I take it that true nails down the particulars of the particular. What does truth do? . — tim wood

I believe it is as I said to creativesoul, truth is the universal, the concept of what it means to be true. So for example, we have individual green things, like we have individual true statements, and we have the concept of what it means to be green, greenness, like we have the concept of what it means to be true, "truth".

When one argues for an independent truth, they are arguing platonic realism.

Not all correspondence(truth) is dependent upon meaning. — creativesoul

Ok, then give me an example of an instance of correspondence which is not meaningful.

Non-linguistic thought/belief doesn't consist of language. Your argument concerns only that which does. That's how... — creativesoul

That my argument only concerns language, is only true if you define "meaningful" in such a way that only language is meaningful. But that's simply begging the question with a false premise. Many things other than language are meaningful, and false premises produce false conclusions.

That is a matter of logic Meta. Whenever there is true thought/belief there must be truth. — creativesoul

You mean a matter of logical fallacy don't you? As I said, truth is the concept of what it means to be true, "the quality or state of being true". Wherever there is something green, is there necessarily the concept of greenness?

Correspondence is a relationship that is necessarily presupposed within all thought/belief formation itself — creativesoul

Simply put, if truth=correspondence as your definition indicates, and there is correspondence within all thought/belief formation, then there is truth within all thought/belief. For the sake of argument, I will assume that this is the case. That is completely consistent with my claim that truth is subjective (of the subject). How would you proceed to get truth out of the subject's mind, to make it objective? Your argument only allows that truth is a part of thought/belief formation, it is something presupposed by the thinking subject, therefore within the mind of the subject.

Conceptions of "truth" require language. Correspondence does not. — creativesoul

But "Truth is correspondence" is a conception of truth. An instance of something corresponding is an instance of something being true, it is not truth itself. Correspondence is truth, but correspondence is the concept of what it means to correspond, so you have equated one concept with the other, "correspondence", and "truth".

Why would we not arrive at a free will choice made by God, at the root, instead of chance?

It is still possible that truth is dependent both on subjects and the objective reality, in which case sentences would be objectively true despite the dependence of this fact itself on subjective interpretation (and in my sense "objectively true" means dependent on the subject-independent reality). — Fafner

I believe that this position, that truth is dependent on both a subject, and on an objective reality, is a common one. It excludes the extreme realist position, which doesn't require subjects for truth, but still assumes an objective reality independent of human existence. This position would allow that truth is a property of knowledge, and even that truth is exclusively found in knowledge because it recognizes the role of the subject in truth, and the subject's role in knowledge is evident and compatible with this.

The issue which arises is the nature of the assumed independent objective reality. Are you acquainted with Kant's claims concerning the distinction between phenomena and noumena? How the assumed objective reality appears to us, is what he calls phenomena, and this is what our knowledge is based in. This is what I call one's interpretation of the objective reality, what is produced by one's senses, and brain, and is how the objective reality appears to the individual. I call that interpretation. When a sentence is said to be "objectively true", the interpretation of the sentence is judged as corresponding with the interpretation of the objective reality (how the objective reality appears to us). So we cannot say that the sentence is "objectively true", in the sense of implying that the meaning of the sentence actually corresponds with the assumed objective reality, but that it corresponds with how the objective reality appears to us, our interpretation of it.

In other words, proving that truth depends on subjects is not the same as proving that there's no objective truth. — Fafner

According to what I just argued, the real object, the thing in itself, the objective reality does not play a part in what you call "objective truth". There is the interpretation of the sentence, carried out by the subject, and the interpretation of the objective reality (how the objective reality appears), carried out by the subject, and the judgement of "true", carried out by the subject. So every aspect of truth is subjective as I defined it. We have no objectivity here.

Now, there is still the assumption of an objective reality, which must be dealt with. Where this assumption plays a role in truth, and it is a pivotal role, is in the trust and faith that we have in ourselves. We have faith, and trust, that our human bodies are giving us an interpretation of the objective reality which is an accurate interpretation. That is to say that we believe that the way that the objective reality appears to us, is a fair representation of how the objective reality actually is. Also, we trust that we have provided ourselves with a proper interpretation of the sentence.

This trust which we have in ourselves, trust in our own capacities, is crucial to truth. It is crucial because we do not define truth as a correspondence between the meaning of the sentence and how the world appears to us, but we define it more as you say, as correspondence between the sentence and the objective reality. So there are two forms of trust in our own capacities, which are involved with truth. We trust our capacity to interpret the sentence, and we trust our capacity to make the objective reality (through sensation and apprehension) appear as it really is. Therefore we define true as "the sentence corresponds with reality", when we really mean that the interpretation of the sentence corresponds with how reality appears to us. That we have interpreted the sentence properly, and that reality appears as it really is, we tend to take for granted because we have confidence, "trust" in our own capacities. This trust, or confidence, is implied within the concept of truth, because without this assumed correspondence between the interpretation and the reality, truth is meaningless.

What about free choice? Can't that necessitate one possible state of affairs over another?

You wrote:

Truth is dependent on meaning, and meaning is dependent on interpretation, therefore truth is dependent on interpretation.

That is the original argument you offered. — creativesoul

Again, you've offered a dreadful representation of my argument. You even added quotations as if it's what I actually wrote. Here's what I actually wrote:

Being true requires being meaningful. Whether or not the statement is meaningful is contingent on interpretation. Therefore being true is contingent on interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

This was in response to your affirmation that being meaningful is required for the truth of a statement:

If it was further qualified by saying something like the truth of a statement is contingent upon it's being meaningful, I would agree. — creativesoul

Now you claim:

Not all truth is dependent upon meaning. — creativesoul

That something which is not meaningful could be true, is contrary to what you said earlier. So this new position of yours, "not all truth is dependent on meaning", is something you'll need to clarify. Obviously, we had agreement earlier that meaning is required for the truth of a statement. A sentence which is meaningless cannot be true. Are you rescinding your agreement?

I think I understand what you're trying to get at. You think that there is truth to things other than statements, and this truth does not require meaningfulness. How is this possible, that there could be truth to something which is not meaningful? If you come to respect the reality, that this is not a viable option, then we're back at my argument. For something to be meaningful requires that it is interpreted as such, and therefore truth requires interpretation.

The underlying issue here is clear. You've neglected to take an account of pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief. — creativesoul

I don't see how non-linguistic thought/belief affects my argument. The truth of non-linguistic thought/belief is still dependent on interpretation even if you define "meaning" in such a way that only language has meaning, and insist that things without meaning could be true. Things other than language are interpreted.

Try this...

Thought/belief is prior to language.
Some pre-linguistic thought/belief is true.
True thought/belief is existentially contingent upon truth.
Thus, some truth is prior to language. — creativesoul

Well, I really don't know what you mean by "true thought/belief is existentially contingent on truth", or how you could apprehend this as a true premise. What is truth other than a concept? Are you claiming here, that if there is a true belief, then there must be an existing concept of "truth"? How is that a viable premise? If there was green plants on the earth prior to human beings, then the concept of "green" must have existed prior to human beings?

Let's say that there was green plants prior to language, why would these green plants be existentially contingent on the concept of greenness? Likewise, if there was true thought/belief prior to language, why would this be existentially contingent on truth (trueness)?

Truth value is not truth. Truth conditions are not truth. The conclusion introduces new terms, and as such it is invalid. — creativesoul

Actually, I was working off of Fafner's definition of "truth". Fafner defined "truth" as when the truth conditions expressed by a sentence, obtain. My argument was that truth, as defined, is dependent on there being truth conditions of the sentence, and this is dependent on interpretation, therefore truth is dependent on interpretation. Then Fafner changed the terms, to talk about "truth value", claiming that a truth value was not dependent on interpretation, so I adjusted my argument to deal with that new terminology.

If you think that you have a definition of "truth" which does not succumb to this argument, then by all means, present it.

You're conflating being mistaken with being and/or becoming aware of that. — creativesoul

That's not so, because someone can judge you as being mistaken whether or not you are aware of it. This does not change the fact, which I am trying to impress upon you, that being mistaken requires a judgement.

All A's are B. All B's require C. All A's require C. — creativesoul

This is not a representation of my argument at all. As I explained to Fafner, I only argue contingencies, no predication. I do not say all A's are B's. I say A's are dependent on B's, and B's are dependent on C's, therefore A's are dependent on C's. A= the truth value of the sentence, B= the truth conditions of the sentence, and C= interpretation by the mind of a subject. I conclude that truth is derived from, or "of the subject", and cannot be any part of a supposed independent objective reality.

Furthermore, in our latest round of discussion, we've moved on to the issue of A, the truth value of the sentence. As I've been arguing now, this is an issue which itself requires a judgement. Since the mind of a subject is the only thing (other than God) which might make such a judgement, the subjective nature ("of the subject") is reinforced by this fact. And it becomes increasingly evident that truth cannot be a part of any independent objective reality (unless we assume God or some other mind to make that judgement).

So we can conclude that the mind of a subject is required for truth in two distinct aspects, first to interpret the sentence, and second, to judge the truth value.

Recap:

One forms a mistaken interpretation when s/he mistakenly attributes meaning. That is... when one attributes meaning where none belongs... s/he is mistaken; s/he has misunderstood. S/he thinks/believes that something means something other than it does. — creativesoul

There is no right or wrong, or mistaken interpretation, unless it is judged in comparison with another interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rubbish.

An interpretation is wrong by virtue of (mis)attributing meaning. — creativesoul

Like any other incidence of right or wrong, correct or incorrect, good or bad, an interpretation is only wrong by virtue of being judged as such. — Metaphysician Undercover

If what you say here were true, there would be no difference between calling something "wrong" and being wrong. — creativesoul

To be "wrong" is to be discordant in relation to some principle, rule, or law. That something is in disagreement with such a principle, requires a comparison of the thing with the principle, and a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

The issue at hand is the question of whether an interpretation can be wrong (mistaken) without having been judged as that. You claimed that when one attributes meaning where none belongs, this is a mistake. I claimed that if the person perceives meaning there, then there is meaning there. That this is a mistake is only determined through a further judgement. You seem to think that an interpretation can be inherently mistaken (wrong) without being judged to be wrong.

It's like if a person describes the precise way a victim were killed and locates the body without having apparent access to that information, I'd not call that person a psychic, but instead a suspect. — Hanover

Buzzkill!

Spacetime is a thing made up of space and time. — litewave

OK, I agree, spacetime is something "made up".

Activity outside of spacetime doesn't make sense to me. — litewave

Why not, we're talking about real activity aren't we? And spacetime is made up. Made up, and real are mutually exclusive. N'est-ce pas? If so, then all real activity is outside of spacetime.

The notion of action presupposes time, and also some kind of space in which the action or change is defined. — litewave

I might go along with this. But before you were talking about one thing, "spacetime", and now you are talking about two distinct things, time and space, so you have changed the subject, divided it into two distinct subjects.

I don't understand how your sentence about field and particle is related to this. — litewave

A field is a concept based in spacetime. The fact that the position of the particle cannot be determined through the use of the field indicates that there is activity outside of the field (not covered by the field), and quite likely outside of spacetime.

Here's an example of why it is important, in this type of discussion, to distinguish between the thing referred to, and the attributes, or properties which the thing is said to have.

Suppose I say "let's talk about the blue sky". You say "yes, I see the blue". I say, "no, I'm talking about the sky, not the blue, look at the sky". Unless you get to the point of accepting that there is something there, being referred to as "the sky", which is blue, you will never proceed toward an understanding of why the blue appears there.

Did I say that?

I've gone to pains to show you how the notion of properties is fraught; perhaps it is you who lacks effort. — Banno

Right, your "pains" amounts "ahhh, I can't relate to this!": followed by the refusal for further engagement.

If you disagree with the word "body" then just use the word "object" or "thing". — litewave

Sure, but do you distinguish between material things like bodies, and immaterial things like souls?

In new agey conceptions the soul acts, moves and evolves, so it exists in spacetime. — litewave

Action is not confined to "in spacetime". That's why the concept of "a field" will not tell the physicist where a particle is.

A soul is a special kind of conscious body that exists and evolves in spacetime, and in its life, movement, actions and perceptions it uses various outfits, devices and vehicles, as we would use clothes (for protection, special function or for fun), sensory aids (to enable or enhance our perception in special kinds of environment), tools, or means of transport such as cars, ships or submarines. — litewave

The soul is explicitly "not a body", therefore it cannot be a "special kind" of body. Since it is not a body, it is highly unlikely that it exists in space-time, because space-time is a concept which was developed to account for the motion of bodies.

I just can't come at this "properties" stuff, Meta. — Banno

That's simply because you refuse to try (denial). You should try though, if you are truly interested in issues like this, because it is very important ontologically, to distinguish between the thing being referred to, and the properties which that thing is said to have.

If you mix these two up, as you've demonstrated with your misunderstanding of reincarnation, and refer to the property as if it were the thing, then you and the reincarnationist are referring to different things. There will be no understanding until you first recognize the thing being referred to.

Why "reincarnation", not "incarnation"? — Banno

As the principle of actuality of a living body, the soul is necessarily prior to the actual living body.

The problem with reincarnation, as it is commonly apprehended, is that we think of the soul as a property of the body, rather than the proper conception which is the inverse of this, the body is the property of the soul. So you ask questions like how is it possible that myself was formerly someone else's self. This just displays that misconception of assuming the soul as a property of the body.

What accounts for this possible world being actual instead of one of the others? — Brayarb

I believe this is an incorrect assumption. All the possible worlds are possible. There is nothing to distinguish one from the others as the actual world, because this would render others as impossible. If you choose to name one of the possible worlds the "actual" world, this is just a random choice, and it means nothing other than that you decided to call this possible world by that name.

You can shout indignities all you want, but the point remains. You haven't explained how you think something could be wrong without having been judged as such.

I limit truth to things I can know the truth about (whether me, or collective knowledge subject to refinements and adjustments). If I do not or cannot know a truth, it would be an error I try not to make to claim it as truth. But nothing in this denies the possibility of truths I do not know. — tim wood

Let me see if I understand you. There are things which you do not know, and even human beings do not know, but there is still a possibility for truth there. But this possibility for truth is limited, because you are assuming that there are things which cannot be known.

Why enact such a restriction against "the possibility of truths"? If you are allowing to truth, the status of possibility, such that "possible truths", are something real which we can talk about, on what basis would you limit the "possible truths"? Consider that possible truths, according to your description refers to unknowns. How can you propose a separation within the unknown, such that some of the unknown is knowable, and some is not knowable. Wouldn't you have to know the unknown in order to establish your division. Then wouldn't that division just be a new division between known and unknown (actual truth and possible truth). On what basis would you say that there cannot be truth concerning some things? Isn't that anti-philosophical (philosophy being the unrestricted desire to know), and inconsistent with your claim "that things are consistent with some law"

Justification. Way back I asked you to justify justification. I don't think you did. If you can have any truth or knowledge without justification then you can have it all. The need for justification goes out the window. — tim wood

Justification is the act of demonstrating the correctness of one's proposition or belief. The act must be successful, in order that the proposition or belief is justified. Agreement is the result. As we've discussed, agreement is more of a hashing out, negotiation, mediation, compromise, rather than a case of I justify my belief through convincing you. However, what comes about from this "process", is justified belief.

Truth, as I've been arguing is perspective dependent. But there is a vast universe which your perspective does not allow you access to. We could apply the term "possible truth" here. These things are in principle knowable, but they are not knowable to me, due to the limitations of my perspective. So I allow that others, such as you, have possible truths, things which I could know if I were in your perspective, but since I am not in your perspective, I don't know them, so they are not actual truths.

You may claim that the things you know are actual truths, just like I would claim that the things I know are actual truths, but I see your truths as possible truths, like you see mine as possible truths. Since I allow that what you claim is possibly true, I invite you to justify your claim. If you can, I might accept it into my personal collection of truths, it becomes part of my perspective.

We cannot throw justification out the window, because it is the means by which we broaden our perspectives. Things which you have observed, learned, and believe may be passed to me, through justification. Justification is the means by which we aspire toward knowing the "whole picture", rather than just a unique perspective. This is the process of unity by which we create a world view.

Or perhaps justification is merely the structure of argumentation that uses and relies on these various groundings. No matter, in every case justification bestows nothing of added significance. If some proposition is accepted as proven, then to say it's justified means - adds - nothing. — tim wood

Yes, that's kind of how I view justification. Butit's much more than just argumentation, it's the whole process of discussing, arguing, and coming to agreement, on how we should use words, etc.. The point in adding to the discussion, this concept of justification, is to distinguish between true and justified. Propositions are not often "proven", they are offered for one reason or another, for a purpose, for the sake of argument for example. You might say that the one offering a proposition might seek to "prove" it through demonstration, perhaps offering proofs. If the proposition is accepted, we can say that it has been justified, but this does not necessarily mean that it has been "proven". The proposition is accepted because it has been demonstrated to be adequate for the intended purpose. This does not mean that it has been "proven" in the sense of having been demonstrated to be true.

You seem to suggest that, although we may agree this object is a blue chair, we could be mistaken - the proposition, "This is a blue chair," could be false. The short answer is, so what?! If the ultimate collective judgment is that it's a blue chair, then mere doubt or skepticism is out of court. Everyone is free to question and investigate in an appropriately responsible way all day long. But mere ungrounded contrariness is a short road to chaos. — tim wood

What you express here is not philosophical thought. The accepted "collective judgement" is often wrong, as demonstrated by concepts like geocentrism, and spontaneous generation, to name a couple. You offer the standard argument against skepticism, insinuating that one should only doubt the aspects of collective judgement which are wrong, because to doubt everything would be a waste of time. The problem is, that the aspects which are wrong, are not exposed as wrong, until after they are subjected to the skeptic's tools of doubt. Therefore the skeptic must doubt everything or else the skepticism is not very meaningful.

it appears here that you concede dialectic truth but reserve truth itself as something that apparently cannot be known, about things at any rate. The idea of truths that cannot be known I'm inclined to denominate nonsense. Perhaps you can adduce an example of one, and I do not mean by conjecture or speculation. As to non-things like mathematical entities, i assume you acknowledge that certain propositions about same are true, and draw on the truth of their subject matter. — tim wood

I don't know what you mean by "dialectic truth". I was only emphasizing the difference between justified and true. I have difficulty with the entire paragraph.

And this is where the problem with your argument lies, because you start from the premise that truth conditions of sentences depend on interpretation (which I accept), but your conclusion says that it follows that sentences having the truth value that it does is also dependent on interpretation (a claim that I reject), and this is an equivocation because having truth conditions and having a particular truth value are two different things. — Fafner

There is no such problem with my argument. The truth value of the sentence (A), is dependent on the truth conditions of the statement (B), which is dependent on the interpretation (C). If A is dependent on B, and B is dependent on C, then A is dependent on C. If cows are dependent on grass, and grass is dependent on the sun, then cows are dependent on the sun.

Yes, the truth value is something which is quite different from the truth condition, as you've graciously explained. Notice my example, grass is quite different from the sun. But there is no ambiguity or equivocation, it's simply the case that there cannot be a truth value of the sentence without a truth condition of the sentence, just like there cannot be a truth condition without an interpretation. Therefore there cannot be a truth value without an interpretation.

I'd like to see the argument for this claim. Because judging that 'cats fly' is true, is not the same as 'cats fly' itself being true. — Fafner

Did you read the part of my last post addressed to creativesoul?

What's the difference between saying something is wrong and something being wrong? — creativesoul

That all depends on how you define "being wrong". If it requires a professional judge, a jury, or God, to determine "being wrong", then the average individual saying "that's wrong" is quite different from actually being wrong. If it doesn't require any special judgement criteria, then my word is as good as your word, and you are wrong, because I say so, and I am wrong because you say so. But of course, I think there is a special judgement needed for actually "being wrong". The problem is that the required special judgement is not well agreed upon, some refer to God, and some do not. That's why I ask, what qualifies as "being wrong" for you? What type of special judgement is needed to fulfill the conditions of actually being wrong in your opinion?

But it all depends on what you mean by 'truth' here. Are we talking about truth conditions or truth values? Because indeed sentences having truth conditions is dependent on subjects (i.e., that sentences mean something that can be either true or false), but it is not the case that it depends on subjects whether a sentence itself is true or false. — Fafner

It was your definition of truth I was working with. You said that truth is when the truth conditions expressed by a sentence obtain. My argument was that according to this definition, truth is dependent on an expression of truth conditions. Further, it was my premise that an expression of truth conditions is dependent on the mind of a subject. Therefore truth, according to your definition is dependent on the mind of a subject.

2. The truth of 'cats fly' doesn't depend on the existence of subjects, but on whether cats fly. — Fafner

According to the argument above, this is a false premise.

So you cannot argue that the negation of (2) follows from (1), because (1) talks about the meaning of the sentence, while (2) about its truth. To show that (2) is false, it is not enough to appeal to the subject-dependence of interpretation, because truth in the sense of (2) has nothing to do with interpretation (as it is defined) but with what the world itself is like objectively. — Fafner

This is false, because according to your definition of "truth", truth is dependent on a sentence expressing a truth condition, and this is dependent on an interpretation from a subject. Therefore, as defined, truth does have something to do with interpretation, interpretation (the expression of its truth condition) is required for truth.

Now the problem here is that the second premise (2') is ambiguous between 'truth' in the sense of having truth conditions (like in (1) - which I accept) and having a truth value (in which case I would reject the premise). But since the conclusion (3') talks about a truth value (you've claimed that the truth of 'cats fly' is dependent on subjects and not the world), then for the argument to be valid 'truth' in (2') must mean the same thing as in (3'). But on this reading of (2'), it is false on my view, because the truth of 'cats fly' is dependent on whether cats fly (according to my understanding of 'truth'), and not on the meaning of the sentence. So you need a different argument to show that (2') is true on this reading. — Fafner

Earlier, you gave me a definition of "truth". The argument, as you admit is valid, and therefore "truth" as you defined it is dependent on the existence of a subject. Now you are talking about "truth value" which you have yet to define, so you have effectively changed the goal posts, but I have no idea what you mean by "truth value".

b. Which truth value ('true' or 'false') 'cats fly' in fact has, is not dependent on its meaning, but only on whether cats actually fly. — Fafner

If this is what you mean by "truth value", then truth value is dependent on a judgement. A judgement, as well as a truth condition, is dependent on a thinking subject. Therefore to have a truth value is also dependent on a subject. This is the issue creativesoul has taken up with me. Read my reply below.

Being judged as wrong is being called "wrong". Something can be called "wrong", but that doesn't make it so. If what you say here were true, there would be no difference between calling something "wrong" and being wrong. — creativesoul

Right, being judged as wrong is what makes something wrong. That's not "rubbish" it's reality. To be "wrong" is to be discordant in relation to some principle, rule, or law. That something is in disagreement with such a principle, requires a comparison of the thing with the principle, and a judgement. You can say that this is rubbish all you want, but your assertions won't change reality.

As I already explained, it is uninteresting because your definition of subjectivity ("involving subjects") is perfectly compatible with the possibility of objective truth, so therefore your argument doesn't prove anything. And the reason that you don't see this is because you are constantly sliding back and forth between different senses of "subjective" without noticing. — Fafner

I told you that I adhere to one definition of subjective. Despite your assertion, you have yet to demonstrate any equivocation on my part. I believe your assertion is the product of a faulty interpretation on your part.

And secondly, I also showed you that your argument is logically fallacious anyway, so it doesn't even matter how you define "subjectivity". And I have seen no response from you concerning this point. — Fafner

Further, I haven't seen this demonstration. My argument is that the existence of truth is dependent on the existence of a subject, and therefore cannot be any part of a supposed independent objective reality. Your demonstration of fallaciousness was based on a misrepresentation of my argument. When I showed you this, you just said my conclusion is uninteresting. So be it.

Two days ago I wrote a very detailed post explaining to you where exactly your arguments go wrong, but you have completely ignored most of the points that I made. Why do I even bother... — Fafner

I addressed any point which appeared relevant. if you're uninterested, then don't bother.

And just to remind you why your argument is logically invalid. Your argument goes like this:

1. Truth depends on interpretation
2. Interpretation is subjective,
3. Therefore truth is subjective.

Here's a parallel example that shows why this doesn't work:

1. Cows depend on grass.
2. Grass is green,
3. Therefore, cows are green.

Do you see the problem? — Fafner

See, your example misrepresents my argument again, just like last time, despite me having explained your misrepresentation. I do not argue predication, like "grass is green". I argue dependence, it is an argument of contingency. That the grass is green is irrelevant. The proper conclusion in your example, should be "therefore cows cannot exist in a world without grass". Just like my conclusion is that truth cannot exist in a world without subjects.

It appears perhaps that you are taking my definition of subjective, "of the subject", and inferring that this means "property of the subject". But I am not arguing properties, I am arguing contingencies, so "of the subject" means derived from the subject, produced, or created by the subject. This may be where your problem of interpretation lies.

I was just trying to help you... This only makes your argument even weaker than I though it was, because the conclusion is trivial and proves nothing of any interest as I already showed. — Fafner

What lacks interest to you, may be interesting to me, that's just human nature.

I did give a definition of 'objective truth' way back, in terms of truth conditions. And nothing that you've said shows that it is not 'acceptable'. — Fafner

Your definition is unacceptable because the way you defined "objective truth" ensures that it is necessarily subjective. If this fact is uninteresting to you, then so be it.

An interpretation is wrong by virtue of (mis)attributing meaning. — creativesoul

Like any other incidence of right or wrong, correct or incorrect, good or bad, an interpretation is only wrong by virtue of being judged as such. That's simply the nature of right and wrong, they are the product of judgement.

Quantum physics is micro-phenomena, irrelevant in the macro world of chairs and cows. I understand that quantum uncertainty attaches a probability that the bow of the battleship USS Massachusetts will appear in my living room (with the rest outside), but I also understand that I really don't have to worry about it. And the same with any other quantum phenomena at "street" level. Truth, then, if it means anything at all, that meaning is neither conditioned nor constrained by any quantum considerations. (The level of precision of this claim, being just the odds against the battleship appearing, is far greater than the level of precision of any other measurement of anything that is measured.) — tim wood

I think this is a very naïve perspective. It appears like you are limiting "truth", to the concerns of things which we can see with our eyes. But the vast majority of things which exist cannot be seen, either they are too small, or too large, or for some other reason, cannot be seen, like air. Surely you recognize that the activity of electrons plays a very important part in your life. So why would you even consider excluding this from "truth", as if there is truth concerning chairs, but no truth concerning electrons.

There is a related issue which is more and more coming to light in the philosophy of science. Scientists produce experiments in a controlled environment with very specific parameters. The "size" of the experiment is neither micro nor macro, in relation to the things which exist in the universe, which range from very large to very small. from their observations, they may extrapolate, and make conclusions concerning the entirety of the universe, which we might call laws. But there is no reason to believe that the very small things, or the very large things behave in the same way as the medium size things, which are the things that are observed.

If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that there can only be truth relative to these medium size things. But why? Just because the human perspective doesn't give one the capacity to directly observe these huge, and tiny things, which are just as much a part of reality as the medium size things. Why would you think that there can be truth concerning medium size things, but no truth concerning huge things, or tiny things?

I describe, you describe (they describe). We tally the descriptions, and they agree! For present purpose let's suppose we all agree it's a blue chair. — tim wood

But the descriptions do not all agree, that's the point. We have to force our own descriptions, adapt them, to make them agree. This is compromise. I see the chair as green, you see it as blue, so we decide that it must be bluish green, or greenish blue. In most cases agreement requires discussion. It is not the case that we tally up the descriptions and they agree, we discuss how things appear from each of our own perspective, then make conclusions about how the things "must be", to fulfill the conditions of the different descriptions.

Is their anything objective, here? I think there is. If we can agree on blueness and chairness, and that these are combined in one object, then it seems reasonable to conclude that there is an object that just is blue and a chair: a blue chair. — tim wood

As I've been saying, I agree, that this is "objective". Agreement produces a form of objectivity, but it is an objectivity based in justification, it does not mean "objective" in the sense of "of the object" as Fafner implies with "objective reality", and "objective truth". The fact that even though we might all agree on something, it might still be false, indicates that the form of "objectivity" derived from agreement or justification, is not the same as "objectivity" when used in "objective truth".

The proposition, "That is a blue chair," then, is true. But it draws from the truth of the matter of there being a blue chair. That truth, I argue, is objective and "lives' in the collective judgment that affirms it. And its objectivity is not that of the blue chair, which is a real existing thing (as established and constituted by collective judgment), it is instead of the same objectivity as numbers, like four, or seven. — tim wood

The proposition "that is a blue chair", is justified. Agreement constitutes justification, and this justification produces a sort of objectivity which might commonly be referred to as objective knowledge. But this agreement does not necessitate that it is the truth, so this is not an objective truth.

Hi tim, nice to see that you've gotten back in the thread, and that you haven't given up hope on finding truth. Nor have I, but I still see no way of getting beyond this problem of interpretation. Do you recognize that some speculative physicists have adopted "information theory" as a means of side-stepping the problem of interpreting quantum uncertainty? When uncertainty is taken as a fundamental property of reality, (which is what special relativity gives us), rather than as an incapacity of the observer to interpret reality, then I believe we forfeit the notion of "truth" as commonly understood by individuals; "truth" as commonly understood being ensured by our commitment to God.

MU has been indefatigably insisting on this through a couple of hundred posts in this thread alone. I think he is in the position of the man who says there is no such thing as a chair because it's all made of atoms, or whatever. I won't say he is that man, but I'll leave it to him to say he isn't. The point is that the chair man is entirely correct, but completely wrong. — tim wood

This is not quite what I am saying. I am not saying that there is no such thing as a chair, that what you're looking at is atoms, or fundamental particles, or quantum fields, or whatever. What I am saying is that it is a chair, and it is fundamental particles, etc.. What it is, is however it is interpreted. Remember, I do not deny truth, I only assert that it is subjective. Are you familiar with Stephen Hawking's notion of "model-dependent realism", put forth in "The Grand Design"? Essentially, it is an ontology which assumes that there is no fundamental reality independent from the model. Reality is as it is modeled. This perspective is a good introduction to "many worlds", which employs similar principles.

But how is it completely wrong? It destroys the possibility of meaning beyond that agreed to by interested parties or imposed by force. If you say, "Sure, agreement is good; that's all we have anyway!" What you mean is that's all we have as a matter of force. You have thrown reason out the window - after all it's all interpretation. — tim wood

Let's just assume that there is meaning beyond that which is agreed, or imposed by force (I would prefer "taught" rather than "imposed by force", because any agreement imposed by force is not a true agreement and without agreement how could there be this type of meaning?). What kind of existence could that meaning have? If there is no need for it to be interpreted for it to exist as meaning, what kind of existence could it have?

I believe that it is a common assumption, to assume that there is something which exists independent of being interpreted. We describe that existence and our descriptions have meaning. We observe a compatibility between our descriptions, and the assumed independent existence. Does this compatibility justify the claim that meaning is independent of our descriptions? How do you bridge that gap, to say that our descriptions have meaning, and there is compatibility between the descriptions and the thing described, so the thing described must have meaning?

I don't understand your criticism about throwing reason out the window. Isn't reason a tool of interpretation? How would claiming "it's all interpretation" be a case of throwing reason out the window?

Interpretation is the attribution of meaning. One can mistakenly attribute meaning. — creativesoul

This is where you demonstrate your confusion. An interpretation is an interpretation. There is no right or wrong, or mistaken interpretation, unless it is judged in comparison with another interpretation. There is no mistake inherent within the interpretation, "mistake" is a product of the external judgement which designates the interpretation as inadequate. So when one interprets, or as you say, attributes meaning, this act is never in itself a mistaken act. If one attributes meaning to something, then there is meaning there, and this is not a mistaken act, despite the fact that you might judge it as a mistaken act, claiming there is no meaning there. It is only your judgement which claims that the interpretation is mistaken. Even if millions or billions of people say there is no meaning there, this does not make it true that there is no meaning there. Sure, the fact that the billions of others see no meaning there makes that person "wrong" according to the judgement of the billions, but this does not make it true that there is no meaning there. If the person sees meaning there, then for that person there is meaning there.

There are different senses of "subjective" here that we shouldn't mix together. Initially you have used "subjective" to mean something that is incompatible with objective truth, but now you are using it in a weaker and more broader sense as anything that is related to subjects. But subjective in this other sense can be perfectly compatible with objective truth, since many things that have to do with subjects are themselves perfectly objective (e.g., if I have a toothache, it's an objective fact about me). Obviously all cognition is 'subjective' in the sense the it involves subjects, but this is a trivial claim, and doesn't prove that cognition cannot itself objectively grasp reality. — Fafner

Are you not paying attention? I've stated numerous times that I am adhering to a definition of subjective which is "of the subject". If you are interpreting anything other than this, then that is your mistake, and the ambiguity is produced by your own mind.

Furthermore, I distinguished between two senses of "objective", which you now demonstrate that you haven't yet understood. The weaker sense of "objective", epistemological objectivity, by which we have "objective knowledge", is produced by common agreement. Since it is an agreement amongst subjects, it is inherently subjective, and better called inter-subjective than "objective". So when a statement is justified, many people agree, and we call this objective knowledge. But the fact that many people agree does not make it truth. The stronger sense of "objective", ontological objectivity, means "of the object". This is what you imply when you say "objective reality", and "objective truth", that what you refer to is a true condition of the object, rather than an idea produced by common agreement.

So in your example, when you say things like having a toothache are objective, you refer to the weaker sense of "objective". That you have a tooth ache, may be justified, and agreed upon, such that it is an inter-subjective reality, therefore it is compatible with this sense of "objective". But the fact that it is justified, and agreed upon, and "objective" in that way, does not make it an objective truth. You may have fooled everyone into thinking that you have a tooth ache, when you really do not. And if you think, "no it is really true, I really do have a tooth ache", then this is what I mean by subjective. It is your mind, the mind of a subject, which "knows" that it is true that you have a toothache, while everyone else is skeptical because you've fooled them in the past. Do you see the gap, between what you as a subject know to be true, and what is known by many, through agreement, because it is justified? The latter knowledge is "objective", because it is justified and agreed upon, and the former is subjective and true. But how do we get to an objective truth?

And now, about interpretation, if you think about actual cases where it makes sense to talk about interpretation, then it actually shows that 'interpretation' is something that is usually aimed at achieving an objective grasp of something which itself is not subjective. Here are some examples (and they could be multiplied): — Fafner

Your examples display the same sort of confusion as creativesoul demonstrated. There is no such thing as correct or incorrect translation of a language into another. Two translators will translate each in one's own way. If someone judges the two, or one judges the other, it may be argued that one is correct and the other incorrect, or the two might be exactly the same. In any case, a single translation, as an interpretation, is just that, an interpretation, it is neither correct nor incorrect until judged as such. And that the judge believes the translation to be correct or incorrect, is a property of the judge, a belief of the judge, it is not a property of the translation.

I reject your claim that all interpretations are necessarily subjective (in the sense of being incompatible with objective truth - see above) — Fafner

You haven't yet given me an acceptable definition of "objective truth", just like you've failed in your attempt to provide an acceptable definition of "objective reality". What you gave me above, is "objective" in the sense of agreed upon by others, but this is inter-subjective, justified, and there is a difference between justified and true. Just because many people agree, does not mean that it is true.

It's nonsense on stilts. — creativesoul

Why the stilts? Afraid to step into the river of truth?

Or can you believe something without understanding it? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Sure you can believe something without understanding what you believe. I think that's very common. Someone tells you something, you believe it, without doubt or reflection, because you have faith in the person's trustworthiness, or authority. Then you tell others. It's like you say, we having the capacity to regurgitate what is fed to you. I think that a large portion of the "knowledge" which exists today is like this, belief without understanding.

The problem being, that science is primarily, or only, concerned with what can be measured or quantified. The 'domain of the qualitative', so to speak, is then regarded as a matter of private belief, tantamount to a matter of opinion. — Wayfarer

Science attempts to quantify any quality, though there are qualities which cannot be quantified. That's just the nature of reality, not all qualities can be reduced to quantity. This is most evident in the top quality, good, though attempts have been made, such as utilitarianism, to quantify the good.

If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them. — Banno

You've already presented (or represented) the situation as "the keys are locked in the car" when you said "if the keys are locked in the car". So the question would be how could you present (or represent) this situation in another way. And, I'm sure it could be done with another language. So we should conclude that "the keys are locked in the car" is not the fact, but your presentation (representation) of the fact, even if the keys are locked in the car. The keys are locked in the car is not fact, even if the keys are locked in the car.

When we disagree, what is it that we are disagreeing on - our use of words, or the state-of-affairs that the words refer to? — Harry Hindu

In most cases when I disagree with someone it has to do with their use of words.

"Interpretation is required for truth" only indirectly via the fixing of meaning, but the truth of the sentence--given some determinate interpretation--is not itself open to interpretation. — Fafner

Not so fast. Let's say that we have a fixed, determinate interpretation of the sentence. That interpretation must be related to some sort of reality, in order that there is a truth to that interpretation. As you said, the truth conditions must "obtain". Do you see that reality must be interpreted as well, in order that there is a truth of the sentence? What makes you think that there is a fixed and determinate reality? A fixed meaning of the sentence cannot provide truth if there is no corresponding fixed reality. And, in referring to accepted notions of time, it seems quite evident that there is no such fixed reality.

Also, as I already told you, I completely reject your assumption that all interpretations are subjective by their nature, because there's nothing in the concept itself to suggest that this must be the case. — Fafner

Are you saying that there is nothing in the concept of interpretation, to suggest that an interpretation is necessarily subjective? Remember how I defined subjective as "of the subject". Do you know of anything else, other than the mind of a subject, which could give us an interpretation? If so, name it. Is it God or something like that? Otherwise I think you're just spouting bullshit.

Here's a simply example to illustrate my point. Cows depend on grass for food, but does it follow that cows are like grass, or that they share some of their properties in common? (that they are green like the grass etc.) Obviously not - so the existence of some dependence relation between two things doesn't license you to infer anything from the properties of the one to the properties of the other. So even if I grant you your premise (which I don't) that meaning is in some sense subjective (--grass), it will not follow that truth is also subjective (--cows) only because it is dependent on meaning. — Fafner

You haven't provided a proper analogy. My argument would be like this. Grass is dependent on sunlight. Cows are dependent on grass. Therefore cows are dependent on sunlight. The truth conditions of the statement are dependent on interpretation. Truth is dependent on the truth conditions. Therefore truth is dependent on interpretation.

We need to go way back in this thread, to see why I argue that truth is necessarily subjective. This is because not only is the interpretation of the sentence subjective, but also the interpretation of reality, which the sentence is supposed to correspond to, is subjective. That is the point made at the beginning of this post. The way the world is, reality, what is the case, varies according to one's perspective. This is manifestly clear in the special theory of relativity. Your perspective gives you your reality, and therefore reality is subjective. Perhaps, it is because reality itself is perspective dependent, that meaning interpretation is perspective dependent. Reality itself is subjective, and that's why meaning is subjective, because it must be to give us a true perspective of reality.

Creativesoul, I believe, suggested that even if the interpretation is subjective, what it is related to by means of correspondence, is objective. But according to the way that time is understood in modern science, this is not the case, Both sides of the relationship are subjective. This is why truth is completely within the subject's mind, it is a relationship between things which are in the mind. So how do you propose that objectivity enters into truth, when it is a relationship between two subjective things?

You don't need platonic forms, since you can simply use ordinary physical objects to fix the references of your terms. — Fafner

Clearly, physical objects are constantly moving and changing, and how they exist depends on one's perspective, so we cannot "fix" references by using these things. It is impossible to fix references to things which are changing. If X changes, it is no longer X, but now Y. How could you fix your reference, if the thing you call X, is Y by the time you finish calling it X. In fact, modern physics demonstrates that even in the time that it takes you to call something X, that thing has gone through a large series of changes.

So, you are claiming that one need not make a connection between a name and what's being named in order to learn how to use the name? — creativesoul

Your use of "name" is ambiguous, we were talking about learning a word, "hand". I'm saying that one makes an association when learning a word, and this association is not an association of correspondence between the word and the object like a proper noun, as you suggested, or else the word would not be used to refer to other similar objects.

I have. Attend to them. — creativesoul

I have demonstrated how your examples are false. You seem to have no respect for that.

Very very poor form to argue about what depends upon what, and then - after having had your argument refuted - say that what depends upon what is irrelevant. — creativesoul

To argue X is contingent on Y is a proper argument when the claims are justified. When one argues Y is contingent on X, and the claim is not justified, it is not a sound argument. Otherwise one could make an argument that anything is contingent on anything else, and this is pure nonsense, just like your unjustified claim that thought/belief is contingent on truth.

Meaning is what P expresses (namely a truth condition), and truth is determined by whether the truth condition obtains. — Fafner

Yes, the truth condition is the meaning expressed by P. As per your statement, this is a requirement for truth. And, interpretation is required for the expression of this truth condition (the meaning). Therefore interpretation is a requirement for truth. Do you not understand this?

I don't see how platonic forms are relevant here. — Fafner

You said "once a particular meaning has been fixed for P, than what P says given that meaning can be objectively true." How do you propose that there can be a fixed meaning for P, when meaning is subject to interpretation? Under Platonic realism, mathematical terms like "two", 'three", "circle", and "square", have eternal fixed meaning, through the assumption of eternal "Forms". There is no need for interpretation, because what these words mean (the meaning) is fixed eternally by these Forms, regardless of whether they are interpreted or not.

Truth as I defined it, simply means the obtainment of a truth condition, and a truth condition could be anything you want. If the truth condition expressed by a sentence is that cats fly (whatever that means), then the truth condition will involve cats and whatever is relevant to their flying. You don't need platonic forms to talk about truth conditions because anything can count as a truth conditions, as far as truth is concerned. — Fafner

Yes, now look, the truth condition expressed by a sentence, is the meaning, as you say above. There is no meaning, therefore no truth condition, and therefore no truth, unless the sentence is interpreted. Further, interpretation is subjective, so subjectivity is inherent within truth.

You tried to avoid this problem by referring to a "fixed" meaning, but there is no such fixed meaning, unless we assume Platonic Forms as the ideas which exist independently of human subjects, that fix the meaning.

You are confusing between meaning and truth. It is the assignment of meaning to P that is relative to an interpretation, but once a particular meaning has been fixed for P, than what P says given that meaning can be objectively true. — Fafner

I'm not confusing meaning and truth Fafner. You said P is true, "if the truth condition expressed by P obtains. I said "the truth condition expressed by P" is necessarily an interpretation of P. And since this is the condition for truth, then interpretation is a condition for truth as well.

If you want to assume a fixed meaning for P, then we can assume eternal Platonic Forms. Is that how you propose to define "objective truth", through reference to Platonic Forms? I am ready to oblige, if you recognize that objective truth requires a fixed meaning, and a fixed meaning is derived from something like Platonic Forms, then I am ready to accept this definition of "objective truth". There is such a thing as objective truth, if there is such a thing as Platonic Forms (fixed meaning).

If I speak to you in a language you do not know, it would make sense for you to say, "That's meaningless to me." "Meaningless to me" would mean "I can't understand this." But even if it were meaningless to you, it could be and is meaningful to me and to anyone else who knows that language. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, that's why interpretation is subjective.

If I say something to you in a language you know, must you interpret what I said for it to be meaningful to you? — Srap Tasmaner

Of course, how could it be meaningful to you without some interpretation?

But that's by and large a matter of clarifying which of several meanings the speaker meant. You could say that until one meaning is settled on, what was said does not have a meaning. But it doesn't look much at all like the case of speech in a language you don't know. If there's an interpreter on hand, she could transform the meaningless into the meaningful for you, but that's not much at all like the problem of selecting one among several meanings. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, this is why "what the thing means", is subjective. To say "what was said does not have a meaning" requires interpretation. It is interpreted as meaningless despite the fact that it may be meaningful to someone else.

What the two cases do share is an asymmetry: there is no reason to think I do not understand what I say to you, whether I speak in a language you don't know, or speak ambiguously in a language you do know, or speak with the exemplary clarity of a post such as this one. I have no need of an interpreter to understand what I say; nor do I need to disambiguate it or fill in whatever was elliptical in it. So I cannot see that my own speech was ever meaningless to me in any sense, even without either of the two sorts of interpretation. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't see your point here, perhaps you could make it more clearly. In the case of "what I say", "What I say" is itself an interpretation of something else.

Without interpretation a statement would be meaningless to the interpretor.<--------That I would agree to. Interpretation attributes meaning. Not all get it right. However, it does not follow from the fact of an interpretor not successfully grasping the meaning of a statement that the statement in and of itself is meaningless. It cannot be. Statements require meaning. That is precisely what's being interpreted. — creativesoul

The point, as I told Srap, is that to say "this is meaningless" is a statement of interpretation. So in essence, it does not matter if the interpreter says this has meaning, or this does not have meaning, both are interpretations. But if what you imply is true, that having been interpreted implies that it has some sort of meaning, whether it is interpreted as meaningful or not, then to say that something is meaningless is somewhat contradictory.

Examples to the contrary are everywhere Meta. You're working from an emaciated notion of thought/belief, and the argument suffers from the fallacy commonly called "affirming the consequent". — creativesoul

If the examples are abundant, then please provide some.

For there is no ability to learn that this is called "a hand", without necessarily presupposing the existence of this(whatever this may be). One learns that this is called "a hand" by virtue of drawing correlations between this and the utterance. — creativesoul

No, people don't learn the different things which are called by the word "hand" by drawing correlations. The hand is shown, and the name said. There is simple repetition of the word in order to learn how to say the word properly. The fact that the person already understands that many different objects (different hands) are called by the same word, and the person immediately proceeds onward to refer to many different objects with that newly learned word, indicates that there is no assumption of correspondence between the word and the object involved with this learning. A similar correlation, or association, drawn between the word and one hand, must be drawn between the word and numerous hands, so this type of correlation is not correspondence, or truth.

Interpretation is existentially contingent upon thought/belief, not the other way around. Thought/belief consists entirely in/of mental correlations. — creativesoul

Whether or not thought/belief is contingent on interpretation, or the other way around is irrelevant. What we are discussing is "truth", and truth is contingent on both of these. You unreasonably insist that there cannot be thought/belief without truth, so you think that if thought/belief is prior to interpretation, then so is truth.

As I said, the claim which needs to be supported, is the claim that there can be truth without interpretation, not the claim that there can be thought/belief without interpretation.

When one is attributing meaning to objects of physiological sensory perception and/or themselves, s/he is doing so by virtue of drawing mental correlations. This does not require being interpreted. — creativesoul

Interpretation and "drawing mental correlations" are closely related. Which one is the more general, such that one is a form of the other, is not relevant here. What we are talking about is truth in the sense of correspondence, so this is what we need to focus on. It is a particular type of correlation which qualifies as corresponding, or truth, not all cases of correlation.

Take a look at what you are doing. You are moving from the more specific, "truth" and "correspondence", to the more general, "correlation", and insinuating that if there is correlation, then there must be correspondence, and truth. But not all cases of correlation are cases of correspondence, or truth. There are clearly cases of drawing mental correlations, which do not presuppose correspondence, or truth. It is only a certain type of correlation which is aimed at truth.

So your example of the child is not an adequate example, it deals with correlations, not correspondence. Primitive thought may be like this, dealing with associations, and correlations, and these give rise to emotions and feelings, like the fear of the fire, which the child has. But we need not assume any correspondence, or truth here. When an animal hears a noise, and scurries off in fear, there is surely some type of association, or correlation going on, but unlikely that there is any presupposition of correspondence.

Suppose there was a presupposition of correspondence, in this example, what would the noise be supposed to correspond with? The noise corresponds with "danger"? We can't expect a little scurrying animal to hold a sophisticated concept like danger? Don't you think that the noise just triggers some associations or correlations, and the animal gets the urge to run? Why do you think that such thought/belief requires a presupposition of correspondence?

Judging that a truth condition obtains is a different thing though from the actual obtainment of that truth condition (you can have the one without the other). — Fafner

This is what you said:

Statement P is objectively true def= if the truth condition expressed by P obtains (and otherwise it is objectively false). — Fafner

Without an interpretation of "P", there is no such thing as "the truth condition expressed by P". What is expressed by P is the product of an interpretation of P. Therefore the truth of P is relative to the interpretation. Interpretation is necessarily subjective. So I'll repeat myself, you define "objectively true" as something subjective. Your use of "objectively" only disguises the fact that what you are referring to is something subjective.

If some truth requires meaning and some meaning requires interpretation then.... — creativesoul

The truth of a proposition or statement requires that the statement has meaning, and this requires that the statement or proposition has been interpreted because without interpretation there is no difference between meaningful and meaningless. Therefore the truth of a proposition or statement requires interpretation.

If this is only "some truth", which requires interpretation, and not all truth, then we're back to what I asked for earlier, an example and demonstration of a type of truth which does not require interpretation. That other type of truth, which does not require interpretation, cannot be a belief, because beliefs require meaning and interpretation in the same way as statements, in order to be true.

if all known instances of truth require meaning, and therefore interpretation because there is no difference between meaningful and meaningless without interpretation, then we can produce the inductive conclusion that all truth requires interpretation. Since this is the case, as no examples to the contrary have been found, therefore, we can say that interpretation is an essential aspect of truth. Truth does not exist without interpretation. Interpretation is the essence of truth.

Now we can proceed to the rest of my claim. All interpretation is subjective. Therefore truth is necessarily subjective.

Statement P is objectively true def= if the truth condition expressed by P obtains (and otherwise it is objectively false).

Are you happy now? — Fafner

You have expressed a conditional, "if". This means that the condition must be fulfilled, for "objectively true". That condition (the truth condition expressed by P obtains), can only be fulfilled by a subject. A subject must determine, decide, judge, whether the condition obtains. Therefore you define "objectively true" as something subjective. Your use of the term "objectively" only covers up, or disguises the fact that the thing referred to is inherently subjective.

In Quantum Field Theory, as far as I know, a field is itself regarded as a real physical thing (which can be visualized as a mattress with springs). — Andrew M

Any physicist who regards a field as a real thing, has got a very strange ontology. It cannot be visualized as a mattress with springs, because numerous fields can occupy the same place, and mattresses can't do that.

As I said before, to think of it as something real requires that it is the property of a thing, and the only thing which it can be a property of is space-time. But this is to reify space and time. How is space-time a substance?