But what I did claim is that if you have two different proposition, then by the definition of correspondence, they cannot have the same entity corresponding to them when true. — Fafner

This is the point here. The supposed "entity", is the "object" which forms the basis of your "objectively true". But there is no reality to that supposed entity, it is just assumed, to support your claim. The entity, or object referred to, exists only by assumption. Each perspective gives a different proposition, and to claim that different propositions are or, are not, referring to the same entity or object, is an assumption made by the subject (therefore subjective). Therefore your "objective" truth is actually subjective.

No, that's not the case, because to be objectively true or false, requires that there is an objective reality which the interpretation of the sentence either corresponds with, or does not. But there is no such thing. The so-called "objective reality" only exists as interpreted. There is no reality without a perspective, so any reality which would be judged as corresponding to an interpretation, is itself subjective because it is dependent on a perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now you are changing the argument. Plainly the claim that sentences are subjectively interpreted doesn't logically entail that there's no objective reality. When you try to present an argument you should explicitly mention all the premises on which you are relying from the start.

On the one hand we have the words, the sentence, "cats fly", which needs to be interpreted. On the other hand, we have the reality which "cats fly" is supposed to correspond with, and this needs to be interpreted as well. Therefore you cannot say that there is an objective truth or falsity to any interpretation of the sentence because reality, what is real, needs to be interpreted as well, in order that it does or does not correspond to the interpretation of the sentence. — Metaphysician Undercover

First I don't accept the correspondence theory of truth, that is, when a sentence is true I don't believe that there is something "corresponding" to the sentence, by virtue of which it is true. On my view, you can have objective truth without correspondence.

Secondly, I can accept your claim that in order to perceive reality you need some sort of interpretation, but again, just as in the case of sentences in language, it doesn't follow that the interpretation must be always subjective. It could be the case that some interpretations of reality are objective, and some are not -- nothing about the concept of 'interpretation' by itself entails that all interpretations are subjective.

And another thing: you argument attempts to establish a metaphysical conclusion ("there's no objective reality") from epistemic premises (all the stuff that you say about interpretation), but this is invalid.

Even if you were correct that all interpretation is subjective (and you are not), it wouldn't follow that objective reality doesn't exist. At best, it could only show that reality cannot be known by us, but its existence is a different matter. It's like arguing that since we don't know if there is life on Mars, then it follows that there is no life on Mars.

And that's it. My goal is a tool to handle beliefs. Beliefs do not have to be true at all to be beliefs. They merely need to be believed. The difficulty - my difficulty - is with people who represent their beliefs as being true, and acting on them as if they were. — tim wood

The difficulty is finding a "truth" that is independent of the subject. The moment it is uttered it becomes dependent on the utterer.

And another thing: you argument attempts to establish a metaphysical conclusion ("there's no objective reality") from epistemic premises (all the stuff that you say about interpretation), but this is invalid. — Fafner

You seem to be mixing up the terms Fafner. That there is no objective reality is the premise, not the conclusion. This premise is supported by the fact that any assumption of an objective reality, is an assumption made by a subject. Therefore the assumption of an objective reality is itself subjective, and this negates the assumption that the reality being assumed is objective, because the assumption itself is subjective. The conclusion, which follows from this, is that there is no objective truth. Truth is subjective.

.

Even if you were correct that all interpretation is subjective (and you are not), it wouldn't follow that objective reality doesn't exist. At best, it could only show that reality cannot be known by us, but its existence is a different matter. It's like arguing that since we don't know if there is life on Mars, then it follows that there is no life on Mars. — Fafner

That "objective reality doesn't exist", is not a conclusion which follows from "all interpretation is subjective". The inverse is what is the case. The assumption that there is an objective reality is an unsound premise, because it is being made from a subjective perspective, by a subject. What follows from this is that all interpretation, or understanding of reality, is inherently subjective, made by a subject.

Unless the assumption of an objective reality can be made to be sound, then any claim of an objective truth is equally unsound, because this relies on the assumption of an objective reality. You are claiming that there is objective truth, so the onus is on you to support this claim by validating your claim of an objective reality. This claim is just made by you, and you are a subject and therefore the claim is subjective. If you get millions or billions of people to agree with this assumption, then this might justify the assumption, but to justify it does not make it true. Unless your premise is true, your conclusion will not be true. So your conclusion of an objective truth, while it may be justified, it is not true. That there is "objective truth", since it is not a true conclusion, is not real truth, because as I've demonstrated, real truth is subjective.

That real truth is subjective is derived simply from the premise that all claims of objectivity are inherently subjective. You appear to be attempting to take a subjective claim, that there is objective reality, and make this into an objective truth. But this is impossible because it is inherently subjective.

That there is no objective reality is the premise, not the conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then see my other comment above.

This premise is supported by the fact that any assumption of an objective reality, is an assumption made by a subject. Therefore the assumption of an objective reality is itself subjective, and this negates the assumption that the reality being assumed is objective, because the assumption itself is subjective. The conclusion, which follows from this, is that there is no objective truth. Truth is subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well no, it doesn't follow. If by "subjective assumption" you mean something like an unjustified or ungrounded belief, then this doesn't show that the belief itself isn't objectively true. It may be the case that my belief that there is life on Mars is ungrounded or unjustified, and yet it still can be the case that it is itself objectively true, and there is life on Mars. Here you are surely trying to derive a metaphysical conclusion from epistemic premises.

Unless the assumption of an objective reality can be made to be sound, then any claim of an objective truth is equally unsound, because this relies on the assumption of an objective reality. You are claiming that there is objective truth, so the onus is on you to support this claim by validating your claim of an objective reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not trying to prove to you anything about the objective reality (I have better things to do), but only to show you that your arguments don't work, which is different. I don't have to demonstrate that truth is objective (or that there is an objective reality) in order to show that your arguments that truth is subjective are unsound.

This claim is just made by you, and you are a subject and therefore the claim is subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

As my example about the existence of life on Mars shows, you cannot make this inference. The fact that the word 'subject' appears in 'subjective', doesn't license you to treat everything that a subject says as itself subjective. You are equivocating between words with different meaning, and this is a blatant logical fallacy (it's like inferring something about the banks of a river from claims about banks as financial institutions, just on the grounds they are spelled the same).

I don't understand what you mean. — Fafner

You had said:

"A can be true even if B is false (Caesar could've died without being murdered)"

That's correct. That's a possibility.

"therefore it can't be the case that the same entity corresponds to A and B."

That is incorrect however. That it's possible that A can be true even if B is false doesn't mean that A IS true while B IS false (or vice versa). And when A and B are both true, then A and B refer to the same event, even though they're different propositions.

In short, the same event can be relevant to different meaning-statements. That the event could have been different with respect to some potential meaning statements doesn't imply that the same event can't be "picked out" by different meaning statements.

In other words, that not-x is possible (not-x could be not-A&B) doesn't imply not-x (not-A&B isn't implied just because it's possible that not A&B. A&B is possible, too, and A&B can pick out the same event, where A is not the same as B semantically.)

You are right, but my argument assumed a definition of correspondence on which for every proposition there's a unique entity corresponding when it is true.

And if the correspondence theorist will accept your suggestion that the same entity can make two different propositions true, then I think his theory will loose much of its explanatory power. And the reasons are related to Quine's famous renate/cordate example that shows that if you define meaning extentionally, then it becomes too coarse-grained for many concepts as we normally understand them.

I asked:

What would it take in order for us to be able to sensibly say something like "X is in the world and it corresponds with 'X'?

You replied:

Well, the first problem is that it is simply unclear what 'correspondence' is supposed to be. It is very hard if not impossible to give an non circular or non trivial analysis for the term, therefore it is not very clear what the theory even says.

Given what I know(or think I know) about correspondence theory, and most academic views regarding truth itself, I would say that that issue is commonly discussed(that truth is unanalyzable). I personally find most of the problems are self-inflicted. Understanding truth(as correspondence) is a consequence of understanding thought/belief.

There have been times that I've visited the SEP and scoured over all I could find. The tangents are daunting. Memory tells me that there were a few issues with correspondence theory that were deep-seated. I mean, if I remember correctly, the differences between my own position and one who typically argues for correspondence theory are fundamental ones involving/revolving around this very issue about what correspondence is and how it works.

On my view truth is a relationship. Correspondence theorists typically posit truth as a quality/property of true statements/assertions/propositions.

I wrote:

If the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation, and there are three different interpretations of "X", all of which conflict with one another, then it would follow that "X" can be both true and false at the same time.

"X" cannot be both, true and false, at the same time.

Thus, it is not the case that the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation.

QED.

You replied:

I like this a lot! It seems to me, though, that this and much of this part of the discussion has ignored the notion of incomplete specification, not only about the content of propositions, but as well their interpretations.

Thanks.

There was only one statement:"Cat's fly". There were three interpretations. All were different. None were "Cat's fly".

This is about meaning v. usage; let's stick with meaning. Let proposition P be appropriately well-formed and meaningful, for present purpose, but not a complete specification of whatever it happens to be about. The expressions P and ~P are, then, are contingent subject to the complete specification of P, whenever that should happen, or be agreed on.

Unrecognized/unacknowledged contingency can cripple discussion. The cure is the recognition that significant questions require some care on approach, and very likely a preliminary definitions section. With these there is a chance that disputants at least may start on the same page.

I would agree with the general thrust of this, but warn against placing too stringent a criterion on the necessary precision.

In consideration of Caeser, above, while it's true not all deaths are from murders, it is certainly true that all murders result in a death; so this, then, is merely a usage problem.

Bottom line, I suppose, is that nearly all Ps that are taken as meaning(ful) are in fact contingent. Converting most of them into a univocal form either by complete specification or definition ranges from impractical to impossible. Fortunately in many cases that effort is also unnecessary.

Again, I think I agree with the general thrust here.

I suppose that the need for establishing what counts as a statement/proposition being precise enough comes into view, particularly when it comes to correctly interpreting another's language use and/or determining what it would take for the statement to be true/false(perhaps even falsifiable/verifiable).

It is as a direct result of Bernie Sanders' not being president, that the statement "Bernie Sanders is not the president of the United States" is true. It is true by virtue of not only what happened(he made an unsuccessful run), but also what did not happen(he did not make a successful run).

A multitude of different true statements can be made about those events.

If the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation, and there are three different interpretations of "X", all of which conflict with one another, then it would follow that "X" can be both true and false at the same time. — creativesoul

A better account of the law of non-contradiction is "contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time". The in the same sense part is avoided if the truth is qualified according to a particular interpretation. So if under one interpretation "X" is true and if under another interpretation "X" is false then they're not true in the same sense, and so there is no contradiction.

It's only if someone were to say that "X" is both true and false under the same interpretation that the law of non-contradiction would be undermined.

I realize that the following quote was directed at Terrapin, however it is of interest to me as well...

You wrote:

And if the correspondence theorist will accept your suggestion that the same entity can make two different propositions true, then I think his theory will loose much of its explanatory power. And the reasons are related to Quine's famous renate/cordate example that shows that if you define meaning extentionally, then it becomes too coarse-grained for many concepts as we normally understand them.

I'm curious about the framework being put to use here...

I hold that different true statements can most certainly be made about the same facts/events/happenings/states of affairs/etc. I wouldn't however call those "entities". The "truth-maker" notion falls flat on my view as well, for it isolates one necessary element for truth and calls it a truth-maker. That would be akin to calling apples "apple pie-makers". It takes more.

You wrote:

A better account of the law of non-contradiction is "contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time". The in the same sense part is avoided if the truth qualified according to a particular interpretation. So if under one interpretation "X" is true and if under another interpretation "X" is false, they're not true in the same sense, and so there is no contradiction.

We were not discussing the truth conditions of an interpretation of "X".

I was objecting to the notion that the truth of "X" was dependent upon the interpretation thereof. Thus, my response fit the bill.

There are no such things as different interpretations in the same sense.

We were not discussing the truth conditions of an interpretation of "X". — creativesoul

You were discussing the claim that the truth of "X" depends upon an interpretation, and claiming that this entails that "X" can be both true and false at the same time, which isn't allowed by the law of non-contradiction. I'm pointing out that you're misstating the law of non-contradiction.

If "X" is true under one interpretation and false under another then it isn't both true and false in the same sense at the same time.

There are no such things as different interpretations in the same sense.

On my view truth is a relationship. Correspondence theorists typically posit truth as a quality/property of true statements/assertions/propositions. — creativesoul

Here's one argument against the view the truth is a relation from the top of my head (I think it originated from either Russell or Wittgenstein).

Consider the two propositions "A loves B" and "B loves A". Clearly they mean different things and therefore they are true under different condition (regrettably, the one can be true without the other). Now, if there's anything they are related with, it must be A, the relation Love and B. However, this by itself cannot explain the difference between the two propositions, since both are related to precisely the same list of entities, so under the relational theory they must be the same proposition (but they aren't), so the theory cannot explain why they differ in their truth conditions.

There are no such things as different interpretations in the same sense. — creativesoul

That's why you're wrong with what you said here:

If the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation, and there are three different interpretations of "X", all of which conflict with one another, then it would follow that "X" can be both true and false at the same time.

"X" cannot be both, true and false, at the same time.

Thus, it is not the case that the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation.

QED.

The different interpretations are not the same sense, and so no contradiction arises if the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation, even if there are "conflicting" interpretations.

I hold that different true statements can most certainly be made about the same facts/events/happenings/states of affairs/etc. I wouldn't however call those "entities". The "truth-maker" notion falls flat on my view as well, for it isolates one necessary element for truth and calls it a truth-maker. That would be akin to calling apples "apple pie-makers". It takes more. — creativesoul

The idea behind truth-makers is to give a metaphysical explanation of truth in terms of entities which are language-independent (or mind independent more generally). But if you appeal to facts or states of affairs instead, then they are too much like propositions (because how do you individuate facts/states of affairs if not by the propositions describing them? - it seems that understanding what facts/states of affairs are already presupposes the understanding of propositions), and that threatens to make the correspondence theory vacuous (because why do we need to talk about correspondence at all, if all we need is to analyze propositions in order to understand what makes them true? -- the later was, incidentally, Wittgenstein's view, both early and late, at least on my understanding of his philosophy).

I think you've misunderstood.

Contradiction most certainly arises in saying that the truth of a statement is dependent upon interpretation. If that were true, then the statement would be both true and false at the same time, depending upon the interpretation... but a single statement cannot be.

You and Meta are both conflating statements and interpretations thereof.

The primary premiss(the truth of a statement is dependent upon it's interpretation) is false. That is what the counterargument showed. I granted the premiss. Showed how it led to a single statement("X") being both true and false at the same time(by virtue of the different senses/interpretations of "X"). Then applied the law of non-contradiction.

"X" is not interpretation of "X".

If that were true, then the statement would be both true and false at the same time, depending upon the interpretation — creativesoul

But not both true and false in the same sense, given that whether or not its true depends upon the interpretation. So it doesn't conflict with the law of non-contradiction, which states that a statement cannot be both true and false in the same sense at the same time.

You wrote:

Here's on argument against the view the truth is a relation from the top of my head (I think it originated from either Russell or Wittgenstein).

Both have influenced my thinking...

Consider the two propositions "A loves B" and "B loves A". Clearly they mean different things and therefore they are true under different condition (regrettably, the one can be true without the other). Now, if there's anything they are related to it must be A, the relation Love and B. However, this by itself cannot explain the difference between the two propositions, since they are related to precisely the same entities, so under the relational theory they must be the same proposition (but they aren't), so the theory cannot explain why they differ in their truth conditions.

The problem, as I see it, begins showing itself by talking about what the two propositions "are related to", and is later compounded by the notion that being related to the same entities requires being the same proposition. So, granting that the above is an accurate depiction of an argument against relational theory, and knowing my own issues with traditional correspondence theory, I can only surmise that I'm neither a typical correspondence theorist, nor a typical relational theorist.

May be as a direct result of rejecting what is common to both, the linguistic framework.

But what distinguishes that two propositions on your view of correspondence?

Sigh...

It is not the case that the truth of "X" is contingent upon misinterpretation.

I didn't say it was. I said that the truth or falsity of "X" depending on interpretation doesn't lead to a contradiction, contrary to your earlier claim, given that it doesn't entail that "X" is both true and false in the same sense at the same time.

If the truth of a statement were dependent upon interpretation, then all statements would have precisely the same truth conditions as all of the interpretations thereof.

That does lead to a contradiction.

No, because if it's true under one interpretation and false under another then it isn't both true and false in the same sense. It's true in one sense and false in another.

If the truth of a statement were dependent upon interpretation, then all statements would have precisely the same truth conditions as all of the interpretations thereof. — creativesoul

There's no contradiction because you can make different statements by using the same words (consider indexicals such as "I" "here" etc.).

All misinterpretation is interpretation.
The truth of "X" is not dependent upon misinterpretation.
The truth of "X" is not dependent upon interpretation.