Do not "requires", and "contingent upon", both imply "is dependent on" to you?

Try this: If C requires B, and B is contingent on A, then C requires A. Therefore truth "requires" interpretation.

The argument is as stated above. Do you agree or not? Truth is dependent on meaning, and meaning is dependent on interpretation, therefore truth is dependent on interpretation.

So, take your argument as you have stated it, and add the premise stated above. If C is dependent on B and B is dependent on A, then C is dependent on A. Then you will have the desired conclusion. Do you agree with the premise?

No, because there are unstated premises involved which are known by principles other than stated in your argument.. If C is dependent on B, and B is dependent on A, then C is dependent on A. Do you agree with this?

Here, we need to look at more than just the statement, for being true requires more than that. Being true is akin to corresponding to fact/reality. It requires being meaningful. Thus, the statement's truth is contingent upon language as well as it's being meaningful. The statement and it's meaning are both existentially contingent upon language. Thus, the truth of the statement is as well. — creativesoul

Being true requires being meaningful. Whether or not the statement is meaningful is contingent on interpretation. Therefore being true is contingent on interpretation.

The statement is not true in one sense and false in another, because the truth of the statement is not dependent upon all interpretations thereof. — creativesoul

Let's take this nice and slow. Take your statement, X. Why do you insist that X must be either true or false?

Well no, it doesn't follow. If by "subjective assumption" you mean something like an unjustified or ungrounded belief, then this doesn't show that the belief itself isn't objectively true. It may be the case that my belief that there is life on Mars is ungrounded or unjustified, and yet it still can be the case that it is itself objectively true, and there is life on Mars. Here you are surely trying to derive a metaphysical conclusion from epistemic premises. — Fafner

Until you define what "objectively true" is, what you say here is meaningless. And, your definition of "objectively true" will be subjective. So all this, what you say about a belief which could be objectively true, is nonsense. "Objectively true" is a nonsense notion. Until you establish some sort of justification for this notion, which you have not yet done, you are speaking nonsense. And, as I keep telling you, even if you justify this notion of objectively true, it doesn't make it true. So your claim that there could be a belief which is unjustified yet objectively true, is indeed false, because it is not true. That is unless you do not equate not true with false.

As my example about the existence of life on Mars shows, you cannot make this inference. — Fafner

Your example about Mars shows nothing, because you assume an unjustified notion of "objectively true", and build your example on this. Until you produce a valid concept of "objectively true", you are just begging the question, assuming the reality of "objectively true", as the basis for your claim.

The fact that the word 'subject' appears in 'subjective', doesn't license you to treat everything that a subject says as itself subjective. — Fafner

What do you base this in? What the subject says, is necessarily of the subject, and therefore subjective. That the subject can say something objective is an assumption which needs to be justified.

As I explained to you already, when the subject says something which is justified, this justification provides a form of objectivity, it is agreed upon by other subjects, because of the justification. This form of objectivity is sometimes known as inter-subjectivity, and is really a form of subjectivity. To use "objective" in this way, meaning inter-subjective, is completely different from the way that you use "objective", in "objectively true", because one refers to justified while the other refers to true. So your assumption that a subject can say something, or believe something, which is "objectively true", is still completely unjustified.

You are equivocating between words with different meaning, and this is a blatant logical fallacy (it's like inferring something about the banks of a river from claims about banks as financial institutions, just on the grounds they are spelled the same). — Fafner

Clearly it is you Fafner, who is attempting to equivocate, not I. I've maintained my definition of subjective, as "of the subject", and adhered to this. You want to take an epistemological form of "objective", which we know of as "inter-subjective", and make it into an ontological form of "objective" known as "of the object". But clearly the epistemological form of objective, which means inter-subjective, is a completely different meaning of "objective", from the ontological form which means of the object. Now you want to equivocate between the two, such that when you refer to the epistemological form, the inter-subjective form of "objective", with "objective truth", you want this to mean "truth of the object".

As I've been explaining to you, truth of the object (objective truth using "objective" in that way), is an impossibility, because truth is always a property of the subject. It is a relationship between interpretations, and interpretations are property of the subject.

Really? Surely there is at least one interpretation of Wittgenstein that allows first person data about the experience of speaking. — Mongrel

Oh yeah, there are many different interpretations of Wittgenstein, that's the issue which got me into this thread.

But don't you agree that sometimes there's value in asking if a statement is informative? To me that's a marker for ordinary language use vs unnecessary philosophical shenanigans (and sometimes other forms of bullshit.) — Mongrel

I can't see the point you're making here. If a statement is meaningful, it is informative. If it were completely void of meaning it would be nonsense, gibberish, so it wouldn't even qualify as a "statement". Are you saying that there are some philosophical statements, and forms of bullshit, which are not informative, yet they are still meaningful statements? Wouldn't these meaningful statements provide some form of information, say something about the author for example, and so they'd still be informative?

So what would be the point in asking whether a statement is informative. By calling it a "statement", it is already assumed that it is in some way informative. Perhaps what you are asking is whether or not the statement is of interest to yourself. The problem with this is that what is not of interest to yourself, such that you might designate it uninformative, might be of interest to another, and be designated informative.

Right and wrong is just settled via success in communication, right? — Mongrel

Yes, but this is not real right and wrong, is it? Real right and wrong is determined by moral principles, not by success in one's activities. Having success in doing what is wrong, doesn't make that wrongful activity right. So success cannot be used distinguish right from wrong.

And another thing: you argument attempts to establish a metaphysical conclusion ("there's no objective reality") from epistemic premises (all the stuff that you say about interpretation), but this is invalid. — Fafner

You seem to be mixing up the terms Fafner. That there is no objective reality is the premise, not the conclusion. This premise is supported by the fact that any assumption of an objective reality, is an assumption made by a subject. Therefore the assumption of an objective reality is itself subjective, and this negates the assumption that the reality being assumed is objective, because the assumption itself is subjective. The conclusion, which follows from this, is that there is no objective truth. Truth is subjective.

.

Even if you were correct that all interpretation is subjective (and you are not), it wouldn't follow that objective reality doesn't exist. At best, it could only show that reality cannot be known by us, but its existence is a different matter. It's like arguing that since we don't know if there is life on Mars, then it follows that there is no life on Mars. — Fafner

That "objective reality doesn't exist", is not a conclusion which follows from "all interpretation is subjective". The inverse is what is the case. The assumption that there is an objective reality is an unsound premise, because it is being made from a subjective perspective, by a subject. What follows from this is that all interpretation, or understanding of reality, is inherently subjective, made by a subject.

Unless the assumption of an objective reality can be made to be sound, then any claim of an objective truth is equally unsound, because this relies on the assumption of an objective reality. You are claiming that there is objective truth, so the onus is on you to support this claim by validating your claim of an objective reality. This claim is just made by you, and you are a subject and therefore the claim is subjective. If you get millions or billions of people to agree with this assumption, then this might justify the assumption, but to justify it does not make it true. Unless your premise is true, your conclusion will not be true. So your conclusion of an objective truth, while it may be justified, it is not true. That there is "objective truth", since it is not a true conclusion, is not real truth, because as I've demonstrated, real truth is subjective.

That real truth is subjective is derived simply from the premise that all claims of objectivity are inherently subjective. You appear to be attempting to take a subjective claim, that there is objective reality, and make this into an objective truth. But this is impossible because it is inherently subjective.

But what I did claim is that if you have two different proposition, then by the definition of correspondence, they cannot have the same entity corresponding to them when true. — Fafner

This is the point here. The supposed "entity", is the "object" which forms the basis of your "objectively true". But there is no reality to that supposed entity, it is just assumed, to support your claim. The entity, or object referred to, exists only by assumption. Each perspective gives a different proposition, and to claim that different propositions are or, are not, referring to the same entity or object, is an assumption made by the subject (therefore subjective). Therefore your "objective" truth is actually subjective.

What you are missing is the fact that given a particular interpretation of the sentence 'cats fly', it is objectively true or false; and the mere fact that the sentence can express something different doesn't show that its truth is subjective. — Fafner

No, that's not the case, because to be objectively true or false, requires that there is an objective reality which the interpretation of the sentence either corresponds with, or does not. But there is no such thing. The so-called "objective reality" only exists as interpreted. There is no reality without a perspective, so any reality which would be judged as corresponding to an interpretation, is itself subjective because it is dependent on a perspective.

That's the point I was making which creativesoul didn't seem to get, that both sides of the equation are interpretation dependent, subjective. On the one hand we have the words, the sentence, "cats fly", which needs to be interpreted. On the other hand, we have the reality which "cats fly" is supposed to correspond with, and this needs to be interpreted as well. Therefore you cannot say that there is an objective truth or falsity to any interpretation of the sentence because reality, what is real, needs to be interpreted as well, in order that it does or does not correspond to the interpretation of the sentence.

So, for example person A interprets "cats" as referring to domesticated house cats. In order that this interpretation may be true or false, reality must be interpreted to determine whether "cats" properly refers to only these domesticated cats, or all types of feline animals, as person B claims. This is just a matter of interpretation as well, a subjective determination. However, in making this interpretation, we may refer to standards, conventions and agreements, "correct usage", to produce a form of "objectivity", which is supported by justification. The interpretation is justified by referring to these standards of correct usage. But this objectivity which is supported by justification, does not qualify to be called "objective truth", because the objectivity is produced by justification, not by truth..

When we say that a car wheel is circular, we are describing the car wheel in mathematical terms. — Andrew M

The wheel is what is circular, it is described by "circular", so the wheel is what we claim to be real. Now what is it which is described by the "field"? What is the real thing which "field" is attributed to, as the property of?

I wasn't trying to explain what Wittgenstein leaves us with. I was pointing out something cool about speech that has to do with freedom and limitation. — Mongrel

Well I haven't read the thread, it's progressed far to fast for me, but I think we've hit the nail on the head. "Language as use" provides us with no approach to this cool thing about speech which has to due with freedom and limitation. Likewise, describing any tool by its use, doesn't give us an approach to the creative force of production and manufacturing, which is the real drive behind the use of that tool. To say that the hammer drives the nail, is to tell us nothing about the art of building, which is what the hammer is really used for. It's not used for driving nails, it's used for building. To say that language is use, is to tell us nothing about thinking, which is what language is really used for, not communicating.

What your post demonstrates is just how different real "rule-following" is, from the Wittgensteinian "rule-following". Real "rule-following" is acting according to the limitations which exist within your mind, that are guiding your actions. Whether these limitations are guiding you toward right or wrong is irrelevant in real rule-following. Wittgensteinian "rule-following" is acting in a way which may be observed as being in accordance with some descriptive, inductive principles, which determine right and wrong, i.e., acting like the others.

In the Wittgensteinian sense, it is impossible that one who is following the rule is acting wrongly, to follow the rule is to act correctly. In the reality of rule-following, one who is following a rule might just as likely be acting wrongly, because following a rule is acting according to the principles of limitation which one accesses within one's mind, thinking.

Yes. I appreciate that point. I spontaneously noticed this some years back: start talking with no conscious end in mind. At some point you may notice the effect of the desire to say something meaningful. That desire produces limitation that didn't appear to be there when you first started talking. The closer you get to the end of the sentence, the fewer options you have

if you want
to continue
being
meaningful
in
your
speech.

So here we aren't talking about rules. We aren't talking about the genesis of rules. We're talking about rule-following (limitation.) — Mongrel

But in Wittgensteinian terms, or definitions, following a rule, or "rule-following", has nothing to do with one's intention or desire. Rule-following is acting in a way which is consistent with those inductive conclusions. So if we say that symbols like "2", "3', and other words of language are used in a particular way, then using them in this way is said to be "correct" behaviour, and that is rule-following, acting correctly.

Intention, or "desire to say something meaningful", cannot enter this picture, because all there can be is desire to act correctly. And this is the desire to act in a way which is consistent with the way that others are acting. This is the question which Wittgenstein alludes to at the beginning of PI, and enters again at the so-called private language argument: what gives one the capacity to act in a way which may be determined as correct, i.e. the way which is consistent with the way that other people are acting. Under the defined terms, we cannot say that the person is following an internal principle, an internal rule, because rule-following is defined by correctness, and the internal principle which inclines one to act may not itself be a correct "rule". So Wittgenstein leaves us with no approach to the "desire to say something meaningful".

If you mean he wasn't talking about any particular set of conventions, I think that's clear. Since he encouraged the philosopher to observe word usage, he appears to have been pointing directly at convention as the reason for wording choices (as opposed to ability of language to represent.) — Mongrel

Try this Mongrel. Observe any particular instance of usage of anything, such as a person using a hammer, or a person using a word. You can describe that particular instance of usage. Now look at a number of different instances of usage. You can perhaps make an inductive conclusion, from similarities in each instance, to say that the hammer, or that specific word, is used in a specific way. Recognize that this is a "rule", or "law", which you have created, by means of your inductive conclusion, that the thing is used in this particular way. You cannot proceed from here, to say that the people using this thing are following that rule, because the rule was produced by you, from your observations.

The point is, to provide a separation between particular instances of "use", and the inductive conclusion, of "use", and recognize, that "use" in general is a rule by inductive conclusion, it is not a rule which the users are following.

If the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation, and there are three different interpretations of "X", all of which conflict with one another, then it would follow that "X" can be both true and false at the same time.

"X" cannot be both, true and false, at the same time.

Thus, it is not the case that the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation. — creativesoul

How do you justify your second premise, that X cannot be both true and false at the same time? Your first premise defines truth as being dependent on interpretation. Your second premise excludes falsity from truth. All you have done is provided two incompatible definitions of "truth", and denied the first in favour of the second.

I've demonstrated, therefore justified the soundness of the first premise. Now the onus is on you to demonstrate the soundness of the second premise, the one you prefer. How is it the case that X cannot be both true and false at the same time?

Let's start with your use of "X". What does X signify, and why can't this be true and false at the same time?

. It's a way of describing physical phenomena, just as we might describe a car wheel as a circle. — Andrew M

There is a big difference here. "Circle" is what we attribute to the wheel, it is a property of a wheel, the shape of the wheel. The wheel is circular. A "field" is not attributed to anything. It is not the property of anything, nor is it itself a thing. It is not a description of a physical phenomenon. A mathematical equation for example, is not a description of a physical phenomenon, though it may be applied toward understanding described physical phenomena.

One might argue that the field is a property of space-time, but to do this is to reify space-time, and I would argue that this is a mistake. In reality, space and time are distinct, and are not one united thing. Furthermore, space and time are not physical phenomena. So even if you attribute the field to space-time, this is not a description of a physical phenomenon, because space-time is not a physical phenomenon.

The "field" functions as a mathematical equation which is applied to the described phenomena.

One ought to be aware, and on the lookout for Wittgensteinian traps. That is the way that he used words, to set traps. That was his game. So it is a matter of knowing how to read, rather than assuming that you know what he is saying without actually understanding it.

Oh Wittgenstein loved to introduce such ambiguities, to lead the unsuspecting reader into one's own equivocations, rendering what he actually said as unintelligible.

So, with the rather recent collapse of the Soviet Union in human history and with it the threat of mutually assured destruction, are we in a better situation today to enjoy a safe future? — Question

Are you kidding? The nuclear weapons, instead of being amassed by just a few super powers, are now in many different hands. The great fear of annihilation which we had in the sixties and seventies has just been replaced by complacency, because it hasn't happened.

Let's take your example, "cats fly" . Person A thinks "cats" refers to domesticated house cats, while person B thinks "cats" refers to wild cats like tigers, lions, and cougars as well as domesticated cats. So we have a difference of interpretation here. Further, person A and person B both think that "fly" refers to what we do in airplanes, and knows that domesticated cats fly on airplanes, and claims "cats fly" is true. Person B says no, wild cats like tigers and lions do not go on airplanes, so "cats fly" is false. Person C says that "fly" refers to what animals and insects with wings do, moving themselves through the air, and neither domesticated nor wild cats have wings, so it is not true that any cats fly. So the truth or falsity of "cats fly" is dependent on interpretation, and is therefore subjective.

But the story of the Gospel exposes the inadequacy of sacrifice. When Cain murders Abel, the sacrifice is shown to be evil, for it does not resolve the mayhem. — Agustino

You seem to completely misunderstand the nature of sacrifice Agustino. Cain murdered Abel. This was not a sacrifice. A sacrifice cannot be a murder, one is presumed to be good in the eyes of God, the other evil. Do you see the difference between the two? Do you see that murder is deemed evil, necessarily, by definition, it is a wrongful killing. Do you accept that it is possible that a killing could be good? And do you see that this is the nature of sacrifice, a killing which is presumed to be good?

You can say that Jesus Christ sacrificed Himself to save us (& reveal the mimetic conflict) - however this "sacrificed" means something completely different. This means giving up on oneself, in order to benefit another. Jesus Christ willingly went to his death, even though He could have avoided it being God. In this sense, yes, he sacrificed himself. — Agustino

Jesus willingly went to his death, because he apprehended that in the eyes of God this was good. Whether Jesus sacrificed himself, or the others sacrificed him, is irrelevant. They were all part of the sacrifice, Jesus included, so they all sacrificed him, including Jesus himself who sacrificed himself. The point though, is that they perceived that in the eyes of God, the killing was good, and this is what made it a sacrifice.

Jesus Christ is not "made sacred" through his sacrifice, nor is the Pharisaic community saved through it - but quite the contrary. — Agustino

Why would you say that Jesus was not made sacred through his sacrifice?

A realist account need not require that particles are fundamental entities. A particle can be an emergent feature of an underlying field. — Andrew M

A field is a mathematical construct. So what type of realism are you talking about, Platonic realism?

What I meant when I said that words are not important is that there is no necessary definitions that one must understand in order to understand what it means for a sentence to be true or false. — Fafner

We're in complete agreement then. There are no necessary definitions, and a person is free to define the words as one pleases, so the determination of true or false is completely subjective. That's the exact point I've been trying to make. Why do you think that this demonstrates that my argument misses the point? It seems to be right on the point.

There are countless different ways to explain what a sentence means, but what counts as a correct understanding is the ability to use the sentence in the right sort of way. — Fafner

This I do not agree with. Using a sentence is speaking, writing, etc.. Explaining what a sentence means is interpretation. The two are distinct, and completely different. You seem to desire to reduce the interpretation of a sentence to a form of using the sentence, but this is impossible. Interpretation is done with the use of other sentences, or demonstrations to oneself, and this is not a case of using the sentence which is being interpreted, it is using something else which is within the demonstration.

And further, you said that interpretations themselves consist of words. But this is false. — Fafner

As I said, there are different levels of interpretation, or understanding. We can do a shallow interpretation just using words. For example, an interpretation of mathematics may be done with words. But to go to a deeper level, and produce a thorough understanding, I agree that more than just words are required. I normally refer to images in my mind. Producing images in my mind, for understanding, is a form of action, I suppose, but I don't think it's what you mean by "action". And I don't see how it could be a case of using the sentence.

But the death of Jesus Christ on the Cross was not a sacrifice. This is precisely the point of the Gospels. Unlike all other myths, Jesus Christ was innocent. The sacrifice wasn't necessary. He was not guilty. Read more here (I've started to adapt your tactic to send you to other sources ;) - see, I'm learning from you): — Agustino

In a sacrifice, the thing sacrificed is generally innocent. The sacrifice is not to punish the guilty, but to make a demonstration to the higher power (God). This is why the procedure, which is "the sacrifice", is well thought out, even contrived, and carried out on the innocent, to ensure that the higher power will respect the sacrifice as a sacrifice, and not just a killing of the condemned, the unwanted.

We can use all sorts of words when explaining something, but what is important is not the particular words that we use, but whether the words are understood the right way; and by 'understood the right way' I mean that one is able to go on acting in a particular way in the appropriate circumstances. — Fafner

Are you serious? It's not important which words are used to explain something? So I could explain "apple" as "a round crisp fruit", or as "a bright green liquid", and my choice of words is unimportant.

What does acting have to do with this? The person wants to know, and understand what an apple is, nothing else, just the truth. That person might never use this information toward any action, never being asked, or inclined to actually get an apple. Yet you belief it is unimportant whether the person believes that an apple is a round crisp fruit or a bright green liquid. For you, the person's actions are important, but knowing the truth is unimportant.

That's the thing about truth, it's desired for the sake of itself, not so that "one is able to go on acting in a particular way". This is philosophy, we act in a moral way, so that we can direct our attention toward knowing the truth. We do not simply accept whatever explanation someone gives us, just because it inclines us to behave in the way that they want us to. That's brainwash. You describe "understood the right way" as brainwash, that which inclines one to act in a particular way.

Well if everything is just a bunch of words, then what you say is also a bunch of words, so by your own lights nothing of what you said here or anywhere should be taken as true (or even meaningful), so I don't understand why you even bother typing something on your keyboard. — Fafner

You are free to interpret the words as you please, that's the point, your interpretation is your interpretation, and it is subjective. if your interpretation leaves you uninterested, then so be it.

What I tried to show is simply that interpreting the meaning of a sentence as saying that such and such is the case can commit you to objective standards of truth. — Fafner

All you showed is that the sentence is interpreted with words. You did a bad job, and didn't represent how a sentence is really interpreted, because you just repeated the same words. If you do it properly, you would use different words, like I did when I showed how that statement would be understood.

But since you and I would use different words from each other, this shows that there are no objective standards, except through agreement and conventions, as is evident in mathematics. And this is what I already claimed is the basis of "objectivity" in knowledge, agreement, which is itself based in justification.

It's just an schematic example which illustrates how 'interpretation of meaning' is compatible with objective standards of truth. — Fafner

When we refer to "objective standards", we refer to these agreements and conventions. But this is not "truth", it is "justification". It is evident that it is not truth because sometimes these standards themselves are based in a misunderstanding of reality.

It is true that if I say 'cats fly' is true iff cats fly then I repeat the same sentence twice, but it does show that there are two ways of using a sentence (which is what the use/mention distinction is about): one is to talk about the sentence as a bunch of words ('cats fly'), and the other is to use the sentence to state how things are in the world (either truly or falsely), and that is objective. — Fafner

I don't accept the use/mention distinction, I think it is unjustified. I see a bunch of words as a bunch of words. If you want to insist that a bunch of words is something other than a bunch of words, you have to demonstrate how this is the case. But how a bunch of words could be something other than a bunch of words is dependent on subjects, so this is something subjective. It is not objective, as you state. "How things are in the world" refers to nothing more than justified statements, what we, as human beings, believed by convention..

Just to make sure you know, creativesoul, there's a member of tpf whose name is Meta. So, out of respect, you shouldn't make false accusations against that person, just like you shouldn't make false accusations against me.

If we understand an English sentence such as 'cats fly' as saying that cats fly, then our 'interpretation' of the sentence commits us to an understanding of the sentence as depending on whether a certain truth condition obtains; but this is an objective matter - the question whether cats fly is of course a question about cats, not about us. — Fafner

No one understands "cats fly" as saying that cats fly. This is just repeating the same thing using the same words,, and that is not understanding. Understanding "cats fly", is first, apprehending that there is a type of animal which is called "cat", and there is an activity referred to by "fly", which cats do. That is a first level of understanding. The second, deeper level, is to understand the conditions under which an animal qualifies to be called "cat", and to understand the conditions under which an activity is qualified to be called "flying". That's what understanding is. It's not knowing how to repeat words, parrots do that without understanding.

Since we all understand these various conditions (what qualifies as a cat, and what qualifies as flying) in different ways, our understandings, and therefore interpretations, vary. This variance is a matter of subjectivity. There are idiosyncrasies in relation to understanding, which are specific to the subject, and this produces what we call subjectivity.

So your argument simply begs the question (if it can be called an argument - since you just assert that all interpretation is subjective, but why?) — Fafner

No Fafner, clearly you have this backwards, it is your argument which begs the question, not mine. Asserting that to understand the sentence "cats fly", is to apprehend it as saying that cats fly, is the most obvious and precise case of begging the question that one could come up with. It's very similar to creativesoul saying "a cow is in the barn" is true because a cow is in the barn. Creative might as well just say, "a cow is in the barn" is true because "a cow is in the barn" is true. And you might as well just say that "cats fly" means that cats fly. Care to beg the question some more?

I have one thing to add.

Contrary to talking about truth being a property, on my view, truth is correspondence and correspondence is much better understood as a kind of relationship that is necessarily presupposed within all thought/belief formation(and statements thereof). Relationships are not properties and they certainly cannot be sensibly said to have a spatiotemporal location. Relationships are best understood in terms of understanding their necessary elemental constituents. — creativesoul

This is the mistake you make, which you refuse to reconsider: all thought/belief presupposes a relationship of correspondence. Actually, most thought/belief is directed toward action, what should I do now, how should I proceed, how can I resolve this problem. As such, what is presupposed by thought/belief is an ability to act, to move forward in many different ways, and this does not involve any necessary relationship of correspondence. Thought/belief is principally directed toward deciding what to do.

Therefore you completely misrepresent the nature of thought/belief in general, in order to support your position on truth. It is only a particular type of thought/belief, most likely only practised by human beings under the influence of language, which is directed toward establishing a relationship of correspondence.

I guess I'm just not seeing the next step of how that makes everything subjective and contradicts correspondence theory though. — Brian

I am not saying that everything is subjective, nor am I claiming that correspondence theory is contradicted by what I say. What I am trying to show, is that correspondence theory leaves truth as subjective. The understanding of the statement, and the understanding of the state of reality which is assumed to correspond, are both in the mind, and therefore subjective, unless we assume God or some type of objective mind, to provide an objective truth.

I do not claim that every aspect of knowledge is subjective, because we have a form of objectivity which is established through justification. Justification is accomplished when people agree. When we agree on definitions, through the use of demonstrations and such, and establish conventions of meaning, this is objectivity. So for instance, we find objectivity in mathematical symbols and definitions of geometry, because there is complete agreement on what the terms mean. Their usefulness has been well demonstrated, justified.

I guess what I would say is, well, all of our perception of the external world is perspectival - from our own subjective perspective but OF objective things. But I still don't really see the leap to your conclusions from that. — Brian

What do you mean, when you say that your subjective perspective is of objective things? What could you mean by "objective things"? How the world is, is dependent on your perspective. The world is different from my perspective than it is from your perspective, than it is from tim wood's, and creativesoul's. Objectivity only comes about when we find things to agree upon, but the fact that we can agree on things, does not change the fact that the way that the world is, in all its splendour, is perspective dependent. This is the simple consequence of the nature of time, that what is real, in the world, is dependent on one's perspective. So "objective things" are only created by different subjective perspectives getting together to create a unity. This unity of subjective perspectives may be called an objective thing.

Thought/belief formation happens prior to language acquisition. Some of those thought/belief are true. — creativesoul

This is a claim you've made for quite some time, which you still haven't properly supported. I've explained to you in the past, that thought/belief prior to language acquisition is most likely probabilistic, and therefore neither true nor false.

However, if truth is correspondence, then it is impossible that thought/belief prior to language could be true if thought/belief with language may be true. That is because such thought/belief would correspond only to the creature's perspective of the world, and this perspective would not be the same as the perspective which describes the world in words. Therefore either the perspective which describes the world in words is true, or the perspective which doesn't is true. If these two very different types of thought/belief both correspond, then we can conclude that any thought/belief may be said to correspond, and therefore all thought/belief is true.

Contrary to talking about truth being a property, on my view, truth is correspondence and correspondence is much better understood as a kind of relationship that is necessarily presupposed within all thought/belief formation(and statements thereof). — creativesoul

So I assume from this passage, that this is your actual claim, that all thought/belief is true. Truth is "... necessarily presupposed within all thought/belief..." This is my point, correspondence as truth, renders all truth as subjective. Correspondence is what a subject produces with belief, therefore all beliefs correspond, and all beliefs are true. Truth is the essence of believing. One would not believe it if it wasn't true.

That is, if I may paraphrase, that truth is in a mind (and not out there). — tim wood

I'll remind you that I have qualified this position. The concept of "truth" as we know it is strongly based in religion, and the idea of God. You may have seen the saying, "God is Truth". So traditionally, truth really is "out there", in the mind of God. It is only when we reject God that truth becomes purely subjective.

MU consistently confuses me at one point: he doesn't hold that ideas are real things; he maintains ideas (concepts) are real as concepts; this from above, and I agree. Where I get tossed is where he seems to argue that Forms are real things, and some ideas are real things, without the qualification. — tim wood

Try thinking of it this way tim. Every material object has a form. The form is what the thing is, it's shape, size, colour, etc., right down to its molecular constitution, atomic makeup, and even the positioning of its subatomic particles and fields. The form is unique, and particular, to each individual thing, and that is why the thing is the thing which it is, and not something else, it has its own unique form.

The form of the thing is changing, with the passing of time, due to the activities of its particles, this what the ancient Greeks referred to as flux, Heraclitus said everything is in flux. So at each moment it has a different form from the last moment, and logically it is a different object at each moment. The material object exists as the material object which it is, only at the moment when it has that form. The next moment it is a different material object because it has a different form.

The argument which I described earlier, concludes that the form which the object will have, in its moment of existence, must precede in time, the actual material existence of that object. This is why we have "Forms", which are as real and particular as the object, and which are separate from the material object, and cannot be sensed. They are prior in time to the present, existing prior to the materialization of the object at its moment of existence, which is the present. In Christian theology, such as Aquinas, these Forms, are from the mind of God, in His creation of the world from day to day as time passes, or angels in their providence over the material world, working to carry out God's creation.

I reject the whole super-naturalization of ideas - of any ideas. In brief, there is no Form of a perfect circle. There is a worked out idea of a what a circle is, and it's simple enough for most folks to grasp it. And that's the secret. Truth isn't in your mind or my mind; it "dwells" in collective mind, worked out over a long time. Just as circle is in collective mind. No Form needed; only the collective understanding. To be sure, that understanding is subject to evolution and refinement - it had better be! - which means that while the truth (collective "wisdom") is true, it could also be in a much larger sense false. — tim wood

As I explained to Brian above, I believe that the "collective mind" is the product of justification. Justification produces a form of objectivity which is the basis for our claims of "objective knowledge". However, justified is different from true, because even though the masses of humanity may believe something, as a collective mind, that thing believed might still not be true. This was the case when the people believed that the sun circled the earth. So despite the objectivity of the collective mind, the subjectivity of the genius is what brings us out of our ancient (mistaken) beliefs, toward the truth.

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I suppose the best thing for me to do is ask if you acknowledge and agree with this very rough summary of our exchange? — creativesoul

I agree, you argue that it is true that truth is correspondence because truth is correspondence. It is true that the cow is in the barn because the cow is in the barn. What's the point in making such an argument?

Notably, you asserted that certain things needed to be explained by one arguing for correspondence. I explained to you how that was not the case based upon other aspects of my own position. — creativesoul

This about sums it up. If you refuse to acknowledge the difficulties involved with correspondence, because you already believe that it is true that truth is correspondence, then what's the point in discussing truth?

1. The first is the kind of radical (just meaning to the root of things) subjectivism that I think you are proffering. Everything I perceive around me is in some way mind-dependent. I think this is in essence an idealist view. The objects surrounding me are products of my mind, and my beliefs about those objects relate various products of mine mind to each other and to me. — Brian

This is a good start, but let me qualify this. I am not arguing that "the objects surrounding me are products of my mind", I accept that there is something independent. What I am arguing is that the way I perceive, apprehend, and understand what's surrounding me is a product of my mind. This I called "interpretation", you prefer "understand".

2. The second possibility is more of a radical objectivism. I am amidst a world of things that are external to and independent of my mind, that would still be there even if I were not there perceiving them. My beliefs about the world are beliefs about these objects that are external to my mind.and how they relate to each other and to me. In this case, the objects or contents of my beliefs are about objective things - things that are not mind-dependent. — Brian

The nature of space and time makes it extremely difficult to accept such an objectivism. If I were not here perceiving my surroundings, what would set the here and now, in which these objects exists? I could say that the objects here, where I would have been, at the time which I would have been here, if I were here, would still exist without me being here, but then I am still referring to my own existence to provide a spatial-temporal perspective. Once I theoretically remove my own existence, I have no such spatial-temporal perspective.

My intuition is on the side of objectivity. — Brian

To exclude this intuition as misguided, simply imagine the universe, all of existence, and all of time, without you here. What would differentiate a planck time length from a second, from a billion years? Without the capacity to separate out a period of time, during which something exists, how can something exist? In an extremely long period of time, an object like a star or planet, would come into, and pass out of existence, and also exist all over the place, just like a fundamental particle at a very short period of time. What gives the "here and now", which we assign to existence?

Nice one Dwit, welcome to tpf. One question though, how can something infinite consist of finite parts? Consider numbers for example. There is an infinite number, but at the same time each one is infinitely divisible, so the parts are not finite. And if we consider finite things, like physical objects, we might just say off-handedly that there is an infinite number of them, but is this really possible?

I'm not sure I agree that there must be an interpretation of its meaning. Rather, I think it would be more precise to say there must be an understanding of its meaning. "Understanding" is something like a mental grasp or comprehension. I often like to refer to understanding as "getting it." When something like "a cow is in the barn" is uttered in relation to a set of particulars like, for instance, a particular cow and a particular barn, we must grasp the meaning of the utterance. In this case, the meaning of the sentence is that there is a particular animal, a cow, spatially located in a particular building, the barn. I think as long as we have something like "understanding" we don't need something like "interpretation" here to do any heavy lifting. — Brian

I don't see the point in the distinction between interpretation and understanding here. Each of these is subjective, so it doesn't affect the point I am making. We could switch out "interpretation" in favour of "understanding", if that's what you would like. Accordingly, there must be an understanding of the collection of words, and an understanding of the situation which the words refer to, in order that there is truth.

The issue is, that since each of these things which are being related to each other, are "understandings", and these are within the mind of the subject, how is it possible to get beyond subjectivity, to assume an objective truth?

The fact is certainly objective. Regardless of what we think about the situation, the cow (Betsy, let's name her), is either in or not in the barn owned by Old McDonald, who has a farm. The fact of the matter is the objective state of affairs. In this particular instance, let's say that Betsy is NOT in Old McDonald's barn; rather, she is actually grazing in Old McDonald's field at Time T. — Brian

You're missing the point Brian. There's an animal in the barn, which you are calling "Betsy". What justifies your claim that Betsy is a cow? So even if this animal is in the building which you call a barn, how is it true that there is a cow in the barn? Isn't it necessary that we have a definition of what it means to be a cow, and someone with an understanding of that definition takes a look at the animal, to get an understanding of the animal, making the judgement, that the animal is a cow? And the same procedure must be carried out for "barn", and the spatial relation, "in". If there is no one with this understanding how could "a cow is in the barn" be true? And even if it is just one person with authority who dictates, this animal is the animal I call "cow", and this building is the building I call "barn", and this is the spatial relation I call "in", therefore it is true by decree, that a cow is in the barn, what makes this an "objective fact"?

It was addressed. The attribution of truth is not truth. We can mistakenly attribute truth just as we can mistakenly presuppose it. — creativesoul

When I say, "the sky is blue", I attribute "blue" to "the sky". Does this mean to you that I am claiming that the attribution of "blue" is blue? I don't think it should, and it sure doesn't to me. So why, when I say that truth is attributed to an interpretation of a statement, do you reply with "the attribution of truth is not truth". Your reply is irrelevant, trivial, drivel. It doesn't at all address my claim that truth is a property of the interpretation, just like blue is a property of the sky.

If you happen to believe that truth can exist somewhere else, other than as a property of interpretation, or as Brian would prefer, as a property of understanding, just like blue exists in places other than as a property of the sky, then I hope you will show me where. Otherwise I will continue to believe that truth only exists as a property of understanding, and is therefore completely subjective, and disregard your irrelevant comments.

That is false. Interpretation of a claim is not a truth condition for the claim. You're conflating conditions of shared meaning with truth conditions. They're very closely related but not the same thing.

It must be meaningful, but there is no need for an interpretation of it's meaning in order for it to be true/false. In order to be understood, meaning must be shared.

"A cow is in the barn" is true if a cow is in the barn. The cow's being in the barn is what makes the statement true. The absence of a cow in the barn is what makes the statement false. So, the statement could be made, misunderstood, and yet still be true/false. It could also be made, understood, and yet still be true/false. — creativesoul

This is completely ridiculous. To say "the cow's being in the barn" is what makes "a cow is in the barn" true is simply begging the question. You are saying nothing more than "a cow is in the barn" is true because it is true that there is a cow in the barn. That's udder (pun) nonsense.

What makes that statement true, is that there is a situation in the world which a human being would apprehend as a building there, which is properly called a "barn" in English, and there is an animal which is properly called a "cow", in a specific spatial relationship with that building which is properly referred to as "in".

Seems to me that the notion of interpretation has caused confusion for you Meta. — creativesoul

Perhaps my use of "interpretation" confused you, but it hasn't confused me. Would you prefer, as Brian suggests, that we use the word "understanding". In any case, if you don't like my belief, that truth is the property of interpretation, or as Brian prefers, understanding, then I'd like to know where you believe truth exists.

So, the statement could be made, misunderstood, and yet still be true/false. It could also be made, understood, and yet still be true/false. — creativesoul

Let's start here then. Suppose a statement is made which is not understood by anyone. You seem to be claiming that the statement is still true or false. Now let's proceed by clarifying this problem, and making it a condition of "a statement", that it is intelligible, in principle it may be understood. This way we don't even have to consider that unintelligible gibberish is a statement. Tell me how this statement could actually be true or false without actually being understood. Of course a conditional such as "if it corresponds" will not suffice, because it is the act of understanding which fulfills that condition.

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If no, then one can not prove God by natural reason, that is, by thinking one self to some sort of proof of his existence just because man's logical mind and reason says he exists. — Beebert

If you can prove with logic, that God must exist, but this doesn't count as an acceptable proof of God's existence, then it follows that anything which you prove with logic cannot be an acceptable proof, because proving with logic is not an acceptable proof. So for you, what is an acceptable proof?

You laid out an argument regarding how "truth" is attributed to the meaning of words, and then erroneously concluded that that is ground for further claiming that truth is subjective. It is no such thing. What follows is that the attribution of "truth" is subjective. — creativesoul

I clarified by saying that truth is attributed to an interpretation of meaning. Since the interpretation is subjective, then the thing which is attributed is subjective as well, as a property of that subjective thing. You haven't yet addressed my clarification.

That is one objection left neglected. The other involved the invocation of the subjective/objective dichotomy. While it is a very very popular one, it is inherently incapable of taking an account of that which is neither and/or requires both. All thought/belief is existentially contingent upon subjective and objective things. Correspondence is a relationship 'between' the two. Thus, it requires both and yet is - itself - neither of those. Meaning is in the same boat. — creativesoul

The only thing objective about an interpretation is the object which is being interpreted. If you believe that there is naturally some type of correspondence between the object, and the interpretation, which is what you seem to be arguing, then the onus is on you to demonstrate this correspondence. To simply assume that there is correspondence is an unjustified assumption. in fact, that there even is an object, has not yet been justified by you.

So perhaps it is true that all thought/belief is contingent on subjective and objective things, but I see no reason to believe this. Instead, I think it is far more likely that some thought/belief may be purely subjective. Until the assumption that there even is an object, is justified, we are much better off to start with the assumption that all thought/belief is purely subjective. Therefore, until you justify the assumption that the object exists, your assertion that "all thought/belief is existentially contingent on subjective and objective things", is completely baseless.

There is no justificatory ground for positing the form of A prior to the existence of A. — creativesoul

I provided a paraphrase of the argument. If you do not agree with it, then demonstrate its weakness. But to claim that there is no justification for the conclusion, without addressing the argument, is just being ridiculous.

Interpretation requires the attribution of meaning by one speaker to another speaker's language use. If the interpeter get's it right, then s/he understands the speaker. That says nothing at all with regard to the truth of the speaker's use. Rather, if both draw the same or similar enough correlations, then they have a shared understanding/meaning. It is when different correlations are drawn that misunderstanding takes place. — creativesoul

Allow me to clarify the point. Assume any statement, like "a cow is in the barn". In order that this statement may be true or false, there must be an interpretation of its meaning. Also, there must be an interpretation of the physical state of the world. If truth is correspondence, then these two interpretations must correspond in order that there is truth. Interpretation is completely subjective (carried out by the mind of a human subject). Since truth as correspondence, is correspondence between two distinct interpretations, which are both subjective, truth as correspondence, is itself subjective.

Why must there be God, instead of god, that created the world? — BlueBanana

Because "God" is the word used to refer to the creator, not "god", it's just a matter of proper English.

Which god did you find through reason? You can as easily come up with a conclusion that God does not exist as that he does. Did you find the God of Abraham or the god of the philosophers? By the way, saying that God EXISTS is ridiculous. Everything that exists has a cause, in the sense that exist actually means out of becoming. Something that exists isn't, it becomes. Everything that is, doesn't exist. God IS, if one said that, I would perhaps say 'yes he probably is'. Did you reason your way to a being or a becoming? Nietzsche and Kant proved that reason isn't sufficient for proving any existence of God, god, or gods. — Beebert

That's a lot of questions, but let me start with the first one. What do you mean by which god did you find? I think I found the God referred to by the word "God", the one responsible for creating material existence.

The god of natural reason is a non-god, as Karl Barth said. — Beebert

What do you mean by "the god of natural reason"?

I don't see your point.

Was Nietzche a long time ago? How did he kill the God of reason? Through assertion? If so, how is assertion enough to kill reason?

Not to mention Immanuel Kant of course. Who destroyed the idea that you can reason your way to God. — Beebert

Again, I don't see how Kant destroyed this idea, rather than simply denying it. Destroying logic requires a reasonable demonstration rather than a simple denial.

No, it doesn't. It makes the attribution of truth subjective. The objective/subjective dichotomy cannot take an account of that which requires both and is thus neither. — creativesoul

I disagree. What I said is that truth is attributed to the meaning of the statement, it is not attributed to the physical words themselves. The meaning must be interpreted before truth can be attributed, and this interpretation is subjective. So truth is attributed to the interpretation, and any interpretation is subjective. It is not the act of attribution which I am claiming is subjective, but the thing, the interpretation, which truth is being attributed to, which I am claiming is subjective.

You're conflating being true with being called true. Sure, we could say that we attribute truth. However, that isn't said by someone coherently arguing for correspondence. — creativesoul

What I am referring to is the thing which is said to be true. It is not a collection of physically existing words which is said to be true, it is the interpretation of these which is said to be true. But unless you can demonstrate how an interpretation can be objective, I assume that any interpretation is subjective.

Please show how logic "demonstrates." — tim wood

Let me quote what I said a few posts back:

It is best laid out in this way, by Aristotle. Anything which exists is necessarily the thing which it is, or else it would not be the thing that it is, it would be something different. And it is impossible by way of contradiction that a thing is something other than the thing it is. So when a thing comes into existence, it must already be pre-determined what that thing will be, or else that thing might be something other than the thing that it is, and this is impossible according to the above statement. Therefore we must assume that the "form" of the thing, the "whatness" of the thing is prior to the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the principle which Aristotle took from Plato, and expounded on. Notice that a "form" of the thing, an idea of the thing, is necessarily prior in time, to the existence of the thing, and this must be true for every existing thing.

He covers this principle in the "Metaphysics", where he explains that the fundamental metaphysical question is not why is there something rather than nothing, but why is there what there is, rather than something else. He takes this question much further than Plato, later in the "Metaphysics", where he develops the concept of potential.

The scientific way of understanding why there is what there is, is through "possibility". Prior in time, to the existence of the thing itself, we claim that there is the possibility of that thing. This "potential" for the thing, is the "idea" which precedes the existence of the thing. But this "idea" of possibility, or potential, is created by the human mind, it is a human idea, and therefore cannot be the real "form", in the world, which must precedes the existence of the thing, according to the above argument. This is covered by Aristotle's cosmological argument. The potential must be validated by something actual.

If the actuality, which validates the possibility for existence of a thing, is assigned to another actual thing (which is the common way to dismiss this problem through efficient causation), then we have an infinite regress of existing things. That is why this solution is rejected by later renditions of the cosmological argument, such as Aquinas'. Furthermore, this approach, which leads to infinite regress, just veils the real issue that an actually existing thing, being the potential for something else, is just a human idea, it's the way human beings describe the situation. This perspective fails to account for a necessary aspect of reality, which is "the act", that makes one thing become another thing.

I believe, you introduce an alternate reality, in which immaterial Forms exist - and presumably Truth has a form? As theory, why not? As real, untenable. — tim wood

Until you address the logic which necessitates the immaterial Forms, and you develop an understanding of the problems involved with this perspective, you have no basis for any claim of "untenable". To simply claim "untenable" without addressing the logic, is just a baseless assertion.

Exacty, and it is not a problem; it is a fact! The fallibility of truth, here, is resolved in whether the truth in question, which (I argue) is necessarily some kind of proposition, is true, or not. Just here is exactly where truth reveals itself as contingent, as possibility - but possibility of a certain kind (what kind a separate discussion). One criterium that suggest itself to me, is "moral certainty." — tim wood

It is a problem though, because we understand "truth" as infallible. If you resolution to the problem is to redefine "truth" as something fallible, something "possible", instead of something real, something actual, then all you have done is dismissed "truth" as we have come to know the concept, for something less than truth, something fallible. This is a problem, because it's simply your failure to establish an understanding of "truth", as it is meant to be understood, so that you introduce a different definition of "truth".

Concepts are left hanging, willy-nilly, all the time. Beyond the inconvenience, so what? — tim wood

A concept which is left hanging, not grounded, cannot be judged as true. It is the justification of the concept which allows us to judge its truth. So to judge such concepts as true, is just a willy-nilly judgement.

Wrong, actually. No doubt new knowledge does lead to new understandings, new truth, if you will. But underlying are what are called absolute presuppositions. And these do change, but as a result of a logical process. Temporality is merely incidental. — tim wood

I don't understand your criticism here, you write "wrong", but then proceed to support my claim. The only difference is that you attempt to remove temporality from a "process". Of course that is what is wrong, we all know that temporality is intrinsic and essential to any process.

Is it possible to say that the universe "existed" in the past when there is no time? — carl37

No, I think this is impossible. The concept of "past" is dependent on the concept of "time", such that past implies time. So past, as something real which we could refer to, is only possible if there is time. Consider the concepts of "human being" and "animal". To ask if there could be a past without time is like asking if there could be a human being when there is no animals.