The question I then have is, if one expresses moral disapproval but with a heavily diluted emotional reaction/connection to a perceived injustice are they in fact diluting their moral sensibilities/judgement as well? — substantivalism

I kind of see the emotional part of it as providing an impetus to act and giving us a bearing kind of like a compass; we know there are many ways of acting, and that some are more correct than others, but without a sense of emotional growth or stimulation we are largely rudderless because it is the emotions that give the narratives that guide us salience in a human sense. So yes, I do think this process of becoming jaded often dilutes moral judgments/sensibilities.

Further, just as some go against their internal desires/intentions to fulfill new moral principles should one forcefully make oneself feel a certain way because they see it as more permissible a reaction? Should this be seen as a moral action in its own way? — substantivalism

I would say that sometimes it is a good thing to expose oneself to the realities of others to remind oneself just how awful or good things can be, but I don't think that an entity needs their emotions to be in flux all of the time to be truly moral. Not that you are saying that last part, but I have to qualify what I'm saying. Whether or not there is an emotional, moral ought compelling us to do such a thing is questionable, but I think an argument could be made.

I kind of see the emotional part of it as providing an impetus to act and giving us a bearing kind of like a compass; we know there are many ways of acting, and that some are more correct than others, but without a sense of emotional growth or stimulation we are largely rudderless because it is the emotions that give the narratives that guide us salience in a human sense. So yes, I do think this process of becoming jaded often dilutes moral judgments/sensibilities. — ToothyMaw

If it provides both actionable will and direction then I'd presume it forms a core component of the way in which one views the moral strength/value of themselves.

Would you also agree that it forms a reflective measure of moral judgement of oneself in a holistic manner?

I.E. it's not just the case that we view moral injustices as rationally incongruent with how we believe we should act but that its also not uncommon to accompany this with a reflective emotional opinion. One of personal disgust or self-hatred while in cases of correct moral action one could possess happiness in having been coincident with oneself in action as well as belief as they fulfill the principles they hold dear.

So not only does 'jaded-ness' dilute moral judgements/sensibilities as you put it but it also removes critical self-parental reflection on whether one is as moral as they believe they are. To dull this mirror is to open oneself up to inconsistency and possess an ignorant moral god-complex.

I would say that sometimes it is a good thing to expose oneself to the realities of others to remind oneself just how awful or good things can be, but I don't think that an entity needs their emotions to be in flux all of the time to be truly moral. Not that you are saying that last part, but I have to qualify what I'm saying. Whether or not there is an emotional, moral ought compelling us to do such a thing is questionable, but I think an argument could be made. — ToothyMaw

Is mere exposure enough?

I'm not one to advocate for the more extreme approaches many poor souls have taken but there is a morbid discussion to have about internally rearing themselves into the empathetic/sympathetic person they desire to be. Sometimes coupled with emotional patterns of their own creation.

An example of such extremes are those who self-flagellate. Course, this is usually in the context of rather religious kinds but I can imagine there are others who indulge in such self-harming principles independent of religion in the desire to show to themselves above all that something carries such deep emotional weight.

Ten cent words, apathetic shrugs, actions which show no clear result, or adherence to transcendent moral principles might not be enough to say to oneself that 'I'm moral'. Sacrificing momentary physical comfort or showing an internal sense of self-shame may seem to some to fulfill this. Its a clear, objective, action that one can take that showcases something beyond mere adherence to moral principles in cases where the fulfillment of such moral desires would seem to be unreachable.

Would you also agree that it forms a reflective measure of moral judgement of oneself in a holistic manner? — substantivalism

Yes. And I also agree with:

it's not just the case that we view moral injustices as rationally incongruent with how we believe we should act but that its also not uncommon to accompany this with a reflective emotional opinion. One of personal disgust or self-hatred while in cases of correct moral action one could possess happiness in having been coincident with oneself in action as well as belief as they fulfill the principles they hold dear.

So not only does 'jaded-ness' dilute moral judgements/sensibilities as you put it but it also removes critical self-parental reflection on whether one is as moral as they believe they are. To dull this mirror is to open oneself up to inconsistency and possess an ignorant moral god-complex. — substantivalism

I find myself imagining an android programmed to adhere to a set of morals completely and totally without exception. It should carry out its limited programming as well as it can once implemented. The conclusion from our discussion is that we don’t really want this unless the android is capable of rigorous self-reflection. This self-reflection might even be able to be programmed, but can empathy or compassion (the strongest markers of morality) really be extracted from the human condition? Guilt? Self-loathing in the more extreme conditions? If not, this self-reflection is a pale imitation of the real thing. It is no surprise that many “relatable” villains in the media are extremely dispassionate agents that possess the moral god-complex you mention - it is an easily recognizable distortion of human psychology.

So yes, I agree, the emotions associated with certain judgments, actions, and knowledge and how they relate to our moral polarities, are essential aspects of an effective moral agent. To try to separate the emotions and feelings from our moral judgements and the necessary self-reflection is no different to me than trying to supplant humans with ethically effective androids - an undesirable and impossible task.

Is mere exposure enough? — substantivalism

Perhaps not.

Ten cent words, apathetic shrugs, actions which show no clear result, or adherence to transcendent moral principles might not be enough to say to oneself that 'I'm moral'. Sacrificing momentary physical comfort or showing an internal sense of self-shame may seem to some to fulfill this. Its a clear, objective, action that one can take that showcases something beyond mere adherence to moral principles in cases where the fulfillment of such moral desires would seem to be unreachable. — substantivalism

The consequentialist in me says it doesn't matter very much how one feels, but rather one's actions and judgements are most important. But I think that in the absence of being able to do something about a morally bad situation, inducing negative emotions over it could maybe be seen as moral - and also more than a little unhealthy. If one really needs it to keep oneself oriented the right way, I can still only advise it if one is sure one can handle it.

The reaction of me or anyone else to such injustices generally would be one of moral disapproval that would take the emotional form of anguish, sadness, depression, discontentment, disgust, rage, etc. — substantivalism

What value does moral disapproval have if you aren't going to act? Answer - none. It doesn't mean anything. As @ToothyMaw notes, it's emotional reactions that lead us to action. Not so much the ones you mention but empathy, compassion, kindness, a sense of responsibility. Moral outrage is an easy way to act as if you've done something without actually having to do anything.

Moral outrage is an easy way to act as if you've done something without actually having to do anything. — T Clark

I think I agree.

But what about someone who is naturally close to being incapable of sympathy, compassion, kindness, etc.? Would it be wrong for them to induce in themselves the kinds of emotions - negative and positive - associated with the activation of these traits to try and foster them? If that would even work, that is.

The argument that moral outrage decoupled from action - which could take the form of self-reflection - can be moral only really floats for me if one grants that such a thing is not wrong. So, it seems that that part of the OP's argument kind of rests on this hint:

I'm not one to advocate for the more extreme approaches many poor souls have taken but there is a morbid discussion to have about internally rearing themselves into the empathetic/sympathetic person they desire to be. Sometimes coupled with emotional patterns of their own creation. — substantivalism

That is, if I'm interpreting everything correctly.

But it is worth noting that the OP is also saying that moral outrage or associated mental events are meaningful insofar as they provide a motive to self-reflect. But I don't think those self-reflections matter too much if they don't themselves entail actions, and I'm pretty certain the OP would agree with that too.

But what about someone who is naturally close to being incapable of sympathy, compassion, kindness, etc.? Would it be wrong for them to induce in themselves the kinds of emotions - negative and positive - associated with the activation of these traits to try and foster them? If that would even work, that is. — ToothyMaw

Not wrong but I’m not sure it’s possible.

Not wrong but I’m not sure it’s possible. — T Clark

You are right, it looks like psychopaths at least have different brains and the only effective treatment is positive reinforcement with intrinsically rewarding activities or sources like video games, candy, etc. So it seems that that part of the OP's argument, as I understand it, kind of fails.