Well yes but I mean in terms of a consensus on some kind of interpretation which makes sense to people within a scientific context. — Apustimelogist

There doesn't have to be a consensus because it makes no sense to ask which is 'right' or 'wrong'. Nor does it make sense to ask which is 'closer' to how it really is.

If you want some populist preference to be made clear on a purely subjective affair then sure but otherwise its still entirely up to you as it would be for every person on that ivory tower jury.

Not sure I agree. Someone might only think that because there is no consensus on quantum interpretation, but that doesn't necessarily mean a reasonable one cannot be found eventually and ways of visualizing it. — Apustimelogist

There are already ways of doing so. Documentaries and introductory textbooks make use of billiard balls moving in the void, vague fluid like depictions of collapsing wavefunctions, fluid animations to depict fields, or ball & spring models to talk about field excitations.

Don't wait for nature to approve your visualization as if nature ever will or that there will be consensus on said 'correct' visualization. You create whatever intuitive picture to talk about nature however you see fit for whatever reason. Nature is a black box and quibbling over the right visualization seems to forget that we have the all the freedom to come up with whatever we want for whatever purposes because its hidden from us.

Whether that be for aesthetic purposes, computational ones, symbolic understanding, practical applications, etc.

Is it? It's sometimes claimed that classical mechanics "works perfectly" for medium sized objects, and that problems only show up at very large or very small scales.

Except it doesn't. Right from the beginning gravity was an occult force acting at a distance, which in turn had to make "natural laws" active casual agents in the world "shoving the planets into their places like schoolboys" as Hegel puts it. The deficiencies of such a model of causation are well highlighted by Hume. Then electromagnetism added another occult force that didn't fit into the "everything is little billiard balls model." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Wasn't that just philosophical ambivalence or ignorance however? A lack of creativity on the possible analogue modeling that can be done on such subject matters because a 'billard ball model' of the universe was some strange dogma of the Classical ages?

Especially since admitting to action at a distance to gravity was not so much a grand philosophical conclusion but an implicit admittance that they creatively gave up or something similar to Newton's, "Hypotheses non fingo."

Nor could/has the mechanistic model, where the billiard ball is the paradigmatic example of all physical interactions, been able to explain life or consciousness, nor was it able to offer up theories of self-organization, except via a deficient view of organisms as simply intricate "clockwork." Nor, in it's classical forms, can it incorporate information and the successes of information theory. We have suggested a long hangover of "Cartesian anxiety," because the classical model required early modern thinkers to excise consciousness, ideas, and freedom from the "physical realm." — Count Timothy von Icarus

. . . or they just needed new analogies and metaphors which could still retain the age old or common folk intuitions we all possess.

There are tons of other rigid body analogies one could make regarding how we think creatively about the black box that is nature which doesn't have to pay lip service to Newton. Such as analogies to fluids, solids, changes of state of materials, computational analogies, balls & springs, etc.

Further, this mental or philosophical anguish over doing away with 'freedom' or consciousness with such useful fantasy is utterly misplaced. As if re-defining the word living to not include viruses suddenly vanishes them out of existence or implies they pose no medical risk that pragmatically minded medical professionals have to contend with.

It's all semantics. If you desired to create an ontological category that included mental thoughts among physical objects the same as the chair I'm sitting in while I'm writing this you've then technically changed nothing. They may both be physical objects by definition but they still have to remain in intuitively obvious or distinct sub-categories now. Call one ghostly physical objects and the other tangible physical objects or something.

I think the "anti-metaphysical movement's" greatest success has been to keep us stuck, frozen with a defunct 19th century metaphysics as the default, such that it becomes "common sense," to most through our education system. But surely it is cannot be "common sense" in any overarching sense, since it differs dramatically from the more organic-focused physics that dominated for two millennia prior to the creation of the classical model. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problem with actually making this more 'Mainstream' is that it has to incorporate itself into a successful economical or result based enterprise in manipulating nature for our ends. This I find difficult given the overly flowery or poetic language that 'pro-metaphysicalist' thinkers could be seen to fall prey to making those adherents of the current establishment lose their minds waiting for practical results of such thinking.

The basic idea is that particles move along trajectories where at any time they are always in a definite position. The caveat is that their motion is kind of random. Closest analogy in everyday experience is probably something like a dust particle bobbing about in a glass of water, the water molecules pushing it one direction then another. — Apustimelogist

Isn't this just a modern rendition of the notions that the early pre-Socratic atomists had?

I recall them talking about their atoms as constantly moving potentially in a randomized fashion aside from the perfectly deterministic collisions they had.

It's also a bit strange because Hossenfelder wants "common sense" interpretations of QM, and retro-causality actually achieves this by making the world both local and deterministic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would say it doesn't achieve that at all. Retro-causality or 'temporal action at a distance' is a part of a long history of taking the spatialized language we use to talk about time way beyond their metaphorical/psychological origins.

Thanks for providing some context and examples. I am not familiar with Philipp Frank's book, but I did read Trout's Scientific explanation and the sense of understanding paper. In it he critiques "the role of a subjective sense of understanding in explanation." In particular, he draws on a number of studies that reliably demonstrate psychological biases that result in unjustified confidence given to explanations. He does not develop an alternative, though he notes that on his part, he would defend an objectivist conception of good explanation: "What makes an explanation good concerns a property that it has independent of the psychology of the explainers..." — SophistiCat

I think your concerns are more pedagogical than epistemological. In the present context, the former is concerned with accessing, internalizing and operationalizing established science (such as the Second Law of thermodynamics). The latter is concerned with establishing criteria for what constitutes a good scientific explanation. Trout above is concerned with epistemology and has little to say about pedagogy, other than that the two should not be mixed up. — SophistiCat

Let me phrase it this way. If we are talking about things we regard as fictions and are only to be taken as fictions does it make intelligible sense to talk about a made up thing which is itself unimaginable? Should such a notion be used in intelligible presentations of our understanding of other notions or concepts?

Explanations usually are seen as some end result of a big dissertation and a sense of understanding can arise from this as a rather subjective but personal 'A Ha' sort of notion. To even have an explanation get off the ground and yield some sense of understanding to someone else of what it is that you are even talking about it needs to at least be. . . intelligible or conceivable.

My brief reading seems to take me this far in seeing explanation as some external presentable media, understanding as something tied to the psychological perspective of the viewer, and intelligibility forming the core psychological base here that allows for this. The Human mind DOES have a bias to certain ways of thinking about the world. . . some of those, however, could be core parts of how we present the world to ourselves regardless of any 'unjustifiability' and so it would be foolish to abandon WHOLE PARTS of our psychology.

You can call these psychologically fundamental parts of our brain make up that we are stuck with or a prior notions but then its probably just semantics at that point.

Inconceivability or intelligibility should hopefully be as a general a series of notions to discuss which transcend discussions related to realist/antirealism, knowledge/mere-belief, or truth-making/falsity. Perhaps these are more core notions to my quandary as Henk's book linked in the OP does present a section talking about the numerous disagreements early quantum physicists had about not so much the truthfulness but the 'intelligibility' of quantum theory.

So what makes an intelligible fiction? Should fictions be allowed into the conceptual machinery of scientific theorizing or explanation?

OK, that's interesting and I'll give it a read, but I am not sure how this relates to the topic. — SophistiCat

You mentioned something about giving neo-positivist names.

I can only hope that Trumps presidency will be merely a series of bad economic decisions for the country putting it further in debt but leaves us far from other on the boots conflicts or a country wide oppression of those who do not fall into his base.

A person close to me just brought up how they fear for themselves, being trans, as they questioned how hospitable the country will now be towards them given the rhetoric Trump spouts.

Who are these neo-positivist dogmatics? What are they actually saying? — SophistiCat

I'll give a few quotes from that book Understanding Scientific Understanding by Henk W. de Regt.

As regards the discussion of intelligibility there are many names covering a variety of topics. One of which is gravitation and a particular author by the name of Philipp Frank within the book Philosophy of Science: The Link between Science and Philosophy makes a point of arguing that intelligibility is merely psychological by product of familiarity,

. . . to give us back the feeling that we can understand the general scientific principles other than and better than by their observable results.

Its merely a mirage though and purely psychological without any empirical or practical merit. A byproduct so to speak. As the author Henk Regt writes,

. . . he regards the appeal to intelligibility as superfluous from a scientific point of view. Its only function is to relate science and common sense, and thereby to provide a kind of psychological comfort.

In the text a more recent example given is that of J.D. Trout who also places such colloquial senses of understanding as even, ". . . hampering scientific progress. . ."

I happened to find this further article which attempts to give a 'metaphysics' of neo-positivism and there are names within which you can find references to including Chalmers or Ladyman who have espoused neo-positivist views however they differ slightly. They will at core agree on some meta-ontological anti-realism or 'anti-metaphysics'/conventionalism but I'm not sure on the degree of importance to scientific experimental import. For example, a quote from a work by Ladyman and Ross talking about a form of neo-positivism going like this:

[N]o hypothesis that the approximately consensual current scientific picture
declares to be beyond our capacity to investigate should be taken seriously.
Second, any metaphysical hypothesis that is to be taken seriously should have
some identifiable bearing on the relationship between at least two relatively
specific hypotheses that are either regarded as confirmed by institutionally
bona fide current science or are regarded as motivated and in principle
confirmable by such science. (2007, p. 29)

Various labels are used including quietist, sometimes pragmatism, scientific anti-realist, or someone who is favor of a 'naturalized metaphysics'. All of these classes of individuals will put greater import on scientific theorizing as it is currently and dissuade metaphysical speculation as detrimental at worst or symptomatic of our psychology at best. The only salvageable neo-positivist approaches which don't entirely gut what we've been doing for centuries is in admitting to some pragmatic worth of what classical positivists would have easily handwaved away.

I'm sorry for summing it up too briefly in a few snide remarks previously. The options here have a wide variety of reach and aren't so easily summarized although their are commonalities.

Well, I don't know what kind of understanding you are after. Do you have a clear idea of what would satisfy you that you understand something? — SophistiCat

If someone tried to explain what the second law of thermodynamics is and how that connects to the problem of the arrow of time I think I'd be at rather a loss if observables weren't referenced. However, I could see how pointing to certain phenomena could obscure what it is exactly we are getting at and the mathematics are too abstract to assist us here.

This is where analogue modeling can come in but to serve as an intuitive vehicle which, through idealization, singles in better into what the conflict here is. Say, to explain it to me, they used the examples of a billiard ball gas in a vacuum without a boundary/container and a ball/spring model of a solid. It doesn't matter that these are unrealistic nor do questions of realism have to appear but such simple visual models get across the notion of the increase of entropy, the settling over time of the vibrations in the solid, or the dispersion of a classical gas displaying a truly irreversible process.

Something so abstract or generalized needs to be given some sense of physicality to be able to feel one has in some sense understood it. In what better sense can one feel they've understood nature than by making references to nature itself in analogous manners? What else are we going to point to in nature than to say it behaves similar to that other part over there!

Metaphors and analogies may help - or mislead - but I don't think they are necessary for understanding. We are capable of understanding scientific concepts on their own terms. — SophistiCat

Note that none of these philosophers talking about understanding/explanation in the sciences denies that you can define understanding/explanation regarding scientific concepts without metaphor/analogy. In fact, its rather vague as to how this is meant to be intended as modern day anti-realists and neo-positivists understand lots of scientific concepts through operational definitions, theoretical definitions, or reference to instrumental practice.

Unless, you meant understanding different from those notions above.

Its the type, not the kind, of explanation/understanding at contention here I'd say if we aren't going to quibble entirely over mere definitions.

Who actually says that? — SophistiCat

No one, I was making a caricature. Course, the founders of quantum mechanics were notorious for either abandoning any attempt at the intelligibility of the atomic or grew rather pessimistic at said notion.

However, its the explicit dogma of neo-positivist to discount anything that isn't either descriptive/observable language or theoretical abstraction/modeling as mere window dressing to further observable/theoretical statements. That, or if its untranslatable to discount it as irrelevant to the sciences.

This includes realist proclamations such as, "There is an electron!" That then report it as having certain specific properties or relations. It would sooner be proclaimed that 'electron' is synonymous with operations used to detect it, some instrumental practice, or a symbol on the black board than anything else.

So, therefore, every statement literally devolves into something tautological. "I observed an electron by this detector and it had these properties," means nothing up and above what was already clear to us. That we were performing an experiment, that it made detections, and we modeled it mathematically. THAT'S IT and we already understood all that! Further, anything more is either metaphysical nonsense or TOO VAGUE to be meaningful of anything. Right?

I think you overstate the limitations of our conceptual grasp. We are not locked into a fixed Kantian conceptual universe. Our minds have some flexibility and room for development, enabling us to comprehend formerly incomprehensible (or at least convince ourselves that we do so comprehend). — SophistiCat

Yeah, that is what the point and purpose of comparative thinking (metaphor/analogy) along with computational/concrete analogue models serve as their purpose. To bring understanding and serve as explanations.

However, this would then be at odds with neo-positivist inclinations which seem to paint themselves into a strange corner saying, "I can describe these things but despite that I don't understand anything here and cannot explain a single thing as well. Mostly, because I see any non-abstract or non-mathematical avenues of thought as mere pointless ventures leading us no where."

So which is it? Do we indulge in being a little speculatively comprehensible or throw it all in the garbage because its no unified objective mathematical field theory?

Struggles with interpreting new and unintuitive science are not that new. Neither is the retreat to the "shut up and calculate" quietist approach. — SophistiCat

I was just reading a book called Concepts of Force by Max Jammer which had a few passages talking about critical reflections on the notion of 'force'. A few by the renowned idealist Berkeley seem to be rather relevant here.

Force, gravity, attraction and similar terms are convenient for purposes of reasoning and for computations of motion and of moving bodies, but not for the understanding of the nature of motion itself.

Real efficient causes of the motion. . . of bodies do not in any way belong to the field of mechanics or of experimental science; nor can they throw any light on these.

. . . then all the famous theorems of mechanical philosophy which. . . make it possible to subject the world to human calculations, may be preserved; and at the same time,the study of the motion will be freed from a thousand pointless trivialities and subtleties, and from (meaningless) abstract ideas.

Despite the somewhat obscure notions that his idealist philosophy may throw in later; all of these statements would find themselves right at home, especially the last one, with the central doctrine of both positivists past as well as those who seek to resurrect it back to general acceptance.

The desire to 'do away with' all that 'abstract nonsense' and pointless speculation. The trend is astoundingly repetitive the farther back you go and the more numerous it becomes closer to the modern age.

Ever happened upon Sabine Hossenfelder's book Lost in Math? There might be some commonality between what you're asking and that book. — Wayfarer

I'm not exactly sure because a cursory examination of said book and some of the reviews summing it up seem to paint her as someone who is more desiring for a callback to scientific advancement or achievements of the past. Wherein physicists astound us with how mixing two bland and boring chemicals gives an astounding show of colors. To use experimental results as guides to solve all our philosophical worries. If only it were testable!

Which is not exactly what I intend or desire to go back to nor do I think we can. The anti-realisms of scientific philosophy have killed that and laid it bear so we are left with a rather personal choice which CANNOT BE DECIDED with experimental results or reference to useful mathematical models.

A choice of whether we dare to make intelligible assertions, speak in obscurantist tongues, or cut out our tongue in general and scribble forever more abstract symbolisms that always escape any sense of intelligibility.

So - is your question basically ‘what does it all mean’? — Wayfarer

Its not a question of meaningfulness but of even playing the game of making meaningful assertions which themselves don't give some immediate pragmatic results. Why play the game when no end goal is in sight?

If I had a machine that could pump out meaningful, experimentally under-determined, and intelligible philosophical statements/systems by the thousands is indulging in the debate or discussion around them a proper place of a rational individual, a modern philosopher, or a practicing physicist? Or should such speculation always be avoided with extreme prejudice?

I apologize for the late reply. I've been struck between college, work, family affairs', and basic needs to even begin to sufficiently read into or collect any of the vast literature understanding/explanation has given rise to.

However, in thinking about what I could say I think I sort of spotted what it is that I have an issue with.

In this modern age of philosophy it seems as if people are going in a direction of some naturalized metaphysics, a form of metaphysical conventionalism, or quietism about these issues. They have taken not a physical or metaphysical but a meta-metaphysical turn as people have re-emerged in other clothing to say many of the same things that scientifically minded skeptics and logical positivists of the past have had say about the pointlessness of metaphysical investigation. This time around without any of the same baggage that these prior groups sort of immediately possessed or fell subject to in critique.

An example I found awhile ago was a form of Carnapian conventionalism about your philosophy of choice but re-interpreted in terms of metaphor rather than the analytic/synthetic split which may in some sense avoid textbook proclamations of its incoherency.

It's not difficult, impossible, or even uncommon to motivate such a quietist mindset. In the same sense that a person can play 'skeptic' and ask 'why' repeatedly to your frustration. However, it seems too easy to say one has 'fixed' these issues by mere changes of symbolism, of axioms, or even in changing the meaning of certain concepts. That or by saying its 'subjective' would seem to motivate a rather swift and easy handwaving of it away. I'm suspicious that such conceptual problems don't actually ever go away and rather will re-appear once again only to be met with someone who has neglected the conceptual tools that would allow them to deal with it.

In everyday speech we emphasize the distinction between things 'outside' our mind and 'inside'. It might be extremely difficult to define what that even means but in an intuitive manner it just seems so obvious. Scientific world views resurrect a similar split under the moniker of realism/anti-realism and philosophy in general despite supposedly being about notions beyond science in some cases have such great debates over a similarly named divide. Further, into meta-philosophy such a distinction arises AGAIN except now its about the choice one has between philosophical conceptual systems of thought and you get many of the SAME usual suspects: Deflationism, forms of realism, and conventionalism.

On the one hand, as I see it, you are left with a camp that tries its utmost best on every level imaginable (everyday, the scientific, the philosophical, the meta-philosophical) to try and create a desert conceptual landscape filled with only the most obvious or limited number of conceptual tools needed to complete some purpose. A descending pragmatic and metaphilosophically pragmatic supremacy with, at least in principle, un-yielding desire for conceptual simplicity.

In short: Why even consider that if I can't even make some tangible use of it? To the fires I shall cast it.

The other approach could be one filled with dogmatism and authoritarianism about the SPECIFIC terms of their ONE philosophical approach. Something desirable as anyone whose ever entered for the first time into scientific or philosophical speculation has had such a similar desire as well. Clearly such an approach is dead or dying and usually falls prey to forms of self-defeating obscurantism to motivate their objective understanding of the world amidst the critiques of skeptics in centuries past.

We could, however, attempt to follow in the foot steps of what Arthur Fine calls the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) and sort of attempt to dissolve this rapid obsession that philosophy has had regarding the realism/anti-realism debate. Which is strange because the person advocating for this position sees it as opposed to the conventionalism or deflationists that other meta-philosophers have brought to the table. Clearly, on practical matters, realists and anti-realists never really disagreed at all for that matter. What would seem to then motivate the distinction? Perhaps, at the end of the rainbow of centuries of philosophical debate about said issues its merely the realization that to be a realist is merely to say with a stomp of a foot, "It's REALLY real, though!"

To express what they meant to say all along was merely, "I entertained this idea because I considered it so informative and attractive to my sensibilities. I think it should serve you well to."

In short once again: Perhaps its a goal and practical desire itself to entertain what may seem as impractical notions/concepts/conceptual systems of thought if not just because they 'may' give practical results. . . they may remain impractical. . . but because its the only way in which we motivate choices between new ways of thinking. Choice among these conceptual systems is subjective, YES, but clearly whatever system you hold to has rather grand and vast ramifications even to practical affairs. So its a subjectivity of choice that isn't so irrelevant as one would want to make it out to be.

_____________________________________________________________________________

The intelligibility, visualization, and form of language that we use to understand/explain/describe nature is merely another set of clothing for the above problem. Will any of such motivated approaches prove more practical in terms of technological development? Perhaps not.

Maybe they all provide easier traction for entrants into the discipline however. . . maybe such speculations allow for easy manipulations of abstract symbolisms or in making grand abstract connections which prove useful. . . are these all happy accidents and could be done without said tool? That could be. . . would you want to risk it for a few generations and only after a few centuries of spinning wheels go back to such fantasies because you were "wrong" on their generative practical "utility"?

This doesn't strike me as true at all. Special and general relativity are full of what you call "ideas of understanding, visualization, or explanation," e.g. space curved by mass. — T Clark

You are not wrong. There are many rather illustrative thought experiments that Einstein and others had or continue to construct which do serve a role in bringing about some sort of understanding through visualized mental experiments.

However, there is a lack of clarification about what exactly the references or type of understanding are being creating here. Are we understanding something about nature? Or merely the manner in which we mathematically model it? Are we referencing noumena or symbols on the black board?

Further, there is usually a lack of clarification about the metaphors being used. Space as a substance is a metaphor that treats a rather abstract concept of space by comparison to other substances. Space as a container is another such metaphor.

Such metaphors don't have to carry any ontological weight and perhaps they shouldn't. They are just manners of speaking which our mind has an obsession with partaking in despite the vexing frustration of physicists. They don't imply any grand philosophical consequences, they don't have to, but does that therefore mean they should be cast into the flames?

I don't think science or even physics in general is seen as "incoherent to our sensibilities." People call QM weird, but as far as I understand it, it's just the way things are. Maybe dispensing with metaphysics, i.e. visualization and explanation, is the right way to approach it. Why should we have to expect that the behavior of the universe at that scale has to be comprehensible in the same terms as baseballs and toothbrushes. — T Clark

Its actually completely irrelevant whether its comprehensible or not at those scales.

Whether we agree on how to determine this or not and what methods will achieve this.

We will continue to have a mind which treats it as meaningful. That nature can be understood on our terms and if that wasn't the case. . . then the majority of scientific practice is an insult to greater objective sensibility. A pathetic useless gesture in attempting to grasp a world that is un-graspable. A form of scientific mental nihilism.

You give a coherency to your understanding of something in whatever means possible NOT because nature is shown to be coherent but because being coherent is the only manner (through visualizations, analogies, metaphors, abstractions, etc) in which a rational person could understand it. I'm advocating then for a form of scientific existentialism perhaps. Except meaning in this comparison is replaced with explanatory approaches and the understanding they bring.

Further, the language of quantum mechanics are derivative of analogues, metaphors, and analogue modeling. The bias you hold about it as, 'just the way things are,' seems to forget where those philosophical certainties came from. . . the same place you just said you are dispensing with.

Where do you think quantum physicists got the language they are using to express its strangeness? Where did they abstract it from?

I have never heard this. I have heard science only deals with how things work, not why. That's not the same as your phrase and it makes sense to me in most situations. — T Clark

Descriptions serve this role of expressing how things take place because they do not go beyond observables or mathematical synonyms for said observables with logical connectives to link one to another. If you want to express or interpret it as 'how'/'why' instead of 'description'/'explanation' then go ahead.

Again, I don't understand the basis of this claim. — T Clark

Usually, examples of analogue models which are presented fall along the lines of billiard balls or old Aether vortices which have been forced out of the modern era by the great Einstein paradigm shift. They are seen as a part of the previous generation which we have passed and are 'long dead' figuratively speaking along with their progenitors who are literally dead.

@Nimish The disgusting, the unlawful, lazy, and immoral parts of ourselves seem to demand for judgement. . . punishment. . . retribution. Right? To abstract the deficient in ourselves into a being of equal reality to ourselves with whom we can wrap our hands around their throat. To flog their back and stone the irrationality out of their veins.

The truly virtuous aren't so if they let the criminals within themselves run free, right? So should that mean that we put on a show to ourselves? To prove to ourselves that we are in fact moral individuals?

If I judge myself with such internal vitriol and there is no one around to bear witness nor any ulterior motive in sight then have I become that pure altruistic soul who knows its moral law by heart?

Morals and the values we hold to aren't just mere statements but require actions as well as judgement in a constant social court of the public but also internally.

@javra I don't know what I'd consider science precisely but months of research to narrow in on such a definition would contain many references/citations from socialist views of science as well as anti-realist ones.

My 'objective' science would be rather boring and not filled with the sort of flair of black holes, time travel, or spacetime warping. Rather, statements about methodological practice, instrumental usage, and direct observer language with some poetic flair merely to make it more palatable to read.

Tell you what, I've repeatedly offered what I take valid empirical science to be. You, so far, have not offered any definition of what you take it to be - and examples of what "science says" do not come close to delineating what is and is not science. — javra

That is sort of why I've been speaking about it in a rather indirect manner and, if I haven't then its implied in previous replies, that the word 'science' is taken as not more than a label of notoriety. Sort of how the title of philosopher has been stretched into such a high colloquial usage with such vastness that its meaningfulness has been rather diluted.

The main issue I see is that whatever definition you come up with could be atomized into different purposes, methodologies, conceptual tools, and colloquial images of 'manifest science' that could be neither sufficient nor altogether necessary.

One can observe nature and yet not be considered a scientist. Someone can observe and manipulate nature according to pragmatic ends with a fallibilist mindset yet be declared a mere industrialist or engineer rather than a physicist. One can observe and speculate on nature but would be found to be a naturalist metaphysician and not a physicist simpliciter.So what is supposed to distinguish the person who uncovers nature as a scientist but is not so speculative while being distinguished from the mere pragmatic naturalist manipulator of it? Since those conceptual tools and practices can be used by ALL.

Perhaps, its their purpose? Then that makes it too subjective and tied in with socialized views of scientific work or progress which are rational analyses of what's been called science but shouldn't be included in its definition. A definition that shouldn't be subjective really in any degree or as distant as possible according to colloquial images of 'manifest science'.

This notion of science also restricts or serves to restrict what allowable language is used to talk about nature. Metaphorical, analogical, and indirect language may be pragmatically useful or common but perhaps it shouldn't be considered scientific given its subjective status. Therefore any talk of preons, the sub-atomic, atomic, and other such quantum weirdness or spacetime bending is to be seen as playful poetic language outside the purview of objective science. Objective science demands clear and directly meaningful statements of which symbolism combined with direct observable language without theoretical entities would suffice. I.E. realism in science is dead and anti-realism of a post-positivist /instrumentalist/operationalist/epistemological idealist sort rules.

I don't think you'd really say science was altogether that different or inconsistent with what is bolded above already but its common to speak highly of the consequences of theories or of the entities they postulate upon the external world. To talk about laws of nature or particle interactions which defy nature's causal connectiveness and connect distant parts of spacetime as a bent sheet. Should these diatribes be considered scientific or philosophical because of their poetic/metaphorical/analogical and indirect language?

I would say these postulations aren't merely 'possible of being disproven' which lends them more credence than an anti-realist would yield them. They aren't mere postulations a new test can upheave. . . THEY ARE MEANINGLESS because they aren't part of an objective direct observer language. Fallibilism yields them more credence as to their mind-independent meaningfulness as statements about the world. It tricks you into thinking they even have a truth value to be given in the first place even if that truth value is declared as 'unknown' or indeterminable. Rather we should join similar minded anti-realists as those fictionalists and declare such talk as no different in nature than the highest fantasy novels Human's have created.

Regardless of any objective untangling of the supremely successful social endeavor we call science any objective bullet point of a pure idea of science separate from that should learn from that mistake or solve it. Is there any meaningfulness to be given to analogical/metaphorical statements about the external world? Is objective science only an anti-realist one in a pragmatic or even non-pragmatic sort?

Further, I'm not confident however that one could separate an idea of science from its pragmatic usage or the purposes of acting 'scientists'. Not without creating some strange platonic science from no where and from which no one performs it nor could anyone be declared a part of it.

I don't want to be that individual but I have to point out a worry that this all brings. What if these sorts of deranged individuals (the shooter that was at that rally for example) suddenly realize they want to go for political fish who have more swing in making rapid changes to their local area. Lower officials, particularly state connected ones, who most definitely would not have the widest and vast protections that we would assume the president or previous presidents would possess. Regardless of any critique one may have on how this was handled regarding Trump and his security detail.

Is this looming, violent, and local anarchy on the horizon?

I can assume that any American citizen can only take so much 'collapse of the U.S.' and the almost stoic acknowledgement that high political affairs are 'outside our control'.

Yeah, I can’t believe he left after being shot. Crazy. — NOS4A2

Teddy didn't leave immediately and apparently he continued doing a speech for 50min WITH it having not grazed him but gone into his chest. Then accepted medical attention only after.

Trump. . . the TRUE American. . . pumped his fist and then shuffled off into safety shortly after.

@javra What distinguishes a mere experimentalist from a physicist to me isn't their proclivity to accord some precise description to nature whether in ordinary language or stated in abstract symbolisms but in going beyond it. To speculate on it in analogy pictorially and in language metaphorically while remaining honest about ones' intentions in doing so.

Perhaps the only distinguishing feature between the Aether's of Classical physics and the Aether models of modern physics then is that we don't take the latter as all that literal when pushed into an intellectual corner.

Nature isn't literally made of an elastic medium but it helps to think of it that way. Same with fluid and billiard ball models which assist us more than esoteric metaphorical statements or abstract symbolisms. Course, the latter two have their place as well.

Not sure how to best interpret the sarcasm in the first sentence. That spacetime bends is not fact, but theory. — javra

Its a lazy and quick interpretation riddled with metaphysical assertions that aren't made explicit that they are, analogue model usage that is stated as literal, and usually in ignorance of a long past of re-interpretations which make GR seem more similar to a mathematical model that has a thousand potential interpretations. . . not specifically one.

It is fact that this theory of relativity currently best accounts for all observables in the field - this to the best of our knowledge. — javra

Yes, a proper connection and interpretation made between qualitative ordinary language predictions with quantitative predictions from approximate/exact results of Einstein's field equations with a host of respectable experimentalist assumptions have gained it express support.

But then it is also fact that this same theory of relativity has to date not been satisfactorily combined with our best theories regarding QM - thereby logically demonstrating that something is amiss in either one of the two theories just mentioned or else with both. To affirm that spacetime bends is fact is then to deny what's just been here stated. — javra

That isn't the point I'm making.

You can have a successful ordinary language machine that takes in qualitative statements as initial starting data and then makes a qualitative prediction in combination with or in the absence of an equally successful quantitative mathematical/logical model. However, the interpretation of said Theory of Everything would number in hundreds before long and in the thousands as generations pass on by. Interpretations are neither unique nor are they ever determined. Rather they are always un-determined.

As to the mathematics, pure mathematics is notoriously indifferent to the observable world, conformant only to mathematical axioms and the logical implications of these. If the maths don't serve to best explain the observable world (or, as is the case with probability, as a tool for best appraising the validity of observable results) they are then worthless to the empirical sciences. Take Einstein's ToR for example; he had to invent an new mathematics to properly address the theory he held in mind - namely, the Einstein field equations. Here, the maths are not sacrosanct but, rather, part of the theorizing regarding the data so far accumulated. — javra

This is the same conclusion as those who have been long involved in the substantivalist/relationist debate where its sort of devolved into whether we formulate the math topologically speaking or emphasize spacetime points.

In the end, some think the emphasis on the math has lead the philosophizing astray. However, if the math and observations imply nothing different on the part of these interpretations then its almost as if I could roll a hundred sided die to determine which I should go with. A sense of objectivity goes out the window and so does the point to such discussions. Why not just become observation obsessed logical neo-positivists?

Sometimes, if not often, newly discerned observables will then make a difference as to which interpretations are to be culled from the list. At the very least narrowing down the valid possibilities as to what in fact is. — javra

Until you wait long enough and then those observable differences only negate one mathematical formalism of a certain interpretation but not another mathematical formalism.

Is spacetime curved or not? That statement isn't decided by a single observation or theory. Its a true/false statement that lives among numerous mathematical models that are all, in terms of observation or formalism, inconsistent with one another. Yet, these inconsistent models might all agree on "proper" interpretation that its true/false. When one dies a thousand others can live on.

To address commonly known examples, Newton's X, Y, and Z did not account for Mercury's movements as observation A. Einstein's X, Y, and Z does. Because of this, we acknowledge the Newton's physics (theory of the physical) is wrong, despite yet being relatively accurate for all intended purposes most of the time. — javra

No, you proved that Newton's mathematical model of gravitation was incomplete. . . not that Newtonian physics is wrong. As if Newtonian/Classical physics wasn't allowed to have alternative mathematical models to Newtonian gravitation or that a different mathematical model coming down from the newest paradigm shift couldn't also be considered Newtonian.

You'd need to precisely define what it means for a mathematical model to be Classical. For that matter you'd need to also clarify this for counterfactual ordinary language modeling as well. That or for any interpretation that may be yielded to a model.

Classical physics can be statistical and long before quantum mechanics there were people who speculated on 'atomic' time or randomness in nature. These concepts don't belong to quantum mechanics and in what sense would they now be non-Classical? Besides Classical/Newtonian merely standing for a vague historical period rather than a clear methodology or idea of theory creation. At least Milic Capek attempts to take on such a historical and interpretative weight as difficult as it is to clarify in what manner Classical is to be distinguished from Modern physics. Hint: Its not the math and if you dug hard enough you'd find Classical attempts at 'field' theories or randomness in nature.

A Classical model is showcased as incorrect. Not Classical physics. Did they disprove Newton's three laws in that test as well?

But I'll reaffirm that science (empirical science proper) was never ever a means of obtaining infallible knowledge or truths regarding what is. One of its greatest strengths is in culling possible explanations regarding what physically is in definitive - yet still technically fallible - manners. Take for example theories of life: there is no scientific manner to reintroduce the theory of Young Earth Creationism into scientific models of how life emerges and behaves - this exactly because it directly contradicts data (fossils and such) - although this is yet still not infallibly known (e.g., one can always bring in something like a Last Thursday-ist explanation of the data, as extremely non-credible as this alternative will be to both anti-YECs and YECs alike - its very logical standing, or better lack of, here tentatively overlooked). That stated, not all variations of Lamarckian interpretations of biological evolution have been falsified - this although Lamarckianism proper has. The Neo-Darwininan model we currently endorse would go through a paradigm-shift were any one of these Lamarckian possibilities valid (via further enquiry into epigenetics and the like) such that the will on the part of parents can in any way whatsoever effect the phenotype of offspring. Yet nothing even remotely adequate has been proposed in terms of any such Lamarckian-like possibility to serve as any significant threat to the Neo-Darwininan model we currently hold and hold onto to as valid representation of what is. This, however, does not make Neo-Darwinianism an established fact, though. And any potential scientific proposal to contest the currently predominant view will need to be a) empirically falsifiable and b) not falsified via any test to stand any chance of evidencing the hypothesis proposed. But if falsified, then that one particular hypothesis will then be definitively evidenced wrong. — javra

If that is all that science is then I'm fine with it. A giant list of counterfactual statements in ordinary language about if this happens, then such and such follows to handle qualitative predictions. Then some logical/mathematical modeling of a simple enough form to handle quantitative predictions.

However, any interpretation beyond the observables of this theory of everything will be doomed to indetermination. Asking questions about whether this caused that, whether spacetime is a thing, what fundamental particles there are, etc. These will remain grossly underdetermined and this will only get worse as time goes one. To a point where the first few pages of a text book will be how to use that counterfactual software on your computer and how to use that mathematical model while the other thousands of pages in hundreds of volumes will list re-interpretation after re-interpretation.

So, going back to the OP, because science has by now evidenced the strictly mechanistic model of the world to be erroneous, we should not "go back" to a Newtonian-physics-like understanding of the world - this, for example, no more than we as a society should go back to a Young Earth Creationist understanding of the world in general and hence of biology in particular. — javra

Then become a logical positivist.

Burn every example of analogue modeling including of GR such as this that you find. Remove all metaphorical language that isn't literalized and lose the mystery or fantastical nature of quantum mechanics. Finally, tell those metaphysicians to never leave their department as the unfalsifiable demands no concern with us as much as the observables do.

All that you have left is a listing of observations and trial/error mathematical modeling. No causation or laws of nature, no point to talk about what spacetime is, nor speculation on which 'particles' are fundamental. Only which curve on the screen follows which button press. . . in a statistical sense.

That is the point I'm trying to make. As if Classical physicists weren't also mathematicians and did statistics as much as quantum physicists currently perform or could in fact do. It would be strange to proclaim a mathematical tool as purely part of Modern physics or Classical physics and I think you would agree. There are also numerous philosophical ancestors to the concepts now being peddled which didn't start with Modern physics nor did they invent them. Further, analogue modeling seems to be making a come back where it was so popular as to its usefulness in Classical physics now people realize they can better understand the world or their models through its use. Its not so antiquated now!

Here is a physical analogue model of a droplet moving on a vibrating basin of water used to understand pilot wave theory. Here is a derivation of Einstein's field equations by mathematically treating it as a fluid with sinks or sources.

Here is an elastic analogue interpretation of Einstein's field equations as well. Funny enough this person actually is a young Earth creationist but we will put aside that strange point as it shouldn't imply anything wrong about his paper besides what results he showcases which can be critically examined separate from that. It is sad that this is the case but that is my own bias.

There is a central creativity to and creation or speculation that goes beyond the observables or the mathematics. Something, that is similar in nature to art interpretation, that isn't supposed to be considered objective.

Those in philosophical arm chairs don't do empirical science by so sitting in arm chairs. One has to be observing out in the field, as least a significant portion of the time, to engage in empirical sciences proper. A very big difference, to me at least. — javra

I don't think you understood and I didn't make it clear enough as it was a snide remark. I want to make the point that the intellectual methods used by both are similar; metaphysicians & theoretical scientists.

They both conduct semantical clarifications, language analysis, thought experiments, construct metaphorical stories, and give pictorial analogue explanations of the world to understand it better.

Unless one is to declare one a metaphysician if and only if they shut off their senses or declare one a scientist because they observe but do not speculate. I'm not sure I really see such a difference if one allows for a metaphysician to probe the world and a scientist to speculate heavily on in it in grandiosely open-ended manners.

As to the "re-interpretations" these again only occur when models/theories do not fit the data, hence requiring at least tweaking in the models/theories/interpretations yet endorsed so as to adequately account for the data. — javra

Re-interpretation is popularized as a demonic tool of pseudo-scientists when it only concerns whose predictive counterfactual models are to be considered simpler or not in their usefulness. As regards their observable consequences but re-interpretation is alive and well among science away from the purview of any observables.

In all facets of science it lies in wait for a curious mind to discover how prevalent it is and how easy it may be to choke oneself on plentiful creations of your own.

Take the fact that spacetime bends. . . oh I mean a strange interpretation that is held in varieties of competing positions of interpretation irrespective of the math under the heading of substantivalists. Then there are the relationists and emergentists who seek to say something different. . . about the same exact mathematics. Then there are the often ignored conventionalists about spacetime geometry who seek to dissolve all such debate as they were popular during and just before Einstein's time before being buried to history despite their current modern relevance. ALL of them don't have to imply anything different about the observations nor the math or the connections between them.

If you obsess over the math's role note that the field equations for GR can be reformulated in terms of torsion (Teleparallel GR) rather than curvature or in terms of metrical variations (Metric Teleparallel GR) which are exactly equivalent mathematical reformulations. A re-interpretation can then be given to GR as to it being a field theory in Teleparallel form bringing back that 'force' of gravity that Einstein apparently killed.

This can even be done in Classical physics under the heading of Newton-Cartan theory which is a 'curved' mathematical re-formulation of Newtonian gravity which makes the force of gravity 'disappear' into the 'spatio-temporal' curvature of 'spacetime'. Different math, different interpretations, but exactly the same observable consequences.

The only way out of this would be to divorce interpretation from math and some how argue all these conflicting interpretations (relationism/substantivalism/emergentism/conventionalism) are the same in some fashion. How that could be done is any ones' guess and would require some heavy handed semantical re-interpretation.

Yet these black boxes at the very least teeter on the non-scientific (irrespective of what the mass-hype might be). Its why the empirical sciences proper only deal with falsifiable hypotheses. As one easy to appraise illustrative example of this, science cannot address the "black box" of whether there is a small unicorn under your tabletop that turns invisible as soon as you look under - this precisely because this hypothesis is unfalsifiable [by any conceivable type of observation]. What does this have to do with physics and, more broadly, the empirical sciences in general? Same applies to myriad "theoretical entities of modern physics": e.g., M-theory, Many Worlds Interpretation, and so forth. Contrast this with something like the variable speed of light theory, which could be falsifiable where our technology to be advanced enough (last I looked into the matter). — javra

You bring up the variable speed of light hypothesis as if the conventionality of simultaneity/geometry doesn't already make that a moot point.

You can construct finite light speed theories that conflict with observations and others that don't. Just as you can do so for variable speed of light theories as long as you keep the observables fixed you can tweak anything you please. It becomes meaningless to say you 'tested' whether the speed of light is variable if you can always construct a theory which fits it or reformulates the math in a manner similar to teleparallel GR.

You showed a variable speed of light theory as inconsistent with observations. . . you didn't showcase that light speed isn't variable and in fact only showed that the prior understanding of it, if it is in fact actually variable, was incorrect.

If I came up with a falsifiable hypothesis about me being a brain in vat that is in fact falsified then that doesn't mean I'm not a brain in a vat. It only means that if I am a brain in a vat that it wouldn't function as I had previously thought.

The speed of light is just one of many other such examples of unfalsifiable proposals which is showcased as if its been proven or narrowed into the corner of truth. Even modern popularized scientific YouTube videos are now talking about the impossibility of measuring this speed let alone its 'constancy'. Poincare long before Einstein was already kicking around this idea of this impossibility over a hundred years ago!

Its the most extreme case of holism. You aren't testing the speed of light as much as you are testing some complicated assumptions about how you link everything together in the exact manner it is currently and there is no mind-independent manner as to which sub-hypothesis you modify/reject/accept.

Think of the Thomas Edison quote:

"I have not failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that won't work."

I somehow feel we yet hold significantly different understandings of what empirical science consists of. But I'm not currently sure of what these underlying differences might be. — javra

I regard science, at least the hard sciences, as plagued by irresolvable immense scientific holism (dependence on parts) and conventionalism. So much so that I find it maddening at this point but not something I feel I could easily give up given my fruitless internet searching for as long as I can remember.

For there to be modeling, or else interpretation, in the first place, there first needs (as in necessity) to be empirical data to be modeled, else interpreted. Yes, science engages in modeling via which interpretation of data occurs. But what I'm attempting to express first and foremost is that the empirical sciences proper, via its use of the scientific method, collects empirical data in as an objective manner as currently fathomable to us humans. — javra

On the one hand your claim that this collecting of empirical data is 'objective' might be riddled with holes if only you got rather more specific on the methods or social practice science uses to collect such data. Further, I don't think I disagree with this nor is this really that astounding a realization as if those in philosophical arm chairs aren't able to or in fact don't do the exact same. They can perform just as equally with as tenacious a spirit as these scientists the observational practices common to modern science just with other interpretative goals.

Models and interpretations that do not account for all data thereby accumulated - or worse, that logically contradict this data in total or in part - will be deemed falsified — javra

I don't think scientists actually think this way as there have been past disagreements that were resolved by further observation but usually by acceptable 're-interpretation' of the data to regard inconsistences as mere appearance. Contradiction with observation implies a bad functional connection between observables and theoretical postulations. It doesn't have to imply anything about the veracity/falsity of theoretical entities nor some conspiracy against our methods of observation. Nothing is tested, neither observation nor theory, but the glue which binds them and there a myriad number of ways to glue together the theoretical with observables.

As a crude example easy to gain accord upon, the theory that Earth is geometrically flat is one such model via which our communal empirical data can become interpreted. Or, more exotic, so too is the theory that planet Earth is hollow and inhabited by sapient beings in its core (which I have heard people address). These models are wrong, i.e. incorrect, only because they fail to account for all commonly shared or else commonly accessible empirical data and on occasion directly contradict it. — javra

I'm not sure I actually care about such models as their falsity is predicated on mutually contradictory observable postulations within the accessibility of falsification within everyday practical understandings of meaning, objectivity, truth, etc.

I'm more concerned with the truly unobservable on the smallest scales and the truly inaccessible such as the past or distant parts of our universe as all of these are plagued by deep unresolvable speculation. A place where falsification provides no relief and only underdetermination of theory remains.

Falsification is a beautiful tool when there are no black boxes. When there are only black boxes then it loses its relevance besides assisting those obsessed with epicycles.

Science (by which I here mean the scientific-method-utilizing empirical sciences) does not, and cannot, fail as our optimal means of obtaining unbiased empirical knowledge regarding what perceptually is. — javra

Science can collect 'observations' and data. Knowledge on the other hand requires a definition to be provided and a theory of meaning to be defended.

I for one am privy in favor to demoting knowledge in part to be the socially special sorts of beliefs we possess. Knowledge as merely a subset of belief of a privileged sort by some pragmatic/social means of justification.

Is there any major disagreement in what I've so far expressed as pertains to science? — javra

Only disagreement or dissension based in how vague its all presented.

I love The Seventh Seal, and several other Bergman films, but he's not your go-to director for sunny up-lift. — BC

Why not!?

Something about the conversation that the knight has with what he thought to be at first a nameless servant of the faith, really in fact death, struck a great cord with me. Especially when he say,

How can we have faith in those who believe when we can't have faith in ourselves? What is going to happen to those of us who want to believe but aren't able to? And what is to become of those who neither want to nor are capable of believing?

Showcasing such deepened worries about whether the ground of thought we lay upon is as certain to hold our weight as we entertain ourselves. A trouble I have had for months if not years now as I've bounced from one ideological attractor to another in pursuit of certainty only to step back in undecisive worry.

Why can't I kill God within me? Why does He live on in this painful and humiliating way even though I curse Him and want to tear Him out of my heart? Why, in spite of everything, is He a baffling reality that I can't shake off? Do you hear me?

A desperate barrage of questions about the desire for meaningful searching and why, if it cannot be satiated, does it remain.

I want knowledge, not faith, not suppositions, but knowledge. I want God to stretch out His hand towards me, reveal Himself and speak to me.

My most favorite line of all. I've even posted something similar somewhere on this forum. That desire for the unexpected and beautifully strange to muddy our mundane daily lives.

I don't know whether you are clinically depressed or are just doom-looping. If it's the latter, well... stop doing that. Depression gets tossed around too much. IS someone really clinically depressed, or are they lonely and angry? Tired? Isolated? Frustrated? Burdened with too many problems to deal with? Antidepressants will not help those sorts of things. — BC

I would say I've never been clinically depressed. . . melancholy for sure.

Just for reference, how old are you now? What kind of connections do you have with other people, at work and outside of work? Family? Friends? Romantic partner? — BC

I'm 23 and have a rather nonexistent collection of social relationships. Workaholic coworkers who are rightfully preoccupied with there own lives. Friends who I've ostracized or they have moved on. Family members who are stretched across countries now and those I have immediate access to are troubled in ways I cannot solve nor can a pouring out of my own troubles satiate their own.

So I have searched for acquaintances but have had no long reprieve between awkward work schedules, losing track of time until months roll by, or just finding such events as few to far between.

In the coming months I will have greater changes roll by which might change this or merely compound upon it.

You probably shouldn't be alone. It sounds as if you're in a state of mind that, if you can't think of a way to change it, you should get help with. At least support from someone you trust. — Vera Mont

Perhaps the way I wrote it created a false sense of worry and I apologize for that. I can assure you such existential worries of such intensity left me in my beginning twenties. I'm a bit lonely on my days off but nothing so morbid entertains my thoughts anymore.

@BC @Vera Mont I, again, appreciate the comments and advice you have given me. I just had a day off yesterday and nothing resulted despite my anticipation in so long. It dragged on and on as I sulked in maddening internal silence. As night continued on I decided to watch The Seventh Seal from 1958 and a video essay on it. I had never seen it but it seemed to encapsulate my existential worries.

The maddening nothingness that others attempt to intellectually obscure with manufactured certainty and the absurdness of continuing on. To play chess with death rather than give in to his beckoning call.

Excellent start to figuring things out. Looks as if you have a lot of re-evaluation and planning to do. You'll need your clearest head. I wish you all the luck! — Vera Mont

Your input is appreciated.

What you are expected to do, and most likely what you can, you must, you shall, and you will do (after you get it over with) is find a job; inhabit hopefully decent housing; pay your bills; gradually pay off loans; shop for groceries; do laundry; establish a short/medium/long term relationship; and more! It's called LIFE. Most people are reasonably happy doing this stuff a good share of the time. — BC

I already do those things. In the two year hiatus I've taken I got a job and worked up to being an assistant manager with a few assorted retirement/medical benefits. I've indulged in some high amount of spending as one does when they get a growing bank account but still can support myself and leave enough aside for a new car, medical emergencies, in case I get laid off for 2-3 months, food, car payments, insurance, etc.

Its nothing glamorous at times and perhaps I work too much to my own detriment.

Course, its the existential element that is not fulfilled. Philosophy and the uncovering of the wonders of this world via physics insights are meant to serve that purpose. . . or so I thought. Now even that has become neglected and dusty as I struggle to find any worth in its conventional or arbitrary pursuits. Meta-philosophy especially has ruined my view of it all and now I'm beginning to see every academic in a similar lights as the occasional raving lunatic on vixra.org. I reject these dissidents only out of laziness as I've found I lack much of any foundation or what foundation I possess is so mundane as to not spark the same fascination I possessed when I was younger.

So I've waited for an article on some journal, a post here, or some paragraph in the books I have in my possession to yield an excuse to feel the way I did before. To sort of return to a more blissful state of mind.

I wonder how many distract themselves - whether with recreational drugs (including alcohol) or sports or social activities - because they should not have been there in the first place. Many young people embark on higher education simply because it is expected of them.
And, too, pressure to succeed, to compete, to excel may drive many others to the performance enhancing drugs that have a whole other set of side- and long-term effects.
Some of that dropping out may be due, not to the drug-use but to the initial reason for drug use. — Vera Mont

I took that too close to heart as I still don't know what I'm doing since taking a hiatus from my education. I'm finishing up the same degree later this year having transferred to a more prestigious university with most expenses covered by state or parents but I still don't understand what I'm to do aside from get it over with.

I know one thing I won't do anymore. . . drink. Hell of a distraction on those free weekends. A drain on your expenses and an ever present potential spiral into a violent irrationalism.

"they performed the same modeling techniques under different labels." - this sounds like you're saying "the model of relativity is just the model of Newtonian mechanics, under a different name." Is that not what you mean? — flannel jesus

That depends on how you define Newtonian mechanics and what it means to say anything is 'Newtonian'. It can't merely be the mathematical structure as Newtonian mathematical models can be as statistical as quantum mechanical ones if not make use of the same mathematical machinery that such modern 'theories' make use of.

If its the interpretation then what exactly is supposed to distinguish Classical from Non-Classical? There have been thinkers in the Classical past who denied any distinguishing factor between space and matter or proclaimed that there was some close connection between the two concepts. That or how, even if rare, people played around with forms of indeterminism or discreteness in nature. These concepts aren't new or novel in light of the history of philosophical thought nor is it the case that modern physics 're-invented' the wheel here so to speak. These base concepts that form its backbone are as old as philosophical/physics practice.

That's not remotely true, that's a completely bonkers narrative that I would expect only from a flat earther. — flannel jesus

Which part? That a paradigm shift resulted from a change in thinking coming from the younger generations or that a large majority of the same classical intellectual biases pervade how modern day physicists continue to model?

The Aether didn't die. . . they just called it analogue modeling and continued doing what physicists before were doing. They continued the same mathematical curve fitting, trial & error matching, and enslaving themselves to a few interpretations of a mathematical model when thousands of others could be made up without issue.

Scientific anti-realists have been beating this tired narrative to a pulp for the past a hundred years and yet it seems it still falls on deaf ears.

Also, I’d say Newtonian Mechanics is wrong. It gives the right answer to a certain number of decimal places but if you go far enough (10th decimal, 100th decimal), it gives an answer that disagrees with Relativity and with reality. — Art48

Depends on what you mean by Newtonian mechanics as well as whether you separate philosophical interpretation, mathematical modeling, and applied technological predictive modeling.

Newtonian mechanics cannot be proven wrong as only a specific Newtonian model is wrong and not Newtonian modeling if Newtonianism is understood in the widest or unlimited sense that many see it as. How do you test F=ma? You can only know the value given to the forces other things have on you by use of either Newtonian modeling making it a circular 'proof' or by use of a Non-Newtonian model which presumes its own destruction by assumption.

A model can be curve fit incorrectly but a curve fitting practice can only be preferred or avoided. Not deemed 'wrong' or 'true'.

Newtonian mechanics didn't die by virtue of disproof. The old guard died off and the new crowd thought the previous thinking was too 'antiquated' while they performed the same modeling techniques under different labels.

An interesting, well-made video. You've covered many of the bases that need to be covered. I do have one disagreement. Materialism is metaphysics, a philosophical perspective on reality, a way of thinking about things. As I, and R.G. Collingwood, think, metaphysical positions are not true or false, right or wrong. This is a drum I've pounded here on the forum many times. As you note, materialism can be very useful as a way of looking at the world. I've read that most physicists are materialist, which makes sense. But it's not the only useful metaphysical approach, e.g. I've read that most mathematicians are idealists. Ontology is not an all or nothing thing. We can use different approaches in different situations and at different times, depending on which is more useful in each set of conditions. — T Clark

So is it purely linguistic simplicity for a particular role/purpose?

I admit it can get rather tiring making explicit what senses and brain states lead to such an' such a mathematical/abstract realization so the majority of such thinkers use certain vernacular as wide/generalized shorthand. Course, then all that philosophical seriousness about the choice between these shorthand languages is beaten into meaninglessness, pointlessness, or pragmatism.

It doesn’t follow, for me. — NOS4A2

It's easier when you don't see them as people but as mere politicians.

He has become a folk devil. As a result, they have become the petty despots they claimed to have feared. — NOS4A2

They've always been that way.

Every time they mention democracy, the rule of law, or some other bromide, we are only reminded of how quick they are to violate them. — NOS4A2

Exactly it's amazing how much the entire U.S. government and all it's affiliations don't tire of this paradoxical rhetoric.

And Trump never committed any. They literally have to conjure them out of thin air in order to maintain a delusion. — NOS4A2

Was he admitted into a greater political position within the U.S.? Then he had to do something to get there the same as all the others.

Who did he mislead? What laws did he break/skirt around? What economic favors did he sign off on against the better judgements of its citizens? Etc. . .

If you haven't found what they have committed wrong then you aren't thinking/looking hard enough.

That's so interesting. Thank you for sharing your insights about time. According to physicists, time is not on its own, it exists as spacetime. — Truth Seeker

Physicists say lots of things that they come to later regret upon a cursory examination of their language. Perhaps they should keep their mouths shut rather than have us be forced to listen to their mad ramblings from documentary to documentary on the subject matter.

I will simply suggest that illusion arises as a possibility from the existence of vision, but that does not make blindness preferable. — unenlightened

Except, if blindness yielded vast catechisms of iron-clad, faithful, resolve and beautiful imagery in our minds over the dullness of what lay before us if we opened ours.

Likewise one can deceive oneself if and only if one can also possibly be honest with oneself. To be open to both possibilities is to already be a philosopher. — unenlightened

To search for what cannot be settled and always demand skeptical humility as if to always rationally castrate oneself for 'seeing'.

Further, the only personal honesty I can 'see' doesn't yield great poetic castles filled with metaphorical ruminations that paint one's eyes in their metaphysical beauty nor do I bear witness to objective natures I didn't already grasp intuitively.

Rather, I see charlatans of all philosophers including myself. People who steal from others to say the same things and despite their claims to fame they seem to know not more than any layman as to what nature lies before them. Mathematicians who know not more than the black board and physicists who can't think beyond the instrumental. Those philosophers, however, who claim to see beyond express their assertions in metaphorically meaningless expressions only for other fellow thinkers to restate them in the most mundane honest language possible showcasing that they revealed nothing. Over and over again. It grows tiresome when you expect the next author you read to make the same mistakes as the previous or some new ones.

Not mistakes of academic rigor, philosophical fallacies, or bad argumentative strategies. No, just the re-hashing of the same plot in more esoteric abstract manners or, even worse, in a low budget sense.

Philosophy raises the strictly pragmatic to that of aesthetic reflection... Even the philosophy of Pragmatism itself is an aesthetic view of things. It is to not walk in the world from one task to another, but to look at the whole, and see it upon reflection, whether that be metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and values. These are things that take a secondary-reflection and not meant necessarily as to obtain some practical end. In this way, philosophy acts as therapy from the mundanity of everydayness, the feeling of being instrumental, and of only survival, and filling up one's free time with proscribed activities of society. — schopenhauer1

If that is the case then I have instilled a new hatred for 'philosophers' of various sorts as they mislead each other by claiming their beyond aesthetics but do it regardless. Masking their claims in authoritative language and absolutist terms to give their ego greater credence.

It is when one can be critical of one's own dearly held philosophies, that one can be open to the synthesis of one's own efforts with others, participating in a sort of dialectic, that will form a novel understanding based on the other, previous ones, even if just small tweaks. — schopenhauer1

That requires a certain breadth of care with the material of all others we've taken from which I may not possess for years. Its best that I stay silent until that time but I will have rather egregious slip ups out of personal weakness.

None of them are evidence based as you've been mislead by the preferences of others who have strapped such interpretations to useful epicycles.

The language and metaphor that we use to talk about the concept(s) of time is multifaceted coming from all parts of one's personal experiences incorporating our most deeply held phenomenological biases. Visual experiences motivate the idea of thinking of time as similar to a film strip in that there is an already existent future waiting to be projected while the past has long since been done away with (spot-light view of time). That or we think of time as similar in nature to a substance that has a beginning and end to itself without any change except the illusory irrelevant scanning of our eyes across the length of such a block (the block view of time). Then our own experiences involving cultural biases seem to motivate other philosophies of time such as the growing block from talk of the past as already having happened (it being 'behind' us) while leaving the future unwritten.

I'm fearful that this implies that the choice of one's language is then not a matter of ontology but pragmatic, aesthetic, choice depending on your intentions as to what you desire to do with it. Block theories of time are favored by those of mathematical bents because they allow us to freeze the world into determinate, precise, states to record down mathematical relations among the curves within it. While esoteric philosophies emphasizing the irreducibility of the language of change or who talk about 'rivers of time' rather than film strips will be favored among those closest to Human experience.

To be clearer, by “mechanistic” I so far understand a model, system, process, thing, etc. that incorporates a classical billiard-ball-like understanding of causation and, thereby, entails the classical Newtonian understandings of space and time required for such causation’s mechanical occurrence. Do you have something else in mind in your use of the term? — javra

Something more inline with what Milic calls the corpuscular-kinetic view of nature which arises almost entirely in certain respects from our imaginative capacities for visualization. Something tinged by spatialized analogies.

This includes both the block spacetime usually attributed to Minkowski, the absolute space of Newton, or the relational instantaneous spaces of Leibniz/Huygens/etc. These are all analogies infected by Classical visualization biases and the metaphorical analogies they yield.

@javra You can only go so far with the, ". . . but the experiments showcase its not rational to assume. . ."

As given enough time someone could construct a model from Classical or other such biases to make it consistent with both the math and experimental results.

You either have to meet them on a metaphysical/philosophical level or just commit in heart as well as to the spirit of the dictum:

Shut up and calculate!

For example, you could browse that link to viXra.org . It may be uncommon but corpuscular modeling is not dead among the non-mainstream nor is its mathematical maturity lacking.

@Wayfarer @javra So I've now taken some time aside after finishing Metaphors We Live By from George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics by Milic Capek, and an article titled Naturalism, Quietism, and the Threat to Philosophy by Thomas J. Spiegel & Schwabe Verlag. I've also consulted some articles from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and also some articles from the pseudoscientific paper posting hotspot called viXra.org. If that looks familiar, yes, its just the rather more heavily relaxed and non-mainstream equivalent of arXiv.org. I've decided to jump on giving a summary of what I've learned so as to hopefully generate novel discussion or questioning. Though, I'm doubtful I will do all this exquisite work any profound justice. This will be long and for that I apologize.

Something that underlies all these articles from the non-Mainstream to these dissident philosophical perspectives is a clear feeling of disenfranchisement from the establishment. There is something that is lacking among these 'ivory towers' which misses the core point of why one philosophizes to begin with, how one constructs scientific explanations, what it means to be scientific, or what deserves to be called a 'fact'. The dramatic displays of scientific rigor and success in documentaries or interviews is seen as increasingly suspect. Something to be ripped a part from analyzing the ambiguities of the language used and show how their own layman speech betrays them intellectually speaking. Each of the works listed explicitly above attempt to synthesize a solution, as is always done, to the perennial conflict of old.

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In The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics this message is front and center throughout the entirety of the work as Milic emphasizes the non-visual nature of how one can come to understand nature without the same perennial errors of those who came before. Such errors revolving around identity, the spatialized language with regards to time, the supremacy of the corpuscular-kinetic modeling of phenomena, the reign of determinism, certain properties of space, and an inherent splitting of nature into primary/secondary qualities.

A key point being the 'subconscious' element of Classical thinking which pervades all of modern physics despite their claims to the contrary. Even in antiquity, the attempts to circumvent perennial issues were rather devoid of rational teeth because the visual thinking they used had them imported in to begin with. An example of this is in the responses to the Eleatic problem of change and Zeno's arrow paradox. I.E. how can something change/move if its only ever composed stage wise of unchanging/un-moving instants? The mathematicians/theoretical physicist solution to this, in line with the Achilles tortoise paradox, ignores the perennial issue at its heart for a purely computational solution in terms of real analysis or limits. However, the usual solution to this from esoteric philosophies of old usually meant abandoning 'instants of time' for 'atomic intervals of time'. This, however, didn't deal directly with removing instants from our thinking as an 'interval' begs the question of a beginning and an end. Those edges being then instants in their own right even if only realized as limits. Further, this doesn't seem to have solved the perennial problem of change as we've rather substituted instantaneous moments for extended unchanging moments thereby still committing us to some peculiar view of nature in which change is. . . illusory or some purely mental phenomenon.

This is because the analogies that one visually conceives of when thinking of time itself, or space/causality/matter/motion, are fundamentally static in nature. Such as a block conception of time that views it pictorially as a collection of instantaneous NOW slices all stacked on top of each other similar to projector slides. That or put into analogy with a film strip whereby the change we perceive is, by the analogy itself, tricking us into thinking it's illusory as the real world doesn't yield true qualitative change but is unchanging fundamentally. I.E. its our consciousness that snakes up our worldline but not do to any 'internal' change of the worldline itself.

The Aristotelian notion of 'gunk' or matter that is not atomic but infinitely divisible is not deemed utterly irrational but rather stripped of much rationale to begin with as the change in size, weight, mass, momentum, energy, heat, or any other qualitative change is found in the unchanged. Heat is not some irreducible qualitative element of nature but a side-effect of the re-distribution/collisional interaction of the unchanging atomic constituents of reality. Any change in volume is by virtue of its 'parts' the result of them being moved farther apart or squished together and not some inherent qualitative change of the property of volume it possesses.

This idea of getting to the unchanged or fundamental then leads to a similar abstracted version of this which is the idea of looking for fundamental particles in nature. Even when Aether's were proposed by their originators to be 'fluidic' and a return to Aristotle's qualities in a sense they were then contradicted by those same physicists claiming this Aether actually had atomic parts. The only difference between this new Aether and the atomism before being the mere sheer number of atoms postulated. This thinking sinking deep into seeing phenomenon such as the Lorentzian contracted of electrons as not indicating qualitative change of fundamental elements but rather that our models indicate that the electron is itself not fundamental. There must be some more fundamental truly unchanging parts which explain how this electron gained or lost its volume! As the admittance of qualitative change in things would seem as if we've postulated the acceptance of 'something from nothing'. Whatever it is that atoms possess and what they are is unable to be changed including their shape or internal properties. In this sense, even if we attempted to undo the Classical biases of before by adopting a 'fluidic' Aether we'd still have to deal with the skepticism of others subconsciously that we have rejected the dictum ex nihilo, nihil fit.

Space is without boundary and fundamentally three-dimensional in nature. It being most importantly homogeneous, isotropic, casually inert, continuous, and Euclidean. There are esoteric philosophies which grabble with the Aristotelian idea of there being no space outside his spheres by using this pictorial imagery of throwing a spear or extending ones' arms beyond this outer most sphere. You can always imagine a more zoomed out view of an object of it sitting in a further, vaster, void and anything moving away from this thing still being 'in space'. The notion of a boundary of space, a hole, or a non-Euclidean nature being virtually ruled out fundamentally by such visual biases.

Further, space is itself not able to be influenced by physical things nor influence them as its core role is some vague logical differentiation of qualitatively similar atoms. It can be zoomed out as far as one pleases or zoomed in and similar to nesting dolls we can find universes within universes that themselves look eerily similar but just smaller. Ergo, the popular Rutherford analogy of an atom in complete similarity to our solar system. This is also dubbed the relativity of magnitude rather than mere continuity. Finally, space may serve the role of differentiating qualitatively similar atoms but its only matter itself that serves to distinguish a part of space from another and not space itself. Only the relative variation of atoms by separation and their motions serving to distinguish one place from another.

Another note is given about how this Classical line of thinking doesn't allow for one to leave the dichotomy of fatalistic determinism or random indeterminism. I.E. when one thinks of different frames of a universal 'movie' its either fully determined how it will all play out before you hit play or you could put in one frame after another with each being fundamentally disjoint/disconnected. The only reason then that this momentary blinking present has any sense of continuity or coherency being some great miracle of nature.

How does one circumvent this all? What interpretation should one then give special/general relativity which isn't one characteristic of a 'block' spacetime? What the true interpretation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle?

Well, its to subvert everything brought about in the entire corpuscular-kinetic picture of the world including the usage of pictorial language. While the Classical picture separated out space from matter the lesson to be learned from General Relativity is one in which the two are rather actually conjoined. This means it becomes rather vague and uncertain fundamentally where space ends or matter begins. It also means to regard space as not homogeneous in the sense that its non-Euclidean of a certain sort. To regard it as discontinuous on some fundamental level similar to theories of quantum gravity which atomize space BUT without the problematic visual biases here so perhaps particles could in some sense be 'gaps' in space. Given matter is seen as another side of the coin of spacetime then this means it's not casually inert anymore but rather actively plays its own role.

The biggest change being to institute, via inspiring work from Bergson or Whitehead, a fundamental notion of change/time that is in no way reducible to the unchanging. Its an acknowledgement of the irrationality of such a pursuit and an admittance of what needs to be done. Here is where a clarification is in order as to how one should interpret Special Relativity and its relativity of simultaneity. Contrary to wide-spread belief there is actually nothing really shocking about what SR has to bring to the table as what becomes relativized in the theory. These being temporal measurements we ascribe intervals of time and casually un-related events. Events which are casually related cannot be made to happen in a different causal order by frame changes. They are in fact topologically invariant and so while it might be relative how long we ascribe metrical units. . . the 'flow of time' is in fact not so relative. The 'movement' from the 'future' to the 'past' is left untouched.

Our notion of an instantaneous NOW is left in shambles without instantaneous actions at a distance and with that our notion of NOW is inexorably intertwined with HERE. I.E. there is now only the HERE-NOW and the THERE-THEN where the notion of THERE-NOW is left in an undetermined or vague sense. Asking such a question as what its like THERE-NOW being as nonsense as saying we are interacting with them right here when in fact we are not.



Despite the claims to the contrary that one either accept a spatialized block interpretation of SR or some highly solipsistic presentist strawman we should admit to the best of both worlds. That the future is left indeterminate or in Aristotle's words filled with potentiality which awaits actualization in the present to then be shrugged off into the determinate past. A concept of time that is 'thick' and begets true 'novelty' in nature as the indeterminate future filled with potentialities talks to the present as the present does to the past in a strongly casual manner but one which allows for true variation in the world. One which cements the irreducibility of the arrow of time and scoffs at the idea of eternal recurrence.

A cohesive and beautiful orchestra of distinct voices which form a coherent whole yet remain distinct. Notes which lose their reality if you analyze them in too short an interval of time and whose reality isn't really so unless you hear their full beat. This usage of musical metaphor being what Milic and those he credits with process philosophizing use rather than pictorial or spatialized ones in getting at these esoteric notions of reality.

There is another characteristic of the approach here which is to regard quantitative ascriptions as something required by our need to manipulate nature but ill-equipped to deal with nature on its own terms. We yearn for boundaries, clear separations, static states, patterns, continuity, etc. However, it seems that nature begets both this quantitative view and the visual analogies we use which force such concepts on us to begin with. Our quantitative manipulations may be useful but their universality is itself the illusion.

What language do we use then? How can we un-visualize our language for the purposes of physics which doesn't fall into mere mathematical symbolism?

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It's not that quantification is either simply abstract or entertaining, but that it's exact. Insofar as you can quantify, you can predict and control. One of the prime factors in the success of science is the increasing scope and accuracy of measurement. In Plato there is recognition of the exact nature of arithmetical proofs, which are contrasted with value judgements about the sensory domain, hence dianoia, arithmetical reasoning, being judged higher that sense experience; when you know an arithmetic proof, you know it with perfect clarity and without reference to anything else. The Galileo quote you refer to was 'nature is written in mathematical language, and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometric figures, without which it is impossible to humanly understand a word; without these, one is wandering in a dark labyrinth.' Hence the fundamental significance of quantitative data in science, and the division I mentioned in the earlier post between primary (measurable) and secondary (subjective) attributes. — Wayfarer

I would feel then that in line with Milic the only direction to go would be to one of a highly metaphorical or esoteric sense of philosophizing which also acknowledges the fallibility of such an approach or its limitations. That way we, as Milic feared, neither fall into some esoteric animisim of old or be accused of seeing math in nature (panmatheism)

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Are you equating these models to what science in essence is? If you are, you then seem to disagree with my appraisals of what empirical science consists of. No biggie, but I am curious. — javra

More playing devils advocate here. Course, its not too far from the Stanford Encyclopedia article's on science to think that true scientific explanation is to be found in visual analogical modeling. Especially given most of scientific theorizing is merely mathematical modeling, visual analogical modeling, and metaphorical prose. Its just a question of intuitive primacy as to which of these aspects should be emphasized more and what we think an explanation amounts to philosophically speaking.

Math for example makes for a rather good description of nature. . . but an explanation?

When I stated that the data remains, I was addressing the verifiable results which are for example obtained from the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment—which pose serious problems either for classical notions of causation, for classical notions of physical identity, or else for both. And I so far understand both these classical notions to be requisite for any mechanistic account, even more so for any "highly mechanistic" account of the world in scientific philosophy. — javra

So did GR. . . and Quantum mechanics. . . or any physics which has come before. Experiments do not decide interpretations in any determinate sense but rather can remain stubborn biases without proof or dis-proof or in lieu of apparent dis-proof. Take the idea of talk about fundamental particles or constituents of reality which is a stubborn assumption of a Classical mentality. No amount of scientific argument or experimentation could settle the rationality of such a doctrine as either the particle is split showcasing its not fundamental, its postulated it is fundamental if it meets certain requirements, or if those requirements aren't met then its assumed to be not fundamental. ITS NOT TESTABLE!

Again, taking the example of the Lorentzian contraction of an electron. This doesn't have to imply a disproof of the corpuscular model but rather a proof of its non-fundamentality model-wise.

You don't falsify the corpuscular-kinetic biases of old and also don't falsify the conception of energy conservation. You don't falsify Classical mechanics or prove an indeterminate reality from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Its only on higher order philosophical intuitions that this is done.

The replicable data obtained from this experiment, then, will yet need to be accurately accounted for regardless of the implemented models, mathematical or otherwise; regardless of the philosophical explanations which inevitably make use of metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of space, time, and causality; and so forth. As to the mathematics involved, it is directly related to the data—such that were the mathematical system implemented to be contradicted by empirical test, it would hold no scientific value. Here, for example, thinking of the classic tests which were accordant to Einstein's theory of general relativity; were these test to have not so been, the mathematical system/theory would not have held water. (Related to this, because string-theory is currently not falsifiable via tests, this mathematical system is argued by some to be non-scientific—even if other speculate that M-theory can be further developed into a unified theory of physics.) At any rate, while explanations and models for the acquired data can change, the data nevertheless remains. — javra

Exactly, the epicycles of the day and the things they model remain unchanged as they are correct by coincidence but if shown wrong then the math is MODIFIED to account for this. You may claim its not done so in the sense of curve fitting but its fitting nonetheless and this may be curve fitting which takes into account more than the data itself. Its still just theory fitting.

Math is ambivalent to interpretation and can beget ANY interpretation.

For example, does General relativity make gravity not a force? According to Einstein's field equations it does not but according to a mathematically equivalent version which predict all the same things, teleparallel gravity, its more akin to a force or a change of torsion rather than curvature. This is similar to how Newtonian gravitation can be geometrized into what is called Newton-Cartan gravity which removes the force from gravity to make it a part of the curvature of space mathematically speaking.