• Antinatalist
    153
    Foreword: First of all, I´m definitely against murder.
    Secondly: I use at the end of this article the concept of  the "potential person" slightly different as R.M. Hare does. My statement is that ´potential person´ has no right to be born, but it has right not to be born. This article is from 2004, although I have made some recent, minor changes. 




     IS IT WRONG TO HAVE CHILDREN?


     "Values are intangibles. They are, in the final analysis, things of the mind that have to do with the vision people have of "the good life" for themselves and their fellows."(Nicholas Rescher) [1] 

    The purpose of this article is to approach the ethical essence of creating and terminating life, with special emphasis on the question of justification of ‘life’ as an overriding basic value.

    Life appears as a meta value in, for example, the biologism represented by sociobiologists, in most utilitarian theories and in the philosophical statements of R.M. Hare, among others. My objective is not to find historical reasons for this; rather, my purpose is to examine the underlying assumptions through which life has been derived as a value over non-life.  The subject has been mentioned in passing in the discussions on abortion and euthanasia in the past few decades, but without focusing on the actual core of the issue: why should life be justified as a basic value over non-life? Or why should this not be done?

    Some might find similarities between the view’s of Finnish thinker Pentti Linkola and the observations I present below. However, this represents a vicious false illusion.  Pentti Linkola’s apocalypticism and utopia on the extinction of the human race is not an argument for the non-value - or anti-value - of life as such; it is rather a clear argument for the intrinsic value of life, even if this requires the extinction of one dominant species. Linkola’s views do not question life as an intrinsic value – or if they do, this implication is highly subtle. 




    Biological world-view and religious naturalism

    "The time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized." (Edward O. Wilson [2]) 


    When Edward O. Wilson published his works Sociobiology. The New Synthesis in 1975, it caused a storm of protests. Humanists, for one, criticized the sociobiological world-view. The most central and forcefully criticized argument in the publication was that the genetic, inherited differences in people are the primary reason behind cultural structures as well as the position of an individual in the social hierarchy, as opposed to random historical factors which were often presented as the cause.

    On the other hand, a new sociobiological movement was formed and it inspired a field known as evolutionary psychology. The movement strove to portray itself as a scientific one, and rationalized many phenomena as products of natural selection and therefore as inherently good.

    Sociobiology hit the mark on many accounts. It is likely that sociologists, psychologists and much of the whole (academic) world have not taken into account to a sufficient extent the role of genetic heredity in the human mental structures, in the political and cultural conventions of people, and in the very foundations of social structures as a whole.

    Wilson’s leap from biology – or biological evolution – to ethics and the field of moral argumentation is nonetheless a daring one:

     ”...Many philosophers will respond by saying, But wait! What are you saying? Ethicists don’t need that kind of information. You really can’t pass from isto ought. You are not allowed to describe a genetic predisposition and suppose that because it is part of human nature, it is somehow transformed into an ethical precept. We must put moral reasoning in a special category, and use transcendental guidelines as required.

    No, we do not have to put moral reasoning in a special category, and use transcendental premises, because the posing of the naturalistic fallacy is itself a fallacy. For if ought is not is, what is? To translate isinto ought makes sense if we attend to the objective meaning of ethical precepts. They are very unlikely to be ethereal messages outside humanity awaiting revelation, or independent truth vibrating in a nonmaterial dimension of the mind. They are more likely to be physical products of the brain and culture. From the consilient perspective of the natural sciences, they are no more than principles of the social contract hardened into rules and dictates, the behavioral codes that members of a society fervently wish others to follow and are willing to accept themselves for the common good. Precepts are the extreme in a scale of agreements that range from casual assent to public sentiment to law to that part of the canon considered unalterable and sacred." [3] 


    To this, my response is that "ought" is the will, desire or intention of a being, and in this sense it truly "is". From this intention of a being, or from the normative attitude of ”should”, no obligation can be drawn. This is purely analytic. The issue is very simple if, generally speaking, the normative attitude of "ought" is a product of the brain and culture and it is required in order to maintain human life; the occurrence of this attitude is common amongst the living. No evolutionary process can even give a probable estimate as to why life would be a value over non-life. However, Wilson is admittedly correct in stating that, when assessing the possibilities and ethicality of actions, one must consider what is possible and what is not. But to assess life as a value over non-life, there is no material produced by the rational mind or empirical data (during, for example, the evolution of billions of years). Among evolutionary biologists, organized religion has often been seen as a contemporarily meaningful adaptation of natural selection. In the modern world, however, the popularity of religion has decreased. This has been seen both as an advantage and as a handicap; a fruitful phenomenon for the scientific world-view, but also the risk of falling into a meaningless spiritual void. Religions have responded to the spiritual needs of people and, even if they were to disappear, the need for sacred narratives remains. Wilson sees this both as a problem and as a challenge for the future.


    "If the sacred narrative cannot be in the form of a religious cosmology, it will be taken from the material history of the universe and the human species. That trend is in no way debasing. The true evolutionary epic, retold as poetry, is as intrinsically ennobling as any religious epic. Material reality discovered by science already possesses more content and grandeur than all religious cosmologies combined. The continuity of the human line has been traced through a period of deep history a thousand times older than that conceived by the Western religions. Its study has brought new revelations of great moral importance. It has made us realize that Homo sapiens is far more than a congeries of tribes and races. We are a single gene pool from which individuals are drawn in each generation and into which they are dissolved the next generation,  forever united as a species by heritage and a common future. Such are the conceptions, based on fact from which new intimations of immortality can be drawn and a new mythos evolved." [4] 


    The end of the last sentence is especially intriguing: “new mythos evolved.” However, regarding life as an axiomatic, dogmatic value can hardly be regarded as a new idea. 


    Unlike Wilson, Georg Henrik von Wright, as an analytical philosopher, does not render himself guilty of a naturalistic fallacy. His set of values is nonetheless similar to that of Wilson.


    "The battle for survival – "the will to live", as Schopenhauer would say – is the natural biological basis for all valuation. In the animal world below human, this aim is simply "evaluative action". It is only on the human level that this action is given the form of grading from good to bad.

    Individuals – even those that are not human – may also aim at the opposite goal: death and destruction, due to some other objective. When this is done to advance one’s own group, it is an act of self-sacrifice. This is not regarded as an irrational act. It may even be admired and accepted. However, struggling for the sort of goals that lead to the self-destruction of a species is irrational. Considering its biological basis, we also label it as perverted or unnatural. These are conceptual observations, not sets of values or scientific truths.

    Instead, the conception of the natural conditions of human and animal survival is scientific – and so, therefore, is the view of what one can or cannot do to nature if existence is to be secured. In this sense, one can state that science explores the boundaries within which rational life is possible. Crossing the boundaries is purposeless self-destruction, an unnatural act of irrationality." [5]  


    According to von Wright, then, the biological – natural – basis for all valuation is the battle for survival, the will to live. With regard to life preservation, unfavourable action can be regarded as irrational in so far as this natural biological tendency to preserve life is rational, as defined. von Wright’s own value preferences are in accordance with general biological tendencies: in other words, in favour of preserving life. 


    Personally, I think so, like von Wright thought, that terminating human life is wrong. Euthanasia and suicide are different kind of cases. And in some cases, when there are no other options, killing people for self defence could be right, when you or other people are under threat of killing.
    I also that I think abortion is right in early stages of pregnancy. I think as a matter of fact that it is a duty, that no one has to be born.
    I hope, that we could address also this issue analytically and rationally no matter how primitive is the first emotional reaction to the that topic (abortion).




    Life and non-life – abortion and euthanasia


    Now, let us take a moment and touch upon one of the most interesting value ethical debates of the past few decades: the discussion on abortion.

    In the last few decades, the justification of abortion has been one of the most central questions in value ethical discussions. Among the most noted abortion debate openers has been philosopher R.M. Hare. Hare’s basic premise is the principle of life preservation which cannot be breached with abortion. The concept of 'a potential person' lies at the core of Hare’s argumentation. He states that a foetus, or even a newly conceived egg cell, is a potential person, and therefore an abortion would be a crime against this potential human being.

    At the same time, arguments have been made against euthanasia (and for it) by stating that life preservation is also a value overriding the will of an existing person – even in the event that this person personally wants euthanasia.

    What is common to all these instances of debate is the underlying assumption of life as something desirable as such, and most of all, as a self-evident value. 


    According to Hare, our duty – assuming that we are happy that our lives have not been terminated at the foetus stage – is not to terminate the life of a "potential person" living to see its foetal stage. [6]

    Not taking a stand on whether or not Hare abuses the concept of "duty", one must take into account three important aspects.

     1.      The assumption that we are happy to be alive at the moment does certainly not cover all living individuals, even if most living individuals consider their life to be a positive thing.

     2.      Even if happiness about life were to be a universal viewpoint, it cannot be used as an argument in concluding whether or not abortion would have been a better choice with regard to happiness. Hence, one cannot know whether it is better to bethan not to be.

     3.      A noteworthy aspect is also the fact that bringing about life – which in this case, if successful, means creating a self-conscious human being, a person  – does not mean merely bringing about life. It is somewhat rational to assume that a forthcoming conscious person will come to die one day. Furthermore, whether or not this is a shift back to the state or non-state which prevailed before the person, there is no clear knowledge of the nature of this shift beyond the fact that the human being ceases to exist as a biological organism. Bringing about life is also a necessary condition for its ending – or termination. 


    Hare’s argument therefore is that life is likely to be a better state of affairs than the lack thereof. What a bold and peculiar argument! And one that should be used to justify obligation towards a potentially forthcoming individual.

    Having said that, it is somewhat evident that our naturalistic attitude drives us to investigate the questions of existence in a highly biocentric manner, with an emphasis on the (presumed) value of life and by perhaps regarding it as a “given value.” And yet: why has this reasoning not been taken to its natural conclusion by comparing the relation of life and non-life and the arguments and circumstances in which it is justified to value one over the other, if either?

    In the viewpoint represented by Hare, sperm is not yet a potential person – even though it can be seen as one if potentiality is defined in a broad sense. Therefore, it does not possess the rights of a potential person. Following Hare’s model, one does not have the duty of “giving” life to the sperm. But what about the right to do so? If a human being does not have the duty of giving life to sperm in the form of human life, does one have the right to do so? Hare does not approach this question. 


    As stated, a sperm is not a potential person in the sense discussed by Hare, and therefore our related actions are not directed at a person or a potential person. In other words, our actions towards  the sperm are relatively insignificant to it.

    Having a child is an action in which decisions are made concerning an individual’s life. The act of having a child has an object, a potentially forthcoming human being. This individual should not be perceived as a person, however.

    My purpose is not to imply that the object as a person exists at the moment of conception, but having a child affects an individual’s life: the object of this action is a child to be born, and that child usually fulfils the criteria of a person. Therefore, it can be concluded that the act of having a child has an object, but this object is not a person at the moment of conception.

    Hare’s hypothesis is that life itself is a value, the creation of which holds no ethical problems, whereas the prevention and especially termination thereof holds several.

    Biocentrism is of course our naturalistic and natural attitude which has developed during evolution, but it does not imply anything about values as such


    Let us compare this argument with another question on existence, the termination of life.

    Let us assume that an adult human being seems to outsiders in their right minds to be willing to die and to clearly and unambiguously state “Kill me!” Is this sufficient justification for killing this human being?

    Juridically surely not, but what about ethically?
    In my opinion, NO. I believe that a vast majority of people hopefully agrees with my view (even though this is no basis for justifying the value of the action).

    Nonetheless, in the above example case, the actor has more information on the tendencies of the object of  the action than in the example on bringing about life – i.e. in the active deed that aims at creating a new human being, a child. Hence, there is some information available on the desires and intentions of the object of "mercy killing". As for the object of conception, there is no information available on the desires of the (forthcoming) individual. This is also true in the likely case of the (intended) object of the action not existing yet. The fact that it is impossible to have this information when creating new life (having a child) does not change our diverging epistemic attitudes in any way.

    Hence, we cannot know whether it is better to be than not to be.


    Is there an object in the act of having a child (in this context, let us forget the existing environment, possible future relatives, the social security system, society)? Certainly: the sperm and the egg cell. But is there an objectas a person when having a child (not yet at the conception stage) – such as a three-year-old child usually is – for example? My claim is that there is one.

    The basic argument is as follows:we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence  of another individual or –  to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.

    Such arguments have been made concerning the act of having a child that one cannot affect something that does not exist. Is this argument justified? 


    An example

    When planning a statue portraying American rock star Bruce Springsteen, the statue does not exist at the moment of planning. Were the statue project to become successful, however, the statue is the object of the action (or one of them). The statue existed as an object, even if not as an actual and existing one, as early as the brainstorming and planning stage. The participants and executors of the statue project can be justly seen as actors responsible for the execution and act of acquiring the statue. The situation is fully analogous to that of knowingly having a child.

    It is true that the individual does not exist at the moment of conception. The individual also does not exist without the act of conception. Therefore, even though the act of conception is the reason or one of the crucial reasons as to why an individual, fulfilling the requirements of a person, will later be born, this person does not exist at the time of the act – in fact, not even as a potential person (Hare). Can we therefore talk about "true causation"? (Note: if we cannot talk about "true causation", the oft-mentioned concern about future generations and, above all, the moral claim to do something for a better life for the yet unborn future generations – actions to be taken to preserve the Earth in a more viable state, perhaps – is completely absurd.) 


    My argument is that Hare’s viewpoint is unfounded.

    The object of the action is a potentially forthcoming person, in similar manner to sperm and an egg cell. Even though it is a fact that, unlike the egg cell and the sperm that exist at the moment of executing the act – the attempt to have a child – this person does not exist nor will s/he perhaps ever exist (the conception may not be successful, a miscarriage may take place, or other complications may prevent childbirth),the act is to be assessed in connection with the object of the act (the forthcoming human being) and the potential person.

    However, as the person materializes, the individuals behind the act of conception hold central roles in the creation chain of the person. These individuals are therefore, in both good and bad, responsible for the emergence of a certain person.





    Utilitarianism and the best possible world


    Let us conduct a thought experiment and assume that life in general is a better choice for a foetus or sperm than non-life. Let us further assume that this is not true in all cases. If we assume, however, that there is a right – in some cases even a duty – to produce human life, what results is suffering for at least a certain part of humankind.  If this is accepted in the name of the "common good" or greater total benefit, the individuals who have come here to suffer have no intrinsic value – at least not in the Kantian sense. In other words, they are used as instruments for a greater end. Consequently, if we stick to the utilitarian viewpoint, a “person” is no normative absolute that cannot be overstepped. The utilitarian outlook expressly causes that a ”person” – in practice, “persons” – ought to be used as instruments for the greater good. This can surely be – or at least ought to be – self-evident to Hare as well. 

    The inevitable unwanted consequences of actions – the side effects – are an unavoidable consequence of life. This results in a situation where some people will suffer fates that are in no way good or enjoyable. The practical truth is that some people will get themselves used as “test animals” in discharge chamber experiments, or raped by wolfhounds, to mention just a few examples. In other words: we know that creating life inevitably results in unwanted consequences. 

    Surely, one can state that non-life can be an even worse fate than the two examples above. If this were to be true, it might not result in the duty of producing as much life for the Earth as possible, but it would undoubtedly be a supererogatory – a Mother Theresa-like – act. Therefore, it is a considerably immoral deed for social workers or anyone else to persuade potential heroin addict mothers to use contraception or even to terminate their pregnancies! The epistemic state of people being as it is, we cannot plead to the value of creating life with such speculative arguments. 

    What about the counterargument to the fact that the same applies in reverse? We cannot regard furnaces and brain pressure test chambers as barriers to banning life creation, as it is also speculative to assume that these phenomena are worse than non-life. 

    What is the correct answer to the foregoing? One attempted answer could be this: by definition, non-life does not enable any experiencing and therefore also not suffering. To this argument, one can of course comment that no definition given by some creature tells anything about the matter as such. This is surely true, but it is equally true that this is not a case of definition randomly given by some local creature: rather, this refers to the fact that it is a pure analytic truth that non-life cannot contain experiencing, as experiencing is logically enabled by life and life only.

    It can be further argued that what we call non-life is in fact not that: it is possible that before turning into a human person, there is an entity that truly lives but in a form that is not evident to humans. Consequently, one could express the same argument that this non-human life ”can be an even worse fate than the two previously mentioned fates” (those of a test animal in a brain pressure chamber and the rape victim of a wolfhound).  This is a very speculative and perhaps unrealistic statement,  but I do not deny that this would in theory be possible, nor do I deny the characteristic similarity of the counterexamples I have presented. 

    Finally, what can we say about this side of the matter? The answer is strikingly clear. Even if it was the case that we cannot say anything about the supremacy of life or non-life – even in the case that all the world’s current and forthcoming human beings were to experience the fate of those two! – there is an important,  fundamental difference between having a child and not having one (as this is finally the focal issue here): not having a child leaves things as they were. Let us assume that unit A is making a decision on whether or not to have a child.

    In case A does not have a child – and the consequence of this choice is that a greater bad will take place than in the event of A having a child – A will still not have actively influenced the occurrence of this bad. Let us now assume the opposite: A has a child, and the consequence of this choice is that a greater bad will take place than in the event of A not having a child. In this case, it is unquestionably clear that A has actively affected the materialization of this bad.  




    This cannot be it!


    In terms of common sense, the conclusions we have reached are absolutely absurd.
    The gut feeling of many is: ”This cannot be it!” This reaction is fully understandable. This is also the case with the undersigned. Having said that, this natural reaction cannot be regarded as a valid argument, be it as regrettable as it may.

    Let us give Pentti Linkola another chance, however:

    "It is logically absurd that a part – private life – is important and meaningful, but the whole – life in its entirety – is insignificant and dispensable". [7] 

    The fact that private life is important and meaningful, which is also my point of view, is a state of affairs (or, to be more precise, the state of affairs affecting as the viewpoint of a certain creature), which is in relation to a state of affairs within another sphere of life. Regarding these values as ”good” is in some cases of course rational, but not unambiguously logical as such. One could even argue that life in general has value over non-life. Rational reasoning does not give any support to this argument.

    A Linkola-spirited argument to this could be: "Only what is can have value. Non-life cannot have value."

    A possible response could be: "Maybe so, but similarly only what is can have anti-value."


    And I mean this so, that suffering, which would be too well-known for practically everyone, will appear at least in some cases as an antivalue, very negative and sometimes as extremely bad things. Something to really avoid. Things that I have touched on in this article. 

    However, I accept a point of view that for some human being life could be a better option than non-being. But we could never reach any kind of certainty at any case, any circumstances, at any place that life is better for any unborn, potential person.

    Finally, nobody will know is it better for human being born into this world or not. However, we know that if child born into this world, her/his life could be painful, perhaps she/he will suffer really hard. And we also know that we make the decision for her/his life, the unborn child not having any kind of veto-prevention to ignition of her/his life, which she/he only has to live.  

    These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not to create human life in to this world.  







    References

    1 Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1969, 1-19
    2 Wilson 1975, 562
    3 Wilson 1998, 249-250
    4 Wilson 1998, 265
    5 von Wright 1992, 194-195
    6 Hare, Abortion and the Golden Rule. Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, 1975, 201-222
    7 Linkola 1989, 168




    Literature

    Rescher, Nicholas, Introduction to Value Theory. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1969, 1-19. 
    Wilson, Edward O., Sociobiology. The New Synthesis. Cambridge, Belknap 1975.
    Wilson, Edward O., CONSILIENCE. The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1998. 
    Hare, R.M., Abortion and the Golden Rule. Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, 1975, 201-222.
    Published also: Hare, R.M., Essays on Bioethics. New York, Clarendon Press Oxford 1993.
    von Wright, Georg Henrik, Minervan pöllö: esseitä vuosilta 1987-1991. Helsinki, Otava 1992.
    von Wright, G.H, Vetenskapen och förnuftet. Ett försök till orientering. Helsinki, Söderström 1986.
    Linkola, Pentti, Johdatus 1990-luvun ajatteluun. Porvoo, WSOY 1989.
  • tim wood
    8.7k
    Is it wrong to have children? No.
  • dimosthenis9
    837


    No. Neither is not to. It's just a matter of choice.Nothing else. I can't see any complexity here.
  • I like sushi
    4.3k
    Looks like an interesting read. Will get to it soon I hope …
  • I like sushi
    4.3k
    These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not to create human life in to this world.Antinatalist

    Sorry, I missed the arguments? What argument? Suffering isn’t necessarily ‘negative’ either. It is ephemeral and allows learning. Learning is ‘suffering’ to some degree.

    Another point …

    A Linkola-spirited argument to this could be: "Only what is can have value. Non-life cannot have value."

    A possible response could be: "Maybe so, but similarly only what is can have non-value."
    Antinatalist

    That is just plain nonsense.

    The glaringly obvious point that needs to be addressed is what ‘good’ means and what ‘wrong’ means. Also, what exactly is ‘suffering’ and given that there is an underlying idea that life is only worth living if it is pleasure for the most part seems a bit strange.

    Next thing that bothered me is comparing apples with oranges. Saying a statue is like a creating a baby? Is a baby a piece of art now. That just doesn’t work. Analogies are not particularly helpful here I feel.

    Perhaps the main thrust of the problem is actually about ‘meaning’. Does life have meaning? That is, as far as I can tell, a redundant question. Value is an item of a spaciotemporal being. Value is how we navigate the world. The negative aspects of life hit harder than then positive aspects of life because this is how we have evolved to survive. There is no ‘better’ or ‘worse’ in this, it is just how things are.

    Note: I don’t really find the political wrangling that involves abortion or euthanasia to be very interesting either (it’s mainly something used by ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’). Life itself is merely a parcelling of certain aspects of human experience. It is in and of itself a concept that lacks rigorous delineation from its absence. The moral issues surrounding this are always going involve opposing views because we are morally driven creatures. If everyone agreed when and if a human life has value then I’d regard that as the end of humanity (but we wouldn’t know it).
  • javi2541997
    4.9k


    Interesting article. I going to check it out later on with more concentration.
    Is it wrong to have children?

    Yes, absolutely. It is even a selfish act having children in nowadays when everything is surrounded to violence and hate. If it is not worthy to have kids when you are a normal/regular person imagine when you are a theft or a drug dependent. These kind of people shall not be able to have the right of having kids at all.
  • TheMadFool
    13.8k
    Antinatalism has merit if we look at escalating suicide rates. People aren't happy and that they choose to end their lives proves that the thought, "I should never have been born," did cross the minds of suiciders; hence their desperation to take their own lives.

    Antinatalism, however, doesn't hold water if we consider the fact that the majority don't suicide.
  • Tzeentch
    3.3k
    What constitutes a moral act?

    A just intention, the wisdom and ability to make that intention come about, and the intended outcome.

    Lets apply this to having children:


    Just intention

    A just intention seems to apply to many future parents, as they often have the happiness of their child as their intention.

    Some parents may have selfish intentions, and see children as a means to a legacy, to be taken care of at old age, or to simply fulfill an irrational instinctual desire.

    Others still may claim that they have children because without children the human race would die out. This seems disingenuous to me, and is probably a way to mask a more selfish intention.

    Then there are parents whose intentions are unjust and intentionally harmful. For them having children is unquestionably an immoral act.


    Wisdom and ability to make the just intention come about

    While some parents may be more wise and capable than others, even the most wise, capable and well-intentioned parents cannot guarantee the well-being of their child.

    The future life of a child is something we are almost entirely ignorant of. The child could become happy, or it could become miserable. It could succeed on the path laid out for it, or fail completely. Additionally, it is affected by many factors that are not within the parents' control, regardless of their wisdom or intentions.

    This is a prerequisite that I believe the act of having children cannot fulfill. It is simply for a large part out of the parents' control whether their intentions, just as they may be, come about in the way they have envisioned.


    The intended outcome

    Without the intended outcome, it cannot be said an act is moral.

    The intended outcome for a just intention concerning child birth is a happy child - or at least a child that believes their life is worth living and the good outweighs the bad.

    This seems to be the case often enough. So we can state that despite a lack of wisdom and capabilities of the parents to guarantee a good outcome, their just intention can and does come about in spite of this.


    Conclusion

    What are we left with then?

    As I said, my opinion is that the prerequisite of wisdom and capability to make the just intention come about cannot be fulfilled for the act of having children.

    This does not automatically make the act of having children immoral, though. It only makes it one that is ignorant.
  • Outlander
    1.8k
    Foreword: First of all, I´m definitely against murder.Antinatalist

    Hm.. looks like you're scot-free as of now, but we'll be watching. :grin:

    Is it moral to have children? Let's for sake of example, compare a child to say.. something that could do good, do bad, experience pleasure, or immense pain. We arrive at something of a crossroads that yes demands a belief either in disbelief or perhaps one of the greater concepts those who came before held that now escapes the lot of us. So, let's use an offhand example, is making a brick or block of stone for sale moral? After all someone could use it to build a house to house orphans. Or, they could use it to beat a hardworking man to death and take his last morsel thus creating orphans. I suppose there has to be some sort of plan, oversight, or idea that is reasonably likely to occur or not to occur before one can say what is 'moral' or not.
  • 180 Proof
    14k
    It's wrong to have children iff you are compelled to have them, or you're having them transactionally, or you deliberately have them even though you either (A) cannot financially afford to feed cloth shelter & educate them or (B) cannot emotionally afford to care for and cultivate them lovingly. By these criteria it's abundantly clear that too many people should not have children who nonetheless have always had and will keep on having them anyway.
  • I love Chom-choms
    65

    It's wrong to have children iff you are compelled to have them, or you're having them transactionally, or you deliberately have them even though you either (A) cannot financially afford to feed cloth shelter & educate them or (B) cannot emotionally afford to care for and cultivate them lovingly.180 Proof

    I don't think it is wrong to have children.


    The action in itself is neither right or wrong whatever your intentions may be.
    I say this because I think that a couple can choose to have no children or have many children, the right or wrong is decided by the awareness of the couple. Even if the couple are poor and they choose to have children whom they cannot support but they don't have awareness then they are not wrong.(I won't say that they are right but they are not wrong)
    If they are aware that they cannot support their child and still have one, for whatever reason, then they are wrong.
  • 180 Proof
    14k
    You hastily misread me. I didn't claim it was wrong categorically, only under the inadequate conditions specified. This is why I wrote "iff" (if and only if) ...
  • I love Chom-choms
    65
    I don't understand how I read it wrong.
    At the very least, you claim that it is wrong the have children if you cannot take care of them financially and emotionally. I argue that it is wrong only when you are aware of that but still do so. Even if you were forced to have a child knowing you can't care for him/her, you would still be wrong but you would be pardoned a little, like in Buddhism you can lie to save a life, you would be rewarded for saving a life but also punished to lying, the same thing.
  • Antinatalist
    153
    These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not to create human life in to this world.
    — Antinatalist

    Sorry, I missed the arguments? What argument? Suffering isn’t necessarily ‘negative’ either. It is ephemeral and allows learning. Learning is ‘suffering’ to some degree.
    I like sushi

    The basic argument is as follows: we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence  of another individual or –  to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.

    And one foundation of this argument: In case A does not have a child – and the consequence of this choice is that a greater bad will take place than in the event of A having a child – A will still not have actively influenced the occurrence of this bad. Let us now assume the opposite: A has a child, and the consequence of this choice is that a greater bad will take place than in the event of A not having a child. In this case, it is unquestionably clear that A has actively affected the materialization of this bad.  


    Next thing that bothered me is comparing apples with oranges. Saying a statue is like a creating a baby? Is a baby a piece of art now. That just doesn’t work. Analogies are not particularly helpful here I feel.I like sushi

    Arguments have been made concerning the act of having a child that one cannot affect something that does not exist. That´s why there is the Bruce Springsteen -statue example.


    Another point …

    A Linkola-spirited argument to this could be: "Only what is can have value. Non-life cannot have value."

    A possible response could be: "Maybe so, but similarly only what is can have non-value."
    — Antinatalist

    That is just plain nonsense.

    The glaringly obvious point that needs to be addressed is what ‘good’ means and what ‘wrong’ means. Also, what exactly is ‘suffering’ and given that there is an underlying idea that life is only worth living if it is pleasure for the most part seems a bit strange.
    I like sushi


    Of course there could not be objective standards for the ´good´ or ´wrong´ (or ´bad´ or ´right´).
    However, what is ´bad´ or that is ´wrong´ easier  to see than what is ´good´ or what is ´right´.
    Right after I have to admit that we can not construct objective moral claims for what we should not to do.

    At the chapter Utilitarianism and the best possible world I said The practical truth is that some people will get themselves used as “test animals” in discharge chamber experiments, or raped by wolfhounds, to mention just a few examples. In other words: we know that creating life inevitably results in unwanted consequences.

    I think that those who have had to experience the same as the ones in example above, for example in the Second World War, really suffered. That is just a fact.
    Of course everything is not that extreme, and what is suffering and what is not is always not so simple.

    My point of view is not that "life is only worth living if it is pleasure for the most part ".
    My point of view is that having a child is wrong, because it is decision for someone else's life. And we can not know is that life better than never being born.




    One other way to approach the question - Is it wrong to have children? - is anti-utilitarian.

    Let´s assume that it is so, that life in general is more happy than not. And it is better to be than not to be, on average. But we also know that some people really suffer.
    Some might say, that it is not important, that´s life. That is collateral damage.

    I think that is just cruel.
  • TheMadFool
    13.8k
    It's wrong to have children iff you are compelled to have them, or you're having them transactionally, or you deliberately have them even though you either (A) cannot financially afford to feed cloth shelter & educate them or (B) cannot emotionally afford to care for and cultivate them lovingly. By these criteria it's abundantly clear that too many people should not have children who nonetheless have always had and will keep on having them anyway.180 Proof

    :fire: These are tough times!
  • I like sushi
    4.3k
    @Antinatalist I don’t buy any of that. Nor do I find it logically persuasive. Some people REALLY SUFFER therefore having children is bad? That is not even weak, it’s just plain silly.

    Note: I’m assuming there is more? If not take the bombast as not bombast :)
  • I like sushi
    4.3k
    If you cross the road you may get hit by a car … therefore never cross the road. In fact never leave your house just in case.

    Is that different to saying don’t have children because they may lead a life of severe suffering. I don’t think so. Yet I leave the house and cross the road (note: the later is actually dangerous where I live).
  • Antinatalist
    153
    Antinatalist I don’t buy any of that. Nor do I find it logically persuasive. Some people REALLY SUFFER therefore having children is bad? That is not even weak, it’s just plain silly.

    Note: I’m assuming there is more? If not take the bombast as not bombast :)
    I like sushi

    First reason to not to have children: Like I said, it is decision for someone´s else´s life and that someone else pays the consequences of that decision.

    Second reason to not to have children: Even if it is so that life in general, on average, is a better option than never been born at all, this situation does not apply to everyone.
    We know that life causes terrible things for some unlucky people.

    I hope the following will clarify my point of view:

    "Bruno Contestabile and Sam Woolfe cites the story The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas by Ursula K. Le Guin. In this story, the existence of the utopian city of Omelas and the good fortune of its inhabitants depend on the suffering of one child who is tortured in an isolated place and who cannot be helped. The majority accepts this state of affairs and stays in the city, but there are those who do not agree with it, who do not want to participate in it and thus they "walk away from Omelas". Contestabile and Woolfe draws a parallel here: for Omelas to exist, the child must be tortured, and in the same way, the existence of our world is related to the fact that someone is constantly harmed. According to Contestabile and Woolfe, antinatalists can be seen just as "the ones who walk away from Omelas", who do not accept such a world, and who do not approve of its perpetuation. Contestabile poses the question: is all happiness able to compensate for the extreme suffering of even one person?[63][64]"

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antinatalism
  • schopenhauer1
    9.9k

    Hi Antinatalist, as you may already know, I like your arguments.. Things that I have to add here:

    1) Unnecessary, and unwanted harmful impositions are wrong, period, entailed in the fact that it is on someone else's behalf. All life has some minor transactional harms.. Even giving someone a gift can lead to some harm (butterfly effect maybe). However not procreating is one example where absolutely no harm will follow to any ONE (as they won't exist), and no ONE misses out either (Benatarian asymmetry).

    2) Ethics should be based on deontological grounds more than utilitarian, but this doesn't mean that degrees of harm are not existent. Thus, as an example, a very low level theft is wrong, but not as wrong as a theft of someone's life savings or life saving drugs.

    3) Amelioration is inherent in existence. That is to say, we are always compromising minimal harms to alleviate lesser harms. Perhaps the cost of a low level harm of a surprise party (because the person doesn't like being surprised) is what must happen in living in any social milieu. We are always compromising, and imposing on others by necessity. Procreation prevents any need for amelioration. All harms are prevented with no collateral damage.
    a) No one is obligated to bring about happy people
    b) We are obligated to prevent unnecessary harm if it's possible.
    c) Not procreating prevents all unnecessary harm for another person (and conversely doesn't create unnecessary harm on their behalf).
    d) Once existing, ameliorations must take place for life to move forward. Thus though things can have a low level harm, they can be necessary to ameliorate greater harms.
  • schopenhauer1
    9.9k
    Added a bit to the previous post.
  • Antinatalist
    153
    I think that most people are against antinatalism because it seems - or perhaps really is - so unnatural. The evolution is a mechanism, what "decides" whose genes will continue their journey and whose genes don´t.
    If there is genes that correlates for antinatalism views, is it quite clear that those genes are not the genes, that will continue to next generations. At least, those are not the first ones.

    That natalistic attitude is natural and understandable. Of course it is. Human being is animal among others. What separates us from other animals? The ability to consider philosophical topics, at least.
    But this naturalistic, natalistic urge comes from something very deep, cerebral cortex maybe, I don´t know. However, it is like Richard Dawkins said, human being is the only animal who can resist the tyranny of the selfish gene.
  • dimosthenis9
    837
    cannot financially afford to feed cloth shelter & educate them180 Proof

    So poor people shouldn't have children?
  • Antinatalist
    153
    ↪Antinatalist
    Hi Antinatalist, as you may already know, I like your arguments.. Things that I have to add here:

    Unnecessary, and unwanted harmful impositions are wrong, period, entailed in the fact that it is on someone else's behalf. All life has some minor transactional harms.. Even giving someone a gift can lead to some harm (butterfly affect maybe).
    schopenhauer1

    I agree with you.

    However birth is one example where absolutely no harm will follow to any ONE (as they won't exist), and no ONE misses out either (Benatarian asymmetry).schopenhauer1

    Do you mean when somebody - there is not somebody, but how can you express this correctly in natural language - does not born, it will not harm anybody?


    My point of view slightly disagree with Benatar´s. I think, he´s  partly right on that, there´s not done any harm for anyone when not having a child, because there is not anyone (I have to clarify: there are not done any harm for any potential person, some might say that not to have a child is a harm for some people, who want to have children but are not having them).

    I think, Benatar is partly wrong. Theoretically, could be so that life is better than non-life. I personally don´t think it´s true in general, but I like to argue also against my own arguments.
    So, if it so that life is better for someone/some people/everyone than not being at all, is true like Benatar have said there is no harm of losing something or suffering for something good, which cannot be realized. Because there is no one who could suffer from those things.

    But suffering for not having something good is only part of the picture.
    It ignores the theoretical fact that life could be better for "someone" than never being born.
    And for this, some would say there have been done harm not having a child. I understand this point of view, but I don´t agree with that.
    When speaking of doing harm or not doing harm, we also speak of duties and obligations - and rights.

    The following is purely theoretical,

    Let´s assume that life is always better than not life at all, and somehow we can know this fact. Let´s assume that what we call non-life is something where is no experiences at all, there is no one who could experience anything at all.

    I don´t think, even in this situation, that no one has duty to reproduce. I don´t think that not having a child is harm doing for anyone (then again, I have to agree with Benatar on this, although I think he is partly wrong on asymmetry argument). Even situation like this, I don´t think it´s obligation to reproduce.
  • Antinatalist
    153
    2) Ethics should be based on deontological grounds more than utilitarian, but this doesn't mean that degrees of harm are not existent. Thus, as an example, a very low level theft is wrong, but not as wrong as a theft of someone's life savings or life saving drugs.

    3) Amelioration is inherent in existence. That is to say, we are always compromising minimal harms to alleviate lesser harms. Perhaps the cost of a low level harm of a surprise party (because the person doesn't like being surprised) is what must happen in living in any social milieu. We are always compromising, and imposing on others by necessity. Procreation prevents any need for amelioration. All harms are prevented with no collateral damage.
    a) No one is obligated to bring about happy people
    b) We are obligated to prevent unnecessary harm if it's possible.
    c) Not procreating prevents all unnecessary harm for another person (and conversely doesn't create unnecessary harm on their behalf).
    d) Once existing, ameliorations must take place for life to move forward. Thus though things can have a low level harm, they can be necessary to ameliorate greater harms.
    schopenhauer1



    I definitely agree with all of this.
  • 180 Proof
    14k
    Which do you think is easier: to get out of poverty with or without children? Or inversely: whether it's easier to remain poor with children or without?
  • khaled
    3.5k
    Finally, nobody will know is it better for human being born into this world or not. However, we know that if child born into this world, her/his life could be painful, perhaps she/he will suffer really hard.Antinatalist

    Do you think of this when deciding what gift to buy a friend for an occasion then settling on nothing since the gift could be harmful?

    I find it dubious that any action that can risk harming someone automatically becomes wrong if you don’t have their consent.

    Even situation like this, I don´t think it´s obligation to reproduce.Antinatalist

    You seem to have somewhat of a false dichotomy going on. Either one must have children or one must not have children.
  • dimosthenis9
    837


    So what if you never get out of poverty? Why should that be a "stop" for having kids? If I am poor but I wanna have kids and I love them, would that be a bad thing? ​Even if they grow up in a poor environment but with much love is that bad for them?

    They might turn into become great people and growing up in poverty at the end to become an "advantage" for them, cause afterwards they will appreciate more other things which are more essential in life than money.
  • 180 Proof
    14k
    Poverty breeds poverty. I was born in poverty, we eventually got out. Ask any actuary; we were a statistical fluke nationally as well as globally. My mother surviving giving birth and me surviving infancy without congenital or developmental disabilities are also statistically rare under the circumstances. The moral thing is to play the numbers and wait for better material conditions to give a child the best chance to survive and thrive. Still poor but want kids? Help raise some other poor parent's impoverished babies instead of breeding more misery.
  • dimosthenis9
    837


    Then you should be the first to know that. You would prefer not to have been born then? Seems to me that you connect poverty with misery. But that's not right at all imo. Poor people can be happy.Rich people can be miserable also.

    At the end as you escaped from poverty others might hope the same too.If I am a poor guy but I believe that I will make it and escape, why should I abandon hope or even the joy that a kid will bring in my life??

    Help raise some other poor parent's impoverished babies instead of breeding more misery.180 Proof

    No I don't want to. I want to have my own kids and raise them with no misery at all. Why should I help others kid and deprive myself from the joy of having my own kids just because I m poor?
    At the end how many genius scientists have grown up from poor parents and make it afterwards? Should their parents never have them?
  • 180 Proof
    14k
    "Not to be born" is not a preference. :roll:
  • khaled
    3.5k
    No I don't want to. I want to have my own kids and raise them with no misery at all. Why should I help others kid and deprive myself from the joy of having my own kids just because I m poordimosthenis9

    All about me me me me me. No consideration for the child.

    I’d think not having kids you can’t afford is common sense nowadays. Apparently not.
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