Without an interpretation of "P", there is no such thing as "the truth condition expressed by P". What is expressed by P is the product of an interpretation of P. Therefore the truth of P is relative to the interpretation. Interpretation is necessarily subjective. So I'll repeat myself, you define "objectively true" as something subjective. Your use of "objectively" only disguises the fact that what you are referring to is something subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confusing between meaning and truth. It is the assignment of meaning to P that is relative to an interpretation, but once a particular meaning has been fixed for P, than what P says given that meaning can be objectively true.

Is there any sense of "truth" that is not existentially contingent upon language? Perhaps this be better put a bit differently:Does any sense of "truth" define something that we discover?

Yes, and you don't need correspondence for that. The sentence "there have been dinosaurs" states a truth which existed way before humans or language did.

We can also make sense of the notion of 'discovery' without correspondence. Objective truths exist, and we can discover them. To discover if something is true, we don't need to take the sentence (or psychological state, or whatever) expressing that truth and check if it 'corresponds' to reality; rather what we do is go and look whether things in the world are the same as what the sentence says about them. So the question of correspondence simply doesn't arise in any normal process of inquiry.

On my view, correspondence is presupposed within all rudimentary thought/belief by the very act of drawing a mental correlation between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or oneself;emotional/linguistic state of mind. — creativesoul

Here's one problem with your story. Suppose that you have a mental state that you want to correlate with your sensory perception, let's say seeing an apple. But when you are having that perception, do you know that what you are having is a sensory perception of an apple? If you do, then it means that you already can think about apples or mentally represent them even before you have correlated anything with your mental states, in which case your story seems redundant. But if you don't know that you have a sensory perception of seeing an apple, then it is not clear how correlating you perception with some other mental state could enable you to acquire the ability to mentally represent apples, or to know what apples are. So correspondence is either redundant or useless.

Denying that your thought/belief presupposes truth doesn't fare well when held alongside everyday relevant facts to see whether or not it makes sense. — creativesoul

One must actually try to find truth in the mobility of thought and expression and actually observe the hopelessness in the effort. One cannot freeze the thought. It changes too fast to catch it. This is not a simple phenomenon. It it's intrinsic in understanding the nature of oneself and the universe. However, we do call phenomenon true when it it's close enough for practical purposes. But this is far away from truth.

You wrote:

The sentence "there have been dinosaurs" states a truth which existed way before humans or language did.

So, truth is equivalent to historic states of affairs/happenings/events/they way things were? That would be to conflate truth and fact/reality.

We can also make sense of the notion of 'discovery' without correspondence. Objective truths exist, and we can discover them.

You missed the point, but it may be inconsequential.

Do you have a candidate/example of one of these objective truths?

To discover if something is true, we don't need to take the sentence (or psychological state, or whatever) expressing that truth and check if it 'corresponds' to reality; rather what we do is go and look whether things in the world are the same as what the sentence says about them.

That is precisely what we're doing my friend. Verification/falsification methods presuppose truth as correspondence. If things in the world are the same as what the sentence says about them, then they are true(verified) and false(falsified) if not.

So, truth is equivalent to historic states of affairs/happenings/events/they way things were? That would be to conflate truth and fact/reality. — creativesoul

I've just gave an example of a language-independent truth as you've asked. I didn't say anything about this being equivalent to truth.

Do you have a candidate/example of one of these objective truths? — creativesoul

The existence of dinosaurs is one such example.

That is precisely what we're doing my friend. Verification/falsification methods presuppose truth as correspondence. If things in the world are the same as what the sentence says about them, then they are true(verified) and false(falsified) if not. — creativesoul

You are not following. You've said that we need correspondence in order to explain x y and z. I've explained x y and z to you without using the notion of correspondence. This shows that correspondence is a redundant concept as I claimed.

You wrote:

Here's one problem with your story. Suppose that you have a mental state that you want to correlate with your sensory perception, let's say seeing an apple. But when you are having that perception, do you know that what you are having is a sensory perception of an apple? If you do, then it means that you already can think about apples or mentally represent them even before you have correlated anything with your mental states, in which case your story seems redundant.

To quite the contrary, if you know that you're looking at an apple, then you have already drawn a multitude of very complex correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or oneself. It is a mistake to speak about 'wanting' to correlate...

But if you don't know that you have a sensory perception of seeing an apple, then it is not clear how correlating you perception with some other mental state could enable you to acquire the ability to mentally represent apples, or to know what apples are. So correspondence is either redundant or useless.

All creatures without complex language are incapable of metacognition. Knowing that one is having a sensory perception is a metacognitive endeavor. Your target is missing the mark.

You wrote:

I've just gave an example of a language-independent truth as you've asked. I didn't say anything about this being equivalent to truth.

So a language independent truth is not equivalent to truth?

The existence of dinosaurs is one such example.

The existence of dinosaurs is an example of a state of affairs/events/happenings/the way things are/were/etc.

You're conflating truth and reality(states of affairs/events/happenings/etc).

I wrote:

Verification/falsification methods presuppose truth as correspondence. If things in the world are the same as what the sentence says about them, then they are true(verified) and false(falsified) if not.

You replied:

You are not following. You've said that we need correspondence in order to explain x y and z. I've explained x y and z to you without using the notion of correspondence. This shows that correspondence is a redundant concept as I claimed.

It is you who are not following. Not using the term "correspondence" is not equivalent to not using correspondence. I suggest that you do not make my claims for me. This topic is quite complex. My understanding is nuanced.

You're in the very process of presupposing correspondence between your expressions here and what was written earlier. Assuming sincerity in speech, you believe that everything you've said here is true, including but not limited to, the bits about what was earlier said.

So a language independent truth is not equivalent to truth? — creativesoul

I didn't mean it as some sort of general definition of truth as your post implied. I didn't say what you've ascribed to me in that post ("truth is equivalent to historic states of affairs").

You're conflating truth and reality(states of affairs/events/happenings/etc). — creativesoul

It is just a form of speaking, "there exists a truth..." is just another way of saying that such and such is true.

Not using the term "correspondence" is not equivalent to not using correspondence. — creativesoul

It is. If I didn't use the word then I didn't use the word, period.

You're in the very process of presupposing correspondence between your expressions here and what was written earlier. — creativesoul

What do you mean?

To quite the contrary, if you know that you're looking at an apple, then you have already drawn a multitude of very complex correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or oneself. It is a mistake to speak about 'wanting' to correlate... — creativesoul

Then I don't understand what you mean by 'correlation'. By virtue of what the mental states are supposed to become correlated in your story, if not by the subject? By accident? Or by God?

All creatures without complex language are incapable of metacognition. Knowing that one is having a sensory perception is a metacognitive endeavor. Your target is missing the mark. — creativesoul

But you are the one who brought up this idea of correlation between mental states, so it is you who are presupposing metacognition.

I wrote:

So a language independent truth is not equivalent to truth?

You replied:

I didn't mean it as some sort of general definition of truth as your post implied. I didn't say what you've ascribed to me in that post ("truth is equivalent to historic states of affairs").

I did not say that you said it. Notably, I'm showing you that you're conflating truth with either fact/reality or true statements. Neither is acceptable. Both fail to be able to account for what kinds of things can be true and what makes them so.

To say that "the existence of dinosaurs is one example"(of a truth) is to either call the past existence of dinosaurs "a truth" or a true statement "a truth".

I wrote: You're conflating truth and reality(states of affairs/events/happenings/etc).

You replied:

It is just a form of speaking "there exists a truth...", which is another way of saying that such and such is true.

Such and such is a true statement in this case. You're conflating true statements with what makes them so.

I wrote:

Not using the term "correspondence" is not equivalent to not using correspondence.

You replied:

It is. If I didn't use the word then I didn't use the word, period.

It is not. Let me clarify, because this is crucial to understand.

One can use a pan without ever using the term "pan". One can form thought/belief without ever being able to use the terms "thought/belief".

You're stating your own thought/belief. You have a thought/belief system(a worldview). Thought/belief formation has long since begun.

All thought/belief presupposes it's own truth(correspondence to fact/reality). That is precisely how thought/belief works, regardless of whether or not you write the word "correspondence".

I wrote:

To quite the contrary, if you know that you're looking at an apple, then you have already drawn a multitude of very complex correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or oneself. It is a mistake to speak about 'wanting' to correlate...

You replied:

Then I don't understand what you mean by 'correlation'.

See the fire example... We'll take it from there.

I wrote:

All creatures without complex language are incapable of metacognition. Knowing that one is having a sensory perception is a metacognitive endeavor. Your target is missing the mark.

You replied:

But you are the one who brought up this idea of correlation between mental states, so it is you who are presupposing metacognition

You're mistaken... slightly. First, I've not mentioned correlation between mental states. I mean, that is not an accurate enough depiction of what I've claimed to be useful. A bun, alone, does not a hotdog make. Second, drawing mental correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or one's own state of mind does not require metacognition.

Again... See the fire example.

Earlier you mentioned the distinction between "I believe" and "I know"...

I'd like for you to set that out for us. Would you?

I did not say that you said it. Notably, I'm showing you that you're conflating truth with either fact/reality or true statements. Neither is acceptable. Both fail to be able to account for what kinds of things can be true and what makes them so.

To say that "the existence of dinosaurs is one example"(of a truth) is to either call the past existence of dinosaurs "a truth" or a true statement "a truth". — creativesoul

First, as I already said, I'm not trying to define truth via facts or reality. I'm not saying that truth is identical or equivalent to such and such things, so there's no conflation of anything in what I say.

Secondly, the concept of truth obviously does apply to reality in a very straightforward way: what a statement does after all is say is how things are in reality if it is true -- and if it is true, then it means that things in reality are exactly the way the statement says they are. So if the statement is about dinosaurs, there is a truth concerning dinosaurs, and there's nothing wrong in saying this.

And it is not the same as conflating the dinosaurs themselves with truth or whatever.

Such and such is a true statement in this case. You're conflating true statements with what makes them so. — creativesoul

No I'm not. You are reading your own metaphysical views into my words. There's no distinctions on my view between statements and what makes them true. A statement just is saying that so and so is the case (or not), and you cannot 'baypass' the statement and ask what makes it true, because the statement itself already tells you (by virtue of being a meaningful expression) how things stand if it is true or if it is false.

It is not. Let me clarify, because this is crucial to understand.

One can use a pan without ever using the term "pan". One can form thought/belief without ever being able to use the terms "thought/belief". — creativesoul

This metaphor is irrelevant, because you never bothered to tell what exactly you yourself mean by the term 'correspondence', so it is simply not clear what it means to "use correspondence" without using the word itself.

All thought/belief presupposes it's own truth(correspondence to fact/reality). That is precisely how thought/belief works, regardless of whether or not you write the word "correspondence". — creativesoul

Here you are just asserting things without any argument.

Second, drawing mental correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or one's own state of mind does not require metacognition. — creativesoul

So what does it require?

And anyway, I don't understand what this story about mental correlations has to do with truth in the first place.

Earlier you mentioned the distinction between "I believe" and "I know"... — creativesoul

Some words that someone might use to express different degrees of intensity of assuredness regarding a statement.

If I speak to you in a language you do not know, it would make sense for you to say, "That's meaningless to me." "Meaningless to me" would mean "I can't understand this." But even if it were meaningless to you, it could be and is meaningful to me and to anyone else who knows that language. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, that's why interpretation is subjective.

If I say something to you in a language you know, must you interpret what I said for it to be meaningful to you? — Srap Tasmaner

Of course, how could it be meaningful to you without some interpretation?

But that's by and large a matter of clarifying which of several meanings the speaker meant. You could say that until one meaning is settled on, what was said does not have a meaning. But it doesn't look much at all like the case of speech in a language you don't know. If there's an interpreter on hand, she could transform the meaningless into the meaningful for you, but that's not much at all like the problem of selecting one among several meanings. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, this is why "what the thing means", is subjective. To say "what was said does not have a meaning" requires interpretation. It is interpreted as meaningless despite the fact that it may be meaningful to someone else.

What the two cases do share is an asymmetry: there is no reason to think I do not understand what I say to you, whether I speak in a language you don't know, or speak ambiguously in a language you do know, or speak with the exemplary clarity of a post such as this one. I have no need of an interpreter to understand what I say; nor do I need to disambiguate it or fill in whatever was elliptical in it. So I cannot see that my own speech was ever meaningless to me in any sense, even without either of the two sorts of interpretation. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't see your point here, perhaps you could make it more clearly. In the case of "what I say", "What I say" is itself an interpretation of something else.

Without interpretation a statement would be meaningless to the interpretor.<--------That I would agree to. Interpretation attributes meaning. Not all get it right. However, it does not follow from the fact of an interpretor not successfully grasping the meaning of a statement that the statement in and of itself is meaningless. It cannot be. Statements require meaning. That is precisely what's being interpreted. — creativesoul

The point, as I told Srap, is that to say "this is meaningless" is a statement of interpretation. So in essence, it does not matter if the interpreter says this has meaning, or this does not have meaning, both are interpretations. But if what you imply is true, that having been interpreted implies that it has some sort of meaning, whether it is interpreted as meaningful or not, then to say that something is meaningless is somewhat contradictory.

Examples to the contrary are everywhere Meta. You're working from an emaciated notion of thought/belief, and the argument suffers from the fallacy commonly called "affirming the consequent". — creativesoul

If the examples are abundant, then please provide some.

For there is no ability to learn that this is called "a hand", without necessarily presupposing the existence of this(whatever this may be). One learns that this is called "a hand" by virtue of drawing correlations between this and the utterance. — creativesoul

No, people don't learn the different things which are called by the word "hand" by drawing correlations. The hand is shown, and the name said. There is simple repetition of the word in order to learn how to say the word properly. The fact that the person already understands that many different objects (different hands) are called by the same word, and the person immediately proceeds onward to refer to many different objects with that newly learned word, indicates that there is no assumption of correspondence between the word and the object involved with this learning. A similar correlation, or association, drawn between the word and one hand, must be drawn between the word and numerous hands, so this type of correlation is not correspondence, or truth.

Interpretation is existentially contingent upon thought/belief, not the other way around. Thought/belief consists entirely in/of mental correlations. — creativesoul

Whether or not thought/belief is contingent on interpretation, or the other way around is irrelevant. What we are discussing is "truth", and truth is contingent on both of these. You unreasonably insist that there cannot be thought/belief without truth, so you think that if thought/belief is prior to interpretation, then so is truth.

As I said, the claim which needs to be supported, is the claim that there can be truth without interpretation, not the claim that there can be thought/belief without interpretation.

When one is attributing meaning to objects of physiological sensory perception and/or themselves, s/he is doing so by virtue of drawing mental correlations. This does not require being interpreted. — creativesoul

Interpretation and "drawing mental correlations" are closely related. Which one is the more general, such that one is a form of the other, is not relevant here. What we are talking about is truth in the sense of correspondence, so this is what we need to focus on. It is a particular type of correlation which qualifies as corresponding, or truth, not all cases of correlation.

Take a look at what you are doing. You are moving from the more specific, "truth" and "correspondence", to the more general, "correlation", and insinuating that if there is correlation, then there must be correspondence, and truth. But not all cases of correlation are cases of correspondence, or truth. There are clearly cases of drawing mental correlations, which do not presuppose correspondence, or truth. It is only a certain type of correlation which is aimed at truth.

So your example of the child is not an adequate example, it deals with correlations, not correspondence. Primitive thought may be like this, dealing with associations, and correlations, and these give rise to emotions and feelings, like the fear of the fire, which the child has. But we need not assume any correspondence, or truth here. When an animal hears a noise, and scurries off in fear, there is surely some type of association, or correlation going on, but unlikely that there is any presupposition of correspondence.

Suppose there was a presupposition of correspondence, in this example, what would the noise be supposed to correspond with? The noise corresponds with "danger"? We can't expect a little scurrying animal to hold a sophisticated concept like danger? Don't you think that the noise just triggers some associations or correlations, and the animal gets the urge to run? Why do you think that such thought/belief requires a presupposition of correspondence?

You are confusing between meaning and truth. It is the assignment of meaning to P that is relative to an interpretation, but once a particular meaning has been fixed for P, than what P says given that meaning can be objectively true. — Fafner

I'm not confusing meaning and truth Fafner. You said P is true, "if the truth condition expressed by P obtains. I said "the truth condition expressed by P" is necessarily an interpretation of P. And since this is the condition for truth, then interpretation is a condition for truth as well.

If you want to assume a fixed meaning for P, then we can assume eternal Platonic Forms. Is that how you propose to define "objective truth", through reference to Platonic Forms? I am ready to oblige, if you recognize that objective truth requires a fixed meaning, and a fixed meaning is derived from something like Platonic Forms, then I am ready to accept this definition of "objective truth". There is such a thing as objective truth, if there is such a thing as Platonic Forms (fixed meaning).

I'm not confusing meaning and truth Fafner. You said P is true, "if the truth condition expressed by P obtains. I said "the truth condition expressed by P" is necessarily an interpretation of P. And since this is the condition for truth, then interpretation is a condition for truth as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes you are confusing meaning and truth. Meaning is what P expresses (namely a truth condition), and truth is determined by whether the truth condition obtains. They are completely different things, and interpretation concerns only the former, not the later. Can't you see the difference between asking "what P means?" and "is what P means true?" One is a semantic question, the other is not.

If you want to assume a fixed meaning for P, then we can assume eternal Platonic Forms. Is that how you propose to define "objective truth", through reference to Platonic Forms? I am ready to oblige, if you recognize that objective truth requires a fixed meaning, and a fixed meaning is derived from something like Platonic Forms, then I am ready to accept this definition of "objective truth". There is such a thing as objective truth, if there is such a thing as Platonic Forms (fixed meaning). — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how platonic forms are relevant here. Truth as I defined it, simply means the obtainment of a truth condition, and a truth condition could be anything you want. If the truth condition expressed by a sentence is that cats fly (whatever that means), then the truth condition will involve cats and whatever is relevant to their flying. You don't need platonic forms to talk about truth conditions because anything can count as a truth conditions, as far as truth is concerned.

Meaning is what P expresses (namely a truth condition), and truth is determined by whether the truth condition obtains. — Fafner

Yes, the truth condition is the meaning expressed by P. As per your statement, this is a requirement for truth. And, interpretation is required for the expression of this truth condition (the meaning). Therefore interpretation is a requirement for truth. Do you not understand this?

I don't see how platonic forms are relevant here. — Fafner

You said "once a particular meaning has been fixed for P, than what P says given that meaning can be objectively true." How do you propose that there can be a fixed meaning for P, when meaning is subject to interpretation? Under Platonic realism, mathematical terms like "two", 'three", "circle", and "square", have eternal fixed meaning, through the assumption of eternal "Forms". There is no need for interpretation, because what these words mean (the meaning) is fixed eternally by these Forms, regardless of whether they are interpreted or not.

Truth as I defined it, simply means the obtainment of a truth condition, and a truth condition could be anything you want. If the truth condition expressed by a sentence is that cats fly (whatever that means), then the truth condition will involve cats and whatever is relevant to their flying. You don't need platonic forms to talk about truth conditions because anything can count as a truth conditions, as far as truth is concerned. — Fafner

Yes, now look, the truth condition expressed by a sentence, is the meaning, as you say above. There is no meaning, therefore no truth condition, and therefore no truth, unless the sentence is interpreted. Further, interpretation is subjective, so subjectivity is inherent within truth.

You tried to avoid this problem by referring to a "fixed" meaning, but there is no such fixed meaning, unless we assume Platonic Forms as the ideas which exist independently of human subjects, that fix the meaning.

I wrote:

You're conflating true statements with what makes them so.

You replied:

No I'm not. You are reading your own metaphysical views into my words. There's no distinctions on my view between statements and what makes them true.(emphasis mine)

That is conflating true statements and what makes them so.

I rest my case regarding that.

Certainty?

What?

With certainty(conviction) comes "I know", and with less comes "I believe".

Is that what you're getting at?

You wrote:

The point, as I told Srap, is that to say "this is meaningless" is a statement of interpretation. So in essence, it does not matter if the interpreter says this has meaning, or this does not have meaning, both are interpretations. But if what you imply is true, that having been interpreted implies that it has some sort of meaning, whether it is interpreted as meaningful or not, then to say that something is meaningless is somewhat contradictory.

I didn't say that.

You wrote:

If the examples are abundant, then please provide some.

I have. Attend to them.

You wrote:...people don't learn the different things which are called by the word "hand" by drawing correlations. The hand is shown, and the name said. There is simple repetition of the word in order to learn how to say the word properly.

So, you are claiming that one need not make a connection between a name and what's being named in order to learn how to use the name?

Sigh...

After reading through the rest... seems that I'm about finished here.

Very very poor form to argue about what depends upon what, and then - after having had your argument refuted - say that what depends upon what is irrelevant.

Sophistry.

If you want to understand correspondence, from my 'viewpoint', I suggest that you think about the term "truth" quite a bit differently than you've displayed here.

So, you are claiming that one need not make a connection between a name and what's being named in order to learn how to use the name? — creativesoul

Your use of "name" is ambiguous, we were talking about learning a word, "hand". I'm saying that one makes an association when learning a word, and this association is not an association of correspondence between the word and the object like a proper noun, as you suggested, or else the word would not be used to refer to other similar objects.

I have. Attend to them. — creativesoul

I have demonstrated how your examples are false. You seem to have no respect for that.

Very very poor form to argue about what depends upon what, and then - after having had your argument refuted - say that what depends upon what is irrelevant. — creativesoul

To argue X is contingent on Y is a proper argument when the claims are justified. When one argues Y is contingent on X, and the claim is not justified, it is not a sound argument. Otherwise one could make an argument that anything is contingent on anything else, and this is pure nonsense, just like your unjustified claim that thought/belief is contingent on truth.

With certainty(conviction) comes "I know", and with less comes "I believe".

Is that what you're getting at? — creativesoul

Yes. It is a feeling that leads us to express a thought with different word characterizations.

Yes, the truth condition is the meaning expressed by P. As per your statement, this is a requirement for truth. And, interpretation is required for the expression of this truth condition (the meaning). Therefore interpretation is a requirement for truth. Do you not understand this? — Metaphysician Undercover

"Interpretation is required for truth" only indirectly via the fixing of meaning, but the truth of the sentence--given some determinate interpretation--is not itself open to interpretation.

Also, as I already told you, I completely reject your assumption that all interpretations are subjective by their nature, because there's nothing in the concept itself to suggest that this must be the case.

So your argument is both fallacious and is based on a false premise.

Here's a simply example to illustrate my point. Cows depend on grass for food, but does it follow that cows are like grass, or that they share some of their properties in common? (that they are green like the grass etc.) Obviously not - so the existence of some dependence relation between two things doesn't license you to infer anything from the properties of the one to the properties of the other. So even if I grant you your premise (which I don't) that meaning is in some sense subjective (--grass), it will not follow that truth is also subjective (--cows) only because it is dependent on meaning.

How do you propose that there can be a fixed meaning for P, when meaning is subject to interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

As I already told you several times, "meaning is open to interpretation" only on the linguistic or semantic level, that is, when there is a possibility of choosing between different things that a sentence can mean in a particular language. But what each of those possible 'meanings' mean is itself objective and not open to interpretation. On my view, to understand a sentence is to know its truth condition, and to know its truth conditions means to know in which circumstances the sentence is true and when it is false. So the 'meaning' itself, so to speak, consist in objective knowledge, or an ability to discriminate between the obtaining or non obtaining of objective states of affairs (namely the truth conditions) -- and nothing that you said shows that this is impossible to achieve.

Under Platonic realism, mathematical terms like "two", 'three", "circle", and "square", have eternal fixed meaning, through the assumption of eternal "Forms". There is no need for interpretation, because what these words mean (the meaning) is fixed eternally by these Forms, regardless of whether they are interpreted or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

All this stuff about forms is irrelevant to what I'm saying. I said that what a sentence means is truth conditions, but platonic forms themselves are not truth conditions but universals. The words 'circle' 'or square' don't say anything by themselves which is true or false, but only when they occur in sentence ("the table in my room is square").

You tried to avoid this problem by referring to a "fixed" meaning, but there is no such fixed meaning, unless we assume Platonic Forms as the ideas which exist independently of human subjects, that fix the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't need platonic forms, since you can simply use ordinary physical objects to fix the references of your terms. So if you take a sentence like "cats fly" and decide what would count as a cat and what would count as flying (and perhaps some other things), then you've fixed an objective meaning for the sentence - that is, your sentence now is 'correlated' with objective states of affairs (its truth and falsehood is sensitive to how the world is like). So for meaning to be objective it need not exist somehow 'in itself' and independently of human beings. We 'construct' meaning by correlating our language with the world, but that which we mean is objective by virtue of the existence of such correlations.

It is best to leave you with your (mis)understanding.

Not the same thought. Different intensity different thought different expressions...

Agree?

Not the same thought. Different intensity different thought different expressions...

Agree? — creativesoul

The thought itself, in memory is rather vague and fleeting. It doesn't stand still. Then there is the expression of that thought, by the mind which is somewhat more concrete but actually can be vague also. The expression attempts to describe the thought within the limited modes available-all are symbolic and therefore inadequate in some way.

Modernists authors (influenced by Bergson such as Virginia Wolfe) imbued these characteristics of thought and expression directly in their written works. Artists tend to delve into these matters more than philosophers though Bergson did not shy away.

"Interpretation is required for truth" only indirectly via the fixing of meaning, but the truth of the sentence--given some determinate interpretation--is not itself open to interpretation. — Fafner

Not so fast. Let's say that we have a fixed, determinate interpretation of the sentence. That interpretation must be related to some sort of reality, in order that there is a truth to that interpretation. As you said, the truth conditions must "obtain". Do you see that reality must be interpreted as well, in order that there is a truth of the sentence? What makes you think that there is a fixed and determinate reality? A fixed meaning of the sentence cannot provide truth if there is no corresponding fixed reality. And, in referring to accepted notions of time, it seems quite evident that there is no such fixed reality.

Also, as I already told you, I completely reject your assumption that all interpretations are subjective by their nature, because there's nothing in the concept itself to suggest that this must be the case. — Fafner

Are you saying that there is nothing in the concept of interpretation, to suggest that an interpretation is necessarily subjective? Remember how I defined subjective as "of the subject". Do you know of anything else, other than the mind of a subject, which could give us an interpretation? If so, name it. Is it God or something like that? Otherwise I think you're just spouting bullshit.

Here's a simply example to illustrate my point. Cows depend on grass for food, but does it follow that cows are like grass, or that they share some of their properties in common? (that they are green like the grass etc.) Obviously not - so the existence of some dependence relation between two things doesn't license you to infer anything from the properties of the one to the properties of the other. So even if I grant you your premise (which I don't) that meaning is in some sense subjective (--grass), it will not follow that truth is also subjective (--cows) only because it is dependent on meaning. — Fafner

You haven't provided a proper analogy. My argument would be like this. Grass is dependent on sunlight. Cows are dependent on grass. Therefore cows are dependent on sunlight. The truth conditions of the statement are dependent on interpretation. Truth is dependent on the truth conditions. Therefore truth is dependent on interpretation.

We need to go way back in this thread, to see why I argue that truth is necessarily subjective. This is because not only is the interpretation of the sentence subjective, but also the interpretation of reality, which the sentence is supposed to correspond to, is subjective. That is the point made at the beginning of this post. The way the world is, reality, what is the case, varies according to one's perspective. This is manifestly clear in the special theory of relativity. Your perspective gives you your reality, and therefore reality is subjective. Perhaps, it is because reality itself is perspective dependent, that meaning interpretation is perspective dependent. Reality itself is subjective, and that's why meaning is subjective, because it must be to give us a true perspective of reality.

Creativesoul, I believe, suggested that even if the interpretation is subjective, what it is related to by means of correspondence, is objective. But according to the way that time is understood in modern science, this is not the case, Both sides of the relationship are subjective. This is why truth is completely within the subject's mind, it is a relationship between things which are in the mind. So how do you propose that objectivity enters into truth, when it is a relationship between two subjective things?

You don't need platonic forms, since you can simply use ordinary physical objects to fix the references of your terms. — Fafner

Clearly, physical objects are constantly moving and changing, and how they exist depends on one's perspective, so we cannot "fix" references by using these things. It is impossible to fix references to things which are changing. If X changes, it is no longer X, but now Y. How could you fix your reference, if the thing you call X, is Y by the time you finish calling it X. In fact, modern physics demonstrates that even in the time that it takes you to call something X, that thing has gone through a large series of changes.

This is because not only is the interpretation of the sentence subjective, but also the interpretation of reality, which the sentence is supposed to correspond to, is subjective. — MU

MU has been indefatigably insisting on this through a couple of hundred posts in this thread alone. I think he is in the position of the man who says there is no such thing as a chair because it's all made of atoms, or whatever. I won't say he is that man, but I'll leave it to him to say he isn't. The point is that the chair man is entirely correct, but completely wrong.

Let's indulge the correct aspect. All right, it's all interpretation. Perhaps MU had better confirm this fairly represents his argument. And why not? We already concede the point. By the way, was that interpretation a term of art needing clarification? Or just mere interpretation, such as I or anyone might do?

Does the absurdity really need to be spelled out?

But how is it completely wrong? It destroys the possibility of meaning beyond that agreed to by interested parties or imposed by force. If you say, "Sure, agreement is good; that's all we have anyway!" What you mean is that's all we have as a matter of force. You have thrown reason out the window - after all it's all interpretation.

Or maybe it's not all interpretation. What do you say, MU? Is it all interpretation? And if not, what is it that is not interpretation.