The question I then have is, if one expresses moral disapproval but with a heavily diluted emotional reaction/connection to a perceived injustice are they in fact diluting their moral sensibilities/judgement as well? — substantivalism

I kind of see the emotional part of it as providing an impetus to act and giving us a bearing kind of like a compass; we know there are many ways of acting, and that some are more correct than others, but without a sense of emotional growth or stimulation we are largely rudderless because it is the emotions that give the narratives that guide us salience in a human sense. So yes, I do think this process of becoming jaded often dilutes moral judgments/sensibilities.

Further, just as some go against their internal desires/intentions to fulfill new moral principles should one forcefully make oneself feel a certain way because they see it as more permissible a reaction? Should this be seen as a moral action in its own way? — substantivalism

I would say that sometimes it is a good thing to expose oneself to the realities of others to remind oneself just how awful or good things can be, but I don't think that an entity needs their emotions to be in flux all of the time to be truly moral. Not that you are saying that last part, but I have to qualify what I'm saying. Whether or not there is an emotional, moral ought compelling us to do such a thing is questionable, but I think an argument could be made.

I kind of see the emotional part of it as providing an impetus to act and giving us a bearing kind of like a compass; we know there are many ways of acting, and that some are more correct than others, but without a sense of emotional growth or stimulation we are largely rudderless because it is the emotions that give the narratives that guide us salience in a human sense. So yes, I do think this process of becoming jaded often dilutes moral judgments/sensibilities. — ToothyMaw

If it provides both actionable will and direction then I'd presume it forms a core component of the way in which one views the moral strength/value of themselves.

Would you also agree that it forms a reflective measure of moral judgement of oneself in a holistic manner?

I.E. it's not just the case that we view moral injustices as rationally incongruent with how we believe we should act but that its also not uncommon to accompany this with a reflective emotional opinion. One of personal disgust or self-hatred while in cases of correct moral action one could possess happiness in having been coincident with oneself in action as well as belief as they fulfill the principles they hold dear.

So not only does 'jaded-ness' dilute moral judgements/sensibilities as you put it but it also removes critical self-parental reflection on whether one is as moral as they believe they are. To dull this mirror is to open oneself up to inconsistency and possess an ignorant moral god-complex.

I would say that sometimes it is a good thing to expose oneself to the realities of others to remind oneself just how awful or good things can be, but I don't think that an entity needs their emotions to be in flux all of the time to be truly moral. Not that you are saying that last part, but I have to qualify what I'm saying. Whether or not there is an emotional, moral ought compelling us to do such a thing is questionable, but I think an argument could be made. — ToothyMaw

Is mere exposure enough?

I'm not one to advocate for the more extreme approaches many poor souls have taken but there is a morbid discussion to have about internally rearing themselves into the empathetic/sympathetic person they desire to be. Sometimes coupled with emotional patterns of their own creation.

An example of such extremes are those who self-flagellate. Course, this is usually in the context of rather religious kinds but I can imagine there are others who indulge in such self-harming principles independent of religion in the desire to show to themselves above all that something carries such deep emotional weight.

Ten cent words, apathetic shrugs, actions which show no clear result, or adherence to transcendent moral principles might not be enough to say to oneself that 'I'm moral'. Sacrificing momentary physical comfort or showing an internal sense of self-shame may seem to some to fulfill this. Its a clear, objective, action that one can take that showcases something beyond mere adherence to moral principles in cases where the fulfillment of such moral desires would seem to be unreachable.

Would you also agree that it forms a reflective measure of moral judgement of oneself in a holistic manner? — substantivalism

Yes. And I also agree with:

it's not just the case that we view moral injustices as rationally incongruent with how we believe we should act but that its also not uncommon to accompany this with a reflective emotional opinion. One of personal disgust or self-hatred while in cases of correct moral action one could possess happiness in having been coincident with oneself in action as well as belief as they fulfill the principles they hold dear.

So not only does 'jaded-ness' dilute moral judgements/sensibilities as you put it but it also removes critical self-parental reflection on whether one is as moral as they believe they are. To dull this mirror is to open oneself up to inconsistency and possess an ignorant moral god-complex. — substantivalism

I find myself imagining an android programmed to adhere to a set of morals completely and totally without exception. It should carry out its limited programming as well as it can once implemented. The conclusion from our discussion is that we don’t really want this unless the android is capable of rigorous self-reflection. This self-reflection might even be able to be programmed, but can empathy or compassion (the strongest markers of morality) really be extracted from the human condition? Guilt? Self-loathing in the more extreme conditions? If not, this self-reflection is a pale imitation of the real thing. It is no surprise that many “relatable” villains in the media are extremely dispassionate agents that possess the moral god-complex you mention - it is an easily recognizable distortion of human psychology.

So yes, I agree, the emotions associated with certain judgments, actions, and knowledge and how they relate to our moral polarities, are essential aspects of an effective moral agent. To try to separate the emotions and feelings from our moral judgements and the necessary self-reflection is no different to me than trying to supplant humans with ethically effective androids - an undesirable and impossible task.

Is mere exposure enough? — substantivalism

Perhaps not.

Ten cent words, apathetic shrugs, actions which show no clear result, or adherence to transcendent moral principles might not be enough to say to oneself that 'I'm moral'. Sacrificing momentary physical comfort or showing an internal sense of self-shame may seem to some to fulfill this. Its a clear, objective, action that one can take that showcases something beyond mere adherence to moral principles in cases where the fulfillment of such moral desires would seem to be unreachable. — substantivalism

The consequentialist in me says it doesn't matter very much how one feels, but rather one's actions and judgements are most important. But I think that in the absence of being able to do something about a morally bad situation, inducing negative emotions over it could maybe be seen as moral - and also more than a little unhealthy. If one really needs it to keep oneself oriented the right way, I can still only advise it if one is sure one can handle it.

The reaction of me or anyone else to such injustices generally would be one of moral disapproval that would take the emotional form of anguish, sadness, depression, discontentment, disgust, rage, etc. — substantivalism

What value does moral disapproval have if you aren't going to act? Answer - none. It doesn't mean anything. As @ToothyMaw notes, it's emotional reactions that lead us to action. Not so much the ones you mention but empathy, compassion, kindness, a sense of responsibility. Moral outrage is an easy way to act as if you've done something without actually having to do anything.

Moral outrage is an easy way to act as if you've done something without actually having to do anything. — T Clark

I think I agree.

But what about someone who is naturally close to being incapable of sympathy, compassion, kindness, etc.? Would it be wrong for them to induce in themselves the kinds of emotions - negative and positive - associated with the activation of these traits to try and foster them? If that would even work, that is.

The argument that moral outrage decoupled from action - which could take the form of self-reflection - can be moral only really floats for me if one grants that such a thing is not wrong. So, it seems that that part of the OP's argument kind of rests on this hint:

I'm not one to advocate for the more extreme approaches many poor souls have taken but there is a morbid discussion to have about internally rearing themselves into the empathetic/sympathetic person they desire to be. Sometimes coupled with emotional patterns of their own creation. — substantivalism

That is, if I'm interpreting everything correctly.

But it is worth noting that the OP is also saying that moral outrage or associated mental events are meaningful insofar as they provide a motive to self-reflect. But I don't think those self-reflections matter too much if they don't themselves entail actions, and I'm pretty certain the OP would agree with that too.

But what about someone who is naturally close to being incapable of sympathy, compassion, kindness, etc.? Would it be wrong for them to induce in themselves the kinds of emotions - negative and positive - associated with the activation of these traits to try and foster them? If that would even work, that is. — ToothyMaw

Not wrong but I’m not sure it’s possible.

Not wrong but I’m not sure it’s possible. — T Clark

You are right, it looks like psychopaths at least have different brains and the only effective treatment is positive reinforcement with intrinsically rewarding activities or sources like video games, candy, etc. So it seems that that part of the OP's argument, as I understand it, kind of fails.

What value does moral disapproval have if you aren't going to act? Answer - none. It doesn't mean anything. As ToothyMaw notes, it's emotional reactions that lead us to action. Not so much the ones you mention but empathy, compassion, kindness, a sense of responsibility. Moral outrage is an easy way to act as if you've done something without actually having to do anything. — T Clark

So what worth are emotional reactions then in the absence of objective actions?

There is no requirement of mine to feel any strong reaction, or desire to, with regards to the newest social media hype regarding new proxy wars, popularized sexual assault cases, or the newest expose of hidden cultish phenomenon.

So does that relegate it to something of personal risque interest of mine to tease out once and a while out of boredom from various forms of highly fictionalized entertainment? Or succumb to it out of instinctual biological proclivities I have not entirely a full lid on?

But it is worth noting that the OP is also saying that moral outrage or associated mental events are meaningful insofar as they provide a motive to self-reflect. But I don't think those self-reflections matter too much if they don't themselves entail actions, and I'm pretty certain the OP would agree with that too. — ToothyMaw

It seem a bit vague what it means for them to 'entail' actions as I would presume that some part of the totality of our experiences under guards most actions either out of explicit acknowledgement or implicit thought free reactionary instincts. Even if those are sometimes so far removed temporally from when they finally make themselves actionably present.

Sort of a casual sorites argument here is what I feel I'm getting at if this is the direction we are going in.

Perhaps, a knowledge premise could be inserted here asserting current ignorance about any immediate application of a proposed method of self-reflection and still asking if in lieu of that unknown potential future applicability whether it would be worth it to indulge in it now.

It seem a bit vague what it means for them to 'entail' actions as I would presume that some part of the totality of our experiences under guards most actions either out of explicit acknowledgement or implicit thought free reactionary instincts. Even if those are sometimes so far removed temporally from when they finally make themselves actionably present. — substantivalism

That moral outrage or similar mental events exist in the presence of, and often cause, notable moral actions is not to say that all instances of moral outrage will ever result in action. Similarly, that the totality of our experiences informs our actions does not mean that every facet of our moral composition really has that much to do with our actions. For example: I am outraged by the genocide of the Palestinians. I also react in disgust and contempt towards the racist people I am pretty much forced to know. Pushing back on those racists does nothing for the Palestinians. In fact, I may never be able to do much of anything for the Palestinians. Is this outrage really all that morally important if I can't make a difference at all?

It seems a little deterministic to say that our moral sensibilities will always give way to action such that all, or a good many, of our personal moral convictions will be manifest.

Perhaps, a knowledge premise could be inserted here asserting current ignorance about any immediate application of a proposed method of self-reflection and still asking if in lieu of that unknown potential future applicability whether it would be worth it to indulge in it now. — substantivalism

Okay, it sounds like you are asking if we ought to choose a disconnected moral quandary and self-reflect about how we feel about it now based on the fact that it might be possible that the self-reflection could be productive in the future. Is that accurate?

If so, why wouldn't we just allow these things to arise naturally? Why subject yourself to that kind of thing if you don't even know a good reason for doing it (yet)?

I suppose one could make the case that doing this would lean towards guiding one's actions ethically in general, but that sounds like quite a burden to be forcing oneself to be reflecting that seriously on tons of things that one might not even be able to affect at the moment (or ever).

So what worth are emotional reactions then in the absence of objective actions? — substantivalism

In the world as I understand it, moral judgments are created by humans, so it makes sense to talk about their value. Emotions, on the other hand, are our body's, primarily biological, reactions to events. It does not really make sense to talk about their value. It's just what we do.

There is no requirement of mine to feel any strong reaction — substantivalism

Yes, this is true. I don't see why that is a concern.

Back when human emotions were invented, moral outrages occurred with an individual's community, thus there was evolutionary pressure to possess moral outrage since one could (should) translate such outrage into action within one's community. In the Modern era, the vast majority of examples of moral outrage are learned about through media and occur in distant locales where the individual has essentially no ability to directly influence this occurrence. Thus since moral outrage carries negative personal health implications, the prudent course of action is to make note of the moral outrage but resist the natural (archaic) impulse to react viscerally to the moral transgression, rather make note of it intellectually and bring that knowledge to bear in the infrequent circumstances where one can somehow influence the situation in question.

since moral outrage carries negative personal health implications, the prudent course of action is to make note of the moral outrage but resist the natural (archaic) impulse to react viscerally to the moral transgression, rather make note of it intellectually and bring that knowledge to bear in the infrequent circumstances where one can somehow influence the situation in question. — LuckyR

I think you are almost entirely right in this more traditional normative assessment. Regardless, I agree with the OP that it is still true that some amount of moral outrage, even experienced disconnected from events one can influence, be it because of temporal or other factors, can prompt self-reflection that might make one more moral or morally driven. This is kind of a gray area because you are right: it carries serious negative health implications. But it might make one a better moral agent to experience the emotions very strongly at least some of the time. I think that this is as close as the OP's argument can get to being grounded intuitively and rationally. That is, unless, or until, @substantivalism offers more insight.

So what worth are emotional reactions then in the absence of objective actions?
— substantivalism

In the world as I understand it, moral judgments are created by humans, so it makes sense to talk about their value. Emotions, on the other hand, are our body's, primarily biological, reactions to events. It does not really make sense to talk about their value. It's just what we do. — T Clark

I'm going to have to disagree with you here, T. It is precisely because we cannot extricate ourselves from our emotions that we need to view them as having some sort of worth or at least examine them in terms of what they do or do not impel us to do and attach value appropriately, which is what I think @substantivalism is saying we ought to do. Shouldn't we make ourselves aware of the ways in which our very engineering would push us to at least desire to act if we were made aware, or more aware of, injustices in the world? That kind of thing could change a life, or many lives, for the better. Wouldn't the kind of emotional stimulus that encourages such a thing be superior to crying over Hallmark movies?

Is their any role or place for the notion of a emotional ought of sorts to be coupled with the usual moral ought's? — substantivalism

I can't think there is any "ought" to emotions. They just are. They don't follow a design, but are instinctual reactions to what we experience around us. And it's true, emotional burnout is a real thing. It's possible to reach a point where to feel anymore is to do yourself in.

Or is apathetic moral judgement a supreme standard by which we should either stride for or see as the end state of proper rational deliberation on such actionably distant affairs? — substantivalism

This is all tied up with self-preservation. Feeling too much hampers survival.

I can't think there is any "ought" to emotions. They just are. They don't follow a design, but are instinctual reactions to what we experience around us. — Questioner

Yes, but these instinctual reactions reinforce or modify our rational moral views by encouraging self-reflection. That is the impasse we find ourselves at, essentially. We make ourselves more effective or grounded by intentionally stimulating our emotions, or you are like the android I mentioned earlier in the thread:

I find myself imagining an android programmed to adhere to a set of morals completely and totally without exception. It should carry out its limited programming as well as it can once implemented. The conclusion from our discussion is that we don’t really want this unless the android is capable of rigorous self-reflection. This self-reflection might even be able to be programmed, but can empathy or compassion (the strongest markers of morality) really be extracted from the human condition? Guilt? Self-loathing in the more extreme conditions? If not, this self-reflection is a pale imitation of the real thing. — ToothyMaw

So, if exposing yourself to emotionally stimulating things - especially as they relate to empathy and compassion - makes you more morally effective, an argument for an emotional ought could be made. That is, if one thinks morality is a fundamentally human endeavor.

Yes, but these instinctual reactions reinforce or modify our rational moral views by encouraging self-reflection. That is the impasse we find ourselves at, essentially. We make ourselves more effective or grounded by intentionally stimulating our emotions, or you are like the android I mentioned earlier in the thread: — ToothyMaw

Self-reflection can only lead to changes in ourselves. If our emotional burnout results from watching the suffering of others, over which we have no power, then to disengage is the self-preserving role.

So, if exposing yourself to emotionally stimulating things - especially as they relate to empathy and compassion - makes you more morally effective, an argument for an emotional ought could be made. That is, if one thinks morality is a fundamentally human endeavor. — ToothyMaw

But you are not calling for morality, you are calling for action.

Self-reflection can only lead to changes in ourselves. — Questioner

That is demonstrably false. Look at any effective activist that has ever existed.

If our emotional burnout results from watching the suffering of others, over which we have no power, then to disengage is the self-preserving role. — Questioner

I never said anything about self-preserving. I agree: to disengage at a certain point is indeed the safe thing to do, for sure.

So, if exposing yourself to emotionally stimulating things - especially as they relate to empathy and compassion - makes you more morally effective, an argument for an emotional ought could be made. That is, if one thinks morality is a fundamentally human endeavor.
— ToothyMaw

But you are not calling for morality, you are calling for action. — Questioner

When I say "emotional ought" I refer to the act of stimulating one's emotions in a healthy way to encourage self-reflection, which itself should entail some concrete actions. Nonetheless, self-reflection is an action anyways, so it is a non-issue.

edit: I see you are newer to the forum. Sorry if I'm being a little combative. It is my default on the forum from so many years of arguing with other combative people.

It is precisely because we cannot extricate ourselves from our emotions that we need to view them as having some sort of worth or at least examine them in terms of what they do or do not impel us to do — ToothyMaw

Emotions themselves are, as I wrote, our natural bodily and mental reactions to events and are, mostly, outside of our direct control. On the other hand, viewing and examining those emotions, which you propose, are human actions and judgments.

But it might make one a better moral agent to experience the emotions very strongly at least some of the time

I don't disagree. I used to advise trainees that while it is good to learn from one's own mistakes, it's much better to learn from other's mistakes since 1) you don't have to make them yourself and 2) there are many more opportunities for "learning" thst way.

It seems a little deterministic to say that our moral sensibilities will always give way to action such that all, or a good many, of our personal moral convictions will be manifest. — ToothyMaw

Ergo, it may be rather too strong to rely on knowledge claims regarding whether we will immediately act or most probably will to then dictate our decision to entertain a certain form of self-reflection in whatever manner we deem fit.

Okay, it sounds like you are asking if we ought to choose a disconnected moral quandary and self-reflect about how we feel about it now based on the fact that it might be possible that the self-reflection could be productive in the future. Is that accurate? — ToothyMaw

Yes, that is what I'm getting from what @T Clark has said which seems to imply some rational decision making to be had probably involving a weighing of certainties and probabilities with respect to future possible actions.

If so, why wouldn't we just allow these things to arise naturally? Why subject yourself to that kind of thing if you don't even know a good reason for doing it (yet)? — ToothyMaw

Why indulge in moral conundrums or fictional scenarios if they will remain as reality separated as they are?

Curiosity, self-education, searching for self-wisdom, etc?

I suppose one could make the case that doing this would lean towards guiding one's actions ethically in general, but that sounds like quite a burden to be forcing oneself to be reflecting that seriously on tons of things that one might not even be able to affect at the moment (or ever). — ToothyMaw

Some would desire to take on that burden while others could be more pragmatically minded and therefore piece-meal about what they choose. While others will see it in a more pessimistic light seeing it as altogether in all cases a pointless endeavor to consider possibilities and not actualities.

In the world as I understand it, moral judgments are created by humans, so it makes sense to talk about their value. Emotions, on the other hand, are our body's, primarily biological, reactions to events. It does not really make sense to talk about their value. It's just what we do. — T Clark

However, we do actually value ourselves and our self-worth based on the moral maturity or emotional connections one is able to make. Even in fictional scenarios or highly restricted removed parts of our great social environment.

Yes, this is true. I don't see why that is a concern. — T Clark

Well, some sociologists and psychologists seems to beat a dead horse regarding the modern age that has given rise to extensive desensitization. From video games, to modern entertainment, popular news channels, and the greatest atrocities being accessible from YouTube. That or a quick TOR venture deep enough to find a videos from active war zones or un-blurred beheadings. This emotional separation is what the @Questioner brings up.

Its natural to do so. . . should we attempt, however, to chart a course towards more sensitive responses or is such a modern and common apathetic response from such overwhelming emotional saturation actually not as worrisome as such headlines make it out to be? Is it in fact a desirable and more morally advantageous state?

I think you are almost entirely right in this more traditional normative assessment. Regardless, I agree with the OP that it is still true that some amount of moral outrage, even experienced disconnected from events one can influence, be it because of temporal or other factors, can prompt self-reflection that might make one more moral or morally driven. This is kind of a gray area because you are right: it carries serious negative health implications. But it might make one a better moral agent to experience the emotions very strongly at least some of the time. I think that this is as close as the OP's argument can get to being grounded intuitively and rationally. That is, unless, or until, substantivalism offers more insight. — ToothyMaw

When I say "emotional ought" I refer to the act of stimulating one's emotions in a healthy way to encourage self-reflection, which itself should entail some concrete actions. Nonetheless, self-reflection is an action anyways, so it is a non-issue. — ToothyMaw

That is another way of putting it. Is there any point to emotionally stimulating ourselves in forceful manners or are we always to 'go with the flow' and merely bear disconnected witness to the emotions we 'put out' by instinct.

Only reacting to ourselves when someone else does their social duty to point out a present issue as such with our behavior.

Emotions themselves are, as I wrote, our natural bodily and mental reactions to events and are, mostly, outside of our direct control. On the other hand, viewing and examining those emotions, which you propose, are human actions and judgments. — T Clark

Which is what the rest of this discussion should concern. The ontology or origin of emotional states is what I'd consider entirely irrelevant.

Self-reflection can only lead to changes in ourselves.
— Questioner

That is demonstrably false. Look at any effective activist that has ever existed. — ToothyMaw

That is because they did not stop with self-reflection. Self-reflection by itself is not action, and does not cause action. In his book, How People Change, psychoanalyst Allen Wheelis sums up the sequence of change as follows:

Suffering > insight > will > action > change

Those who self-reflect and see some need somewhere but do nothing about it stop at “insight.”

Action means making things happen.

Nonetheless, self-reflection is an action anyways, so it is a non-issue. — ToothyMaw

See above.

edit: I see you are newer to the forum. Sorry if I'm being a little combative. It is my default on the forum from so many years of arguing with other combative people. — ToothyMaw

Not at all! I welcome the invitation to continue the discussion.

It is precisely because we cannot extricate ourselves from our emotions that we need to view them as having some sort of worth or at least examine them in terms of what they do or do not impel us to do
— ToothyMaw

Emotions themselves are, as I wrote, our natural bodily and mental reactions to events and are, mostly, outside of our direct control. On the other hand, viewing and examining those emotions, which you propose, are human actions and judgments. — T Clark

How many things that guide your behavior do you think actually have intrinsic worth outside of, or regardless of, human views and judgments? Is it not true that attaching value to the emotions that guide us morally based on some examination gives those emotions worth, even if it isn't intrinsic?

That is because they did not stop with self-reflection. Self-reflection by itself is not action, and does not cause action. In his book, How People Change, psychoanalyst Allen Wheelis sums up the sequence of as follows:

Suffering > insight > will > action > change — Questioner

First off, I think that it is true that self-reflection can be an action in itself, which I argue for below. But we know, even based on this linear chain you provided, that self-reflection can result in changes that result in a will that result in an action that could cause some change. If I am right, and this chain is right, about this and that self-reflection is an action, we can safely say that there could be an emotional ought, as the composition of causes that qualify as actions changes.

Furthermore, that chain seems relevant to me only if by "suffering" he means being exposed to suffering of others. As such:

I think we are conflating literature on psychology with an examination of how people ought to act in a moral sense. Wheelis probably understands the way people actually change far better than me, but we are talking about a hypothetical that could, as far as I can tell, fit within what little of Wheelis' examination of psychology has been presented here. So, I can only agree that Wheelis is likely right, but it doesn't come close to ending the discussion.

I think that the relevant kind of insight isn't just magically generated in one's head when exposed to suffering, and I think Wheelis would agree. Think about it: does everyone who is exposed to the same suffering generate meaningful moral insight? No, and that kind of implies another step, a necessary personal quality, or even an action in there. Or, as I would argue, the act of an empathetic person reacting mentally with compassion to generate some sort of moral insight into themselves or the human condition, for example.

A person's moral reality is a psychological reality, sure, but it doesn't have to strictly abide by this model of how we change in a general sense; it doesn't have to be recursive, and, once again, I think could probably fit within this model of how people change if we truly wanted to force it.

edit: I see that Wheelis is dead. That sucks.

that self-reflection can result in changes that result in a will that result in an action that could cause some change. — ToothyMaw

It may, but often does not.

I think we have different definitions of what constitutes “action.” Action actually means doing something, not just thinking about it.

You have identified that not all exposure to suffering leads to insight. So, too, I would say, that not all insight leads to action. These are two wholly separate undertakings.

that self-reflection can result in changes that result in a will that result in an action that could cause some change. — ToothyMaw

So, what you have described here is a causal chain. And cause is not the same thing as effect.

does everyone who is exposed to the same suffering generate meaningful moral insight? No, and that kind of implies another step, a necessary personal quality, or even an action in there. — ToothyMaw

So, what you are looking at is this first two steps: Suffering > insight

And asking what could happen there? And what ought to happen?

The chain might continue in two different ways.

A negative insight will lead to negative action.

A positive insight will lead to positive action.