You wrote:

The thought itself, in memory is rather vague and fleeting. It doesn't stand still. Then there is the expression of that thought, by the mind which is somewhat more concrete but actually can be vague also. The expression attempts to describe the thought within the limited modes available-all are symbolic and therefore inadequate in some way.

Modernists authors (influenced by Bergson such as Virginia Wolfe) imbued these characteristics of thought and expression directly in their written works. Artists tend to delve into these matters more than philosophers though Bergson did not shy away.

Indeed. Thoughts can be vague and fleeting. They can also be less vague and ever approaching clarity. It's the combinations that intrigue me.

Knowing the combinations requires knowing what's being combined.

I asked:Is the above true?

You replied:

It is an expression of what I believe.

I replied:

Granting that you believe what you write, then all we would need to do is copy some of those statements, put quotes around them and we would have statements of belief.

What's to be believed about those statements if not that they're true?

That question remains unanswered.


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I asked:

With certainty(conviction) comes "I know", and with less comes "I believe". Is that what you're getting at?

You answered:

Yes. It is a feeling that leads us to express a thought with different word characterizations.

Certainty/uncertainty is a feeling that leads us to express a thought with different word characterizations?



So, I'm curious...

What, on your view, counts as being an example of the simplest thought/belief? What is required in order for it to be possible? What preconditions lead to that outcome, each and every time?

Perhaps more importantly...

Do you draw and maintain a meaningful distinction between feeling and thought?

Interpretation is the attribution of meaning. One can mistakenly attribute meaning.

Meta doesn't know the difference, for if s/he did s/he would be forced to admit that meaning is being interpreted. Since interpreting meaning is contingent upon pre-existing meaning, it only follows that interpretation is existentially contingent upon pre-existing meaning. Thus, meaning is not existentially contingent upon interpretation. To quite the contrary, it is the other way around. If that were not the case, one could not be mistaken; one could not misunderstand.

One forms a mistaken interpretation when s/he mistakenly attributes meaning. That is... when one attributes meaning where none belongs... s/he is mistaken; s/he has misunderstood. S/he thinks/believes that something means something other than it does.

Meta's notion of interpretation is just plain wrong.

What makes you think that there is a fixed and determinate reality? A fixed meaning of the sentence cannot provide truth if there is no corresponding fixed reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

If this is what your argument really comes down to, then surely you've given no reasons to think there's no "fixed reality" (whatever that means).

Are you saying that there is nothing in the concept of interpretation, to suggest that an interpretation is necessarily subjective? Remember how I defined subjective as "of the subject". Do you know of anything else, other than the mind of a subject, which could give us an interpretation? If so, name it. Is it God or something like that? Otherwise I think you're just spouting bullshit. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are different senses of "subjective" here that we shouldn't mix together. Initially you have used "subjective" to mean something that is incompatible with objective truth, but now you are using it in a weaker and more broader sense as anything that is related to subjects. But subjective in this other sense can be perfectly compatible with objective truth, since many things that have to do with subjects are themselves perfectly objective (e.g., if I have a toothache, it's an objective fact about me). Obviously all cognition is 'subjective' in the sense the it involves subjects, but this is a trivial claim, and doesn't prove that cognition cannot itself objectively grasp reality.

And now, about interpretation, if you think about actual cases where it makes sense to talk about interpretation, then it actually shows that 'interpretation' is something that is usually aimed at achieving an objective grasp of something which itself is not subjective. Here are some examples (and they could be multiplied):

• Interpretation of a foreign language: you are using a dictionary to translate sentences in a language that you don't understand into your native tongue. And in this context it makes sense to speak about correct and incorrect interpretation of the text - you've either translated the text correctly into your own language, or you didn't. And what would count in this case as the correct interpretation is not subjective in the sense that it is not up to you to decide what is the correct translation of any given sentence (e.g. that "schnee ist weiß" is correctly translated from German to English as "snow is white" is an objective fact about German and English).
  
• Interpretation of a map: to grasp a map, or know how to use it, you must know all sorts of conventions (such as, this icon stands for this kind of building, a green area is where trees grow etc.). And indeed there's a sense in which to understand a map you must apply some interpretation to understand it, but again there's a distinction between the correct and incorrect interpretation of the map, which itself is not merely a 'subjective' distinction. If you apply the correct interpretation then you would able navigate around using the map, and thus acquire objective knowledge about your surroundings, which would not be possible under just any sort of interpretation of the map that one could choose.

You haven't provided a proper analogy. My argument would be like this. Grass is dependent on sunlight. Cows are dependent on grass. Therefore cows are dependent on sunlight. The truth conditions of the statement are dependent on interpretation. Truth is dependent on the truth conditions. Therefore truth is dependent on interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but I already acknowledged that the truth of a sentence is in some sense dependent on how its meaning is interpreted, and this doesn't help you because it doesn't prove that truth is subjective. This is because a) I reject your claim that all interpretations are necessarily subjective (in the sense of being incompatible with objective truth - see above) and b) even if I grant you the premise that all interpretations are subjective (and I don't), as my original example about the cows and grass show, you cannot logically infer from the fact that A is dependent on B, anything about the properties of A from the properties of B (so if B is subjective, and A is dependent on B, it doesn't follow that A itself is subjective).

We need to go way back in this thread, to see why I argue that truth is necessarily subjective. This is because not only is the interpretation of the sentence subjective, but also the interpretation of reality, which the sentence is supposed to correspond to, is subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would make precisely the same objection to this argument as the objection that I made to your "interpretation of language is subjective" argument. It is possible to achieve perfectly objective interpretations of reality in most normal cases (e.g. if you are watching an action film, and believe that someone is shooting at you from the screen, then you are obviously incorrectly interpreting reality, as opposed to the people who understand that they are only watching a movie, and there are no people behind the screen with guns, and so on). And secondly even if I grant you that all interpretations of reality are subjective (and I don't), then it still doesn't follow that we cannot establish objective standards of truth on the basis of these interpretations, because this sort of inference is logically fallacious.

If X changes, it is no longer X, but now Y. How could you fix your reference, if the thing you call X, is Y by the time you finish calling it X. — Metaphysician Undercover

This claim is ambiguous. You have to distinguish between a case of an X changing into a completely different thing Y (a cube of ice melting into a puddle of water), and the case of an X that is changing one or more of its properties while remaining the same X (like a car that moves from position a to position b while remaining the same car). In the second case we can perfectly well fix the reference for X even if X changes some of its properties in the process.

If this is what your argument really comes down to, then surely you've given no reasons to think there's no "fixed reality" (whatever that means). — Fafner

The evolving quantum state of any system per the Schrodinger's equation.

The evolving quantum state of any system per the Schrodinger's equation. — Rich

I don't see how this is relevant.

I don't see how this is relevant. — Fafner

Which is why you are comfortable with your position.

As John Bell described, there is a chasm between precision of knowledge and knowledge that is adequate for all practical purposes. [FAPP]. What you are describing as facts are approximations that are practicable but necessarily subject to continuous change depending upon time and observer. Nothing is persistent or consistent long enough to be a fact, though one can label it as such until this belief is undermined by new events. Necessarily different observers will label such differently depending upon time and position. The underlying reality is in constant flux as a whole. Heraclitus observed this whole watching a river as did the Daoists. It is not possible to create immobility in a universe of continuous change.

Nothing is persistent or consistent long enough to be a fact, though one can label it as such until this belief is undermined by new events. — Rich

I don't think that fact about cats (or whatever) are in any way any less real or objective just because the subatomic particles from which cats are composed behave in funny ways. We care about cats only in so far as their observable properties and behavior is concerned, and on the macroscopic levels cats (as animals) exhibit perfectly stable and persistent behavior, even if on the subatomic level of description things behave differently (their quantum properties after all don't show up on the macroscopic level, so we are perfectly entitled to ignore them when we deal with cats, or anything else).

and on the macroscopic levels cats (as animals) exhibit perfectly stable and persistent behavior, even if on the subatomic level of description things behave differently (their quantum properties after all don't show up on the macroscopic level). — Fafner

I have never observed this. What I have observed is constantly changing behavior that may fall within the boundaries of probabilities but totally unpredictable (echoing quantum theory). No one has ever found a boundary between the micro and the macro and the flux in the universe percolates to all levels of observations. Quantum theory hold that all systems are in constant flux.

In any case, the crux of the issue lies in whether one can find immobility in the universe, that is persistent and consistent throughout duration, such that it can be call a truth or a fact. Such beliefs drive one's philosophical views and concurrently create all kinds of paradoxes as Zeno noted.

I have never observed this. — Rich

You have never observed what? I'm not sure what your are referring to.

No one has ever found a boundary between the micro and the macro and the flux in the universe percolates to all levels of observations. — Rich

It doesn't prove that there are no such boundaries though.

In any case, the crux of the issue lies in whether one can find immobility in the universe, that is persistent and consistent throughout duration, such that it can be call a truth or a fact. — Rich

The question doesn't make sense unless you can tell me in advance what should count as "immobility" and "persistence".

I just wanted to provide evidence that the universe is in constant flux everywhere at all time. It is up to you whether this affects your conception of truth and facts.

If it is the case that the constant state of flux causes one to believe that they cannot step into the same river twice, then that person cannot talk about the river. Different rivers have different names. Which river cannot one step into twice?

It's nonsense on stilts.

If it is the case that the constant state of flux causes one to believe that they cannot step into the same river twice, then that person cannot talk about the river. Different rivers have different names. Which river cannot one step into twice?

It's nonsense on stilts. — creativesoul

Not at all. It is the basis of many philosophies. One just needs to observe that what is symbolically called a given river is so named for practicality, recognizing that it is constantly changing and evolving in all manner and form. One only needs to recognize the practical reasons one names a river while still observing what is transpiring over duration.

A river is an excellent example and widely used to exemplify the flux in the universe. If one just studies this one will understand why it appears we live in a universe of mobility.

Hi tim, nice to see that you've gotten back in the thread, and that you haven't given up hope on finding truth. Nor have I, but I still see no way of getting beyond this problem of interpretation. Do you recognize that some speculative physicists have adopted "information theory" as a means of side-stepping the problem of interpreting quantum uncertainty? When uncertainty is taken as a fundamental property of reality, (which is what special relativity gives us), rather than as an incapacity of the observer to interpret reality, then I believe we forfeit the notion of "truth" as commonly understood by individuals; "truth" as commonly understood being ensured by our commitment to God.

MU has been indefatigably insisting on this through a couple of hundred posts in this thread alone. I think he is in the position of the man who says there is no such thing as a chair because it's all made of atoms, or whatever. I won't say he is that man, but I'll leave it to him to say he isn't. The point is that the chair man is entirely correct, but completely wrong. — tim wood

This is not quite what I am saying. I am not saying that there is no such thing as a chair, that what you're looking at is atoms, or fundamental particles, or quantum fields, or whatever. What I am saying is that it is a chair, and it is fundamental particles, etc.. What it is, is however it is interpreted. Remember, I do not deny truth, I only assert that it is subjective. Are you familiar with Stephen Hawking's notion of "model-dependent realism", put forth in "The Grand Design"? Essentially, it is an ontology which assumes that there is no fundamental reality independent from the model. Reality is as it is modeled. This perspective is a good introduction to "many worlds", which employs similar principles.

But how is it completely wrong? It destroys the possibility of meaning beyond that agreed to by interested parties or imposed by force. If you say, "Sure, agreement is good; that's all we have anyway!" What you mean is that's all we have as a matter of force. You have thrown reason out the window - after all it's all interpretation. — tim wood

Let's just assume that there is meaning beyond that which is agreed, or imposed by force (I would prefer "taught" rather than "imposed by force", because any agreement imposed by force is not a true agreement and without agreement how could there be this type of meaning?). What kind of existence could that meaning have? If there is no need for it to be interpreted for it to exist as meaning, what kind of existence could it have?

I believe that it is a common assumption, to assume that there is something which exists independent of being interpreted. We describe that existence and our descriptions have meaning. We observe a compatibility between our descriptions, and the assumed independent existence. Does this compatibility justify the claim that meaning is independent of our descriptions? How do you bridge that gap, to say that our descriptions have meaning, and there is compatibility between the descriptions and the thing described, so the thing described must have meaning?

I don't understand your criticism about throwing reason out the window. Isn't reason a tool of interpretation? How would claiming "it's all interpretation" be a case of throwing reason out the window?

Interpretation is the attribution of meaning. One can mistakenly attribute meaning. — creativesoul

This is where you demonstrate your confusion. An interpretation is an interpretation. There is no right or wrong, or mistaken interpretation, unless it is judged in comparison with another interpretation. There is no mistake inherent within the interpretation, "mistake" is a product of the external judgement which designates the interpretation as inadequate. So when one interprets, or as you say, attributes meaning, this act is never in itself a mistaken act. If one attributes meaning to something, then there is meaning there, and this is not a mistaken act, despite the fact that you might judge it as a mistaken act, claiming there is no meaning there. It is only your judgement which claims that the interpretation is mistaken. Even if millions or billions of people say there is no meaning there, this does not make it true that there is no meaning there. Sure, the fact that the billions of others see no meaning there makes that person "wrong" according to the judgement of the billions, but this does not make it true that there is no meaning there. If the person sees meaning there, then for that person there is meaning there.

There are different senses of "subjective" here that we shouldn't mix together. Initially you have used "subjective" to mean something that is incompatible with objective truth, but now you are using it in a weaker and more broader sense as anything that is related to subjects. But subjective in this other sense can be perfectly compatible with objective truth, since many things that have to do with subjects are themselves perfectly objective (e.g., if I have a toothache, it's an objective fact about me). Obviously all cognition is 'subjective' in the sense the it involves subjects, but this is a trivial claim, and doesn't prove that cognition cannot itself objectively grasp reality. — Fafner

Are you not paying attention? I've stated numerous times that I am adhering to a definition of subjective which is "of the subject". If you are interpreting anything other than this, then that is your mistake, and the ambiguity is produced by your own mind.

Furthermore, I distinguished between two senses of "objective", which you now demonstrate that you haven't yet understood. The weaker sense of "objective", epistemological objectivity, by which we have "objective knowledge", is produced by common agreement. Since it is an agreement amongst subjects, it is inherently subjective, and better called inter-subjective than "objective". So when a statement is justified, many people agree, and we call this objective knowledge. But the fact that many people agree does not make it truth. The stronger sense of "objective", ontological objectivity, means "of the object". This is what you imply when you say "objective reality", and "objective truth", that what you refer to is a true condition of the object, rather than an idea produced by common agreement.

So in your example, when you say things like having a toothache are objective, you refer to the weaker sense of "objective". That you have a tooth ache, may be justified, and agreed upon, such that it is an inter-subjective reality, therefore it is compatible with this sense of "objective". But the fact that it is justified, and agreed upon, and "objective" in that way, does not make it an objective truth. You may have fooled everyone into thinking that you have a tooth ache, when you really do not. And if you think, "no it is really true, I really do have a tooth ache", then this is what I mean by subjective. It is your mind, the mind of a subject, which "knows" that it is true that you have a toothache, while everyone else is skeptical because you've fooled them in the past. Do you see the gap, between what you as a subject know to be true, and what is known by many, through agreement, because it is justified? The latter knowledge is "objective", because it is justified and agreed upon, and the former is subjective and true. But how do we get to an objective truth?

And now, about interpretation, if you think about actual cases where it makes sense to talk about interpretation, then it actually shows that 'interpretation' is something that is usually aimed at achieving an objective grasp of something which itself is not subjective. Here are some examples (and they could be multiplied): — Fafner

Your examples display the same sort of confusion as creativesoul demonstrated. There is no such thing as correct or incorrect translation of a language into another. Two translators will translate each in one's own way. If someone judges the two, or one judges the other, it may be argued that one is correct and the other incorrect, or the two might be exactly the same. In any case, a single translation, as an interpretation, is just that, an interpretation, it is neither correct nor incorrect until judged as such. And that the judge believes the translation to be correct or incorrect, is a property of the judge, a belief of the judge, it is not a property of the translation.

I reject your claim that all interpretations are necessarily subjective (in the sense of being incompatible with objective truth - see above) — Fafner

You haven't yet given me an acceptable definition of "objective truth", just like you've failed in your attempt to provide an acceptable definition of "objective reality". What you gave me above, is "objective" in the sense of agreed upon by others, but this is inter-subjective, justified, and there is a difference between justified and true. Just because many people agree, does not mean that it is true.

It's nonsense on stilts. — creativesoul

Why the stilts? Afraid to step into the river of truth?

What I am saying is that it is a chair, and it is fundamental particles, etc.. What it is, is however it is interpreted....
I believe that it is a common assumption, to assume that there is something which exists independent of being interpreted. We describe that existence and our descriptions have meaning. We observe a compatibility between our descriptions, and the assumed independent existence. Does this compatibility justify the claim that meaning is independent of our descriptions? How do you bridge that gap, to say that our descriptions have meaning, and there is compatibility between the descriptions and the thing described, so the thing described must have meaning? — MU

Quantum physics is micro-phenomena, irrelevant in the macro world of chairs and cows. I understand that quantum uncertainty attaches a probability that the bow of the battleship USS Massachusetts will appear in my living room (with the rest outside), but I also understand that I really don't have to worry about it. And the same with any other quantum phenomena at "street" level. Truth, then, if it means anything at all, that meaning is neither conditioned nor constrained by any quantum considerations. (The level of precision of this claim, being just the odds against the battleship appearing, is far greater than the level of precision of any other measurement of anything that is measured.)

The real existence of things is more than an assumption: we agreed on that way back above. Reality is not in question. I've agreed that our description/naming/labeling of things is interpretation. As to meaning: if I'm alone in the universe, I think maybe meaning doesn't matter: whatever I say goes. But if I'm not alone, then it gets interesting. I describe, you describe (they describe). We tally the descriptions, and they agree! For present purpose let's suppose we all agree it's a blue chair.

Collectively and severally we affirm - via our interpretation of our perception - it's a blue chair. The consensus, the agreement, establishes but does not constitute meaning. For there to be meaning, there must be agreement, but it must be agreement about something. There are lots of ways to argue this. It seems to me adequate simply to say that agreement is the form, or intention, of meaning, and the subject the substance. Meaning, then, requires agreement (of interpretation), and a subject of that agreement.

Interpretation, then, matures into meaning. It is no longer just interpretation. Why not? Because interpretation is an individual act and meaning is collective.

Is their anything objective, here? I think there is. If we can agree on blueness and chairness, and that these are combined in one object, then it seems reasonable to conclude that there is an object that just is blue and a chair: a blue chair.

I agree that the testimony of one person may be suspect - after all, that's his or her interpretation. The judgment of the many, however, is meaningful. The many can be wrong, be mistaken; and mass hysteria can happen. The difference lies in the vagaries of interpretation, versus the possibility of a mistake in meaning. For "meaning" we could read understanding, information, or knowledge.

The proposition, "That is a blue chair," then, is true. But it draws from the truth of the matter of there being a blue chair. That truth, I argue, is objective and "lives' in the collective judgment that affirms it. And its objectivity is not that of the blue chair, which is a real existing thing (as established and constituted by collective judgment), it is instead of the same objectivity as numbers, like four, or seven.

We can refine this a bit. I've distinguished between one and the many in terms of creating meaning from interpretation. In fact one can be enough.

Meta wrote:

This is where you demonstrate your confusion. An interpretation is an interpretation. There is no right or wrong, or mistaken interpretation, unless it is judged in comparison with another interpretation.

This coming from one who incessantly (mis)attributes meaning to my words. If the above is true, then in order for you to be mistaken, it would require your mistaken report of what I said being judged in comparison to my own interpretation of my own words?

Rubbish.

An interpretation is wrong by virtue of (mis)attributing meaning.

I have see no problem with taking change into consideration. The problem arises when it's taken too far. For instance, it is not a matter of practicality that we name things, and their identity endures over time. Rather, we first name things as a matter of building a basis of thought/belief about those things. The river was identified long before anyone thought to say that you cannot step into the same river twice. That is an abuse of the term "same". A nonsensical use.

That statement is false. We can and we do it all the time. I swam in the same river for years. The only counterargument to this is untenable. One would argue that it is not the same river, because it has changed. So, then the obvious question becomes how much change does it take for something to be no longer what it was? If all change results in something no longer being the same thing, then how does one even begin to say that without ending in incoherence?

It cannot be done.

Which river is it again?

That one. Not another. That one, right there. See??? It changed, and yet it's still the same river.

Change happens constantly. So what? We can still say true stuff about ever-changing things, and we do so all the time.

That statement is false. We can and we do it all the time. I swam in the same river for years — creativesoul

You swam in a different river with a persistent name. That you give it the same name does not make the river the same but it is practical to call it with the same name. Someone else may give the river a different name or the river may dry up somewhere else and not even be observed as a river.

Everything is undergoing constant change but for practical reason we use symbolics to provide some persistence, but the symbolic does not prevent the change from occurring.

Are you not paying attention? I've stated numerous times that I am adhering to a definition of subjective which is "of the subject". If you are interpreting anything other than this, then that is your mistake, and the ambiguity is produced by your own mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was just trying to help you... This only makes your argument even weaker than I though it was, because the conclusion is trivial and proves nothing of any interest as I already showed.

So in your example, when you say things like having a toothache are objective, you refer to the weaker sense of "objective". — Metaphysician Undercover

No I'm not.

But the fact that it is justified, and agreed upon, and "objective" in that way, does not make it an objective truth. You may have fooled everyone into thinking that you have a tooth ache, when you really do not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are begging the question. Obviously on my understanding of truth, truth is not the same as justification.

You are going in big circles all the time. You have your own idiosyncratic understanding of the concepts "truth", "objectivity", "subjectivity" and "interpretation", and all your arguments have this understanding built right into them, and so they can't seriously engage anyone who doesn't already agree with you on most things. If you want to have a chance of convincing anybody and not just talking to yourself, you should construct your arguments in such a way that even people who don't agree with your views could still find the arguments convincing.

There is no such thing as correct or incorrect translation of a language into another. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I say there is such a thing, so?

You haven't yet given me an acceptable definition of "objective truth" — Metaphysician Undercover

I did give a definition of 'objective truth' way back, in terms of truth conditions. And nothing that you've said shows that it is not 'acceptable'.

just like you've failed in your attempt to provide an acceptable definition of "objective reality" — Metaphysician Undercover

Objective reality def= anything that could be described truly or falsely.

There is no such thing as correct or incorrect translation of a language into another.
— Metaphysician Undercover
And I say there is such a thing, so? — Fafner

Really? This is really what you believe? Do you believe this is a fact or a truth?

Yes, why not? Otherwise bilingual dictionaries would be useless.

Yes, why not? Otherwise bilingual dictionaries would be useless. — Fafner

They are not useless, but depending on who or what it's doing the translation, the results are always quite different. There are over 300 translations of the Dao De Jing, must of which are entirely different. For example, some use concepts that the translator believes were being used at the time the Dao De Jing was written, whenever that might have been instead of modern context.

But, we can even use translation of Shakespeare as an example. How does a translator translate Shakespeare while maintaining all of the nuances of the language and historical context. The art of translation is a tricky one as is the art of interpretation. An example of the issues:

http://www.npr.org/2008/11/22/97002969/the-art-of-translation

Translation of literary works is a somewhat different topic than translating between languages, let's say for purposes of simple conversation. What I had in mind is simple cases such as the word 'cat' being translatable into 'katze' in German, since in most cases English and German speakers use the two words in similar ways to talk about the same kind of animal. Also it seems natural to talk about expressions in different languages as capable of expressing the very same thoughts/ideas/propositions. And so for example if I interpret a German speaker that says "es regnet" as meaning that it is raining, then I will be getting his thought or belief right.

Of course things become way more complicated when it comes to translating literature, but this doesn't show that for most intents and purposes you can find very close correlations in meaning between words of different languages. It also partly depends on what one means by "translation", because we can adopt different criteria for "correctness" of translation - say 'literal' as opposed to 'free' etc.

Of course things become way more complicated when it comes to translating literature, but this doesn't show that for most intents and purposes you can find very close correlations in meaning between words of different languages. It also partly depends on what one means by "translation", because we can adopt different criteria for "correctness" of translation - say 'literal' as opposed to 'free' etc. — Fafner

Yes, it all gets kind of tricky, even for simple situations such as the well known example of the snow and how different cultures symbolically represent it with language.

Quantum physics is micro-phenomena, irrelevant in the macro world of chairs and cows. I understand that quantum uncertainty attaches a probability that the bow of the battleship USS Massachusetts will appear in my living room (with the rest outside), but I also understand that I really don't have to worry about it. And the same with any other quantum phenomena at "street" level. Truth, then, if it means anything at all, that meaning is neither conditioned nor constrained by any quantum considerations. (The level of precision of this claim, being just the odds against the battleship appearing, is far greater than the level of precision of any other measurement of anything that is measured.) — tim wood

I think this is a very naïve perspective. It appears like you are limiting "truth", to the concerns of things which we can see with our eyes. But the vast majority of things which exist cannot be seen, either they are too small, or too large, or for some other reason, cannot be seen, like air. Surely you recognize that the activity of electrons plays a very important part in your life. So why would you even consider excluding this from "truth", as if there is truth concerning chairs, but no truth concerning electrons.

There is a related issue which is more and more coming to light in the philosophy of science. Scientists produce experiments in a controlled environment with very specific parameters. The "size" of the experiment is neither micro nor macro, in relation to the things which exist in the universe, which range from very large to very small. from their observations, they may extrapolate, and make conclusions concerning the entirety of the universe, which we might call laws. But there is no reason to believe that the very small things, or the very large things behave in the same way as the medium size things, which are the things that are observed.

If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that there can only be truth relative to these medium size things. But why? Just because the human perspective doesn't give one the capacity to directly observe these huge, and tiny things, which are just as much a part of reality as the medium size things. Why would you think that there can be truth concerning medium size things, but no truth concerning huge things, or tiny things?

I describe, you describe (they describe). We tally the descriptions, and they agree! For present purpose let's suppose we all agree it's a blue chair. — tim wood

But the descriptions do not all agree, that's the point. We have to force our own descriptions, adapt them, to make them agree. This is compromise. I see the chair as green, you see it as blue, so we decide that it must be bluish green, or greenish blue. In most cases agreement requires discussion. It is not the case that we tally up the descriptions and they agree, we discuss how things appear from each of our own perspective, then make conclusions about how the things "must be", to fulfill the conditions of the different descriptions.

Is their anything objective, here? I think there is. If we can agree on blueness and chairness, and that these are combined in one object, then it seems reasonable to conclude that there is an object that just is blue and a chair: a blue chair. — tim wood

As I've been saying, I agree, that this is "objective". Agreement produces a form of objectivity, but it is an objectivity based in justification, it does not mean "objective" in the sense of "of the object" as Fafner implies with "objective reality", and "objective truth". The fact that even though we might all agree on something, it might still be false, indicates that the form of "objectivity" derived from agreement or justification, is not the same as "objectivity" when used in "objective truth".

The proposition, "That is a blue chair," then, is true. But it draws from the truth of the matter of there being a blue chair. That truth, I argue, is objective and "lives' in the collective judgment that affirms it. And its objectivity is not that of the blue chair, which is a real existing thing (as established and constituted by collective judgment), it is instead of the same objectivity as numbers, like four, or seven. — tim wood

The proposition "that is a blue chair", is justified. Agreement constitutes justification, and this justification produces a sort of objectivity which might commonly be referred to as objective knowledge. But this agreement does not necessitate that it is the truth, so this is not an objective truth.

Rich asserted:

You swam in a different river with a persistent name.

Nope. As I said, it was the same river.

That you give it the same name does not make the river the same...

Oh, pray tell...

What does?

This could be fun.

If there is no such thing as being the same, then the very notion of being not the same is rendered utterly meaningless. If all change makes being the same physically impossible, then all there is is change. And yet... there is no such thing as being the same, and yet everything is precisely the same... All is change.

Untenable. Reductio.

Everything is a goat.

Our knowledge of the same river includes not only which specific singular entity we're focusing our attention on, but also how it changes...

An interpretation is wrong by virtue of (mis)attributing meaning. — creativesoul

Like any other incidence of right or wrong, correct or incorrect, good or bad, an interpretation is only wrong by virtue of being judged as such. That's simply the nature of right and wrong, they are the product of judgement.

I was just trying to help you... This only makes your argument even weaker than I though it was, because the conclusion is trivial and proves nothing of any interest as I already showed. — Fafner

What lacks interest to you, may be interesting to me, that's just human nature.

I did give a definition of 'objective truth' way back, in terms of truth conditions. And nothing that you've said shows that it is not 'acceptable'. — Fafner

Your definition is unacceptable because the way you defined "objective truth" ensures that it is necessarily subjective. If this fact is uninteresting to you, then so be it.