What "naturalism" refers to is the loosest ball in this discussion. — Paine

What do you think is at stake in that passage you cited from The Sophist? Anything?

Perhaps dialectic is a process of error elimination that enables the gaining of wisdom even if the wisdom gained is only to realize that one does not know what one thought one knew. — Janus

I agree, but think there is another related connection between dialectic and wisdom. The art of making and evaluating opinion. In a word, the art of the enthymeme.

In the thread on Aristotle's Metaphysics I argued that Aristotle's arguments are dialectical. He says:

Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes.

(982a)

then:

Since we are investigating this kind of knowledge, we must consider what these causes and principles are whose knowledge is Wisdom.

but rather stating what these causes and principles are he says in the next sentence:

Perhaps it will be clearer if we take the opinions which we hold about the wise man. (982a)

Why the shift from the causes and principles to opinions about the wise man? Can those who are not wise have wise opinions about the wise man?

Prior to this he said:

In general the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach ...

(981b)

If Aristotle is wise can he teach us to be wise, to know the causes and principles? Now we all learn that Aristotle said there are four causes. It would be unwise to think that knowing this makes us wise. He does not teach us the causes and principles are whose knowledge is wisdom. He can, however, teach us to think dialectically about opinions and their claims and premises.

In this regard, my attempts to cleanly separate history and interpretation runs into a spot of bother. — Paine

It is is a large problem. I think the best we can do is be aware of our own prejudices and assumptions and try not to impose them on writings that are at once foreign and our own. We can only jump into the river from where we are, but can question the boundary marks that have been set.

[added]: If one is a Platonist then there is no boundary separating Plato from Platonism or even for some Platonism and us.

I agree, but think there is another related connection between dialectic and wisdom. The art of making and evaluating opinion. In a word, the art of the enthymeme.

In the thread on Aristotle's Metaphysics I argued that Aristotle's arguments are dialectical. He says:

Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes.
(982a)

then:

Since we are investigating this kind of knowledge, we must consider what these causes and principles are whose knowledge is Wisdom. — Fooloso4

Do you think he is referring specifically to practical wisdom (phronesis) rather than some kind of metaphysical or transcendent wisdom. I'm not trying to imply anything about a correct answer to this question, as I'm not that much familiar with Aristotle's works.

If Aristotle is wise can he teach us to be wise, to know the causes and principles? Now we all learn that Aristotle said there are four causes. It would be unwise to think that knowing this makes us wise. He does not teach us the causes and principles are whose knowledge is wisdom. He can, however, teach us to think dialectically about opinions and their claims and premises. — Fooloso4

I wonder whether Aristotle's wise man is a generic or universal wise man or whether he rather refers to those who are wise in various contexts or fields.

It seems right to think that the important lesson from Aristotle would be to understand the dialectical mode of thinking rather than to hold any particular beliefs.

Do you think he is referring specifically to practical wisdom (phronesis) rather than some kind of metaphysical or transcendent wisdom. — Janus

I think that with regard to phronesis knowledge of principles and causes is not sufficient. In so far as good judgment involves action it depends on good character. What is at issue here is not 'principles' in the sense of rules. In his translation of Metaphysics Joe Sachs says that 'arche is a "ruling beginning"'.

He translates it as 'source'.

In more contemporary terms Aristotle's inquiry into the arche or source of things is ontological rather than epistemological. If we consider that:

... it is through experience that men acquire science and art ...

. (981a)

then either wisdom is unattainable for human beings or, as the Platonists would have it, it is attained through mystical or transcendent experience. Some might find or import mystical experience in Aristotle but I don't.

What do you think is at stake in that passage you cited from The Sophist? Anything? — Wayfarer

To answer that, several features of the Sophist need to be taken into account. It begins with Socrates asking what kind of authority the Stranger will be speaking with:

Socrates: In that case, Theodorus, are you unwittingly bringing in some god rather than a stranger, as Homer’s phrase would have it, when he says that the gods 216B in general, and the god of strangers in particular, become the companions of people who partake of true righteousness, to behold the excesses and the good order of humanity? So perhaps this companion of yours may indeed be one of those higher powers who is going to watch over and refute our sorry predicament in these arguments, as he is a god of refutation.

Theod: That is not the manner of this stranger, Socrates, no; he is more moderate than those who take controversies seriously. Indeed, the man does not seem to me to be a god at all, though he is certainly divine. For 216C I refer to all philosophers as divine. — Plato, Sophist, 216A, translated by Horan

The way Theodorus puts it, taking controversies seriously means putting up a fight. Throughout the dialogue, the Stranger draws comparisons between that method and others. The contrast between the violent and the gentle becomes the means of division in many cases. The method of division itself is a vehicle of being self-aware of its limits. There is a lightness of touch with starting the dialogue by comparing the sophist to an angler. That is combined with more strict limits to the method:

Str: They certainly are, Theaetetus. However, it is of no particular concern to the method based on arguments whether purification by washing or medication benefits us much or little. For it endeavours to discern the inter-relation and non-relation of all the skills, with the aim of acquiring intelligence, 227B and to that end it respects them all equally. Indeed, because of their similarity, this method does not believe that one is more ridiculous than another, and it does not regard a person as more important if he exemplifies his skill in hunting, through general-ship, rather than louse-catching, though it will probably regard him as more pretentious. — ibid. 227A

The method can be used strictly while permitting other observations. Maybe even to the extent of cracking jokes. But the Stranger brings up a challenge that directly concerns Socrates' opening statement regarding the giants who have spoken:

Str: It seems to me that Parmenides has conversed with us quite casually, and so has anyone who has ever set about specifying which and how many are things that are.

Theae: In what way?

Str: Each of them appears to me to be telling us a story, as though we were children. One says that things that are, are threefold, and some of them on occasion conduct some sort of battle with one another 242D and at other times become friends, marry, have children and look after their offspring. Another says there are two factors, wet and dry or hot and cold, and he sets up a household for them and marries them off. While we Eleatic folk, beginning with Xenophanes or even earlier, recount our stories as though what we refer to as “all things” are actually one. But some Ionian and later some Sicilian Muses, consider it safest to combine both stories, 242E and say that “what is”, is both many and one, and is held together by enmity and friendship.

“Though it is separating, it is continually combining”

say the more severe of these Muses. But the milder ones relaxed the requirement that it always be this way, and they say that it alternates, and that the all is sometimes one and is friendly on account of Aphrodite 243A and at other times it is many and at war with itself due to some strife. Now some of these men may have spoken the truth in all this, or they may not, though it is difficult and problematic to attribute such a serious failing to famous men of old. But we can say one thing without reproach.

Theae: What is it?

Str: That they have shown no regard for common folk, and they despise us. For each of them pursues his own line of argument, without considering at all whether we are following what they say or are being left behind. 243B — ibid. 215e

The Stranger no longer seems so gentle. He wants to interrogate the giants:

Theae: Which one do you mean? Or is it obvious that you are saying that we must first examine “what is” and what exactly those who use the phrase think that it signifies?

Str: You have understood precisely, Theaetetus. For I am saying that this is indeed the approach we should adopt; we should resort to close questioning, as though the men were actually present and say: “Come on, all you who say that hot and cold or any pairs like that are all things, what precisely 243E are you attributing to both, when you say that both are and each is? What should we understand by this ‘is’ of yours? Is it a third factor in addition to the other two, and should we propose, on your behalf, that the all is no longer two but three? For, presumably, you do not take one of the pair and call it being and say that both of them equally ‘are’, for in either case they would effectively be one and not two. — ibid. 243d

But the importance of the distinction between gentle and violent comes back into the fore in reference to the battle of the gods and giants:

Str: Well, some are dragging everything from heaven and the unseen down to earth, literally grabbing trees and rocks in their hands. Indeed, they lay hold of all such objects and strenuously maintain that, that alone is, which gives rise to some contact and touch. 246B They define body and being as the same, and if any of the others say that there is anything without a body, they are utterly contemptuous, and they want to hear no more.

Theae: Yes, you are describing fearsome men, and indeed, I myself have met many of them before.

Str: Yes, that’s why those who oppose them conduct their defence, very cautiously, from above, from the unseen, maintaining forcibly that true being consists of certain bodiless forms which can be known by reason. And they gradually break the bodies of those other men into little pieces in their discussions, and what the others maintain to be true 246C they refer to as a sort of becoming in motion, rather than being. And there is always a huge battle going on between both parties about these issues, Theaetetus. — ibid. 246b

The difference between what you might say in a fight is different from the problems that belong to an idea as that idea.

That is what I think is at stake in the passage I quoted.

The gentle way of looking at the difference between Being and Becoming leads to this statement:

Str: Well, I am saying that anything actually is, once it has acquired some sort of power, 247E either to affect anything else at all, or to be affected, even slightly, by something totally trivial, even if only once. Indeed, I propose to give a definition, defining things that are, as nothing else except power. — ibid. 247d

The vivacity of this statement is like waking up from a dream. For those with a little Greek in their quiver, consider how close this is to the translation:

τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.

The difference between what you might say in a fight is different from the problems that belong to an idea as that idea.

That is what I think is at stake in the passage I quoted. — Paine

Thanks for that elaboration, but I’d like to return to the interpretation of the passage you quoted previously.

I was rather thinking that ‘what is at stake’ in that dialogue is the reality of the Ideas, and consequently what the implications would be if they are found not to be real. Denial is what ‘naturalism’, which you say is ‘hard to define’, is inclined towards, isn’t it? The denial of the reality of the ideas? I had thought that in the passage, that ‘the friends of the forms’ were defending the forms. The ‘earth-born’ represent those who are unable to reconcile the distinction between ‘being’ - what truly is - and ‘becoming’, the world of change, growth and decay, and so are calling ideas into question. (And indeed there are many ‘perplexities’ involved as has been mentioned already, as the reality of change and decay seems undeniable. It is not as if admitting the reality of the ideas is a simple matter.)

Consider this passage in particular:

And you say our communion with becoming is through the body, by means of sense perception, while it is by means of reasoning through the soul that we commune with actual being, which you say is always just the same as it is, while becoming is always changing. — Sophist, 248A, translated by Horan

I can’t help but be struck by the resemblance to a passage I’ve often quoted in the past here in respect of Aquinas:

….if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

Can you see the resemblance in those two passages? The differentiation between ‘sense perception’ and ‘ideas grasped by reason’? That in the platonic vision, the faculty of reason is able to grasp what is ‘always the case’? I know my attempt here might be a bit simplistic but I’m trying to get a handle on the big underlying issue as I see it.

*

I had thought that in the passage, that ‘the friends of the forms’ were defending the forms. The ‘earth-born’ represent those who are unable to reconcile the distinction between ‘being’ - what truly is - and ‘becoming’, the world of change, growth and decay, and so are calling ideas into question. (And indeed there are many ‘perplexities’ involved as has been mentioned already, as the reality of change and decay seems undeniable. It is not as if admitting the reality of the ideas is a simple matter.) — Wayfarer

The Stranger is saying that the sharp separation between being and becoming emerged in the battle against those who are:

"dragging everything from heaven and the unseen down to earth, literally grabbing trees and rocks in their hands. Indeed, they lay hold of all such objects and strenuously maintain that, that alone is, which gives rise to some contact and touch."

The friends proceed by letting some of what the earth-born "maintain to be true" to be referred to "as a sort of becoming in motion, rather than being"

The relationship between the two camps changes over time:

Str: Then let’s obtain from both sides, in turn, the account of being that they favour.

Theae: How shall we obtain them?

Str: It will be easier in the case of those who propose that being consists of forms, for they are gentler people. However, it is more difficult, perhaps almost impossible, from those who drag everything by force 246D to the physical. But I think they should be dealt with as follows.

Theae: How?

Str: The best thing would be to make better people of them, if that were possible, but if this is not to be, let’s make up a story, assuming that they would be willing to answer questions more fully than now. For agreement with reformed individuals will be preferable to agreement with worse. However, we are not interested in the people: we are seeking the truth.

Theae: Quite so. 246E

Str: Then call upon these reformed folk to answer you, and you should interpret what is said.

Theae: I shall. — ibid. 246c

The reformation takes place through getting the earth-born to accept having a soul:

Str: Well, let them say whether they maintain there is such a thing as a mortal living being.

Theae: How could they disagree?

Str: And won’t they agree that this is a body with a soul in it?

Theae: Yes, certainly.

Str: And they include soul among things that are?

Theae: Yes. 247A

Str: What about this? Don’t they agree that a soul can be just or unjust and can be wise or foolish?

Theae: Of course.

Str: But isn’t it from the possession and presence of justice and wisdom that each of these souls becomes like this, while their opposites do the opposite?

Theae: Yes, they agree with all this too.

Str: And they will surely agree that whatever is capable of being present or absent is something.

Theae: They do say so.

Str: 247B So, if they accept that there is justice, wisdom, and excellence, in general, and their opposites, and also soul in which they arise, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible or are they all unseen?

Theae: Hardly any of these is visible.

Str: Well then, surely they do not say that anything of this sort has a body?

Theae: They do not answer the entire question, in the same way. Although they think, that the soul has acquired a body of some sort, when it comes to wisdom and the other qualities you asked about, 247C they are ashamed either to admit that these are not included in things that are, or to maintain emphatically that they are all physical.

Str: Well, Theaetetus, we can see that these men have been reformed, for the original stock, their earth-born ancestors, would not have been ashamed of anything. Instead, they would insist that whatever they are unable to squeeze with their hands is nothing at all.

Theae: Yes, you have expressed their attitude fairly well.

Str: Then let’s question them once more. Indeed, if they are prepared to concede that there is even a 247D small non-physical portion of things that are, that is sufficient. For, they must explain the shared nature that has arisen simultaneously in the non-physical, and also in anything physical, with reference to which, they say that they both are. Perhaps this may leave them perplexed; and if that is what happens to them then consider this; would they be willing to accept a suggestion from us and agree that “what is” is as follows?

Theae: Yes, what is the suggestion? Tell us and we shall know immediately.

Str: Well, I am saying that anything actually is, once it has acquired some sort of power, 247E either to affect anything else at all, or to be affected, even slightly, by something totally trivial, even if only once. Indeed, I propose to give a definition, defining things that are, as nothing else except power.

Theae: Then, since they do not have anything better to suggest right now they accept this.

Str: Very well, though perhaps a different suggestion may occur both to us or them 248A later. For the present, let this stand as it has been agreed by both parties.

Theae: Let it stand.

Str: Now let us move on to the others, the friends of the forms, and you should interpret their doctrines for us too. — ibid. 246e

We are back to the quote I started with where the Stranger criticizes the friends by showing a big problem with keeping being and becoming completely separated, culminating in:

Str: But, by Zeus, what are we saying? Are we actually going to be persuaded so easily that change, life, soul and thought are absent from 249A what altogether is, that it neither lives nor thinks, but abides unchanging, solemn and pure, devoid of intelligence? — ibid. 248e

The Stranger continues this criticism in ways that uncover other problems.

As an Eleatic ambassador of sorts, the Stranger accepts Parmenides must be modified but not rejected. He proposes something like that happen to the friends.

The Aquinas passage does connect with ideas about the soul in the Sophist but needs discussion of the remainder of the text.

Couldn’t classical philosophy ascribe the unintelligibility of the world to the treachery of the senses? — Wayfarer

What is at issue here is something else. @Paine points to the problem in the passage he quotes from the Sophist in the thread on Gerson and Platonism. The question arises:

Come on, all you who say that hot and cold or any pairs like that are all things, what precisely are you attributing to both, when you say that both are and each is? What should we understand by this ‘is’ of yours? Is it a third factor in addition to the other two, and should we propose, on your behalf, that the all is no longer two but three?

(243d-e)

The underlying problem of what 'is' is that we cannot give a proper account of what is without giving a proper count. Most encompassing of "any pairs" are motion and rest.

So, what is, is not the two together, motion and rest, but something different from them.

(250c)

Are all things one - the Whole or All
or two - motion and rest
or three - being, motion, and rest
or five - being, motion, rest, same, and different

Well now, what precisely are the “same” and the “different” which we have just mentioned? Are they two additional kinds, apart from the first three, two kinds which must necessarily combine with the three, and should we investigate them as though there were five and not three?

(254e-255a)

Just to return to this, you have not answered why Plato, in his letter, when he clearly has an opportunity to present himself as a skeptic, instead chooses to say something very different, and even implies that he has shared knowledge of the forms with others (although not through dissertations.)

The Seventh Letter might not have been written by Plato, but it was decidedly not written by a skeptic.

Your reference to the Phaedo also doesn't say what you say it does in context. He doesn't call the forms "foolish" at 100. Rather, Socrates is making an argument for the immortality of the soul based on the assumption that something like the theory of forms is true. That is, he is (perhaps foolishly, or seemingly so) not going to justify the forms here again, but will show what follows from his understanding of them.

Plato does have Socrates say something to the effect of: "no one should take this exact narrative too seriously and think these things are just as I have described them," but this would seem to be a reference to the images he is painting. Like he says in the letter, you can't put this stuff into words. This is why he uses many different images to try to get the ideas across. This is why Socrates repeatedly demures from speaking on these issues directly, because they cannot be spoken of. The warning then is to not mistake his image, appearance, for the reality he is directing our attention to. It isn't to say something like, "and I actually don't know if any of this has any real merit because knowledge of such things is impossible, so don't take me too seriously."

And it's worth noting that "opinion" is in some ways a very inadequate translation of doxa. Today we tend to think of opinion as subjective, as having no real grounding outside itself. But doxa refers to images or what things "seem to be like." What things "seem to be like," is an important parts of what they are. The divided line is all one line, rather than two discrete lines, for a reason. Appearances are part of reality. The line is a hierarchy. To know such appearances, to move up the line, to know something of the truth (in the way the English "knowledge" is colloquially used). Plato's use of doxa has none of the connotations of the English "opinion," where we might think that "to only have opinion" means to lack any knowledge and understanding of a thing.

Again, if Plato knew nothing of the Good, but is just spinning tales based on pragmatic usefulness (a pragmatic consideration based on... what? he doesn't know anything of the Good right?) then would be acting like the very paradigm of the Sophists he criticizes so heavily. He would be someone who pretends to know what he doesn't know and who uses words to try to manipulate people for his own pragmatic ends.

Just to return to this, you have not answered why Plato, in his letter, when he clearly has an opportunity to present himself as a skeptic, instead chooses to say something very different, and even implies that he has shared knowledge of the forms with others (although not through dissertations.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

He leaves it to the reader to decide whether he is a skeptic by way of their engagement is skeptical practice. That is to say, by way of doubt and inquiry. The question of what he knows is left open. Where does he imply that he and others have knowledge of the forms?

The Seventh Letter might not have been written by Plato, but it was decidedly not written by a skeptic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, you may have decided it was not written by a skeptic, but there are others who do not share that opinion.

Your reference to the Phaedo also doesn't say what you say it does in context. He doesn't call the forms "foolish" at 100. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. He does not call the forms foolish. What he says is:

“Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything ... I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.”

Socrates does not attempt to describe the precise relationship of beautiful things to Beauty itself. One would think it important to do so if it is to be accepted as philosophically sound.

Like he says in the letter, you can't put this stuff into words. This is why he uses many different images to try to get the ideas across. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is more to it than that. See what he says about his "second sailing" in the Phaedo:

After this, he said, when I had wearied of looking into beings, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material ...

So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.

(99d-100a)

In the Republic:

“... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …”

(517b-c)

A god knows if this account "happens to be true" but he does not claim to know this. He is not using images to convey something he knows. He is using images and the imagination as a way of thinking about how things he does not know and cannot see. This is very different from the image of philosopher whose soul is turned to see the Forms.

acting like the very paradigm of the Sophists he criticizes so heavily. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As he says in the Sophist, sometimes the philosopher appears as a sophist. (216d) What distinguishes the one kind from the other? Without getting too far into it, I think it is a matter of intent. The sophist aims to benefit himself, the philosopher to benefit others. it is for the benefit of others that they believe in the just, beautiful, and good. To this end the philosopher makes images of them.

He would be someone who pretends to know what he doesn't know — Count Timothy von Icarus

But Socrates does not pretend to know what he does not know. In the passage from the Republic he does not say that the way things look to him are the way they are. He says that a god, not him, knows if it happens to be true.

The question of what he knows is left open. Where does he imply that he and others have knowledge of the forms?

I shared them and bolded the most relevant parts earlier. There is a reason "skeptical Plato" theorists, from what I have seen, almost always deny the authenticity of the letter. At the very least, the letter decidedly does not say "I write no doctrines because I have none," let alone "I wrote no doctrines because I know nothing."

But Socrates does not pretend to know what he does not know. In the passage from the Republic he does not say that the way things look to him are the way they are. He says that a god, not him, knows if it happens to be true.

It's not a question of Plato's Socrates, it's a question of Plato the author. If Plato is a skeptic and doesn't think he really has any good idea what the Good is, why is he writing things that are so suggestive and have been overwhelmingly understood as saying something quite the opposite? To pragmatically move the dial on policies he prefers? (but of courses, not ideas he knows are good, since he is a skeptic). This would seem to put him right in with the Sophists, fighting over who gets to mount their shadow puppets over the fires of Athens.

- Yep, good points. I find ' allusion to Burnyeat's article apropos.

I shared them and bolded the most relevant parts earlier. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Do you mean this post?

For everything that exists there are three instruments by which the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted; fourth, there is the knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself which is known and truly exists.

I do not read it as implying that he or anyone else has knowledge of:

the good itself, the beautiful itself, and the just itself.

The three instruments by which knowledge is imparted are the name, the definition, and the image. None of these instruments is adequate for imparting knowledge of the good itself, the beautiful itself, and the just itself. If we look at the statement regarding a light being kindled, it is the result of converse with the matter and a life lived together.The Perseus translation has this last as communion therewith. How does one live together with or be in communion with the good itself, the beautiful itself, and the just itself if these are not known?

There is a reason "skeptical Plato" theorists, from what I have seen, almost always deny the authenticity of the letter. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That may be true in some cases, but I do not deny its authenticity. I brought up the letter in support of my claims.

At the very least, the letter decidedly does not say "I write no doctrines because I have none," let alone "I wrote no doctrines because I know nothing." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. He does not say these things.

What I said is:

In other words, according to Plato in the Seventh Letter there are no core doctrines or any doctrines at all in his writings that can rightly be attributed to him. I have included more from the letter below. — Fooloso4

And the statement you quoted and responded to:

The idea found in the Republic of eternal, fixed, transcendent truths known only to the philosophers is a useful political fiction. This "core doctrine" is a myth, a noble lie.

If Plato is a skeptic and doesn't think he really has any good idea what the Good is — Count Timothy von Icarus

I did not say he did not have a good idea what the Good is. Having an idea is not having knowledge. He is a skeptic in part because he knows the difference between them.

...why is he writing things that are so suggestive and have been overwhelmingly understood as saying something quite the opposite? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because, as I have said, he thinks it will be beneficial to those who are not philosophers. He thinks the images he casts on the cave wall are preferable to those of the poets, theologians, sophists, and politicians. The philosopher, however, because he desires the truth, is not satisfied with what others say.

This would seem to put him right in with the Sophists, fighting over who gets to mount their shadow puppets over the fires of Athens. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not with them. Against them. His shadows, his images of what 'is' in place of theirs. This is what the banning of the poets from the Republic is about.



.

I cannot see beyond the paywall on that article.

I don't get what Strauss has to do with the limit of what is knowable. What I have read of Strauss is mostly in the register of political philosophy. The mentions of the 'esoteric' are connected to that interest as his idea of the pedagogy of the elite. It is one way to interpret the Republic and Meno. There are plenty of other ways.

Why did not the theists in that thread appeal more to the reading of Cornford rather than involve Strauss who argued for the idea of natural rights? I question both of those authors for different reasons.

What is the connection between the skeptical approach of Socrates and some overriding theology? Agnosticism is being equated with atheism here. None of the references to Strauss in that old thread involved quoting what he actually said. It feels like whacking a piñata.

A bit more on the Seventh Letter:

Nevertheless, the thorough examination of all these problems, going up and down and over each one with great effort, imparts knowledge of a good thing unto a person of a good nature.

(343e)

There is a difference between knowledge of a good thing and knowledge of the good itself.

And when all of these things – names, definitions, appearances, and perceptions – have been painstakingly elaborated in relation to each other and examined through thoughtful argumentation by
people who ask questions and provide answers without malice, only then is it that the light of knowledge and understanding of each element shines forth unto a person who has applied himself as
much as humanly possible. (344b-c)

As much as humanly possible sets a limit that may fall short of knowledge of the thing itself. So then, if the pursuit of philosophy does not lead to knowledge of the good, the beautiful, and the just then why pursue it? Put somewhat differently, what do we expect and hope for in our pursuit of philosophy?

In a reversal of the turning of the soul toward the Forms, there is a turning of the soul to itself, toward self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is guided by knowledge of our ignorance. We do not know the Forms. We do not have a vision of the Forms. The question then is: which way do we turn? Do we turn away from the "human things" in pursuit of some imagined (and it must be imagined if it is not something we have seen or known) reality or toward it? It is one thing to aspire to something beyond ourselves, but quite another to mistake imagination for knowledge. Absent knowledge of the good we can still seek to know what is good for us.

I cannot see beyond the paywall on that article. — Paine

Yes, I see it is paywalled now. I read it a number of years ago. It is a critique of Strauss' convoluted and inaccessible interpretations of Plato, and the confrontation between Timothy's commonsensical interpretation and Fooloso's convoluted interpretation reminded me of it. As I recall, the point of Burnyeat's "Sphinx without a Secret" was that highly convoluted interpretations of Plato are not only wrong, but they are also contrary to the philosophical spirit of Plato's dialogues. Additionally, in Burnyeat's eyes this is what led to Strauss' guru-esque status among his students.

Agnosticism is being equated with atheism here. — Paine

Good point.

I would add that Socratic skepticism is being equated with other forms of skepticism

If the Burnyeat perspective is worth considering, argue it on your own behalf if it is not publicly available.

I have argued that Plotinus is claiming authority of a certain kind. I accept that I have to do more than claim such to be the case.

- I think @Count Timothy von Icarus is already arguing that perspective. I was just pointing him to a corroborating source. I assume that some who have access to university portals might have access to the article. But I will review the article and try to come back to this.

I can’t help but be struck by the resemblance to a passage I’ve often quoted in the past here in respect of Aquinas:
"….if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality."
Can you see the resemblance in those two passages? The differentiation between ‘sense perception’ and ‘ideas grasped by reason’? That in the platonic vision, the faculty of reason is able to grasp what is ‘always the case’? I know my attempt here might be a bit simplistic but I’m trying to get a handle on the big underlying issue as I see it. — Wayfarer

I assume the "underlying issue" for you is similar to what Chalmers labeled "the Hard Problem" of how humans are able to distinguish (differentiate) between obvious physical Reality (things) and obscure essential Ideality (essences). That's the job of the Rational Faculty of human intellect. But how it works in a physical neural context is a multi-millennial philosophical mystery that may be closer to becoming a mundane science fact.

For example : In brain-scoping studies, the aha! moment of insight is associated with synchrony of neuronal firing : i.e. when the brain is functioning as an inter-operative (holistic) system. Years ago, a neurologist had his own aha! moment : "what fires together, wires together". Presumably, forming concepts and memories. Some have concluded metaphorically that the brain is like an antenna, resonating with the universe. I don't take it literally, but the analogy may be insightful.

In a video linked to a Big Think article*1, several professionals of various disciplines --- Beau Lotto, neuroscientist ; Alva Noë, philosopher ; Donald Hoffman, cognitive psychologist ; among others --- discuss Consciousness and Perception of the world. They all seem to be agreeing with Kant, that we only know mind-made appearances via the senses, not the Ideal essences. And with Plato, that there is a valid philosophical distinction between Real and Ideal.

In our 21st century era, that is also the difference between the focus of Science (material reality ; instances) and of Philosophy (essential ideality ; universality). Yet some scientists, studying the brain and complex systems have reached similar conclusions, but tend to avoid fraught terms such as "ideal" & "forms" & "holism". "Hoffman argues that consciousness is more fundamental than the objects and patterns perceived by consciousness. We have conscious experiences because consciousness is posited as a fundamental aspect of reality" ___ Wiki. :smile:


*1. Is Reality Real?
https://bigthink.com/videos/objective-reality/

It is a critique of Strauss' convoluted and inaccessible interpretations of Plato — Leontiskos

Have you read Strauss or just relying on

Burnyeat's eyes — Leontiskos

?

What you call my and Strauss' "convoluted interpretation" is perhaps based on assumptions about how to read Plato that Strauss and others have called into question.

From an interview with Stanley Rosen. I have highlighted one statement because I think it is at the heart of much of the disagreement here.

ROSEN: Well, firstly, the approach to the Platonic dialogues has changed over the course of history. For example, in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously. And they read very complicated views into what would look to, say, the members of the contemporary analytical tradition like extremely trivial and secondary stylistic characteristics. Secondly, there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer. And we now know, of course, that Heidegger in his lectures on the Sophist took the details of the dialogue very seriously. So, that has to be said in order for us to understand that the apparent heterodoxy or eccentricity of Leo Strauss’ approach to the Platonic dialogues is such a heterodoxy only with respect to the kind of positivist and analytical approach to Plato ... Final point, within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue as though they discovered this. More directly, the Strauss approach is characterized by a fine attention to the dramatic structure, the personae, all the details in the dialogues because they were plays, and also by very close analyses.

...

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.

...

First of all, there is no unanimity in the tradition of reading Plato. I told you that what passed for orthodoxy is no longer orthodox. The same analysts who made fun of Leo Strauss and me and his other students, today are copying us, but with no acknowledgment. They are copying the Straussian methods, but not as well. Leo Strauss is a much more careful reader and a more imaginative reader, and I certainly am as well. You get these inferior, inferior versions of the same methods they criticized ten years ago. This thesis of a long, orthodox tradition, that’s nonsense. It doesn’t exist. Even if it did, it would show nothing.

https://college.holycross.edu/diotima/n1v2/rosen.htm

I assume the "underlying issue" for you is similar to what Chalmers labeled "the Hard Problem" of how humans are able to distinguish (differentiate) between obvious physical Reality (things) and obscure essential Ideality (essences). — Gnomon

Co-incidentally there might be a superficial resemblance. There's a theme in pre-modern philosophy, which is that reason, the capacity of intellect (nous) to perceive/grasp the forms (ideas, principles, essences) is what distinguishes rational man from dumb beasts. The 'eye of reason'. Hence the (specifically occidental) mythology of the rational soul, wherein reason itself has a salvific potential - although, for Aquinas, not unaided reason, as revelation is primary and all would be lost without it (he is after all a Christian saint). But the reason that passage appeals to me, and I've mentioned it many times, is because it lays out the outlines of Aquinas' version of Aristotle's 'matter/form' dualism very clearly. (You can find it here. Incidentally, also check out this dialogue with Google Gemini on the possible link between hylmoporphic dualism and computer design.)

There's an over-arching narrative that interests me, although I don't know if anyone else here agrees with it - it is that with the decline of scholastic realism and metaphysics proper, something of great importance was lost to Western culture, generally. It's a book-length argument, though, so I'm not going to continue trying to press it.

:up: Thanks, very good interview, illuminating.

...My difficulty with @Fooloso4's Plato is fairly simple. I think Plato is a great philosopher and an unparalleled pedagogue, and Fooloso ends up making him an invisible philosopher and a shoddy pedagogue. Fooloso has an a priori (political?) motivation to wrestle Plato away from the Christian tradition, and his means is a skeptical-know-nothing version of Plato that prevents one from building any substantial doctrine upon Plato's writings, much less a Christian doctrine. This successfully undercuts the Western tradition of interpreting Plato since at least Augustine, but it also undercuts the idea that Plato was a great pedagogue. Why? Because on Fooloso's account, anyone who draws anything of substance from Plato has de facto misunderstood him; and if everyone has misunderstood Plato then surely Plato is a shoddy teacher or else a non-teacher. I find this all rather silly, especially given the strange swirling motivations which are very far from an innocent attempt to understand Plato in himself. The irony is that in order to dethrone a Christianized Plato, Fooloso has conjured up a dogmatism of his own, namely the dogma of Plato as a skeptical-know-nothing. Obviously such an approach creates the ambience of a secret knowledge of gnostic Platonism, unknown to the uninitiated, and this in turn further catalyzes the idea that Plato is a weak pedagogue, in need of auxiliary help in order to be understood.

And to be clear, the focus on Christianity comes from Fooloso, not from me. He protests far too much, often when no one has said a word about Christian interpretations of Plato. For my part, I accept a healthy distinction between Plato and Christianity, and I am not a great promoter of a single perennial philosophy running throughout the West. I would prefer to let Plato speak, but in order for that to happen we must acknowledge that he has a voice and we must also clear our ears of biases that would pre-scribe his voice.

But the reason that passage appeals to me, and I've mentioned it many times, is because it lays out the outlines of Aquinas' version of Aristotle's 'matter/form' dualism very clearly. (You can find it here. Incidentally, also check out this dialogue with Google Gemini on the possible link between hylmoporphic dualism and computer design.) — Wayfarer

Yes. Aristotle's hylomorphism was a proposed explanation for the philosophical distinction between Body & Mind. But it could also serve as a metaphor for the modern analysis of material/physical Hardware and abstract/metaphysical Software. Presumably, only rational animals are able to make that differentiation between what we see and what we infer. In a computer, the hardware serves as the Hyle to embody and process the abstract data of digital logic : Morph. Together they become a "computer", and act as a "thinking machine".

But materialists will object that the Data (mind-stuff) is dependent on the Hardware (matter stuff) to provide the necessary substance for computation. Hence, no Brain, no Mind. But that's an Either-Or reductive way to look at the Mind/Body problem. I suspect that Aristotle and Aquinas would view the thinking-computing system Holistically as a Both-And feature of Nature. That's also the basis of my personal BothAnd philosophy.

For me, BothAnd is the traditional principle of Holism & Complementarity, as illustrated in the Yin/Yang symbol. Human reason can differentiate Yin from Yang, and Mind from Body, but the system only works as a team. Separately, the Mind-Software-Idea is vacuous, and the Brain-Hardware-Matter is inert. But working together they produce the systematic "magic" that makes a Person or Computer more than a collection of isolated Bits & Bolts : a system for receiving, processing & sending Symbolized Meaning that is significant only to rational minds in functional brains. Our analytical minds are able to parse the monistic world into dualistic complementary components. :nerd:


YIN / YANG : HARDWARE / SOFTWARE

No, for Burnyeat Strauss' problem is a kind of dogmatism ... — Leontiskos

This is funny because as I see it, the resentment of Strauss is based largely on his calling the dogmatic assumptions of the academic establishment into question.

...combined with showmanship or privileged insight ... — Leontiskos

From what I have read his classes attracted a large following of both students and faculty. It seems to me that there is more than a little jealousy at work here.

... and for me the critique would simply need to be adjusted for your unique form of dogmatism, namely one based on skepticism. — Leontiskos

When Socrates claimed not to know anything "noble and good" (Apology 21d) do you think he was lying? Or do you think Plato knew what Socrates did not? When the dialogues lead to aporia do you think there is a way through that Plato was keeping from us?

The contrarian showmanship is much the same. — Leontiskos

Yes, this confirms by point above. When someone calls into question interpretations of Plato that do not remain in deeply worn ruts it is regarded as being contrarian. As if the truth has been established.

Those of us who take philosophy seriously will think that this clash of reasoned views among the ancient philosophers is more relevant to our present interests than the anti-Utopian ‘teaching’ that Strauss has single-handedly invented. — Myles Burnyeat, Sphinx without a Secret

The term 'utopia' was invented by Thomas More. It means no (οὐ) place (τόπος).

The SEP article "Plato on Utopia" includes the following:

The predominant view, until fairly recently, holds that the Republic is Plato’s statement of what the ideally best city is; the Laws, on the other hand, describes the city that would be best, given less optimistic assumptions about what human nature is capable of.

Is Burnyeat's criticism based on Strauss' reading of the Republic or the Laws? Where does he fit with regard to these changing views?

... readers of the Platonic dialogues, from Aristotle onward, have taken Socrates to be Plato’s spokesman — Myles Burnyeat, Sphinx without a Secret

First, Strauss is not alone in challenging the mouthpiece theory. Second, what is the role of Plato's Strangers? Third, even if we accept the assumption that he is Plato's mouthpiece, the problem of what Nietzsche calls his:

secrecy and sphinx-like nature

(BGE 28)

remains. This is by no means something invented by modern philosophers. The following quotes and more can be found here

For, as Plato liked and constantly affected the well-known method of his master Socrates, namely, that of dissimulating his knowledge or his opinions, it is not easy to discover clearly what he himself thought on various matters, any more than it is to discover what were the real opinions of Socrates.

(Augustine, City of God, 248)

[Plato] resorted to allegories and riddles. He intended thereby to put in writing his
knowledge and wisdom according to an approach that would let them be known
only to the deserving. (Alfarabi, Harmonization, 131 (sec. 12))

Plato has employed a variety of terms in order to make his system less intelligible to the
ignorant.

(Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 1:333 (3.63))

Glaucon and Adeimantus undertake to participate in the task of persuasion themselves, should the day of Utopia come.54 A significant event, this undertaking, for Glaucon and Adeimantus belong to the aristocratic elite. — Myles Burnyeat, Sphinx without a Secret

From this it looks like Burnyeat took the Republic rather than the Laws to be Plato's utopia.

Any ‘gentlemen’ who read the Republic and identify with Glaucon or Adeimantus should find themselves fired with the ambition to help achieve justice on earth, and convinced that it can be done. — Myles Burnyeat, Sphinx without a Secret

This is not just hopelessly naive it is dangerous. The relation between persuasion and force is a recurring theme in the Republic, beginning with Socrates being "persuaded" not to leave the city:

Then Polemarchus said, “Socrates, I assume you two are heading back to the city and leaving us.”

“Not a bad assumption,” said I.

“Well,” said he, “do you see how many of us there are?”

“Of course I do.”

“Then,” said he, “you should either grow stronger than all of these men, or stay here.”

“Is there not another option?” said I. “Could we not persuade you that you should let us leave?”

“And would you be able to persuade us,” said he, “if we were not listening to you?”

“Not at all,” replied Glaucon.

(327c)

If Burnyeat were writing today he might not be so sanguine. There is a big difference between helping to achieve justice on earth and expecting to achieve utopia. Further, if the Republic is a model of utopia it is a city that few of us would want to live in. The breeding program is not what most of us would consider desirable.

I have read more Straussians than Strauss himself, — Leontiskos

We have discussed this before. I do not think that a teacher should be held responsible for everything any of his students say. Some who have learned from him do not regard themselves as "Straussians". Given his emphasis on independent thought they might consider this a failure to understand him. Not all who are considered Straussians are in agreement with each other or with him on various topics.

...My difficulty with Fooloso4's Plato is fairly simple. I think Plato is a great philosopher and an unparalleled pedagogue, and Fooloso ends up making him an invisible philosopher and a shoddy pedagogue. — Leontiskos

I too think Plato is a great philosopher. As to invisibility why does he not speak in his own name? Why does the Phaedo make a point of Plato's absence? With regard to pedagogue: Socrates denies that education is putting knowledge into the soul. (Republic 518b-c) One who knows must come to see for themselves, not have his head filled with theories and claims. Plato's pedagogical power lies in his teaching us to think, not to have truths revealed to us.

Fooloso has an a priori (political?) motivation to wrestle Plato away from the Christian tradition — Leontiskos

If the "Christian tradition" lays claim to ownership of Plato then I think that is wrong, but I doubt that there is a single Christian interpretation. My argument is against claims of transcendent knowledge, which is not limited to Christianity. Given your Christian affiliation, however, it would seem that it is your own beliefs and assumptions as they relate to Plato that is at issue for you.

... prevents one from building any substantial doctrine upon Plato's writing — Leontiskos

Well, if you want to build such a doctrine have at it.

The irony is that in order to dethrone a Christianized Plato, Fooloso has conjured up a dogmatism of his own, namely the dogma of Plato as a skeptical-know-nothing. — Leontiskos

Dethrone? It has honestly never occurred to me that a Christianized Plato sits on the throne. I do, however, reject theological interpretations.

... anyone who draws anything of substance from Plato has de facto misunderstood him; and if everyone has misunderstood Plato then surely Plato is a shoddy teacher or else a non-teacher. — Leontiskos

I draw a great deal of substance from Plato. The difference is that I do not find it in the same places that you do. I have not claimed that "everyone' has misunderstood him. I do, however, think that you have misunderstood him, but I don't blame Plato for that. It is likely that in some ways I also misunderstand him. The problem is, instead of discussing specific things you think I've gotten wrong, you make sweeping accusations.

I find this all rather silly, especially given the strange swirling motivations which are very far from an innocent attempt to understand Plato in himself. — Leontiskos

What is silly is your accusations about my motivations.

Obviously such an approach creates the ambience of a secret knowledge of gnostic Platonism, unknown to the uninitiated — Leontiskos

So which is it, know nothing or secret knowledge?

And to be clear, the focus on Christianity comes from Fooloso, not from me. — Leontiskos

Where has my discussion of Plato focused on Christianity?

I would prefer to let Plato speak, but in order for that to happen we must acknowledge that he has a voice and we must also clear our ears of biases that would pre-scribe his voice. — Leontiskos

Where does Plato speak in his own voice? Certainly not in the dialogues. Not even once. Why is that?

I only learned of Leo Strauss through this forum, by means of a previous contributor, Apollodorus. I've subsequently read the SEP entry and recently found a long essay, from which:

In 1988, one of Strauss’s most vociferous critics, published an entire book on the debate over Strauss. Shadia Drury, professor of philosophy and political science at the University of Regina in Canada, wrote in The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss that she had once been dismissive of Strauss’s scholarship and, like Burnyeat, “perplexed as to how such rubbish could have been published.” But once she began to see Strauss as not a mere scholar but also a philosopher in his own right, she became fascinated by him–and alarmed. She set out to expose Strauss’s thought for the dark, perverse, nihilistic philosophy that she understood it to be. “Strauss believes that men must be kept in the darkness of the cave,” she wrote, “for nothing is to be gained by liberating them from their chains.”

I don't know if it's true, but it seems consistent with a lot of what is being said here, what with 'modernity being our cave'. For me, I'm giving up on discussing Plato on this forum, it is far too convoluted and contentious for philosophical edification. But I will continue to read elsewhere.

I suggest that these squabbles are no replacement for reading Plato and seeing where it goes. There is no scorecard at the end.

Edit to add: You have gone to considerable trouble to read Buddhist text to participate in those discussions. Why the distance you impose upon yourself regarding Plato?