What lacks interest to you, may be interesting to me, that's just human nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I already explained, it is uninteresting because your definition of subjectivity ("involving subjects") is perfectly compatible with the possibility of objective truth, so therefore your argument doesn't prove anything. And the reason that you don't see this is because you are constantly sliding back and forth between different senses of "subjective" without noticing.

And secondly, I also showed you that your argument is logically fallacious anyway, so it doesn't even matter how you define "subjectivity". And I have seen no response from you concerning this point.

Your definition is unacceptable because the way you defined "objective truth" ensures that it is necessarily subjective. If this fact is uninteresting to you, then so be it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Two days ago I wrote a very detailed post explaining to you where exactly your arguments go wrong, but you have completely ignored most of the points that I made. Why do I even bother.

And just to remind you why your argument is logically invalid. Your argument goes like this:

1. Truth depends on interpretation
2. Interpretation is subjective,
3. Therefore truth is subjective.

Here's a parallel example that shows why this argument is invalid:

1. Cows depend on grass
2. Grass is green,
3. Therefore, cows are green.

Do you see the problem? the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, even if the premises are true.

As I already explained, it is uninteresting because your definition of subjectivity ("involving subjects") is perfectly compatible with the possibility of objective truth, so therefore your argument doesn't prove anything. And the reason that you don't see this is because you are constantly sliding back and forth between different senses of "subjective" without noticing. — Fafner

I told you that I adhere to one definition of subjective. Despite your assertion, you have yet to demonstrate any equivocation on my part. I believe your assertion is the product of a faulty interpretation on your part.

And secondly, I also showed you that your argument is logically fallacious anyway, so it doesn't even matter how you define "subjectivity". And I have seen no response from you concerning this point. — Fafner

Further, I haven't seen this demonstration. My argument is that the existence of truth is dependent on the existence of a subject, and therefore cannot be any part of a supposed independent objective reality. Your demonstration of fallaciousness was based on a misrepresentation of my argument. When I showed you this, you just said my conclusion is uninteresting. So be it.

Two days ago I wrote a very detailed post explaining to you where exactly your arguments go wrong, but you have completely ignored most of the points that I made. Why do I even bother... — Fafner

I addressed any point which appeared relevant. if you're uninterested, then don't bother.

And just to remind you why your argument is logically invalid. Your argument goes like this:

1. Truth depends on interpretation
2. Interpretation is subjective,
3. Therefore truth is subjective.

Here's a parallel example that shows why this doesn't work:

1. Cows depend on grass.
2. Grass is green,
3. Therefore, cows are green.

Do you see the problem? — Fafner

See, your example misrepresents my argument again, just like last time, despite me having explained your misrepresentation. I do not argue predication, like "grass is green". I argue dependence, it is an argument of contingency. That the grass is green is irrelevant. The proper conclusion in your example, should be "therefore cows cannot exist in a world without grass". Just like my conclusion is that truth cannot exist in a world without subjects.

It appears perhaps that you are taking my definition of subjective, "of the subject", and inferring that this means "property of the subject". But I am not arguing properties, I am arguing contingencies, so "of the subject" means derived from the subject, produced, or created by the subject. This may be where your problem of interpretation lies.

Let me try again to explain myself. You wrote:

The proper conclusion in your example, should be "therefore cows cannot exist in a world without grass". Just like my conclusion is that truth cannot exist in a world without subjects. — Metaphysician Undercover

But it all depends on what you mean by 'truth' here. Are we talking about truth conditions or truth values? Because indeed sentences having truth conditions is dependent on subjects (i.e., that sentences mean something that can be either true or false), but it is not the case that it depends on subjects whether a sentence itself is true or false.

Here's my old example again:

1. That the sentence 'cats fly' in English means that cats fly (= a truth condition), depends on the existence of subjects.
2. The truth of 'cats fly' doesn't depend on the existence of subjects, but on whether cats fly.

So you cannot argue that the negation of (2) follows from (1), because (1) talks about the meaning of the sentence, while (2) about its truth. To show that (2) is false, it is not enough to appeal to the subject-dependence of interpretation, because truth in the sense of (2) has nothing to do with interpretation (as it is defined) but with what the world itself is like objectively.

Now, you made this argument from transitivity that purported to show that the negation of (2) does follow from (1). I agree that the form of the argument is valid: if A is dependent on B, and B is depend on C, then indeed it follows that A is dependent on C. However this argument is not applicable here. Here's how I understand your argument (based on your latest post):

1'. The meaning of sentence S ('cats fly') is dependent on the existence of subjects.
2'. The truth of S is dependent on the meaning of S.
3'. Therefore, the truth of S is dependent on the existence subjects.

Now the problem here is that the second premise (2') is ambiguous between 'truth' in the sense of having truth conditions (like in (1) - which I accept) and having a truth value (in which case I would reject the premise). But since the conclusion (3') talks about a truth value (you've claimed that the truth of 'cats fly' is dependent on subjects and not the world), then for the argument to be valid 'truth' in (2') must mean the same thing as in (3'). But on this reading of (2'), it is false on my view, because the truth of 'cats fly' is dependent on whether cats fly (according to my understanding of 'truth'), and not on the meaning of the sentence. So you need a different argument to show that (2') is true on this reading.

You have also said that you deny the existence of an objective reality, and therefore no sentence can be objectively true on your view. This however, would be an entirely different argument, since it need not mention anything about 'interpretation', because the conclusion already follows from the premise: if there's no objective reality, then trivially, no sentence is objectively true.

(actually it is not quite true because "no sentence can be objectively true" doesn't follow from "no sentence is objectively true", since form "P is false" (contingently) it doesn't follow that "P is necessarily false". So even if you are correct that there's not objective reality, it doesn't prove that our sentences can't be objectively true. It only proves they happen to be (as a matter of contingency and not necessity) false. And this argument would also prove (ironically) that there are at least subject independent falsehoods. Of course this is itself an incoherent claim (because a falsehood is logically equivalent to a true negation), but I'll let it pass for now)

So it is not clear to me what your original argument concerning 'interpretation' supposed to do, since it neither shows that no sentences are objectively true (or can be objectively true), nor that there's no objective reality. To argue for either of these two claims you need a different argument (which you haven't provided).

And just to clarify a little ambiguity in my formulation. I wrote:

the truth of 'cats fly' is dependent on whether cats fly [...] and not on the meaning of the sentence.

and now I think that you can object here that the truth (in the sense of the truth value) of 'cats fly' is in fact dependent on the meaning of the sentence, and I agree that this is true, but only in one sense and not in another, because what I say in the quote is ambiguous between:

a. 'cats fly' having a truth value at all is dependent on its meaning.
b. Which truth value ('true' or 'false') 'cats fly' in fact has, is not dependent on its meaning, but only on whether cats actually fly.

(a) and (b) are mutually consistent, because (a) actually means the same as saying that 'cats fly' has truth conditions, but as I explained already, having truth conditions is not the same as having a (particular) truth value of either 'true' or 'false'.

I think this is a very naïve perspective. It appears like you are limiting "truth", to the concerns of things which we can see with our eyes. But there is no reason to believe that the very small things, or the very large things behave in the same way as the medium size things, which are the things that are observed....

If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that there can only be truth relative to these medium size things. But why? — Metaphysician Undercover

There is every reason to believe that things are consistent with some law. At the moment, and gravity aside, that law is best expressed by quantum physics.

I limit truth to things I can know the truth about (whether me, or collective knowledge subject to refinements and adjustments). If I do not or cannot know a truth, it would be an error I try not to make to claim it as truth. But nothing in this denies the possibility of truths I do not know.

Yes, I agree, descriptions have to be negotiated and mediated to be agreed upon. But this is just process. I am unaware of any successful description of how a raspberry tastes, beyond saying it tastes like a raspberry. But that works. "... tastes like a raspberry," is a perfectly good, meaningful, and useful predicate.

Agreement produces a form of objectivity, but it is an objectivity based in justification, it does not mean "objective" in the sense of "of the object" as Fafner implies with "objective reality", and "objective truth". The fact that even though we might all agree on something, it might still be false, indicates that the form of "objectivity" derived from agreement or justification, is not the same as "objectivity" when used in "objective truth". — Metaphysician Undercover

Justification. Way back I asked you to justify justification. I don't think you did. If you can have any truth or knowledge without justification then you can have it all. The need for justification goes out the window.

Or, perhaps by justification you mean relying on axioms. Or alternatively relying on faith. The difference between these being either relying on what is self-evident, or relying on what is exactly not self-evident. Or relying on certain absolute presuppositions, being just those ideas that are presupposed in order to ground subsequent understandings, and acting as touchstone for those understandings. Or perhaps justification is merely the structure of argumentation that uses and relies on these various groundings. No matter, in every case justification bestows nothing of added significance. If some proposition is accepted as proven, then to say it's justified means - adds - nothing.

You seem to suggest that, although we may agree this object is a blue chair, we could be mistaken - the proposition, "This is a blue chair," could be false. The short answer is, so what?! If the ultimate collective judgment is that it's a blue chair, then mere doubt or skepticism is out of court. Everyone is free to question and investigate in an appropriately responsible way all day long. But mere ungrounded contrariness is a short road to chaos.

The proposition "that is a blue chair", is justified. Agreement constitutes justification, and this justification produces a sort of objectivity which might commonly be referred to as objective knowledge. But this agreement does not necessitate that it is the truth, so this is not an objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

it appears here that you concede dialectic truth but reserve truth itself as something that apparently cannot be known, about things at any rate. The idea of truths that cannot be known I'm inclined to denominate nonsense. Perhaps you can adduce an example of one, and I do not mean by conjecture or speculation. As to non-things like mathematical entities, i assume you acknowledge that certain propositions about same are true, and draw on the truth of their subject matter.

You wrote:

...an interpretation is only wrong by virtue of being judged as such...

Rubbish.

Being judged as wrong is being called "wrong". Something can be called "wrong", but that doesn't make it so. If what you say here were true, there would be no difference between calling something "wrong" and being wrong.

The irony...

But it all depends on what you mean by 'truth' here. Are we talking about truth conditions or truth values? Because indeed sentences having truth conditions is dependent on subjects (i.e., that sentences mean something that can be either true or false), but it is not the case that it depends on subjects whether a sentence itself is true or false. — Fafner

It was your definition of truth I was working with. You said that truth is when the truth conditions expressed by a sentence obtain. My argument was that according to this definition, truth is dependent on an expression of truth conditions. Further, it was my premise that an expression of truth conditions is dependent on the mind of a subject. Therefore truth, according to your definition is dependent on the mind of a subject.

2. The truth of 'cats fly' doesn't depend on the existence of subjects, but on whether cats fly. — Fafner

According to the argument above, this is a false premise.

So you cannot argue that the negation of (2) follows from (1), because (1) talks about the meaning of the sentence, while (2) about its truth. To show that (2) is false, it is not enough to appeal to the subject-dependence of interpretation, because truth in the sense of (2) has nothing to do with interpretation (as it is defined) but with what the world itself is like objectively. — Fafner

This is false, because according to your definition of "truth", truth is dependent on a sentence expressing a truth condition, and this is dependent on an interpretation from a subject. Therefore, as defined, truth does have something to do with interpretation, interpretation (the expression of its truth condition) is required for truth.

Now the problem here is that the second premise (2') is ambiguous between 'truth' in the sense of having truth conditions (like in (1) - which I accept) and having a truth value (in which case I would reject the premise). But since the conclusion (3') talks about a truth value (you've claimed that the truth of 'cats fly' is dependent on subjects and not the world), then for the argument to be valid 'truth' in (2') must mean the same thing as in (3'). But on this reading of (2'), it is false on my view, because the truth of 'cats fly' is dependent on whether cats fly (according to my understanding of 'truth'), and not on the meaning of the sentence. So you need a different argument to show that (2') is true on this reading. — Fafner

Earlier, you gave me a definition of "truth". The argument, as you admit is valid, and therefore "truth" as you defined it is dependent on the existence of a subject. Now you are talking about "truth value" which you have yet to define, so you have effectively changed the goal posts, but I have no idea what you mean by "truth value".

b. Which truth value ('true' or 'false') 'cats fly' in fact has, is not dependent on its meaning, but only on whether cats actually fly. — Fafner

If this is what you mean by "truth value", then truth value is dependent on a judgement. A judgement, as well as a truth condition, is dependent on a thinking subject. Therefore to have a truth value is also dependent on a subject. This is the issue creativesoul has taken up with me. Read my reply below.

Being judged as wrong is being called "wrong". Something can be called "wrong", but that doesn't make it so. If what you say here were true, there would be no difference between calling something "wrong" and being wrong. — creativesoul

Right, being judged as wrong is what makes something wrong. That's not "rubbish" it's reality. To be "wrong" is to be discordant in relation to some principle, rule, or law. That something is in disagreement with such a principle, requires a comparison of the thing with the principle, and a judgement. You can say that this is rubbish all you want, but your assertions won't change reality.

Now you are talking about "truth value" which you have yet to define, so you have effectively changed the goal posts, but I have no idea what you mean by "truth value". — Metaphysician Undercover

A truth value is simply the truth or falsehood of a given sentence (the truth value (in the present) of "Trump is the president" is "true", and the truth value of "Obama is the president" is "false"). A truth condition on the other hand, is the situation on which the sentence is true when it obtains (and if it doesn't then the sentence is false). So the truth conditions of "cats fly" is that it is true just in case that cats fly, and false if they don't; whereas its truth value happen to be "false" because cats as a matter of fact don't fly, at least in the sense of having wings like birds.

It is also crucial to note that truth conditions by themselves don't determine the actual truth value of a sentence (except in the limiting case of logical tautologies). Because just by knowing what 'cats fly' mean (knowing its truth conditions), you cannot know whether cats actually fly (which truth condition obtains in the world). And this is where the problem with your argument lies, because you start from the premise that truth conditions of sentences depend on interpretation (which I accept), but your conclusion says that it follows that sentences having the truth value that it does is also dependent on interpretation (a claim that I reject), and this is an equivocation because having truth conditions and having a particular truth value are two different things.

I hope that you can see now why all your objections to my post mentioning that "truth is dependent on interpretation" are ambiguous between 'truth' in the sense of truth conditions and the sense of having a truth value. I claimed only that the former is dependent on interpretation but not the letter

(and I actually did define truth in terms of truth values (because a truth value is simply a truth condition that obtains - so it was already implicit in the definition), but I didn't mention this term by name, hoping that you would yourself understand the difference between the two on an intuitive level).

If this is what you mean by "truth value", then truth value is dependent on a judgement. A judgement, as well as a truth condition, is dependent on a thinking subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd like to see the argument for this claim. Because judging that 'cats fly' is true, is not the same as 'cats fly' itself being true.

What's the difference between saying something is wrong and something being wrong?

:-|

And this is where the problem with your argument lies, because you start from the premise that truth conditions of sentences depend on interpretation (which I accept), but your conclusion says that it follows that sentences having the truth value that it does is also dependent on interpretation (a claim that I reject), and this is an equivocation because having truth conditions and having a particular truth value are two different things. — Fafner

There is no such problem with my argument. The truth value of the sentence (A), is dependent on the truth conditions of the statement (B), which is dependent on the interpretation (C). If A is dependent on B, and B is dependent on C, then A is dependent on C. If cows are dependent on grass, and grass is dependent on the sun, then cows are dependent on the sun.

Yes, the truth value is something which is quite different from the truth condition, as you've graciously explained. Notice my example, grass is quite different from the sun. But there is no ambiguity or equivocation, it's simply the case that there cannot be a truth value of the sentence without a truth condition of the sentence, just like there cannot be a truth condition without an interpretation. Therefore there cannot be a truth value without an interpretation.

I'd like to see the argument for this claim. Because judging that 'cats fly' is true, is not the same as 'cats fly' itself being true. — Fafner

Did you read the part of my last post addressed to creativesoul?

What's the difference between saying something is wrong and something being wrong? — creativesoul

That all depends on how you define "being wrong". If it requires a professional judge, a jury, or God, to determine "being wrong", then the average individual saying "that's wrong" is quite different from actually being wrong. If it doesn't require any special judgement criteria, then my word is as good as your word, and you are wrong, because I say so, and I am wrong because you say so. But of course, I think there is a special judgement needed for actually "being wrong". The problem is that the required special judgement is not well agreed upon, some refer to God, and some do not. That's why I ask, what qualifies as "being wrong" for you? What type of special judgement is needed to fulfill the conditions of actually being wrong in your opinion?

Bullshit Meta. You said that being judged as wrong is what makes something wrong.

I didn't invoke the term, you did. I was talking about mistaken interpretation. You changed the terms, as always... to "wrong". Now you're squirming.

You're wrong because I judged you to be...

That is exactly what follows from your nonsensical language use.

I limit truth to things I can know the truth about (whether me, or collective knowledge subject to refinements and adjustments). If I do not or cannot know a truth, it would be an error I try not to make to claim it as truth. But nothing in this denies the possibility of truths I do not know. — tim wood

Let me see if I understand you. There are things which you do not know, and even human beings do not know, but there is still a possibility for truth there. But this possibility for truth is limited, because you are assuming that there are things which cannot be known.

Why enact such a restriction against "the possibility of truths"? If you are allowing to truth, the status of possibility, such that "possible truths", are something real which we can talk about, on what basis would you limit the "possible truths"? Consider that possible truths, according to your description refers to unknowns. How can you propose a separation within the unknown, such that some of the unknown is knowable, and some is not knowable. Wouldn't you have to know the unknown in order to establish your division. Then wouldn't that division just be a new division between known and unknown (actual truth and possible truth). On what basis would you say that there cannot be truth concerning some things? Isn't that anti-philosophical (philosophy being the unrestricted desire to know), and inconsistent with your claim "that things are consistent with some law"

Justification. Way back I asked you to justify justification. I don't think you did. If you can have any truth or knowledge without justification then you can have it all. The need for justification goes out the window. — tim wood

Justification is the act of demonstrating the correctness of one's proposition or belief. The act must be successful, in order that the proposition or belief is justified. Agreement is the result. As we've discussed, agreement is more of a hashing out, negotiation, mediation, compromise, rather than a case of I justify my belief through convincing you. However, what comes about from this "process", is justified belief.

Truth, as I've been arguing is perspective dependent. But there is a vast universe which your perspective does not allow you access to. We could apply the term "possible truth" here. These things are in principle knowable, but they are not knowable to me, due to the limitations of my perspective. So I allow that others, such as you, have possible truths, things which I could know if I were in your perspective, but since I am not in your perspective, I don't know them, so they are not actual truths.

You may claim that the things you know are actual truths, just like I would claim that the things I know are actual truths, but I see your truths as possible truths, like you see mine as possible truths. Since I allow that what you claim is possibly true, I invite you to justify your claim. If you can, I might accept it into my personal collection of truths, it becomes part of my perspective.

We cannot throw justification out the window, because it is the means by which we broaden our perspectives. Things which you have observed, learned, and believe may be passed to me, through justification. Justification is the means by which we aspire toward knowing the "whole picture", rather than just a unique perspective. This is the process of unity by which we create a world view.

Or perhaps justification is merely the structure of argumentation that uses and relies on these various groundings. No matter, in every case justification bestows nothing of added significance. If some proposition is accepted as proven, then to say it's justified means - adds - nothing. — tim wood

Yes, that's kind of how I view justification. Butit's much more than just argumentation, it's the whole process of discussing, arguing, and coming to agreement, on how we should use words, etc.. The point in adding to the discussion, this concept of justification, is to distinguish between true and justified. Propositions are not often "proven", they are offered for one reason or another, for a purpose, for the sake of argument for example. You might say that the one offering a proposition might seek to "prove" it through demonstration, perhaps offering proofs. If the proposition is accepted, we can say that it has been justified, but this does not necessarily mean that it has been "proven". The proposition is accepted because it has been demonstrated to be adequate for the intended purpose. This does not mean that it has been "proven" in the sense of having been demonstrated to be true.

You seem to suggest that, although we may agree this object is a blue chair, we could be mistaken - the proposition, "This is a blue chair," could be false. The short answer is, so what?! If the ultimate collective judgment is that it's a blue chair, then mere doubt or skepticism is out of court. Everyone is free to question and investigate in an appropriately responsible way all day long. But mere ungrounded contrariness is a short road to chaos. — tim wood

What you express here is not philosophical thought. The accepted "collective judgement" is often wrong, as demonstrated by concepts like geocentrism, and spontaneous generation, to name a couple. You offer the standard argument against skepticism, insinuating that one should only doubt the aspects of collective judgement which are wrong, because to doubt everything would be a waste of time. The problem is, that the aspects which are wrong, are not exposed as wrong, until after they are subjected to the skeptic's tools of doubt. Therefore the skeptic must doubt everything or else the skepticism is not very meaningful.

it appears here that you concede dialectic truth but reserve truth itself as something that apparently cannot be known, about things at any rate. The idea of truths that cannot be known I'm inclined to denominate nonsense. Perhaps you can adduce an example of one, and I do not mean by conjecture or speculation. As to non-things like mathematical entities, i assume you acknowledge that certain propositions about same are true, and draw on the truth of their subject matter. — tim wood

I don't know what you mean by "dialectic truth". I was only emphasizing the difference between justified and true. I have difficulty with the entire paragraph.

You can shout indignities all you want, but the point remains. You haven't explained how you think something could be wrong without having been judged as such.

The truth value of the sentence (A), is dependent on the truth conditions of the statement (B) — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually no, I don't think this is true, and it doesn't follow from my definition of 'truth' (or of truth conditions). Let me explain.

Recall that I defined 'truth' as the obtaining of a truth condition (e.g. 'cats fly' is true (=has the truth value of "true") just in case its truth conditions obtain). So this means that for a sentence to have a truth value (like "true") all you need is for some truth condition to obtain.

But what does it mean for a sentence to have truth conditions? Well it is something that is relative to a language. So in English, the sentence 'cats fly' express one particular set of truth conditions, but it could've been otherwise (if English had a different history, for example if 'cat' meant what 'dog' means in our English, then 'cats fly' would have different truth conditions in that hypothetical English).

So let's imagine a world where 'cats fly' doesn't have any truth conditions, and that would be a world where English doesn't exist, or any other language (suppose that there are no humans in that world). But now, can the sentence 'cats fly' have a truth value in that world? It seems to me that it can. If cats fly in that world, then the sentence is true in that world, and if they don't then it would be false. So here you have a world where a sentence doesn't have truth conditions but has a truth value. So truth values don't depend on truth conditions, and hence they cannot depended on interpretation either, as you claimed (I take it that if A can exist without B, then it proves that A is not dependent on B (at least logically), and I hope that you would agree).

Did you read the part of my last post addressed to creativesoul? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes I did, but I didn't find it very convincing. You wrote:

To be "wrong" is to be discordant in relation to some principle, rule, or law. That something is in disagreement with such a principle, requires a comparison of the thing with the principle, and a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've defined here "wrong" as something requiring judgment, but this simply begs the question against someone who doesn't hold your view. If you have a rule that specifies that such and such application of the rule will count as correct, then the application is going to be correct only if it is in fact correct, and that has nothing to do with judgment. You cannot just by stipulation rule out an objective understanding of rules. That's not an argument.

So you yourself defined "wrong" as something that is independent of judgment... — Fafner

When one uses symbols to represent thought (as is done in logic), one loses the essence of thought and action as a continuous whole. The judgement and utterance of that judgement it's a single unitary event or process. They cannot be made into separate entities. And if one follows the complete process, the understanding of this judgement/utterance by an another observer as well as by the subject of the utterance now also becomes entangled in the same way creating a continuous process engulfing a greater number of participants.

In this manner and description, it is not possible to separate the source from that what the source created, i.e the judgment and symbolic utterance. In order to comprehend this framework it is first necessary to penetrate the continuous flow of nature and jettison symbolic representations as adequate descriptions.

In a prior thread, I suggested that discrete symbolism of any sort it's not only inadequate, it will yield an upside down view if nature.

You wrote:

You can shout indignities all you want, but the point remains. You haven't explained how you think something could be wrong without having been judged as such.

What are you talking about?

The debate between us was about existential dependence. You were asserting that meaning is existentially contingent(dependent) upon interpretation. I argued otherwise.

I've already given the argument for that. You've neglected to address it head on.

Talking about how something could be wrong only serves to further obfuscate the underlying issue. There are all sorts of way to be wrong. Mistaken interpretation(misunderstanding another's language use) is the one that matters here.

As it pertains to the topic...

Truth depends upon interpretation.
Interpretation is subjective
Truth is subjective

That was one argument that I, and others since, have refuted.

I've argued several things here that refute your claims, none of which you've gotten right in your objections to them. Most of the time your rejoinders have suffered from a failure to properly quantify. In other words, you've been arguing that all this depends on that... when it is only some.

That my friend is the underlying issue of which nearly everyone here suffers from not taking into consideration...

All A's are B. All B's require C. All A's require C.

That is the general outline of argument here. It suffers in scope as a result of improper quantification practice. Here's what I mean by that:

For argument's and understandings' sake, let's first assume that not all A's are B. The scope changes remarkably...

Some A's are B. All B's require C. Some A's require C.

Let's further assume that not all B's require C. The scope, again, changes remarkably...

All A's are B. Some B's require C.... nothing further can be said about A's unless it is the case that all of the B's that require C are A's.

Or...

Some A's are B. Some B's require C... nothing further can be said here either unless it is the case that all of the B's that require C are A's and that that group of A's exhausts all of the A's that are B's.

I'm inclined to agree with the parts regarding what is lost when translating thought/belief into logic. Simply put, logic presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of it's premisses. Furthermore, it is quite misleading to then call a valid conclusion "true" as a result of it's being valid. Validity is insufficient for truth. The examples of this are numerous, and obvious to those reasonably well versed.

On a related matter, it is often the case that thought/belief is represented in terms of "belief that" or "belief in". Now, I would gladly agree to the distinction between the two, however, when we then continue on to represent all statements of belief in terms of "belief that" we must be very careful to not take that process too far, as Witt and many many others have done and continue to do.

There's the notion that any and all belief is statable in terms of "belief that". However, that is to relegate all thought/belief in metacognitive terms. Thought/belief is not the same thing as thinking about thought/belief. The latter is existentially contingent upon the former, not the other way around.

Metacognition(thinking about thought/belief) requires language. Thought/belief does not. Language requires shared meaning. Thought/belief does not. Shared meaning requires thought/belief.

Getting pre/non linguistic thought/belief right is imperative, absolutely crucial, to understanding everything that has ever been written and/or spoken. Including, but not limited to, the operative role that meaning and truth plays in all of it.

Thank you for sharing your ideas. It b is always interesting for me penetrate deeper into the process of thoughts and conveyance thereof. As a person who is studying arts, I find that the nature of thought changes (less language oriented, more image oriented) as new skills are.developed . in addition for many artists the emphasis might be more on creativity and less on rationality as they express their nature (some thought is involved but not necessarily). Thus, I observe that describing the nature of thought can be quite challenging at times.

Here's a different example of flying to consider.

In Toy Story, Buzz claims that he can fly, and Woody claims that Buzz cannot. When Buzz performs an action A he believes will count as evidence that indeed he can fly, Woody responds, "That wasn't flying! That was -- falling with style." (Thank you, Joss Whedon.)

Woody's statement could be taken as: That's not what we mean by "flying." As it turns out, although Woody does not yet know this, Buzz and Woody have the same understanding of the word "flying"; neither do they disagree on how to apply the word "flying." That they disagree about whether action A counts as flying is not down to a disagreement in usage; Buzz has a mistaken belief about what action A was. Buzz's epiphany later in the film is not, "I have been misusing the word 'flying,'" even though that is also true: he has been applying it to actions that are not examples of flying. But he has been applying it correctly, and as Woody would, relative to his beliefs; it's his beliefs that were mistaken.

I don't quite understand what your example is supposed to show. 'Cats fly' was just a stupid random sentence that I chose for no particular reason, and therefore I don't pretend to have a complete analysis of the concept 'fly' (or anything of that sort) to be able to handle every possible sort of example.

Recap:

One forms a mistaken interpretation when s/he mistakenly attributes meaning. That is... when one attributes meaning where none belongs... s/he is mistaken; s/he has misunderstood. S/he thinks/believes that something means something other than it does. — creativesoul

There is no right or wrong, or mistaken interpretation, unless it is judged in comparison with another interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rubbish.

An interpretation is wrong by virtue of (mis)attributing meaning. — creativesoul

Like any other incidence of right or wrong, correct or incorrect, good or bad, an interpretation is only wrong by virtue of being judged as such. — Metaphysician Undercover

If what you say here were true, there would be no difference between calling something "wrong" and being wrong. — creativesoul

To be "wrong" is to be discordant in relation to some principle, rule, or law. That something is in disagreement with such a principle, requires a comparison of the thing with the principle, and a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

The issue at hand is the question of whether an interpretation can be wrong (mistaken) without having been judged as that. You claimed that when one attributes meaning where none belongs, this is a mistake. I claimed that if the person perceives meaning there, then there is meaning there. That this is a mistake is only determined through a further judgement. You seem to think that an interpretation can be inherently mistaken (wrong) without being judged to be wrong.

Indeed. The 'nature' of thought is a difficult topic. Any such notion would need to be able to effectively explain/exhaust all of the different senses(uses) of the term "thought". One issue that arises is the use of the term "thought" as a means to describe active consideration; the 'act' so to speak, rather than what the act consists in/of. Thinking about something or other is re-cognition - 'revisiting' pre-existing thought/belief.

All A's are B. All B's require C. All A's require C. — creativesoul

This is not a representation of my argument at all. As I explained to Fafner, I only argue contingencies, no predication. I do not say all A's are B's. I say A's are dependent on B's, and B's are dependent on C's, therefore A's are dependent on C's. A= the truth value of the sentence, B= the truth conditions of the sentence, and C= interpretation by the mind of a subject. I conclude that truth is derived from, or "of the subject", and cannot be any part of a supposed independent objective reality.

Furthermore, in our latest round of discussion, we've moved on to the issue of A, the truth value of the sentence. As I've been arguing now, this is an issue which itself requires a judgement. Since the mind of a subject is the only thing (other than God) which might make such a judgement, the subjective nature ("of the subject") is reinforced by this fact. And it becomes increasingly evident that truth cannot be a part of any independent objective reality (unless we assume God or some other mind to make that judgement).

So we can conclude that the mind of a subject is required for truth in two distinct aspects, first to interpret the sentence, and second, to judge the truth value.

Fair enough. Let's revisit your argument as you've clarified...

You wrote:

A's are dependent on B's
B's are dependent on C's
A's are dependent on C's.

A= the truth value of the sentence, B= the truth conditions of the sentence, and C= interpretation by the mind of a subject. I conclude that truth is derived from, or "of the subject", and cannot be any part of a supposed independent objective reality.

Truth value is not truth. Truth conditions are not truth. The conclusion introduces new terms, and as such it is invalid.

In addition, you've restricted the scope to statements of thought/belief. That is... you've restricted truth to language. Big mistake. Common... nonetheless.

You wrote:

The issue at hand is the question of whether an interpretation can be wrong (mistaken) without having been judged as that. You claimed that when one attributes meaning where none belongs, this is a mistake. I claimed that if the person perceives meaning there, then there is meaning there. That this is a mistake is only determined through a further judgement. You seem to think that an interpretation can be inherently mistaken (wrong) without being judged to be wrong.

You're introducing all sorts of new terms... unnecessarily so.

You're conflating being mistaken with being and/or becoming aware of that.

Truth value is not truth. Truth conditions are not truth. The conclusion introduces new terms, and as such it is invalid. — creativesoul

I introduced these terms because the word 'truth' itself is ambiguous (for example, it is not clear to what things it applies). So talking about truth in terms of truth values of sentences instead (and defining their meaning in term of truth conditions) gives us something more concrete to discuss.

Talking about truth in terms of truth values is fine as long as it is done with quite a bit of discipline. Strictly speaking, truth value is a measure of coherency/validity. Truth conditions, when referring to truth tables, measures the same...

Coherency is insufficient for truth.