' and reduction of 'happiness' ... (see above: I await your explanation, but at least I think we've found a major point of confusion!).

Tried to keep it short and answer in order:

I agree with David Benatar with his asymmetry argument.
— Antinatalist

Maybe I only understand the surface details. On the surface it looks overly simplistic. I'm even slightly convinced by it. If you could indulge me and explain it further than the not this then x not that then y (or is that all there is to it? I hope not). — I like sushi

I will quote David Benatar:

"Benatar argues that bringing someone into existence generates both good and bad experiences, pain and pleasure, whereas not doing so generates neither pain nor pleasure. The absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. Therefore, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation.

Benatar raises four other related asymmetries that he considers quite plausible:

We have a moral obligation not to create unhappy people and we have no moral obligation to create happy people. The reason why we think there is a moral obligation not to create unhappy people is that the presence of this suffering would be bad (for the sufferers) and the absence of the suffering is good (even though there is nobody to enjoy the absence of suffering). By contrast, the reason we think there is no moral obligation to create happy people is that although their pleasure would be good for them, the absence of pleasure when they do not come into existence will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
It is strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide to create them, and it is not strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide not to create them. That the child may be happy is not a morally important reason to create them. By contrast, that the child may be unhappy is an important moral reason not to create them. If it were the case that the absence of pleasure is bad even if someone does not exist to experience its absence, then we would have a significant moral reason to create a child and to create as many children as possible. And if it were not the case that the absence of pain is good even if someone does not exist to experience this good, then we would not have a significant moral reason not to create a child.
Someday we can regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created them – a person can be unhappy and the presence of their pain would be a bad thing. But we will never feel regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we did not create them – a person will not be deprived of happiness, because he or she will never exist, and the absence of happiness will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
We feel sadness by the fact that somewhere people come into existence and suffer, and we feel no sadness by the fact that somewhere people did not come into existence in a place where there are happy people. When we know that somewhere people came into existence and suffer, we feel compassion. The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good. This is because the absence of pain is good even when there is not someone who is experiencing this good. On the other hand, we do not feel sadness by the fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and are not happy. This is because the absence of pleasure is bad only when someone exists to be deprived of this good."
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Benatar)

I'm interested by your view of what 'consent' means here. All living people can kill themselves. Non-existing people cannot choose to exist nor can they argue for 'lack of consent' because they don't exist. You come to exist by the acts of others (right or wrong doesn't seem to have much of a place here does it?). Once you're born you are nurtured and grow, without consent. I do think children should be given more freedom to choose when younger (specifically in education), but this would have to be a global phenomenon so in actuality such a revolution in education would be hard to impliment (not that I'm against attempts ... even though they may very well lead to worsening the situation).

Anyway, you seem to have a different use of the term 'consent'. If you can explain further it might help. I don't see how 'consent' has any application to things/people that don't exist. Neither do I think parents ask for consent to raise their children ... that would be quite strange. — I like sushi

I think we use the term ´consent´ quite similar, but my point of view is that when we can´t get it, cause in this case is about unborn child, we should not then have a child. When a child is already born, it is very different situation. There is somebody, whose well-being some non-consent act are needed.

Fundamental difference of having a child and that crossing the road -example is that if it´s your life, cross the road or don´t, but having a child is deciding for other person´s life, without her/his consent.
Other difference is that non-existing creature does not have to make choices between bigger and smaller risks.
— Antinatalist

As stated above you'll have to explain how you're using 'consent' for a non-existing being? It doesn't make sense to me. Also, non-existing creatures don't have to make choices implies they can make choices. They cannot make choices. Subtle aspects of language can sneak in unsuspecting ideas without notice (the two meanings of 'don't have to' is one of these cases). I assume you meant cannot btw but such things can make a difference to someone's perspective :) — I like sushi

I don´t think this - non-existing creatures don't have to make choices - implies they can make choice; you are right, they can not.

That is natural way to think. But you do not provide very convincing arguments for this. In matter of fact not a one.
— Antinatalist

I'm not here to present any argument to say that bring life into the world is 'better'/'good'. It's your position that's up for debate right? I have discussed ethics elsewhere with points I find to be of more import. I've yet to be convinced this is a matter of much import to my view but I'm intrigued.

I value life, but it is not just about life, it is highly about the existing, living person who lives that life.
And this existing person is highly valuable.
— Antinatalist

Sounds like you're refusing to call an Orange an Orange and instead refer to it as a Round Fruit. I fnot I don't quite get this. I'm not trying to catch you out just want to understand what these terms mean for you. What is the difference between a person existing and a person living? Is a person living more important than a bird or plant living? Do those questions matter to your position? (if not ignore). — I like sushi

A person living is a person existing. Perhaps it is just my poetic(?) way to underline that at life the person who lives is more important than his life itself, as strange as may seem when you first time hear thing like that. And I mean for this, that life could be horrible for the person who is living that life. In my point of view a bird is important, but living human being is more important - you can disagree on that, and you might have some good arguments against mine. I don´t consider plant as important as human or bird, because it isn´t sentient being.

Regarding Pollyanna principle I do have some thoughts there but they're based on empirical evidence and neurological studies.

Basically we know that humans are 'wired' to be optimistic. We also have good evidence (psychological not neurological last time I looked) that we feel worse about loss more than we feel about a gain - hence humanity's general aversion to 'loss'. I think these items kind of do something to balance out our attitudes towards ideas/concepts ot 'pleasure'/'pain'. — I like sushi

I largely agree, although pessimist seem to be more realistic than optimists, in general.

Note: referring back to David Benatar I'd have to grasp his use of the terms 'pain' and 'pleasure'. I think viewing something as 'absence' of is perhaps related to the above^^

You've mentioned 'utilitarian' twice in quick succession now. You have problems with that perspective? If so what are they (beyond the obvious)? — I like sushi

Trivial example of utilitarian philosophy is when we can have 10 000 pleasure points, when some sadistic people are torturing some other people, but their miseries outcome is only 9999 suffering points. The outcome is positive, so then it is morally right to torture those people.

Let´s assume you are right on that. I simply can´t think any cruel acts/things etc., which does not involve suffering, which makes your assertion kind of absurd.
But let´s still assume that I am wrong on that. If you mean some suffering will prevent some other suffering (like a boxer, who will strengthen his/her abdominals that he/she will not tear apart when facing body punches in a real fight).
But that doesn't answer the question, why there have to be life in the first place.
— Antinatalist

For reference ASSUME I am right that it is neither right nor wrong. If that is the assumption there is no argument is there? To be clear I view 'right' and 'wrong' as situational. Sitting on a chair could be right or wrong (highly) in various situations and extremities. By choosing, or through happenstance, we 'have' children I don't see this as starting from a position of justification. the justification comes in the choice to have children or in the choosing not to have a child that is expected/possibility in the future. — I like sushi

Like you might seen, I find this choice to have a child problematic.

I have no issue with questioning the why/how/what of the sitiuation. It is not a one size fits all thing though. I would not travel back in time and tell some peasant to have less children to avoid burdening their offspring with pain and suffering and to suffer more themselves in the longrun in both terms of personal and family striving (not necessarily 'happiness' which is certainly a whole other topic worthy of consideration ... I just find 'happy' to be a little off). I'm sur eyou're familiar with De Botton in this area. He has some nice ways of conveying these things, but I'm not by any means completely in agreement with everythign he says.

WHy we have life in the first place? I don't think it is a 'why?' question tbh. In the same light I don't understand the 'why?' in the 'consent' and having childrenfalls into the 'why?' category either. All questions are 'what?' underneath. Reframing such 'whys' as 'whats' in numerous ways can help pick apart the underlying mechinations .. sometimes! :D. — I like sushi

I don´t agree, although I think I´ve heard this before. One physicist spoke at same thing at some lecture years ago, if I can remember correctly. Human differs from most animals, if not all, that she/he can ask "why?" . Of course there is "whys" and "whys", some could say that in the beginning materia and antimateria fought each other and materia won, and because of that Tampa Bay Buccaneers won Super Bowl 2021. Sounds very fatalistic. I have a very different kind of view. I don´t think there are any physical laws that human beings have to exist. It just happened.

IStakes are high, when making decision for someone else's life, like I said before.
— Antinatalist

Before they are born they have no life. Bringing a life into the world doesn't require what we colloquially refer to as 'consent'. This seems to be a running theme so I'll wait for your explanation of 'consent' in the terms you mean it to be used.

Like I said one previous post, I think life can have also negative value (and those, who support euthanasia agree with me on that). But the right to end will belong only to the one who lives, it´s her/his life and other people should respect her/his sovereignty.
— Antinatalist

Agreed. But again ... there are 'cirumcstances' that can alter these things. I'm not for a one size fit sall attitude. The individual case is, correct me if I'm wrong, far more important than a universal 'law' for singular people (ie. killing someone in a crazed murderous frenzy for the sake of saving others is not 'bad' but it doesn't make killing 'good'). My ethical view is about the unwilling need to explore the extreme fringes of our natures, but it is dangerous so I am not impelled to 'recommend' it for any/everyone. — I like sushi

I agree.

But the right to end will belong only to the one who lives, it´s her/his life and other people should respect her/his sovereignty.
— Antinatalist

To what degree does a newborn possess 'sovereignty'? In terms of consciousness and being a fully enough fledged human being? Again, this is certainly where the whole abortion debarcle emits something wonderful about humanity. We care about it - right or wrong - and that is human. I like humans ... mostly on an individual basis though :D — I like sushi

I think newborn has sovereignty as like any other already born human being. Of course we can continue probably there, what is the time when a foetus is sovereign human being - if ever; but that is a matter of another topic.

At suffering, I don´t value purely by the amount of its suffering; but to some degree it certainly correlates.
— Antinatalist

Good. And I agree. It is a singular perspective to consider amoungst others. I'm inclined - for various manifest reasons - to favour some perspectives over others and undoubtedly delude myself to some degree ... such is life :) Currently here guarding against delusions but not because delusions are necessarily 'bad' I just favour lessening them to some healthy degree ... I hope! ;)

My point of view is also that preventing harm is greater value than bringing happiness
— Antinatalist

I don't see the intrinsic difference between reduction of 'pain' and reduction of 'happiness' ... (see above: I await your explanation, but at least I think we've found a major point of confusion!). — I like sushi

I touched the subject in the "utilitarianism example" in this post.

@Antinatalist

I'll get to this all tomorrow. Late here now. For now I'll just say that I'd find it hard to believe the mainstream utilitarian point of view here is that 10,000 people 'happy' exempts 9,999 being tortured. I'm pretty sure you can at least agree that 10,001 people 'happy' and 9,998 is superficially 'better' than the above. They are at least different.

Given that there are no quantifiable units of such things it is merely a hypothetical to explore the ethics lying underneath (like with the previously mentioned 'Utopian' society where the happiness of all depends on the condensed suffering of one.

In the above I'd rather we all carry the burden of suffering than pile hell on one individual. The question then morphs into something entirely more dark and gruesome with progressive speed when you seriously start to ask yourself 'how many would need to suffer?' and 'to what degree?' - this is likely closer to what you're getting at.

Anyway, leave that until later if you can or respind briefly please so I can get back the Benatar bit ...

Antinatalist

I'll get to this all tomorrow. Late here now. For now I'll just say that I'd find it hard to believe the mainstream utilitarian point of view here is that 10,000 people 'happy' exempts 9,999 being tortured. I'm pretty sure you can at least agree that 10,001 people 'happy' and 9,998 is superficially 'better' than the above. They are at least different.

Given that there are no quantifiable units of such things it is merely a hypothetical to explore the ethics lying underneath (like with the previously mentioned 'Utopian' society where the happiness of all depends on the condensed suffering of one.

In the above I'd rather we all carry the burden of suffering than pile hell on one individual. The question then morphs into something entirely more dark and gruesome with progressive speed when you seriously start to ask yourself 'how many would need to suffer?' and 'to what degree?' - this is likely closer to what you're getting at. — I like sushi

Dostoevsky and Ursula K. Le Guin have addressed this issue, and I think they both have great point in their texts.

Anyway, leave that until later if you can or respind briefly please so I can get back the Benatar bit ... — I like sushi

Alright.

@Antinatalist Mean to have written NOT even slightly convinced by it.

NOTE: Anyone else reading these are NOT quotes from Antinatalist they are from David Benatar.

I'll break it down best I can ...

The absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. Therefore, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation. — Antinatalist

Why not absence of either is impossible in life? Why not 'the absence of either pleasure or pain is not bad'? The absence of pain/pleasure is a given in a non-existing individual. Also, lacking pleasure is not exactly what I'd call 'not bad' if the opposite argument is that lacking pain is 'good'.

Let us view this differently ... less pain is better and less pleasure is worse. I think we can all agree with that.

So we can see that the 'ethical conclusion' (a nonsense term in my view for the most part) of favouring non-procreation is based on premises set up from a biased position, or rather a singular perspective.

The conslusion I come to from the opening paragraph is that existence is bad. You said you didn't believe that so you're probably not convinced by this kind of antinatalism in reality (do doubt there are various sectionings of this philosophical position?).

We have a moral obligation not to create unhappy people and we have no moral obligation to create happy people. The reason why we think there is a moral obligation not to create unhappy people is that the presence of this suffering would be bad (for the sufferers) and the absence of the suffering is good (even though there is nobody to enjoy the absence of suffering). — Antinatalist

The above is purely based of what I consider to be singular and unconvincing premises. If the foundation is flawed the conclusion is not going to be of any use. The process can be interesting though so I'll follow it through ...

For starters, why does he assume we're morally obliged to 'create' people without pain and suffering yet doesn't think we're morally obliged to 'create' happy people? That seems like a cognitive bias to push forward his unfounded conclusion. As an opinion it doesn't quite stand up to scrutiny yet.

It looks like he's saying gray is more black than white.

By contrast, the reason we think there is no moral obligation to create happy people is that although their pleasure would be good for them, the absence of pleasure when they do not come into existence will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good. — Antinatalist

Why? Because he says so? I think the mental hoodwinking going on here is confusing 'degrees' of pleasure and pain with some imaginary absolute.

As I stated previous less pleasure is bad and less pain is good. A lack of either, or will to lack either, is where nihilism and what I frame as 'buddhist mentality' collide. They are in denial of existing and or against existence - and often abstain from any idea of free will too. We can see this is the end of the sentence above where non-existence is placed above existence. And as I've stated a lack of 'pleasure' is bad in my eyes just as 'pain' is bad (using the terms in the broadest sense here rather than bothering with gettin into all that).

It is strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide to create them, and it is not strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide not to create them. — Antinatalist

FIrst question here is why? If we have a moral obligation to a potential child surely we need to take into account what the life of such a child could be like and how readily armed we believe we are to 'give them' (probably better to say, 'set them up for') a life they won't wish they'd ever lived. Nothing 'strange' there?

Maybe he is just referring to how people generally consider the responsibility of having children here? If so considering the downfalls isn't a steadfast peice of evidence for his argument. For people who enjoy life they wish to share it. Who better to share this perspective with than a new life. Makes perfect sense.

As previously stated we know that humans are overly optimistic in one sense yet there is pretty good evidence that we are, to put it simply, more 'loss adverse' than 'gain seeking'. It might be too much of a leap for some to parallel this with 'pain' and 'pleasure' as those are very loaded terms. In the realm of this discussion though I think it is more than worth consideration.

Next bit is a willful ignorance of 'worse'/'better' in favour of monadic 'good'/'bad' concepts ...

If it were the case that the absence of pleasure is bad even if someone does not exist to experience its absence, then we would have a significant moral reason to create a child and to create as many children as possible. And if it were not the case that the absence of pain is good even if someone does not exist to experience this good, then we would not have a significant moral reason not to create a child. — Antinatalist

Why? The absence of either means no more humans. I have no qualms with humanity to the point where I'd wish the existence of humanity away merely because I don't understand the ins and outs of the universe at large.

If there is no one to experience it then ... well, it's a pointless discussion that we cannot have because we're existing/living. Just like I cannot think outside of myself I cannot think outside of existence. These are quite basic principles in mainstream philosophy ... or so I thought :D

Someday we can regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created them – a person can be unhappy and the presence of their pain would be a bad thing. — Antinatalist

NO NO NO! The presence of pain is a given. No one can live a life absent of pain. The presence of pain means they live. the DEGREE of pain is the moral issue being avoided here from what I can tell. This likely because when you dig in far enough some extrememly disturbing truths surface and most sane people shun them.

eg. How many people would you kill to save 1 million strangers? Let us assume such and such a person thinks one, then we shift the question about torturing them to death over decades ... would we rather kill two instantly than torturing one for decades?

The point being here NOT to make public statements about these kind of thoughts but to get to the most honest heart of yourself about how and what you feel about this then try to draw some loose conclusions from it.

You will hopefully find that all life is equal is not where you go at the end of the day. I'm not of the camp that not all lives are worth living (who am I to say!), but I readily accept that some lives must, almost certainly, be more worth living than others. Given that we only ever get to appreciate such a question at or aroundb our demise with any real kind of perspective - and an extrememly limited singular one - passing universal judgements over what lives are and aren't worth living seems quite naive/perverse. THAT is literally the only opening for an antinatalist doctrine I can establish, but it is far from convincing for all the above points made and many more I've not gotten into yet.

Someday we can regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created them – a person can be unhappy and the presence of their pain would be a bad thing. But we will never feel regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we did not create them – a person will not be deprived of happiness, because he or she will never exist, and the absence of happiness will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good. — Antinatalist

Sounds like cowardice diguised as moral dignity. Shirking any ounce of responsibility towards others is just that. I'm not going to offer to help that person in the street because I might cause them harm ... this is precisely where an item common;ly referred to as 'wisdom' comes into play. I think the ancient Greeks did pretty well in marking out the grounds about 'bravery,' foolhardy' and other such psyhcological categories of human behaviour.

Abstaining is all too often pedestalled as moral. I don't buy it. Also, as mentioned by others as an argument about a purely 'parental spective' the above is extremely selfish in terms of avoiding responsibility. you may very well be 'dripriving a possible human of happiness' but this is somehow okay in balanced to 'depriving them of pain' ... just silly imo.

We feel sadness by the fact that somewhere people come into existence and suffer, and we feel no sadness by the fact that somewhere people did not come into existence in a place where there are happy people. — Antinatalist

Nope! We do, we just don't tend to consider it because it isn't a day to day thought. I'm sure many couples who've experienced miscarraiges would quite clearly state that the above is nonsense. We can also, I'm sure, appreciate that when someone we know has died (no longer 'existing') we wish they could 'be there for this/that'.

You could well argue that these people 'existed' but I'm not sure how this works for a miscarriage as that is more or less the idea of someone coming to exist. For those dead it is similar in that they did exist but don't any longer, so it is a 'potential' (albeit an unrealistic 'potential').

When we know that somewhere people came into existence and suffer, we feel compassion. The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good. — Antinatalist

Why is this 'good'? Is the assumption that they merely suffered and died? No mention of 'pleasure' here for reasons unknown. Again, there is a DEGREE of these things. Would we wish away the potential existence of someone alone on a desert island who lived a rather ordinary life on the beaches waking up in morning, fishing and dancing around a fire at night merely because they suffering hardships and pain (physical and mental)? That said it is of course VERY easy to pass a quick judgement if the proposed scenario is painted as 'Born and suffered excruciating pain non-stop for several decades before dying in even more agony'.

As a little aside 'pleasure' can be painful too. A rather horrible tale about a study where elderly people in a home were given more volunteer visitors for month. Their well-being and sense of 'happiness' when through the roof. A follow up study though showed that for some time after (once they didn't have so many visitors) that overall the sense of well-being plummetted. They didn't know what they were missing, so when it was taken away they felt worse of for it.

I find that interesting because this a little parallel reversal of arguments for antinatalism mentioned by some here. Would they be better of without such 'pleasure'? Do we measure in a 'utilitarian sense' amounts of pleasure against pain. I'm not saying one or the other just pointing out how easily such views for one side of a position can be used against it. Plus, this is a singular situation of a myriad of human experience and life.

In conclusion ...

The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good. This is because the absence of pain is good even when there is not someone who is experiencing this good. On the other hand, we do not feel sadness by the fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and are not happy. This is because the absence of pleasure is bad only when someone exists to be deprived of this good." — Antinatalist

I'm disappointed that that is all David Benatar has. Someone can exist to be 'deprived of good' yet the thought of tyhem existing to be 'deprived of bad' is wholly ignored as well as th edegree to which said potential persons will experience and deal with 'pleasure' and 'pain'.

To sum up, the absence of either pleasure or pain is not a life and therefore to draw comparisons of a life purely 'painful' or purely 'pleasureable' is irrelevant AND a complete fantasy that makes so actual realistic sense. It seems like something has happened here that many scientists try hard to guard against. That is to have an idea then search for evidence to back it up.

What this has hopefully revealed more clearly is the problems surrounding any 'measurements'/'categories' of 'pleasure'/'pain' and what exactly these terms can/could mean in various different perspectives.

Broadly, when it comes to 'ethics,' I'm instantly suspicious of any/all ethical 'conclusions'. If we don't question and scrutinise our principles I don't see what use they are to us at all. Otherwise such 'principles' are like dead limbs we drag around and use to abstain more any sense of PERSONAL repsonsibility amoung/within/without the 'world' (weltenschuuang) at large.

So Antinatalist, can we perhaps get into how 'degrees' fits in here or is this entire antinatalist vie wbased solely on a hypothetical rigid extremity?

Is there anything I've said that is unclear? Do you have a harder position to put forward - perhaps in your own words with more nuance that those of Benatar?

Thanks either way :)

Dostoevsky and Ursula K. Le Guin have addressed this issue, and I think they both have great point in their texts. — Antinatalist

What are they?

In addition to my long scrawl ...

If there is some underlying 'measurement' of subjective pain vs pleasure then someone somewhere in human history someone has/will suffer more pain than anyone else, and vice versa the same is true for pleasure. Was such 'pain'/'pleasure' inevitable OR has/will humanity find a way to nurture the latter more and more in the future whilst reducing the later ... AND (most importantly!) if we have done/did this would we even know it?

I would argue simply that the having of children belongs in a moral limbo of just intentions coupled with a fundamental ignorance and lack of power to make those intentions come to fruition.

Too much is unknown about the future life of one's child, and too much is out of the control of the parents. The outcome is a matter of chance, therefore it cannot be considered a moral act, but at the same time I cannot conisder an act immoral if it wasn't done with malicious intention.

Dostoevsky and Ursula K. Le Guin have addressed this issue, and I think they both have great point in their texts.
— Antinatalist

What are they?

In addition to my long scrawl ...

If there is some underlying 'measurement' of subjective pain vs pleasure then someone somewhere in human history someone has/will suffer more pain than anyone else, and vice versa the same is true for pleasure. Was such 'pain'/'pleasure' inevitable OR has/will humanity find a way to nurture the latter more and more in the future whilst reducing the later ... AND (most importantly!) if we have done/did this would we even know it? — I like sushi

Perhaps it is just my poetic(?) way to underline that at life the person who lives is more important than his life itself, as strange as may seem when you first time hear thing like that. — Antinatalist

I´ve referred before to Le Guin´s The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Ones_Who_Walk_Away_from_Omelas). I think Dostoyeski brings some real heavy issue in The Brothers Karamazov. This is just one quote from Ivan Fyodorovich Karamazov, there are many perhaps much more impressive points, buI don’t have the original novel on hand:

“Listen: if everyone must suffer, in order to buy eternal harmony with their suffering, pray tell me what have children got to do with it? It’s quite incomprehensible why they should have to suffer, and why they should buy harmony with their suffering.” 

(https://www.sparknotes.com/lit/brothersk/quotes/page/2/)

So Antinatalist, can we perhaps get into how 'degrees' fits in here or is this entire antinatalist vie wbased solely on a hypothetical rigid extremity?

Is there anything I've said that is unclear? Do you have a harder position to put forward - perhaps in your own words with more nuance that those of Benatar?

Thanks either way :) — I like sushi

I will answer more completely a little bit later, but I ask you one question.

Do you think is more ethical to have a child than give euthanasia for some healthy human being, who just one time asks it (and that´s just all you know about that person)?

And if it is, why so?

You seem to enjoy being alive. If even not for the sole purpose to convince others otherwise. I'm trying to tread carefully here but, look at your argument from an outside perspective.

@Antinatalist and @I like sushi, just wanted to mention that it looks like you may be going down the same road I had previously in this thread and in my previous thread about "No options" and Most people". You are even mentioning degrees and such. That doesn't mean you don't have to go through the dialectic as I think it's important to work out, but just wanted to provide it for a reference. I'd like to add the idea of "trivial harm" vs. "non-trivial harm". Trivial harm would be things like getting a papercut from a friend giving you a five dollar bill. Non-trivial harm are burdens one would not want, even if one looked back and was okay later on. It's things to a degree of threshold that they are no longer practically negligent to consider anymore. I think the main argument that can made for AN here is that:

Creating conditions for unnecessary, non-trivial harms for others is wrong (or negligent). From here, as long as we agree on the terms, AN has good footing to stand on. Coupled with this idea is Benatar's argument that harm is indeed more important to consider in procreation decisions. He relies on our own intuitions. For example, we seem to care more if people are suffering on deserted planets than we would care that "No one exists to be happy!". It seems to be neutral, not really worthy of moral consideration, to have no happy people. It does seem to be "bad" to have unhappy or suffering people, however.

Do you think is more ethical to have a child than give euthanasia for some healthy human being, who just one time asks it (and that´s just all you know about that person)? — Antinatalist

I'm not really into some 'ethic law' so to speak. That aside, as stated before, it would depend on individual circumstances. That is the crux of it. Universal ethics is not realistic and is usually found buried in mass religious circles.

Not to avoid the hypothetical (if I was in a position to force open over the other) then I'd say having a child is 'better'. Here it is based almost entirely on reason though. The child doesn't exist so isn't suicidal, yet the person wishing to die (with no knowledge of the situation) is more than likely just in a depressive slump because that is more common than someone actually deciding to end their life due to severe illness or because they've reasoned that they are better off dead for whatever reason.

Remember though, I don't view this anything like you do and have seemingly very different impressions and experiences of what 'happy,' 'pain,' 'pleasure,' 'ethics' and such terms mean.

Logically, it seems wrong yes. Why bring more nature slaves to suffer? Doesn't make much sense.

I'd like to add the idea of "trivial harm" vs. "non-trivial harm". Trivial harm would be things like getting a papercut from a friend giving you a five dollar bill. Non-trivial harm are burdens one would not want, even if one looked back and was okay later on. It's things to a degree of threshold that they are no longer practically negligent to consider anymore. — schopenhauer1

Which reminds me, did you come up with some criteria to distinguish the two? So far you've just given examples. If someone were to say that life is a trivial harm, or not a harm at all, why would they be wrong?

From here, as long as we agree on the terms, AN has good footing to stand on. — schopenhauer1

As long as we agree that life is a non-trivial harm. Which is precisely what most people disagree with you on.

As long as we agree that life is a non-trivial harm. Which is precisely what most people disagree with you on. — khaled

I'll answer you more fully later, but realize we are going to disagree on criterion. You will say that it's a summative report that only counts. I will say that the experiences in real time have to be considered.

Also keep in mind that no objective criterion is needed for the logic the axiom. Non-trivial can be subjective, but it would have to be understood that all human life will have subjectively non-trivial harm.

As long as we are understood that my more speculative ideas on objective harm are not even necessary for the claim to work, then I will entertain your question. The minute you try to use it as a cudgel against the primary argument, I will call bad faith debate as you are now crossing over as we agreed we would not do.

Are we agreed? I am not interested in arguing with someone who simply wants to argue in bad faith and non-productive ways. I am making sure of this from the beginning so as to prevent useless efforts.

but realize we are going to disagree on criterion. You will say that it's a summative report that only counts. I will say that the experiences in real time have to be considered. — schopenhauer1

I will pretend to think that summative reports and experiences don't count. That's exactly why I asked you to find a criteria that doesn't rely on these reports. I could've just said "Disagreed. Only the report matters" but I'm trying to understand how you can evaluate these things without the report, or the experience.

Non-trivial can be subjective, but it would have to be understood that all human life will have subjectively non-trivial harm. — schopenhauer1

But there is a very crucial difference here. "Will have non-trivial harm" is not a sufficient condition for making something wrong, nor is that your argument as I understand it. It has to be a non-trivial harm overall. I will agree to:

Foisting non-trivial, unnecessary impositions/burdens/harms on someone else is wrong — schopenhauer1

I won't agree that having children is non-trivial, unnecessary imposition. You must show that using whatever your criteria is.

I won't agree that having children is non-trivial, unnecessary imposition. You must show that using whatever your criteria is. — khaled

I thought we agreed that as long is all that was needed was subjective, non-trivial harm.

We can agree that imposing subjective, non trivial harm on people is wrong.

It does not follow from this that having children is wrong.

It will only be wrong if imposing life was subjectively non trivial.

You can only determine whether or not life is a non trivial imposition once you have a criteria that separates trivial from non trivial.

That’s the criteria I want to know. Doubly so since supposedly it doesn’t rely on the subjective evaluation at all.

That’s the criteria I want to know. Doubly so since supposedly it doesn’t rely on the subjective evaluation at all. — khaled

No, what I meant was, all we needed to agree on is that all life has subjectively non-trivial harm for it to be valid in this case.

What is "it" that is valid?

As long as you think non-trivial harm exists for all humans, the argument stands:
— schopenhauer1

What argument?

Do you mean to say that "non trivial harm exists in life" = "Procreation is wrong"?

Because that doesn't follow at all. — khaled

That is something you just implied, not what I stated. — schopenhauer1

Do you think that all life experiences subjective non-trivial harm? If so, why wouldn't that be an example of the former? You keep going to the objective when I have said from earlier that it works just as fine from subjective as long as you think at some point people experience non-trivial subjective harm.

Antinatalist Mean to have written NOT even slightly convinced by it.

NOTE: Anyone else reading these are NOT quotes from Antinatalist they are from David Benatar.

I'll break it down best I can ...

The absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. Therefore, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation.
— Antinatalist

Why not absence of either is impossible in life? Why not 'the absence of either pleasure or pain is not bad'? The absence of pain/pleasure is a given in a non-existing individual. Also, lacking pleasure is not exactly what I'd call 'not bad' if the opposite argument is that lacking pain is 'good'.

Let us view this differently ... less pain is better and less pleasure is worse. I think we can all agree with that.

So we can see that the 'ethical conclusion' (a nonsense term in my view for the most part) of favouring non-procreation is based on premises set up from a biased position, or rather a singular perspective.

The conslusion I come to from the opening paragraph is that existence is bad. You said you didn't believe that so you're probably not convinced by this kind of antinatalism in reality (do doubt there are various sectionings of this philosophical position?). — I like sushi

I wrote in my original text:
"However, I accept a point of view that for some human being life could be a better option than non-being. But we could never reach any kind of certainty at any case, any circumstances, at any place that life is better for any unborn, potential person."
But this fact, it could be a better option than non-being, does not justify the act of having a child. 

  We have a moral obligation not to create unhappy people and we have no moral obligation to create happy people. The reason why we think there is a moral obligation not to create unhappy people is that the presence of this suffering would be bad (for the sufferers) and the absence of the suffering is good (even though there is nobody to enjoy the absence of suffering).
— Antinatalist — I like sushi

  The above is purely based of what I consider to be singular and unconvincing premises. If the foundation is flawed the conclusion is not going to be of any use. The process can be interesting though so I'll follow it through ...

For starters, why does he assume we're morally obliged to 'create' people without pain and suffering yet doesn't think we're morally obliged to 'create' happy people? That seems like a cognitive bias to push forward his unfounded conclusion. As an opinion it doesn't quite stand up to scrutiny yet. 

It looks like he's saying gray is more black than white. — I like sushi

There underlies the fact that somebody not existing has no needs, so absence of good is not a bad thing. It perhaps is not a "good" thing, but at least it is a neutral thing. Absence of bad is good even if there is nobody enjoying it. Presence of bad is bad, that will be quite clear. I don´t understand how you don´t get this.

  By contrast, the reason we think there is no moral obligation to create happy people is that although their pleasure would be good for them, the absence of pleasure when they do not come into existence will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
— Antinatalist — I like sushi

  Why? Because he says so? I think the mental hoodwinking going on here is confusing 'degrees' of pleasure and pain with some imaginary absolute.

As I stated previous less pleasure is bad and less pain is good. A lack of either, or will to lack either, is where nihilism and what I frame as 'buddhist mentality' collide. They are in denial of existing and or against existence - and often abstain from any idea of free will too. We can see this is the end of the sentence above where non-existence is placed above existence. And as I've stated a lack of 'pleasure' is bad in my eyes just as 'pain' is bad (using the terms in the broadest sense here rather than bothering with gettin into all that). — I like sushi

Do you really think that way?

Theodor Adorno once said:
“It would be advisable to think of progress in the crudest, most basic terms: that no one should go hungry anymore, that there should be no more torture, no more Auschwitz. Only then will the idea of progress be free from lies.”
― Theodor W. Adorno

What does this mean? What are the consequences of that "no more Auschwitz"?
I once thought "pro life, pro concentration camps". I was wrong, it was just a thought - and I didn't thought that way deep inside me. But I was at least partly right at that thought.
But still, what is the only sure way to prevent things like Auschwitz ever to exist? It is to stop procreating. When there is no life, there are no concentration camps.

That sounds extreme. And I´m the first to admit, it is. It is extreme. But that is the only sure way to prevent horrors of Auschwitz and other horrors like it.

I don´t see any thing, which are perceived as enjoyable, happy etc could ever balance the badness of Auschwitzes.

 It is strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide to create them, and it is not strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide not to create them.
— Antinatalist — I like sushi

  FIrst question here is why? If we have a moral obligation to a potential child surely we need to take into account what the life of such a child could be like and how readily armed we believe we are to 'give them' (probably better to say, 'set them up for') a life they won't wish they'd ever lived. Nothing 'strange' there?

Maybe he is just referring to how people generally consider the responsibility of having children here? If so considering the downfalls isn't a steadfast peice of evidence for his argument. For people who enjoy life they wish to share it. Who better to share this perspective with than a new life. Makes perfect sense.

As previously stated we know that humans are overly optimistic in one sense yet there is pretty good evidence that we are, to put it simply, more 'loss adverse' than 'gain seeking'. It might be too much of a leap for some to parallel this with 'pain' and 'pleasure' as those are very loaded terms. In the realm of this discussion though I think it is more than worth consideration.

Next bit is a willful ignorance of 'worse'/'better' in favour of monadic 'good'/'bad' concepts ...

If it were the case that the absence of pleasure is bad even if someone does not exist to experience its absence, then we would have a significant moral reason to create a child and to create as many children as possible. And if it were not the case that the absence of pain is good even if someone does not exist to experience this good, then we would not have a significant moral reason not to create a child.
— Antinatalist

Why? The absence of either means no more humans. I have no qualms with humanity to the point where I'd wish the existence of humanity away merely because I don't understand the ins and outs of the universe at large.

If there is no one to experience it then ... well, it's a pointless discussion that we cannot have because we're existing/living. Just like I cannot think outside of myself I cannot think outside of existence. These are quite basic principles in mainstream philosophy ... or so I thought :D — I like sushi

We are living now. We can make decisions for the future. And we know the pain and pleasure are things the possible upcoming child is most likely to face. I surely can think of a universe without human beings, and a universe without life at all.

About that what Benatar says about what is strange and what is not when discussing the purpose of having a child, I´m not sure about that. Perhaps it is the way people usually state their reasons. But most likely, I think, is so as Benatar has argued, someone who doesn´t exist, does not have interests. But again, if the child is born, she/he then have interests/needs.

  Someday we can regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created them – a person can be unhappy and the presence of their pain would be a bad thing.
— Antinatalist — I like sushi

NO NO NO! The presence of pain is a given. No one can live a life absent of pain. The presence of pain means they live. — I like sushi

This is one thing - "The presence of pain means they live" - agree on, at least.

the DEGREE of pain is the moral issue being avoided here from what I can tell. This likely because when you dig in far enough some extrememly disturbing truths surface and most sane people shun them.

eg. How many people would you kill to save 1 million strangers? Let us assume such and such a person thinks one, then we shift the question about torturing them to death over decades ... would we rather kill two instantly than torturing one for decades? — I like sushi

These are the things we have to deal with, when there is human life. When there is not, we don´t have to. My view is antinatalistic, not pro-mortalist. I am in favor of voluntary extinction. You yourself don´t favor absence of bad over presence of good. Some people - if not most - want to blame antinatalists with all kinds of accusations, but your view on life sounds kind of terroristic. To sacrifice some people for Greater Good.

  The point being here NOT to make public statements about these kind of thoughts but to get to the most honest heart of yourself about how and what you feel about this then try to draw some loose conclusions from it.

You will hopefully find that all life is equal is not where you go at the end of the day. I'm not of the camp that not all lives are worth living (who am I to say!), but I readily accept that some lives must, almost certainly, be more worth living than others. Given that we only ever get to appreciate such a question at or aroundb our demise with any real kind of perspective - and an extrememly limited singular one - passing universal judgements over what lives are and aren't worth living seems quite naive/perverse. THAT is literally the only opening for an antinatalist doctrine I can establish, but it is far from convincing for all the above points made and many more I've not gotten into yet. — I like sushi

Antinatalism can be grounded on Kantian ethics or negative utilitarianism, at least.

  Someday we can regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created them – a person can be unhappy and the presence of their pain would be a bad thing. But we will never feel regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we did not create them – a person will not be deprived of happiness, because he or she will never exist, and the absence of happiness will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
— Antinatalist — I like sushi

  Sounds like cowardice diguised as moral dignity. Shirking any ounce of responsibility towards others is just that. I'm not going to offer to help that person in the street because I might cause them harm ... this is precisely where an item common;ly referred to as 'wisdom' comes into play. I think the ancient Greeks did pretty well in marking out the grounds about 'bravery,' foolhardy' and other such psyhcological categories of human behaviour. — I like sushi

You simply do not get it, the main principle for antinatalism is: you can not do harm someone who does not exist. It is a very different case, when someone is already born and living in this world. On cowardness, I'm pretty sure I find it more on natalists, natalism is, after all, far more socially acceptable ideology than antinatalism. As an antinatalist, you are a rebel. And not that kind of "rebel" you find on mainstream movies or some MTV videos, which were watched when I was young.

    Abstaining is all too often pedestalled as moral. I don't buy it. Also, as mentioned by others as an argument about a purely 'parental spective' the above is extremely selfish in terms of avoiding responsibility. you may very well be 'dripriving a possible human of happiness' but this is somehow okay in balanced to 'depriving them of pain' ... just silly imo. — I like sushi

As a matter of fact it is not depriving anything for anybody, because there is nobody existing.

    We feel sadness by the fact that somewhere people come into existence and suffer, and we feel no sadness by the fact that somewhere people did not come into existence in a place where there are happy people.
— Antinatalist — I like sushi

  Nope! We do, we just don't tend to consider it because it isn't a day to day thought. I'm sure many couples who've experienced miscarraiges would quite clearly state that the above is nonsense. We can also, I'm sure, appreciate that when someone we know has died (no longer 'existing') we wish they could 'be there for this/that'.

You could well argue that these people 'existed' but I'm not sure how this works for a miscarriage as that is more or less the idea of someone coming to exist. For those dead it is similar in that they did exist but don't any longer, so it is a 'potential' (albeit an unrealistic 'potential'). — I like sushi

Miscarry could be tragic, but those who we see suffering from it are usually the parents of the potential child. It is more about  the expectations of the parents than missing the life of the possible upcoming child.

  When we know that somewhere people came into existence and suffer, we feel compassion. The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good.
— Antinatalist

Why is this 'good'? Is the assumption that they merely suffered and died? No mention of 'pleasure' here for reasons unknown. Again, there is a DEGREE of these things. Would we wish away the potential existence of someone alone on a desert island who lived a rather ordinary life on the beaches waking up in morning, fishing and dancing around a fire at night merely because they suffering hardships and pain (physical and mental)? That said it is of course VERY easy to pass a quick judgement if the proposed scenario is painted as 'Born and suffered excruciating pain non-stop for several decades before dying in even more agony'.

As a little aside 'pleasure' can be painful too. A rather horrible tale about a study where elderly people in a home were given more volunteer visitors for month. Their well-being and sense of 'happiness' when through the roof. A follow up study though showed that for some time after (once they didn't have so many visitors) that overall the sense of well-being plummetted. They didn't know what they were missing, so when it was taken away they felt worse of for it.

I find that interesting because this a little parallel reversal of arguments for antinatalism mentioned by some here. Would they be better of without such 'pleasure'? Do we measure in a 'utilitarian sense' amounts of pleasure against pain. I'm not saying one or the other just pointing out how easily such views for one side of a position can be used against it. Plus, this is a singular situation of a myriad of human experience and life. — I like sushi

If you try to attack the asymmetry argument, the different situation for your example above, is that in your example there are living people, who could feel the loss of something good and possibly feel grief from that.

   In conclusion ...

The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good. This is because the absence of pain is good even when there is not someone who is experiencing this good. On the other hand, we do not feel sadness by the fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and are not happy. This is because the absence of pleasure is bad only when someone exists to be deprived of this good."
— Antinatalist

I'm disappointed that that is all David Benatar has. Someone can exist to be 'deprived of good' yet the thought of tyhem existing to be 'deprived of bad' is wholly ignored as well as th edegree to which said potential persons will experience and deal with 'pleasure' and 'pain'.

To sum up, the absence of either pleasure or pain is not a life and therefore to draw comparisons of a life purely 'painful' or purely 'pleasureable' is irrelevant AND a complete fantasy that makes so actual realistic sense. It seems like something has happened here that many scientists try hard to guard against. That is to have an idea then search for evidence to back it up.

What this has hopefully revealed more clearly is the problems surrounding any 'measurements'/'categories' of 'pleasure'/'pain' and what exactly these terms can/could mean in various different perspectives.

Broadly, when it comes to 'ethics,' I'm instantly suspicious of any/all ethical 'conclusions'. If we don't question and scrutinise our principles I don't see what use they are to us at all. Otherwise such 'principles' are like dead limbs we drag around and use to abstain more any sense of PERSONAL repsonsibility amoung/within/without the 'world' (weltenschuuang) at large.

So Antinatalist, can we perhaps get into how 'degrees' fits in here or is this entire antinatalist vie wbased solely on a hypothetical rigid extremity?

Is there anything I've said that is unclear? Do you have a harder position to put forward - perhaps in your own words with more nuance that those of Benatar?

Thanks either way :) — I like sushi

Like I said before, my antinatalism is grounded on the fact that having a child is a decision for someone else´s life, whose consent we can not have. The fact that consent is impossible to have, doesn´t make the decision right. It is a decision for someone else´s whole life, it is not a trivial "cross a road or not" kind of decision.

You seem to enjoy being alive. If even not for the sole purpose to convince others otherwise. I'm trying to tread carefully here but, look at your argument from an outside perspective. — Outlander

I´m an antinatalist, not pro-mortalist. And even when I live happy, enjoyable life, I don´t think I have right to reproduce. Am I happy or not, is irrelevant for this decision.

Antinatalist and I like sushi, just wanted to mention that it looks like you may be going down the same road I had previously in this thread and in my previous thread about "No options" and Most people". You are even mentioning degrees and such. That doesn't mean you don't have to go through the dialectic as I think it's important to work out, but just wanted to provide it for a reference. I'd like to add the idea of "trivial harm" vs. "non-trivial harm". Trivial harm would be things like getting a papercut from a friend giving you a five dollar bill. Non-trivial harm are burdens one would not want, even if one looked back and was okay later on. It's things to a degree of threshold that they are no longer practically negligent to consider anymore. I think the main argument that can made for AN here is that:

Creating conditions for unnecessary, non-trivial harms for others is wrong (or negligent). From here, as long as we agree on the terms, AN has good footing to stand on. Coupled with this idea is Benatar's argument that harm is indeed more important to consider in procreation decisions. He relies on our own intuitions. For example, we seem to care more if people are suffering on deserted planets than we would care that "No one exists to be happy!". It seems to be neutral, not really worthy of moral consideration, to have no happy people. It does seem to be "bad" to have unhappy or suffering people, however. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I have to check your previous threads.

Do you think is more ethical to have a child than give euthanasia for some healthy human being, who just one time asks it (and that´s just all you know about that person)?
— Antinatalist

I'm not really into some 'ethic law' so to speak. That aside, as stated before, it would depend on individual circumstances. That is the crux of it. Universal ethics is not realistic and is usually found buried in mass religious circles.

Not to avoid the hypothetical (if I was in a position to force open over the other) then I'd say having a child is 'better'. Here it is based almost entirely on reason though. The child doesn't exist so isn't suicidal, yet the person wishing to die (with no knowledge of the situation) is more than likely just in a depressive slump because that is more common than someone actually deciding to end their life due to severe illness or because they've reasoned that they are better off dead for whatever reason.

Remember though, I don't view this anything like you do and have seemingly very different impressions and experiences of what 'happy,' 'pain,' 'pleasure,' 'ethics' and such terms mean. — I like sushi

I wrote on my original text:


"Let us assume that an adult human being seems to outsiders in their right minds to be willing to die and to clearly and unambiguously state “Kill me!” Is this sufficient justification for killing this human being?

Juridically surely not, but what about ethically?
In my opinion, NO. I believe that a vast majority of people hopefully agrees with my view (even though this is no basis for justifying the value of the action).

Nonetheless, in the above example case, the actor has more information on the tendencies of the object of the action than in the example on bringing about life – i.e. in the active deed that aims at creating a new human being, a child. Hence, there is some information available on the desires and intentions of the object of "mercy killing". As for the object of conception, there is no information available on the desires of the (forthcoming) individual. This is also true in the likely case of the (intended) object of the action not existing yet. The fact that it is impossible to have this information when creating new life (having a child) does not change our diverging epistemic attitudes in any way.

Hence, we cannot know whether it is better to be than not to be."