1) Let's suppose it is: truth is an ideal. Whence ideals? Which came first, the horse or the ideal (of a ) horse? I think the real horse came first. But what would be the real truth that is prior to the ideal? If this question is legitimate, then it follows that truth is not originally or entirely an ideal. Further, it can reasonably be asked what property the ideal has that is not already manifest in its instances. What property does the ideal horse have that is not already manifest in one or another real horse? (Assuming that the ideal horse is not an unnatural or super-natural horse, although it's fair to include in the one ideal horse all the perfections of many real horses and none of their imperfections.) — tim wood

As much as many people today do not believe this, it has been well proven by Plato and Aristotle, that the form of the thing is prior in existence, to the particular thing itself. It is best laid out in this way, by Aristotle. Anything which exists is necessarily the thing which it is, or else it would not be the thing that it is, it would be something different. And it is impossible by way of contradiction that a thing is something other than the thing it is. So when a thing comes into existence, it must already be pre-determined what that thing will be, or else that thing might be something other than the thing that it is, and this is impossible according to the above statement. Therefore we must assume that the "form" of the thing, the "whatness" of the thing is prior to the thing itself.

This is what the neo-Platonists expanded on, the immaterial Forms which are necessarily prior to the physical existence of objects. Christian thinkers like Aquinas were clear to distinguish between this immaterial Form which precedes the existence of an object, and human ideas which follow the existence of objects in abstraction. I intentionally used the word "ideal", to allow that even in human activity, the ideal like a template, or prototype, precedes the object which is created as a representation of the ideal. So we cannot speak of a "real truth" which precedes the ideal, because the ideal is the real truth.

2) Let's assume that truth is not just an ideal. It follows immediately, then, that there's more to truth than just being an ideal. Where else would that be but in the real, in praxis. — tim wood

You always fall back on this, or a similar position, that truth is not in the mind, that it is not an ideal, seemingly not willing to follow where the investigation leads.

As an ideal, truth is a universal. — tim wood

This is not the case. Concepts and such are universals, but the ideal is a particular concept, it is the one chosen as the best, the most appropriate, the ideal. It is not a universal, it is a particular. Every object has a particular form unique to itself, and the statement of that form is also a particular statement, unique in reference to that particular object. That is the thing about truth, it is particular to every situation. The truth concerning that situation is the best description of it, the ideal description, it is unique and particular.

Truth, then, becomes the possibility that we trust, or at least can hope for, that is realized in the true. The ideas of truth and true are in part just as MU claims. But as part of being in the world, they extend beyond the idea into that which makes them truth, or true. — tim wood

OK, let me consider this notion of extending beyond the idea, which you suggest. Consider that the ideal extends beyond the idea, referring to the best, or most perfect idea. Do you see that it is impossible for the ideal to exist within the human mind, due to the deficiencies and fallibilities of the human being? The human mind cannot hold the best, most perfect idea. Therefore truth, in its most perfect and real form is not something within the human mind.

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it has been well proven by Plato and Aristotle, that the form of the thing is prior in existence, to the particular thing itself. — MU

I believe you're thinking temporal priority, when it really is logical priority, and that in thought, as an idea. And even that is arguable. As to coming into existence, I think you're shorting the notions of telos and nisus. The telos of a cat is to be(come) a cat; the kitten's nisus is to realize its telos. While not yet a cat, it is exactly not a cat. But that just means that it is exactly something else, which is a very clumsy pseudo-philosophical way of saying that the kitten grows into a cat, that is, is continually changing.

To the main point:

Let's assume that truth is not just an ideal. It follows immediately, then, that there's more to truth than just being an ideal. Where else would that be but in the real, in praxis. — timw

You always fall back on this, or a similar position, that truth is not in the mind, that it is not an ideal, seemingly not willing to follow where the investigation leads. — MU

And you always are completely correct in this criticism. But the criticism is too narrow and reductionist. All right, truth is in the mind, but not as an ideal. Perhaps as a kind of judgment. Maybe that's it. Truth is the mind's judgment as to whether certain propositions are true. As such it has nothing to do with the particular trueness of any proposition, and is not even in itself a guarantee that the proposition is true. It is just a judgment (Insert Gurugeorge, here).

If so, this judgement also speaks to the person giving the judgment, and his or her use of the world in making it. Truth-as-judgment, then, while not in the world as a thing, is a part of being in the world, using the world, and exposing oneself in the world. And in so far as the person measures the world as part of making a judgment as to truth, he or she is also at the same time measured, used, expressed, by the world.

The ideal as not a universal. Hmm. I had learned that George (any George, any person), while an individual, is thought of as a universal. Maybe I've confused "universal" with substance. The idea was that George could never be a predicate. Can an ideal be a predicate? In as much as the ideal is the perfect, and no-thing is perfect, then it can't be predicated. Of course at some point we might have to examine just what, exactly, the perfection of the ideal actually is.

Anyway, can you go with this: that truth is a kind of judgment that invokes the world and the being in the world of the person making the judgment. (And has nothing to do with the trueness of any proposition, except through hope (trust, honesty, etc.). Please feel obliged to clean this up, if you think it needs it.

I believe you're thinking temporal priority, when it really is logical priority, and that in thought, as an idea. And even that is arguable. As to coming into existence, I think you're shorting the notions of telos and nisus. The telos of a cat is to be(come) a cat; the kitten's nisus is to realize its telos. While not yet a cat, it is exactly not a cat. But that just means that it is exactly something else, which is a very clumsy pseudo-philosophical way of saying that the kitten grows into a cat, that is, is continually changing. — tim wood

I think your missing the point. The point is that the logic demonstrates that a sort of "Idea" of each particular, individual thing, precedes in time, the material existence of that thing. Of course, we believe that there have been things long before there were human beings, so these "Ideas" are not human ideas. This is why Neo-Platonism was so well received by Christian theologians, because they designated these Ideas as divine.

Instead of taking a religious perspective though, let's just call these "natural Ideas", or "forms", as Aristotle did. It is very important to notice that these Forms, (I'll use the capital F to distinguish the natural Ideas from the human ideas), are of particular things, rather than universals which human ideas are. So each particular, individual thing, has a Form which precedes in time, its material existence, and therefore the Form of the thing is something separate from the material thing itself. We see an object, like a chair at the table, the chair has a Form, which is necessarily separate from the material chair itself, because it precedes the existence of the material chair, in time. The separation is a temporal separation. The temporal perspective of the human being is extremely limited, as is evident by relativity theory. It is restricted by the material constitution of the human body. You see the material chair at the present, "now", but just prior to the present in which you are seeing the material chair, is the Form of the chair, (the Form is at a different "now", a shifted now, which is prior to the "now" of your experience), and the Form causes the material existence of the chair, at the now of your experience.

And you always are completely correct in this criticism. But the criticism is too narrow and reductionist. All right, truth is in the mind, but not as an ideal. Perhaps as a kind of judgment. Maybe that's it. Truth is the mind's judgment as to whether certain propositions are true. As such it has nothing to do with the particular trueness of any proposition, and is not even in itself a guarantee that the proposition is true. It is just a judgment (Insert Gurugeorge, here). — tim wood

I don't believe that you completely followed the last passage which I just I wrote. And if you could follow it, you most likely dismissed it as "untrue", from the opening premise, that the Form of each individual thing is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing, so it makes no sense to you anyway. If you've dismissed this as untrue, then we need to go back to the argument from Aristotle, which I presented, and hash this out, because either the premise is wrong or it is right, and what I say about "judgement" now, will be based in the assumption that the premise is correct.

The reason why I insisted for so long, that we do not allow truth out of the ideal realm, was to avoid the notion of truth being a correspondence between human ideas, and material existence. So now I've introduced Forms, which are separate from material existence, and also separate from human ideas. I propose that material existence is a medium between human ideas, and the Forms. Truth, as correspondence, is a correspondence between human ideas, and the separate Forms.

The problem with judgement now, is that the human mind is fallible, and cannot be trusted to accurately judge truth. Judgement is an act of will, a passing of judgement. Many times we judge something as true, when it is false. So if we are to assume that truth is a judgement, then this judgement must be an action carried out not by the human mind, but the Mind in which the Forms exist. But we haven't yet determined that the Forms exist within a Mind, that is the ancient assumption which puts the Forms in the mind of God. All we have is that the Forms are necessarily prior in time, to material existence. There is an act, which is the passing of time, and this act makes material things correspond to the Forms, but what kind of thing could "judge" whether human ideas correspond with the Forms?

So "judgement" may not be the proper concept here because unless we assume a being like God, with the capacity to judge, we cannot have a judgement. It is a left over idea, held over from the times in which human beings thought that the Forms must exist in the mind of God, and the judgement of "truth" was made by God. Now I have presented a slightly more complex model. I have posited material existence as the medium between the Forms and the human ideas. Instead of the Will of God, passing judgement, making material existence correspond to the Forms as independent "truth", I posit the passing of time. Truth, from this perspective is not a judgement, it is the passing of time. We can replace the statement "God is truth" with "The passing of time is truth".

Anyway, can you go with this: that truth is a kind of judgment that invokes the world and the being in the world of the person making the judgment. (And has nothing to do with the trueness of any proposition, except through hope (trust, honesty, etc.). Please feel obliged to clean this up, if you think it needs it. — tim wood

In the old days, "truth" would be the judgement of God. The human mind is fallible, and judges truth incorrectly quite often, so truth cannot be a judgement of human beings. Our society has grown up as a religious society, where God played an important part, such that many of the foundational concepts like "truth", are supported by the assumption of God. For instance, notice that it is common to say there is an "objective" truth or falsity to every proposition regardless of whether it is believed by human beings to be true. This invokes the "God's eye view". Now we tend to dismiss the reality of God, so concepts such as these, concepts which are foundational within our society, are left hanging.

This is the evolutionary cycle of the progression of knowledge. The foundational concepts of a society are the oldest, well established principles, but ancient. As time passes knowledge progresses and we learn vast new fields. The vast new expansions of extended knowledge will inevitably undermine the ancient principles, which were developed from the full extent of the restricted capacities of ancient people. Consider something like what Wittgenstein says, we cannot doubt these foundational, bedrock concepts. In actuality, what he does is question them, cast doubt on them, exposing the reality that we must doubt them. When we subject these bedrock principles to a complete system of skepticism, it becomes evident just how much modern knowledge has undermined fundamental principles.

So this is the importance of human judgement. Each foundational concept, being a fundamental premise, must be analyzed and judged by a system of skepticism. If the concept has been undermined by modern knowledge, as is the case with the foundational concept of "truth", we must determine the premises which have been added at a higher level, which contradict the foundational concept. The foundational concept, as well as the contradictory concepts, must be analyzed together, and they must be altered to be made consistent.

Fair point. So what is truth then?

I don't believe in things like abstract forms in the Platonic sense, so at best I would say that truth is an abstract concept. You could argue its either a logical or psychological concept, I suppose, but to me both boil down to mental entities.

I suppose the first question is: what is the nature or essence of this concept.

I'd have to think through this. My preliminary answer would be something like "Truth is a concept that denotes the reality of a particular proposition, belief, or statement."

Perhaps, taking it a step further, Truth with a capital T is something like the sum totality of all true propositions.

Or perhaps truth is the property a proposition has when it is in fact true. We say things like "Statement X is the truth." In other words, Statement X has the property of being a true statement.

Just thinking as I go here, feel free to shoot holes in it. : )

I'd have to think through this. My preliminary answer would be something like "Truth is a concept that denotes the reality of a particular proposition, belief, or statement." — Brian

OK, let's start with this. What do you mean by the "reality" of a proposition? Let's assume that a proposition consists of words, either written or spoken, and there is also supposed to be something which the proposition refers to. Each of these may be physical states of the world. Each of these states must be interpreted. If someone interprets them both, the words and the thing referred to, in the same way, that person would say the proposition is true. In other words, if I would describe a particular state of the world, with the same words as used in the proposition, I would say that the proposition is true.

Or perhaps truth is the property a proposition has when it is in fact true. We say things like "Statement X is the truth." In other words, Statement X has the property of being a true statement. — Brian

Yes, this is what I would agree with. When we judge a particular collection of words as true, we claim that it has the property of truth. The problem is that truth is not attributed to the physical existence of the words, it is not something which is sensed in the words, it is attributed to the meaning of the words. The meaning is interpretive, and truth is attributed to the meaning, so this makes truth subjective.

The point is that the logic demonstrates that a sort of "Idea" of each particular, individual thing, precedes in time, the material existence of that thing. Of course, we believe that there have been things long before there were human beings, so these "Ideas" are not human ideas. This is why Neo-Platonism was so well received by Christian theologians, because they designated these Ideas as divine. — MU

Please show how logic "demonstrates." Please keep in mind that I have no complaint (here) of any kind with any system of ideas, or theories of anything. You consistently use language that seems to imply that when you say something is, you mean it exists as real, just exactly like a chair and not merely as an idea or concept (which we both accept as real as ideas and concepts, or so I think). We have your clarification from the other thread, but it's not clear that applies here. And of course that's just where I have a problem. And you're the only person I know of for whom logical priority in this context means temporal priority. At the moment I'm thinking that's simply a mistake on your part.

[L]et's just call these "natural Ideas", or "forms", as Aristotle did. It is very important to notice that these Forms, (I'll use the capital F to distinguish the natural Ideas from the human ideas), are of particular things, rather than universals which human ideas are. So each particular, individual thing, has a Form which precedes in time, its material existence — MU

As you observe below, we part company here. This is at best a kind of theory You're free to have it. But you need something more for it to be true (and not merely consistent).

I don't believe that you completely followed the last passage which I just I wrote. And if you could follow it, you most likely dismissed it as "untrue", from the opening premise, that the Form of each individual thing is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing, so it makes no sense to you anyway. If you've dismissed this as untrue, then we need to go back to the argument from Aristotle, which I presented, and hash this out, because either the premise is wrong or it is right, and what I say about "judgement" now, will be based in the assumption that the premise is correct. — MU

"True" within a theory, an account, sure. I am not attacking - not even thinking about - your argument as theory. For present purpose I acknowledge and concede it, as (a) theory. But not as an account of reality. For that, more evidence, please.

The reason why I insist that we not allow truth out of the ideal realm, is to avoid the notion of truth being a correspondence between human ideas, and material existence. So now I've introduced Forms, which are separate from material existence, and also separate from human ideas. I propose that material existence is a medium between human ideas, and the Forms. Truth, as correspondence, is a correspondence between human ideas, and the separate Forms. — MU, slightly edited

I'm thinking by "correspondence" you mean the correspondence theory of truth (CTT). From a reasonable distaste for CTT, one widely shared, I believe, you introduce an alternate reality, in which immaterial Forms exist - and presumably Truth has a form? As theory, why not? As real, untenable.

The problem with judgement now, is that the human mind is fallible, and cannot be trusted to accurately judge truth. — MU

Exacty, and it is not a problem; it is a fact! The fallibility of truth, here, is resolved in whether the truth in question, which (I argue) is necessarily some kind of proposition, is true, or not. Just here is exactly where truth reveals itself as contingent, as possibility - but possibility of a certain kind (what kind a separate discussion). One criterium that suggest itself to me, is "moral certainty."

Judgement is an act of will, a passing of judgement. Many times we judge something as true, when it is false. So if we are to assume that truth is a judgement, then this judgement must be an action carried out not by the human mind.... — MU

Nope, we're on separate, different paths, here.

In the old days, "truth" would be the judgement of God. The human mind is fallible, and judges truth incorrectly quite often, so truth cannot be a judgement of human beings. — MU

Well, I'd argue that we don't judge truth, rather truth is the judgment, subsequently settled in the adjudication of whether the thing taken as truth is actually true, or not.

Our society has grown up as a religious society, where... many of the foundational concepts like "truth", are supported by the assumption of God. For instance, notice that it is common to say there is an "objective" truth or falsity to every proposition regardless of whether it is believed by some (my insert) human beings to be true. This invokes the "God's eye view". Now we tend to dismiss the reality of God, so concepts such as these, concepts which are foundational within our society, are left hanging. — MU

Concepts are left hanging, willy-nilly, all the time. Beyond the inconvenience, so what? And certainly it is a very good thing that some concepts are not just left hanging, but positively hanged!

This is the evolutionary cycle of the progression of knowledge. The foundational concepts of a society are the oldest, well established principles, but ancient. As time passes knowledge progresses and we learn vast new fields. The vast new expansions of extended knowledge will inevitably undermine the ancient principles, which were developed from the full extent of the restricted capacities of ancient people. Consider something like what Wittgenstein says, we cannot doubt these foundational, bedrock concepts. In actuality, what he does is question them, cast doubt on them, exposing the reality that we must doubt them. When we subject these bedrock principles to a complete system of skepticism, it becomes evident just how much modern knowledge has undermined fundamental principles. — MU

Wrong, actually. No doubt new knowledge does lead to new understandings, new truth, if you will. But underlying are what are called absolute presuppositions. And these do change, but as a result of a logical process. Temporality is merely incidental.

So this is the importance of human judgement. Each foundational concept, being a fundamental premise, must be analyzed and judged by a system of skepticism. If the concept has been undermined by modern knowledge, as is the case with the foundational concept of "truth", we must determine the premises which have been added at a higher level, which contradict the foundational concept. The foundational concept, as well as the contradictory concepts, must be analyzed together, and they must be altered to be made consistent. — MU

Well, this is a program, to be sure! I don't know about altering "foundational concepts," though. How do you intend to accomplish that?

You wrote:

When we judge a particular collection of words as true, we claim that it has the property of truth. The problem is that truth is not attributed to the physical existence of the words, it is not something which is sensed in the words, it is attributed to the meaning of the words. The meaning is interpretive, and truth is attributed to the meaning, so this makes truth subjective.

No, it doesn't. It makes the attribution of truth subjective. The objective/subjective dichotomy cannot take an account of that which requires both and is thus neither.

You're conflating being true with being called true. Sure, we could say that we attribute truth. However, that isn't said by someone coherently arguing for correspondence.

Asking what correspondence is leads one astray. If I say that that is a tree, then it is nonsense to ask what a tree is. Truth is correspondence. Correspondence is truth. It is a relationship presupposed within all thought/belief formation itself, and therefore presupposed within all statements thereof...

Please show how logic "demonstrates." — tim wood

Let me quote what I said a few posts back:

It is best laid out in this way, by Aristotle. Anything which exists is necessarily the thing which it is, or else it would not be the thing that it is, it would be something different. And it is impossible by way of contradiction that a thing is something other than the thing it is. So when a thing comes into existence, it must already be pre-determined what that thing will be, or else that thing might be something other than the thing that it is, and this is impossible according to the above statement. Therefore we must assume that the "form" of the thing, the "whatness" of the thing is prior to the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the principle which Aristotle took from Plato, and expounded on. Notice that a "form" of the thing, an idea of the thing, is necessarily prior in time, to the existence of the thing, and this must be true for every existing thing.

He covers this principle in the "Metaphysics", where he explains that the fundamental metaphysical question is not why is there something rather than nothing, but why is there what there is, rather than something else. He takes this question much further than Plato, later in the "Metaphysics", where he develops the concept of potential.

The scientific way of understanding why there is what there is, is through "possibility". Prior in time, to the existence of the thing itself, we claim that there is the possibility of that thing. This "potential" for the thing, is the "idea" which precedes the existence of the thing. But this "idea" of possibility, or potential, is created by the human mind, it is a human idea, and therefore cannot be the real "form", in the world, which must precedes the existence of the thing, according to the above argument. This is covered by Aristotle's cosmological argument. The potential must be validated by something actual.

If the actuality, which validates the possibility for existence of a thing, is assigned to another actual thing (which is the common way to dismiss this problem through efficient causation), then we have an infinite regress of existing things. That is why this solution is rejected by later renditions of the cosmological argument, such as Aquinas'. Furthermore, this approach, which leads to infinite regress, just veils the real issue that an actually existing thing, being the potential for something else, is just a human idea, it's the way human beings describe the situation. This perspective fails to account for a necessary aspect of reality, which is "the act", that makes one thing become another thing.

I believe, you introduce an alternate reality, in which immaterial Forms exist - and presumably Truth has a form? As theory, why not? As real, untenable. — tim wood

Until you address the logic which necessitates the immaterial Forms, and you develop an understanding of the problems involved with this perspective, you have no basis for any claim of "untenable". To simply claim "untenable" without addressing the logic, is just a baseless assertion.

Exacty, and it is not a problem; it is a fact! The fallibility of truth, here, is resolved in whether the truth in question, which (I argue) is necessarily some kind of proposition, is true, or not. Just here is exactly where truth reveals itself as contingent, as possibility - but possibility of a certain kind (what kind a separate discussion). One criterium that suggest itself to me, is "moral certainty." — tim wood

It is a problem though, because we understand "truth" as infallible. If you resolution to the problem is to redefine "truth" as something fallible, something "possible", instead of something real, something actual, then all you have done is dismissed "truth" as we have come to know the concept, for something less than truth, something fallible. This is a problem, because it's simply your failure to establish an understanding of "truth", as it is meant to be understood, so that you introduce a different definition of "truth".

Concepts are left hanging, willy-nilly, all the time. Beyond the inconvenience, so what? — tim wood

A concept which is left hanging, not grounded, cannot be judged as true. It is the justification of the concept which allows us to judge its truth. So to judge such concepts as true, is just a willy-nilly judgement.

Wrong, actually. No doubt new knowledge does lead to new understandings, new truth, if you will. But underlying are what are called absolute presuppositions. And these do change, but as a result of a logical process. Temporality is merely incidental. — tim wood

I don't understand your criticism here, you write "wrong", but then proceed to support my claim. The only difference is that you attempt to remove temporality from a "process". Of course that is what is wrong, we all know that temporality is intrinsic and essential to any process.

No, it doesn't. It makes the attribution of truth subjective. The objective/subjective dichotomy cannot take an account of that which requires both and is thus neither. — creativesoul

I disagree. What I said is that truth is attributed to the meaning of the statement, it is not attributed to the physical words themselves. The meaning must be interpreted before truth can be attributed, and this interpretation is subjective. So truth is attributed to the interpretation, and any interpretation is subjective. It is not the act of attribution which I am claiming is subjective, but the thing, the interpretation, which truth is being attributed to, which I am claiming is subjective.

You're conflating being true with being called true. Sure, we could say that we attribute truth. However, that isn't said by someone coherently arguing for correspondence. — creativesoul

What I am referring to is the thing which is said to be true. It is not a collection of physically existing words which is said to be true, it is the interpretation of these which is said to be true. But unless you can demonstrate how an interpretation can be objective, I assume that any interpretation is subjective.

Well Meta, you and I have had quite nuanced discussions involving the differences in our positions. These have ranged from things similar to what you've argued with Tim to what counts as being justified. I'm confident that you can recall such conversation, even if - like myself - the recollection isn't a complete one.

You've neglected to address what I've just objected to.

You laid out an argument regarding how "truth" is attributed to the meaning of words, and then erroneously concluded that that is ground for further claiming that truth is subjective. It is no such thing. What follows is that the attribution of "truth" is subjective.

That is one objection left neglected. The other involved the invocation of the subjective/objective dichotomy. While it is a very very popular one, it is inherently incapable of taking an account of that which is neither and/or requires both. All thought/belief is existentially contingent upon subjective and objective things. Correspondence is a relationship 'between' the two. Thus, it requires both and yet is - itself - neither of those. Meaning is in the same boat.

Honestly, I'm not even comfortable with saying that. The objective/subjective dichotomy is inherently lacking in explanatory power regarding all sorts of things. It shoehorns misunderstanding into one's worldview.

Plato's and Aristotle's notion(s) of form is/are based upon an unproven premiss that assumes precisely what needs to be argued for. On my view, both unnecessarily multiply entities where and when no such multiple is required.

There is no justificatory ground for positing the form of A prior to the existence of A.

Potential, if it is to make any sense in my book, must be on par with necessary preconditions. There is no need for a form prior to existence. There is a need for what A consists of/in if A is a composite.

Just a bit of criticism regarding this part...

What I am referring to is the thing which is said to be true. It is not a collection of physically existing words which is said to be true, it is the interpretation of these which is said to be true. But unless you can demonstrate how an interpretation can be objective, I assume that any interpretation is subjective.

This seems quite confused. The objective/subjective dichotomy adds nothing but unnecessary confusion.

Interpretation requires the attribution of meaning by one speaker to another speaker's language use. If the interpeter get's it right, then s/he understands the speaker. That says nothing at all with regard to the truth of the speaker's use. Rather, if both draw the same or similar enough correlations, then they have a shared understanding/meaning. It is when different correlations are drawn that misunderstanding takes place.

Understanding(correctly interpreting) another's word use has nothing to do with understanding what it would take for them to be true. I can interpret another's words perfectly and those words be demonstrably false.

You laid out an argument regarding how "truth" is attributed to the meaning of words, and then erroneously concluded that that is ground for further claiming that truth is subjective. It is no such thing. What follows is that the attribution of "truth" is subjective. — creativesoul

I clarified by saying that truth is attributed to an interpretation of meaning. Since the interpretation is subjective, then the thing which is attributed is subjective as well, as a property of that subjective thing. You haven't yet addressed my clarification.

That is one objection left neglected. The other involved the invocation of the subjective/objective dichotomy. While it is a very very popular one, it is inherently incapable of taking an account of that which is neither and/or requires both. All thought/belief is existentially contingent upon subjective and objective things. Correspondence is a relationship 'between' the two. Thus, it requires both and yet is - itself - neither of those. Meaning is in the same boat. — creativesoul

The only thing objective about an interpretation is the object which is being interpreted. If you believe that there is naturally some type of correspondence between the object, and the interpretation, which is what you seem to be arguing, then the onus is on you to demonstrate this correspondence. To simply assume that there is correspondence is an unjustified assumption. in fact, that there even is an object, has not yet been justified by you.

So perhaps it is true that all thought/belief is contingent on subjective and objective things, but I see no reason to believe this. Instead, I think it is far more likely that some thought/belief may be purely subjective. Until the assumption that there even is an object, is justified, we are much better off to start with the assumption that all thought/belief is purely subjective. Therefore, until you justify the assumption that the object exists, your assertion that "all thought/belief is existentially contingent on subjective and objective things", is completely baseless.

There is no justificatory ground for positing the form of A prior to the existence of A. — creativesoul

I provided a paraphrase of the argument. If you do not agree with it, then demonstrate its weakness. But to claim that there is no justification for the conclusion, without addressing the argument, is just being ridiculous.

Interpretation requires the attribution of meaning by one speaker to another speaker's language use. If the interpeter get's it right, then s/he understands the speaker. That says nothing at all with regard to the truth of the speaker's use. Rather, if both draw the same or similar enough correlations, then they have a shared understanding/meaning. It is when different correlations are drawn that misunderstanding takes place. — creativesoul

Allow me to clarify the point. Assume any statement, like "a cow is in the barn". In order that this statement may be true or false, there must be an interpretation of its meaning. Also, there must be an interpretation of the physical state of the world. If truth is correspondence, then these two interpretations must correspond in order that there is truth. Interpretation is completely subjective (carried out by the mind of a human subject). Since truth as correspondence, is correspondence between two distinct interpretations, which are both subjective, truth as correspondence, is itself subjective.

Allow me to clarify the point. Assume any statement, like "a cow is in the barn". In order that this statement may be true or false, there must be an interpretation of its meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure I agree that there must be an interpretation of its meaning. Rather, I think it would be more precise to say there must be an understanding of its meaning. "Understanding" is something like a mental grasp or comprehension. I often like to refer to understanding as "getting it." When something like "a cow is in the barn" is uttered in relation to a set of particulars like, for instance, a particular cow and a particular barn, we must grasp the meaning of the utterance. In this case, the meaning of the sentence is that there is a particular animal, a cow, spatially located in a particular building, the barn. I think as long as we have something like "understanding" we don't need something like "interpretation" here to do any heavy lifting.

Also, there must be an interpretation of the physical state of the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this particular case, I think it would be more correct to say that we must have a *belief* about the world (physical or whatever) rather than an *interpretation* of the world. A belief here meaning something that you hold to be true, whether or not it actually is, in fact, true. In this particular case, you are holding it to be true that there is a particular animal, a cow, in a particular spatial location, inside the structure we refer to as the barn.

If truth is correspondence, then these two interpretations must correspond in order that there is truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

If truth is something like correspondence, I would argue that the correspondence is actually not between the meaning of the sentence and the world, but rather the belief you are holding and the world. I have a belief B about state of the world Y. Now, there is an actual state of the world, F, which we can call a fact about the world. The fact is the way the world actually is. If B matches up with F, then that is the actual correspondence relationship. Now, the fact is not an interpretation. The fact is simply the way the world is. The belief, on the other hand, is also not an interpretation, but rather an opinion about the world that you happen to hold as true. If the two match, then correspondence obtains and the belief is True.

As to whether this is subjective or objective:

The fact is certainly objective. Regardless of what we think about the situation, the cow (Betsy, let's name her), is either in or not in the barn owned by Old McDonald, who has a farm. The fact of the matter is the objective state of affairs. In this particular instance, let's say that Betsy is NOT in Old McDonald's barn; rather, she is actually grazing in Old McDonald's field at Time T.

Now is the belief subjective or objective. Here we get into the issue of intentionality (one of my favorite topics, as a phenomenologist, I might add!)

A belief is a mental state / psychological state. Now, we have to distinguish the existence of the mental state itself, maybe we we can refer to as its form, from its actual content, which is not the same thing. I have many beliefs, and these are all psychological states, so it could be fair to say that they are the world as I perceive it, which means they are subjective.

HOWEVER, the content of the beliefs are assertions about the world being a certain way or not being a certain way. In this example, I hold it to be true that Betsy is in Old McD's Barn. The structure of the belief is subjective, but the content is asserting something objective about the world. Unfortunately for me, what I am asserting does not actually correspond to the way the world really is. The belief fails to obtain. As a consequence, my belief about the world is False. The world is not the way I believe it to be. It does not meet up with my assertion about it.

Interpretation never really needs, and I think, never does ever actually enter the picture here at all.So I think that any argument against the correspondence theory of truth that hinges on the concept of interpretation is doomed to miss the mark.

I welcome and am looking forward to any disagreements or objections you might have to this thinking though. : )

This topic has become so much more important to me in the era of Donald Trump, in which "Truth" seems to become not a correspondence between a belief and a fact, but simply strongly held belief regardless of whether it corresponds to anything objective at all. So, if Donald Trump believes that "It is not raining outside", the truth of the assertion "it is not raining outside" hinges entirely on whether or not Donald Trump believes it to be true. Not only does this seem to be a wildly, extremely incorrect epistemological theory, I think it's also an extremely dangerous one when it comes to our ability to make decisions about pretty much anything. Our decisions, after all, generally hinge on our beliefs, and if our beliefs have no correspondence with an objective reality, despite the fact that there is an objective reality, we risk taking actions, that may have very negative consequences, for very poor reasons.

You wrote:

I clarified by saying that truth is attributed to an interpretation of meaning. Since the interpretation is subjective, then the thing which is attributed is subjective as well, as a property of that subjective thing. You haven't yet addressed my clarification.

It was addressed. The attribution of truth is not truth. We can mistakenly attribute truth just as we can mistakenly presuppose it.

Allow me to clarify the point. Assume any statement, like "a cow is in the barn". In order that this statement may be true or false, there must be an interpretation of its meaning.

That is false. Interpretation of a claim is not a truth condition for the claim. You're conflating conditions of shared meaning with truth conditions. They're very closely related but not the same thing.

It must be meaningful, but there is no need for an interpretation of it's meaning in order for it to be true/false. In order to be understood, meaning must be shared.

"A cow is in the barn" is true if a cow is in the barn. The cow's being in the barn is what makes the statement true. The absence of a cow in the barn is what makes the statement false. So, the statement could be made, misunderstood, and yet still be true/false. It could also be made, understood, and yet still be true/false.

Seems to me that the notion of interpretation has caused confusion for you Meta.

Thought/belief consists entirely in/of mental correlations drawn 'between' objects of physiological sensory perception and/or the agents own 'state of mind'. Meaning consists of precisely the same. The two(truth and meaning) are virtually inseparable/indistinguishable prior to and in many/most cases long after language acquisition/creation/use. It takes a metacognitive endeavour to isolate them.

Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.<---------That is the presupposition of truth at work in all thought/belief and statements thereof, including those that attribute meaning.

Davidson(I think) and others arrived at the notion that if and when a listener knows what it would take for a statement to be true, then s/he knows what the statement means.

The consequence of this is that it is possible for a listener to know more about what a speaker thinks/believes/states than the speaker. An interesting topic in it's own right, that has been borne out by fact...

I'm not sure I agree that there must be an interpretation of its meaning. Rather, I think it would be more precise to say there must be an understanding of its meaning. "Understanding" is something like a mental grasp or comprehension. I often like to refer to understanding as "getting it." When something like "a cow is in the barn" is uttered in relation to a set of particulars like, for instance, a particular cow and a particular barn, we must grasp the meaning of the utterance. In this case, the meaning of the sentence is that there is a particular animal, a cow, spatially located in a particular building, the barn. I think as long as we have something like "understanding" we don't need something like "interpretation" here to do any heavy lifting. — Brian

I don't see the point in the distinction between interpretation and understanding here. Each of these is subjective, so it doesn't affect the point I am making. We could switch out "interpretation" in favour of "understanding", if that's what you would like. Accordingly, there must be an understanding of the collection of words, and an understanding of the situation which the words refer to, in order that there is truth.

The issue is, that since each of these things which are being related to each other, are "understandings", and these are within the mind of the subject, how is it possible to get beyond subjectivity, to assume an objective truth?

The fact is certainly objective. Regardless of what we think about the situation, the cow (Betsy, let's name her), is either in or not in the barn owned by Old McDonald, who has a farm. The fact of the matter is the objective state of affairs. In this particular instance, let's say that Betsy is NOT in Old McDonald's barn; rather, she is actually grazing in Old McDonald's field at Time T. — Brian

You're missing the point Brian. There's an animal in the barn, which you are calling "Betsy". What justifies your claim that Betsy is a cow? So even if this animal is in the building which you call a barn, how is it true that there is a cow in the barn? Isn't it necessary that we have a definition of what it means to be a cow, and someone with an understanding of that definition takes a look at the animal, to get an understanding of the animal, making the judgement, that the animal is a cow? And the same procedure must be carried out for "barn", and the spatial relation, "in". If there is no one with this understanding how could "a cow is in the barn" be true? And even if it is just one person with authority who dictates, this animal is the animal I call "cow", and this building is the building I call "barn", and this is the spatial relation I call "in", therefore it is true by decree, that a cow is in the barn, what makes this an "objective fact"?

It was addressed. The attribution of truth is not truth. We can mistakenly attribute truth just as we can mistakenly presuppose it. — creativesoul

When I say, "the sky is blue", I attribute "blue" to "the sky". Does this mean to you that I am claiming that the attribution of "blue" is blue? I don't think it should, and it sure doesn't to me. So why, when I say that truth is attributed to an interpretation of a statement, do you reply with "the attribution of truth is not truth". Your reply is irrelevant, trivial, drivel. It doesn't at all address my claim that truth is a property of the interpretation, just like blue is a property of the sky.

If you happen to believe that truth can exist somewhere else, other than as a property of interpretation, or as Brian would prefer, as a property of understanding, just like blue exists in places other than as a property of the sky, then I hope you will show me where. Otherwise I will continue to believe that truth only exists as a property of understanding, and is therefore completely subjective, and disregard your irrelevant comments.

That is false. Interpretation of a claim is not a truth condition for the claim. You're conflating conditions of shared meaning with truth conditions. They're very closely related but not the same thing.

It must be meaningful, but there is no need for an interpretation of it's meaning in order for it to be true/false. In order to be understood, meaning must be shared.

"A cow is in the barn" is true if a cow is in the barn. The cow's being in the barn is what makes the statement true. The absence of a cow in the barn is what makes the statement false. So, the statement could be made, misunderstood, and yet still be true/false. It could also be made, understood, and yet still be true/false. — creativesoul

This is completely ridiculous. To say "the cow's being in the barn" is what makes "a cow is in the barn" true is simply begging the question. You are saying nothing more than "a cow is in the barn" is true because it is true that there is a cow in the barn. That's udder (pun) nonsense.

What makes that statement true, is that there is a situation in the world which a human being would apprehend as a building there, which is properly called a "barn" in English, and there is an animal which is properly called a "cow", in a specific spatial relationship with that building which is properly referred to as "in".

Seems to me that the notion of interpretation has caused confusion for you Meta. — creativesoul

Perhaps my use of "interpretation" confused you, but it hasn't confused me. Would you prefer, as Brian suggests, that we use the word "understanding". In any case, if you don't like my belief, that truth is the property of interpretation, or as Brian prefers, understanding, then I'd like to know where you believe truth exists.

So, the statement could be made, misunderstood, and yet still be true/false. It could also be made, understood, and yet still be true/false. — creativesoul

Let's start here then. Suppose a statement is made which is not understood by anyone. You seem to be claiming that the statement is still true or false. Now let's proceed by clarifying this problem, and making it a condition of "a statement", that it is intelligible, in principle it may be understood. This way we don't even have to consider that unintelligible gibberish is a statement. Tell me how this statement could actually be true or false without actually being understood. Of course a conditional such as "if it corresponds" will not suffice, because it is the act of understanding which fulfills that condition.

.

Ok Meta, this conversation doesn't look promising, as it seems that we cannot agree upon some fundamental issues. This post aims to sort some stuff out.

I began my exchange with you as one who argues in favor of truth as correspondence. Notably, you asserted that certain things needed to be explained by one arguing for correspondence. I explained to you how that was not the case based upon other aspects of my own position. You've since told me that I'm wrong... basically insisting that I use the conceptual framework that you use, despite the fact of my having rejected that very thing... for good reason, I might add, in lieu of the position I do hold.

That's my summary... a very very rough outline of what's taken place here.

So, it is clear that we hold different positions and that those positions employ remarkably different key terms. It is safe to say that that is the basis of our disagreement. So. where do we take it from here?

I suppose the best thing for me to do is ask if you acknowledge and agree with this very rough summary of our exchange?

The issue is, that since each of these things which are being related to each other, are "understandings", and these are within the mind of the subject, how is it possible to get beyond subjectivity, to assume an objective truth? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a good question. It's kind of an existential-ontological question. The human situation is that we are in the midst of a world of stuff and things etc. Much like Descartes once did, I find myself sitting here, writing (typing) in my dressing gown by the light of a candle at night, surrounded by various objects like my books, a coffee mug and my computer screen.

So there are two very distinct possibilities here.

1. The first is the kind of radical (just meaning to the root of things) subjectivism that I think you are proffering. Everything I perceive around me is in some way mind-dependent. I think this is in essence an idealist view. The objects surrounding me are products of my mind, and my beliefs about those objects relate various products of mine mind to each other and to me.

2. The second possibility is more of a radical objectivism. I am amidst a world of things that are external to and independent of my mind, that would still be there even if I were not there perceiving them. My beliefs about the world are beliefs about these objects that are external to my mind.and how they relate to each other and to me. In this case, the objects or contents of my beliefs are about objective things - things that are not mind-dependent.

Which possibility is definitively true? I have no idea. At first blush, both are very possible.

I don't know of a good rational argument that can prove that this existing external world of objectivity is not actually just mind-dependent subjectivity. But I also don't know of a good rational argument that proves the opposite view, that everything is definitively mind dependent and subjective.

So I come to an impasse, and yet I must make a decision about what I think the nature of things really is.

My intuition is on the side of objectivity. I wish I had a good argument for or against that intuition, but I do not. But when I have a belief about, say, the coffee cup sitting next to my computer screen, I very much believe that this coffee cup is external and objective qua physical thing to my mind.My belief is about an external physical object, and not just a belief about a subjective psychological state.

That, of course, is where Brentano and Husserl's idea of intentionality comes into play.

I suppose the best thing for me to do is ask if you acknowledge and agree with this very rough summary of our exchange? — creativesoul

I agree, you argue that it is true that truth is correspondence because truth is correspondence. It is true that the cow is in the barn because the cow is in the barn. What's the point in making such an argument?

Notably, you asserted that certain things needed to be explained by one arguing for correspondence. I explained to you how that was not the case based upon other aspects of my own position. — creativesoul

This about sums it up. If you refuse to acknowledge the difficulties involved with correspondence, because you already believe that it is true that truth is correspondence, then what's the point in discussing truth?

1. The first is the kind of radical (just meaning to the root of things) subjectivism that I think you are proffering. Everything I perceive around me is in some way mind-dependent. I think this is in essence an idealist view. The objects surrounding me are products of my mind, and my beliefs about those objects relate various products of mine mind to each other and to me. — Brian

This is a good start, but let me qualify this. I am not arguing that "the objects surrounding me are products of my mind", I accept that there is something independent. What I am arguing is that the way I perceive, apprehend, and understand what's surrounding me is a product of my mind. This I called "interpretation", you prefer "understand".

2. The second possibility is more of a radical objectivism. I am amidst a world of things that are external to and independent of my mind, that would still be there even if I were not there perceiving them. My beliefs about the world are beliefs about these objects that are external to my mind.and how they relate to each other and to me. In this case, the objects or contents of my beliefs are about objective things - things that are not mind-dependent. — Brian

The nature of space and time makes it extremely difficult to accept such an objectivism. If I were not here perceiving my surroundings, what would set the here and now, in which these objects exists? I could say that the objects here, where I would have been, at the time which I would have been here, if I were here, would still exist without me being here, but then I am still referring to my own existence to provide a spatial-temporal perspective. Once I theoretically remove my own existence, I have no such spatial-temporal perspective.

My intuition is on the side of objectivity. — Brian

To exclude this intuition as misguided, simply imagine the universe, all of existence, and all of time, without you here. What would differentiate a planck time length from a second, from a billion years? Without the capacity to separate out a period of time, during which something exists, how can something exist? In an extremely long period of time, an object like a star or planet, would come into, and pass out of existence, and also exist all over the place, just like a fundamental particle at a very short period of time. What gives the "here and now", which we assign to existence?

This is a good start, but let me qualify this. I am not arguing that "the objects surrounding me are products of my mind", I accept that there is something independent. What I am arguing is that the way I perceive, apprehend, and understand what's surrounding me is a product of my mind. This I called "interpretation", you prefer "understand". — Metaphysician Undercover

I see - I would accept that as true I think...

I guess I'm just not seeing the next step of how that makes everything subjective and contradicts correspondence theory though.

I guess what I would say is, well, all of our perception of the external world is perspectival - from our own subjective perspective but OF objective things. But I still don't really see the leap to your conclusions from that.

This post is for the interested reader...

Meta wrote the following:

I say, "the sky is blue", I attribute "blue" to "the sky". Does this mean to you that I am claiming that the attribution of "blue" is blue? I don't think it should, and it sure doesn't to me. So why, when I say that truth is attributed to an interpretation of a statement, do you reply with "the attribution of truth is not truth"?(emphasis mine)

Sometimes stating the obvious is the best starting point. I was simply looking for an agreement that the attribution of "truth" is not truth. Despite what's been said heretofore by Meta about my approach, Meta clearly agreed with this obviousness, as the above shows.

So...

The attribution of "truth" is not truth. That is relevant - thus I mention it here as before - because Meta claimed that it followed from the notion that interpretations are subjective, and that we attribute truth to an interpretation, that truth is subjective. That conclusion quite simply doesn't follow, unless the attribution of "truth" is truth.

It's not.







Meta wrote:

If you happen to believe that truth can exist somewhere else, other than as a property of interpretation, or as Brian would prefer, as a property of understanding, just like blue exists in places other than as a property of the sky, then I hope you will show me where. Otherwise I will continue to believe that truth only exists as a property of understanding, and is therefore completely subjective, and disregard your irrelevant comments.

Here, two notions warrant attention; truth as a property and the existence of truth somewhere. Both are quite problematic. I'll explain further...

The notion that truth is a property of true propositions/assertions/statements/interpretations is very commonly held. Holding that truth is a property of statements, assertions, propositions, and/or interpretations is to hold that truth requires language, for all of those are language constructs. That is, all of those are existentially contingent upon language. If truth is a property of those, and nothing more, then truth too requires language. So, this position has logical consequences that leave it inherently incapable of taking an account of pre and/or non-linguistic true thought/belief. It can admit of no such thing.

However...

Thought/belief formation happens prior to language acquisition. Some of those thought/belief are true. If truth were a property of propositions/assertions/statements/interpretations and nothing more, then truth would be existentially contingent upon language and this could not be the case, but it is. Thus, it is a mistake to hold that truth is existentially contingent upon language.

Contrary to talking about truth being a property, on my view, truth is correspondence and correspondence is much better understood as a kind of relationship that is necessarily presupposed within all thought/belief formation(and statements thereof). Relationships are not properties and they certainly cannot be sensibly said to have a spatiotemporal location. Relationships are best understood in terms of understanding their necessary elemental constituents.




Meta wrote:

That's completely ridiculous. To say "the cow's being in the barn" is what makes "a cow is in the barn" true is simply begging the question. You are saying nothing more than "a cow is in the barn" is true because it is true that there is a cow in the barn. That's udder (pun) nonsense.

Evidently Meta and I work from different notions of what counts as nonsense and being ridiculous. On my view, it becomes ridiculous when an interlocutor habitually misunderstands and/or misattributes meaning to another's words and then argues against their own imaginary opponent. Commonly called a non-sequitur, and/or a strawman.

I did not claim that "the cow's being in the barn" is what makes "a cow is in the barn" true. I did not say that "a cow is in the barn" is true because it is true that there is a cow in the barn. If one wants to make strong assertions about what another is saying, then it is always best to quote them verbatim as a starting point.

Meta used quotation marks where none belong. The quotation marks are used by me to distinguish between statements about the case at hand and the case at hand. Meta has attributed meaning where none belongs and the proof of that is the difference between what Meta's report of what I wrote, and what I wrote.


Some other considerations worth mentioning...

What makes that statement true, is that there is a situation in the world which a human being would apprehend as a building there, which is properly called a "barn" in English, and there is an animal which is properly called a "cow", in a specific spatial relationship with that building which is properly referred to as "in".

By my lights, that's a very rough description of what it takes for the statement to be meaningful.

Suppose a statement is made which is not understood by anyone. You seem to be claiming that the statement is still true or false. Now let's proceed by clarifying this problem, and making it a condition of "a statement", that it is intelligible, in principle it may be understood. This way we don't even have to consider that unintelligible gibberish is a statement. Tell me how this statement could actually be true or false without actually being understood. Of course a conditional such as "if it corresponds" will not suffice, because it is the act of understanding which fulfills that condition.

Poisoning the well, based upon falsehood.

One understands a false statement. False statements do not fulfill that condition. Therefore, the act of understanding does not fulfill that condition.

Two senses of the word truth are given: 1) that truth simply and only refers to the quality that each true proposition has; and if there's more than one such proposition, then truth refers to those several qualities collectively. 2) That there's more to truth than is contained in 1). The question of the OP is whether #2 is correct - true - and if so, what makes it so.

#1 is trivial. I think #2 is true. And this is common form, that one word - truth - may have more than one meaning.

I have never thought for a moment that if I dug long enough and deep enough my shovel might strike truth. In this I have to side with MU: truth is not a thing. But at the same time MU says (I think; his posts are above) both that truth is subjective and subject to meaning/interpretation/understanding. That is, if I may paraphrase, that truth is in a mind (and not out there).

On the other side is something called the correspondence theory of truth. I accept that there can be something called correspondence, and that correspondence can be a warrant for a claim of truth. Like many people, I'm not satisfied that the correspondence theory exhausts truth - even if it may be correct as far as it goes (I don't know, either way).

For something - anything - to exist in any sense whatsoever, there are both minimal and maximal limits of time, space, energy it must conform to. Water for example, is H2O, a molecule. If all you have are atoms of hydrogen and oxygen, then you don't have water - there is no atomic form of water. Speech arguably requires a time span longer than is needed to say a single word. Clothing requires more than a strand of thread. And so on.

First question, then, might be what is the minimal requirement of truth. The possibility of being false was referenced above. I reject that. "A bachelor is an unmarried man," is true and conveys a truth without any possibility of being false. So far the only minimal criteria I can think of is that the proposition merely have the possibility of being true. Not, to be sure, a statistical possibility - that's not what I mean. I do mean that truth is itself a possibility, that becomes true when the proposition is true.

But that appears to set truth as entirely contingent, and that doesn't seem right. "Is P true?" "Dunno, but until we find out, it's the truth!" Expressed this way, it's not only ugly, but repellent! But I don't see anything better, with respect to propositions. At the moment, it seems #1 is correct, for propositions.

But I think there's a broader field. To get to it I have to deal with MU's version of Forms, via Plato, Aristotle, and the Neo-Platonists. MU has graciously laid out these ideas in detail, above. In sum, things in the world and human ideas are all imperfect instantiations/ideas/ideations of perfect forms. The perfect forms pre-exist human mind (because no human mind can think them). MU consistently confuses me at one point: he doesn't hold that ideas are real things; he maintains ideas (concepts) are real as concepts; this from above, and I agree. Where I get tossed is where he seems to argue that Forms are real things, and some ideas are real things, without the qualification.

I reject the whole super-naturalization of ideas - of any ideas. In brief, there is no Form of a perfect circle. There is a worked out idea of a what a circle is, and it's simple enough for most folks to grasp it. And that's the secret. Truth isn't in your mind or my mind; it "dwells" in collective mind, worked out over a long time. Just as circle is in collective mind. No Form needed; only the collective understanding. To be sure, that understanding is subject to evolution and refinement - it had better be! - which means that while the truth (collective "wisdom") is true, it could also be in a much larger sense false.

This agrees with usage, imo. The expression, "That's the truth," invokes the best the community has to offer. History - the future, that is - may eventually reset the standards, but this is not usually based on new knowledge, but new axioms, new absolute presuppositions. But while that may be, it lies in the future, predicting which is a road to madness.

That leaves a lot to be said about truth, all no doubt interesting. I think we've said here what truth is, and that's enough for one thread - unless of course someone disagrees.

I guess I'm just not seeing the next step of how that makes everything subjective and contradicts correspondence theory though. — Brian

I am not saying that everything is subjective, nor am I claiming that correspondence theory is contradicted by what I say. What I am trying to show, is that correspondence theory leaves truth as subjective. The understanding of the statement, and the understanding of the state of reality which is assumed to correspond, are both in the mind, and therefore subjective, unless we assume God or some type of objective mind, to provide an objective truth.

I do not claim that every aspect of knowledge is subjective, because we have a form of objectivity which is established through justification. Justification is accomplished when people agree. When we agree on definitions, through the use of demonstrations and such, and establish conventions of meaning, this is objectivity. So for instance, we find objectivity in mathematical symbols and definitions of geometry, because there is complete agreement on what the terms mean. Their usefulness has been well demonstrated, justified.

I guess what I would say is, well, all of our perception of the external world is perspectival - from our own subjective perspective but OF objective things. But I still don't really see the leap to your conclusions from that. — Brian

What do you mean, when you say that your subjective perspective is of objective things? What could you mean by "objective things"? How the world is, is dependent on your perspective. The world is different from my perspective than it is from your perspective, than it is from tim wood's, and creativesoul's. Objectivity only comes about when we find things to agree upon, but the fact that we can agree on things, does not change the fact that the way that the world is, in all its splendour, is perspective dependent. This is the simple consequence of the nature of time, that what is real, in the world, is dependent on one's perspective. So "objective things" are only created by different subjective perspectives getting together to create a unity. This unity of subjective perspectives may be called an objective thing.

Thought/belief formation happens prior to language acquisition. Some of those thought/belief are true. — creativesoul

This is a claim you've made for quite some time, which you still haven't properly supported. I've explained to you in the past, that thought/belief prior to language acquisition is most likely probabilistic, and therefore neither true nor false.

However, if truth is correspondence, then it is impossible that thought/belief prior to language could be true if thought/belief with language may be true. That is because such thought/belief would correspond only to the creature's perspective of the world, and this perspective would not be the same as the perspective which describes the world in words. Therefore either the perspective which describes the world in words is true, or the perspective which doesn't is true. If these two very different types of thought/belief both correspond, then we can conclude that any thought/belief may be said to correspond, and therefore all thought/belief is true.

Contrary to talking about truth being a property, on my view, truth is correspondence and correspondence is much better understood as a kind of relationship that is necessarily presupposed within all thought/belief formation(and statements thereof). — creativesoul

So I assume from this passage, that this is your actual claim, that all thought/belief is true. Truth is "... necessarily presupposed within all thought/belief..." This is my point, correspondence as truth, renders all truth as subjective. Correspondence is what a subject produces with belief, therefore all beliefs correspond, and all beliefs are true. Truth is the essence of believing. One would not believe it if it wasn't true.

That is, if I may paraphrase, that truth is in a mind (and not out there). — tim wood

I'll remind you that I have qualified this position. The concept of "truth" as we know it is strongly based in religion, and the idea of God. You may have seen the saying, "God is Truth". So traditionally, truth really is "out there", in the mind of God. It is only when we reject God that truth becomes purely subjective.

MU consistently confuses me at one point: he doesn't hold that ideas are real things; he maintains ideas (concepts) are real as concepts; this from above, and I agree. Where I get tossed is where he seems to argue that Forms are real things, and some ideas are real things, without the qualification. — tim wood

Try thinking of it this way tim. Every material object has a form. The form is what the thing is, it's shape, size, colour, etc., right down to its molecular constitution, atomic makeup, and even the positioning of its subatomic particles and fields. The form is unique, and particular, to each individual thing, and that is why the thing is the thing which it is, and not something else, it has its own unique form.

The form of the thing is changing, with the passing of time, due to the activities of its particles, this what the ancient Greeks referred to as flux, Heraclitus said everything is in flux. So at each moment it has a different form from the last moment, and logically it is a different object at each moment. The material object exists as the material object which it is, only at the moment when it has that form. The next moment it is a different material object because it has a different form.

The argument which I described earlier, concludes that the form which the object will have, in its moment of existence, must precede in time, the actual material existence of that object. This is why we have "Forms", which are as real and particular as the object, and which are separate from the material object, and cannot be sensed. They are prior in time to the present, existing prior to the materialization of the object at its moment of existence, which is the present. In Christian theology, such as Aquinas, these Forms, are from the mind of God, in His creation of the world from day to day as time passes, or angels in their providence over the material world, working to carry out God's creation.

I reject the whole super-naturalization of ideas - of any ideas. In brief, there is no Form of a perfect circle. There is a worked out idea of a what a circle is, and it's simple enough for most folks to grasp it. And that's the secret. Truth isn't in your mind or my mind; it "dwells" in collective mind, worked out over a long time. Just as circle is in collective mind. No Form needed; only the collective understanding. To be sure, that understanding is subject to evolution and refinement - it had better be! - which means that while the truth (collective "wisdom") is true, it could also be in a much larger sense false. — tim wood

As I explained to Brian above, I believe that the "collective mind" is the product of justification. Justification produces a form of objectivity which is the basis for our claims of "objective knowledge". However, justified is different from true, because even though the masses of humanity may believe something, as a collective mind, that thing believed might still not be true. This was the case when the people believed that the sun circled the earth. So despite the objectivity of the collective mind, the subjectivity of the genius is what brings us out of our ancient (mistaken) beliefs, toward the truth.

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I've nothing further to add Meta. Let he who has eyes...

:-}

I have one thing to add.

Contrary to talking about truth being a property, on my view, truth is correspondence and correspondence is much better understood as a kind of relationship that is necessarily presupposed within all thought/belief formation(and statements thereof). Relationships are not properties and they certainly cannot be sensibly said to have a spatiotemporal location. Relationships are best understood in terms of understanding their necessary elemental constituents. — creativesoul

This is the mistake you make, which you refuse to reconsider: all thought/belief presupposes a relationship of correspondence. Actually, most thought/belief is directed toward action, what should I do now, how should I proceed, how can I resolve this problem. As such, what is presupposed by thought/belief is an ability to act, to move forward in many different ways, and this does not involve any necessary relationship of correspondence. Thought/belief is principally directed toward deciding what to do.

Therefore you completely misrepresent the nature of thought/belief in general, in order to support your position on truth. It is only a particular type of thought/belief, most likely only practised by human beings under the influence of language, which is directed toward establishing a relationship of correspondence.

truth is attributed to the meaning of the statement, it is not attributed to the physical words themselves. The meaning must be interpreted before truth can be attributed, and this interpretation is subjective. So truth is attributed to the interpretation, and any interpretation is subjective. It is not the act of attribution which I am claiming is subjective, but the thing, the interpretation, which truth is being attributed to, which I am claiming is subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

But 'interpretation' is not always a subjective thing, in fact the case of language is precisely where interpretation is not subjective in most cases. If we understand an English sentence such as 'cats fly' as saying that cats fly, then our 'interpretation' of the sentence commits us to an understanding of the sentence as depending on whether a certain truth condition obtains; but this is an objective matter - the question whether cats fly is of course a question about cats, not about us.

Granted, it's an arbitrary fact that the sentence 'cats fly' says what it says in English (because other languages use different signs to say that cats fly), but this by itself doesn't diminish from the fact that it is an objective matter that the sentence is either true or false. So your argument simply begs the question (if it can be called an argument - since you just assert that all interpretation is subjective, but why?)