The spatiotemporal properties are properties of the part; so it does hold that we distinguish them based off of the parts even if they are identical notwithstanding their occupation of space or place in time. — Bob Ross

Depending on your conception regarding spacetime realism/anti-realism that would then make the argument dependent on spacetime realism or a form of platonic relationism so that these 'spatiotemporal' properties are 'things' that are ontologically real 'parts' of them. Not mere linguistic devices or fictions.

A part of something should be a 'real' thing. Not a mere conventional or mental artefact.

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist. — Bob Ross

I assert that its conceptually possible for there to be two distinct extended simples which both lack further proper parts and are numerically distinct being merely separated by the void.

This

. . . checks out in my head.

I feel like every new discovery in the field gets muddled by thousands of people who try to run away with it and draw conclusions that it's not saying. I'm pretty sure physics doesn't really have anything to say about realism, anti-realism, or idealism, but that hasn't stopped folks from trying. I just want to know what it means, because from the little I was able to parse it doesn't seem that disastrous — Darkneos

I agree with your suspicion here that it really isn't as astoundingly world changing as its made out to be and contains some connection in form to other similar discussions surrounding the base assumptions we make along with their implications on local causation.

It's making me think about the conventionality of simultaneity arguments that people had after Einstein's special theory of relativity. If you happened to detect a tachyon its implied that you are left with two choices either it 'came from the future' and perhaps is showcasing a case of retro-causality, time travel of sorts. That or you claim that whatever speed you've ascribed to the speed of causality, the speed of light, was merely incorrect and the speed of light is actually not our fastest conceivable influence. Retro-causality is a rather astounding physical re-interpretation of what the math implies while the other interpretation, including nonlocal action-at-a-distance, could retain all our commonsensical assumptions at the pain of leaving the core interaction we are concerned with undetectable by first principles.

Whenever we are met with an influence, interaction, or probabilistic correlation that may seem to go faster than the speed of light we either devolve into rather esoteric notions of 'action-at-a-distance' again or postulate that the fastest possible manner in which something can influence something else (the speed of local causation) isn't actually exhibited by any known signal. Photons are the fastest influence we have access to but there could be physical signals or interactions that violate this in undetectable manners.
So when they make their presence clear it appears non-locally and all of sudden because we base our operational definitions of simultaneity on the slower signal which we can observe.

The other horn is in being highly militant about the speed of light being coincident with the speed of causality and therefore having to interpret any apparent 'faster than light' correlations or casual influences as implying some weird form of hyper localism. This is where things would get rather peculiar with regards to the language one uses and I'm curious if it's at all possible to phrase it in intuitive terms that don't relegate it to obvious 'metaphysical nonsense'.

They haven't discussed it to death, in fact they can't settle on anything. You're just making noise because what you offer has no real value to science, not anymore anyway. — Darkneos

So are you saying that what I linked to has no value? Are you going to submit a paper or opinion piece on your blog about the wasted efforts of each of those authors?

Even before you've fully read anything by them?

I'm glad an espoused layman such as yourself can dictate whether their research or speculation mattered at all to the fields they are trying to actively be participants in and are actually a part of.

You don't need cited sources when it comes to philosophy, it's all just arguments. — Darkneos

However, the point of science is to build on critical thinking skills and the peer review process is built to be argumentative as well as critical for a reason. Not to 'avoid arguments' because its. . . what. . . inconvenient.

Again, engage with the science, not this philosophy of science noise where they can't agree on anything. — Darkneos

When I engage in science is it the case that there will be no reference to analogies or metaphorical speech regarding interpretations of any theory? Is there fully NO experimental underdetermination and if I wait long enough for the next experiment without inconsistency of debate will this always resolve to the correct interpretation?

Many of those 'nonsense philosophical discussions' were initiated in honesty with the intent to improve our scientific thinking from well known physicists. How about you forget the label philosophy and we will just start naming authors along with discussing their positions on the matter so you can't play your game of intellectual populism.

As you said in a previous reply to someone else. . .

It's pretty much done every day, you don't really need philosophy to do that. The fact it pans out and leads to discoveries that we can manipulate and act on sorta implies it doesn't matter what philosophy thinks about it. — Darkneos

If it doesn't matter what philosophy thinks on it then it also doesn't matter what interpretation you bring to the table or what words you put to the math. All we would need is a mathematical model and a collection of operational/instrumental practices that allow us to 'manipulate' the world or 'act on sorta' but with all that other interpretational fat shaved away.

Why? That being because the debate you are hypocritically indulging in ON A PHILOSOHPY FORUM doesn't matter to building a bridge that won't fall or semi-conductor based chips in our phones.

That is the practical, innovate, and experimental aspect of science. Not the interpretational or the purely theoretical. Would you abandon the latter because they don't suit you or provide any immediate or even future practicalities?

^--- That right there is the real choice. If you decide to do so then a lot of what physicists have done which they may not have considered philosophical could be thrown in the same bin.

Well that’s what they are. It’s not a matter of belief. That’s is until they interact with anything, at which point they settle. — Darkneos

According to what?

You have still left this a complete mystery as to how you interpret correctly mathematical models of any given phenomenon. I think the reason why you choose to remain silent on it and cite sources is because either you'd be shown as a dogmatist who can't think beyond his textbooks or your literally start talking about things that philosophers of science have discussed to death already. That or accidently have to bring in other such fields as linguistics and psychology into the fold because if philosophy is dead that doesn't actually mean all its problems go away as they find new homes in more palatably named alternative fields of study.

I have read some but to use the word analogy means you don’t understand what is going on and what they’re doing. — Darkneos

Explain to me why the word analogy doesn't fit? With a cited source?

You think the math is the pure data and it has to be translated to language and that’s just not what’s going on. — Darkneos

I've repeatedly made the distinction between the mathematical models one uses to quantify observations or make predictions which is CONSTRASTED with the actual observational statements made or observations performed.

There are theoretical and then there are generally therefore observational statements/terms. It's really simple. Read the above twice if you have to.

Again you keep trying to make philosophy valid where it isn’t. This is just noise. — Darkneos

. . . and your trying so hard to not have a discussion about things that confuse laymen all the time. I see tons of questions by such people all the time asking if the statements made by popular pop-cultural depictions of scientific facts or by actual scientists themselves are 'true' or 'mere language games/metaphor'.

I know you didn’t really these, you literally quoted the first paragraph. Not only do you not understand what science is doing but you link evidence to the contrary, nice work. — Darkneos

You stated that scientist did not do anything related to what I was talking about which implied they worked with nothing involving analogies or metaphors. I showed that this was wrong simply by the fact modern scientists construct and see worth in analogue modeling. It's a common ancient practice. It's literal basic modeling!

If you wanted a bit of a historical treatment and a deep dive into the prevalence of analogies in scientific work then I'd advocate grabbing yourself the book scientific models in philosophy of science by Bailer-Jones. Someone who has had an extensive interest in the philosophy of science but is also it seems has a masters in astrophysics. If you can't stand the more philosophical chapters at least read the sections showcasing paradigm examples from well known names such as Maxwell or Boltzmann. They both had brief but intriguing perspectives on the roles of modeling or analogy in the sciences.

I'd also recommend any historical treatment regarding physics concepts such as force, mass, space/time, simultaneity, or the interpretations of quantum mechanics (if you can find a cheap copy) by Max Jammer which are extensive historical treatments far beyond any text book presentation of the common physics notions you are now familiar with. (https://www.amazon.com/s?k=max+jammer&crid=2JUXI96VNZO85&sprefix=max+ja%2Caps%2C567&ref=nb_sb_noss_2)

The whole "measurement problem" seems like a hoax. If it only settles when we look we have no idea what it would be (or is) if we didn't — Gregory

Are you saying there is un-observational even in principle speculation to be had here? *gasp*

It seems a little deterministic to say that our moral sensibilities will always give way to action such that all, or a good many, of our personal moral convictions will be manifest. — ToothyMaw

Ergo, it may be rather too strong to rely on knowledge claims regarding whether we will immediately act or most probably will to then dictate our decision to entertain a certain form of self-reflection in whatever manner we deem fit.

Okay, it sounds like you are asking if we ought to choose a disconnected moral quandary and self-reflect about how we feel about it now based on the fact that it might be possible that the self-reflection could be productive in the future. Is that accurate? — ToothyMaw

Yes, that is what I'm getting from what @T Clark has said which seems to imply some rational decision making to be had probably involving a weighing of certainties and probabilities with respect to future possible actions.

If so, why wouldn't we just allow these things to arise naturally? Why subject yourself to that kind of thing if you don't even know a good reason for doing it (yet)? — ToothyMaw

Why indulge in moral conundrums or fictional scenarios if they will remain as reality separated as they are?

Curiosity, self-education, searching for self-wisdom, etc?

I suppose one could make the case that doing this would lean towards guiding one's actions ethically in general, but that sounds like quite a burden to be forcing oneself to be reflecting that seriously on tons of things that one might not even be able to affect at the moment (or ever). — ToothyMaw

Some would desire to take on that burden while others could be more pragmatically minded and therefore piece-meal about what they choose. While others will see it in a more pessimistic light seeing it as altogether in all cases a pointless endeavor to consider possibilities and not actualities.

In the world as I understand it, moral judgments are created by humans, so it makes sense to talk about their value. Emotions, on the other hand, are our body's, primarily biological, reactions to events. It does not really make sense to talk about their value. It's just what we do. — T Clark

However, we do actually value ourselves and our self-worth based on the moral maturity or emotional connections one is able to make. Even in fictional scenarios or highly restricted removed parts of our great social environment.

Yes, this is true. I don't see why that is a concern. — T Clark

Well, some sociologists and psychologists seems to beat a dead horse regarding the modern age that has given rise to extensive desensitization. From video games, to modern entertainment, popular news channels, and the greatest atrocities being accessible from YouTube. That or a quick TOR venture deep enough to find a videos from active war zones or un-blurred beheadings. This emotional separation is what the @Questioner brings up.

Its natural to do so. . . should we attempt, however, to chart a course towards more sensitive responses or is such a modern and common apathetic response from such overwhelming emotional saturation actually not as worrisome as such headlines make it out to be? Is it in fact a desirable and more morally advantageous state?

I think you are almost entirely right in this more traditional normative assessment. Regardless, I agree with the OP that it is still true that some amount of moral outrage, even experienced disconnected from events one can influence, be it because of temporal or other factors, can prompt self-reflection that might make one more moral or morally driven. This is kind of a gray area because you are right: it carries serious negative health implications. But it might make one a better moral agent to experience the emotions very strongly at least some of the time. I think that this is as close as the OP's argument can get to being grounded intuitively and rationally. That is, unless, or until, substantivalism offers more insight. — ToothyMaw

When I say "emotional ought" I refer to the act of stimulating one's emotions in a healthy way to encourage self-reflection, which itself should entail some concrete actions. Nonetheless, self-reflection is an action anyways, so it is a non-issue. — ToothyMaw

That is another way of putting it. Is there any point to emotionally stimulating ourselves in forceful manners or are we always to 'go with the flow' and merely bear disconnected witness to the emotions we 'put out' by instinct.

Only reacting to ourselves when someone else does their social duty to point out a present issue as such with our behavior.

Emotions themselves are, as I wrote, our natural bodily and mental reactions to events and are, mostly, outside of our direct control. On the other hand, viewing and examining those emotions, which you propose, are human actions and judgments. — T Clark

Which is what the rest of this discussion should concern. The ontology or origin of emotional states is what I'd consider entirely irrelevant.

What value does moral disapproval have if you aren't going to act? Answer - none. It doesn't mean anything. As ToothyMaw notes, it's emotional reactions that lead us to action. Not so much the ones you mention but empathy, compassion, kindness, a sense of responsibility. Moral outrage is an easy way to act as if you've done something without actually having to do anything. — T Clark

So what worth are emotional reactions then in the absence of objective actions?

There is no requirement of mine to feel any strong reaction, or desire to, with regards to the newest social media hype regarding new proxy wars, popularized sexual assault cases, or the newest expose of hidden cultish phenomenon.

So does that relegate it to something of personal risque interest of mine to tease out once and a while out of boredom from various forms of highly fictionalized entertainment? Or succumb to it out of instinctual biological proclivities I have not entirely a full lid on?

But it is worth noting that the OP is also saying that moral outrage or associated mental events are meaningful insofar as they provide a motive to self-reflect. But I don't think those self-reflections matter too much if they don't themselves entail actions, and I'm pretty certain the OP would agree with that too. — ToothyMaw

It seem a bit vague what it means for them to 'entail' actions as I would presume that some part of the totality of our experiences under guards most actions either out of explicit acknowledgement or implicit thought free reactionary instincts. Even if those are sometimes so far removed temporally from when they finally make themselves actionably present.

Sort of a casual sorites argument here is what I feel I'm getting at if this is the direction we are going in.

Perhaps, a knowledge premise could be inserted here asserting current ignorance about any immediate application of a proposed method of self-reflection and still asking if in lieu of that unknown potential future applicability whether it would be worth it to indulge in it now.

Not language games, just that translating the math is hard because quantum physics isn't exactly intuitive. — Darkneos

Your acting as if there is some clear god given manner in which you translate the math into ordinary language. The fact that we do disagree on how to do so means that it isn't so much a revelation to a scientist as much as it is a long drawn out unending debate that has numerous subjective threads.

Such as appeals to: Empirical adequacy, simplicity, unificationism, counterfactual restriction of physical possibilities, conceptual pragmatic utility, etc. There are many other such subjective meta-criteria that scientists appeal to all the time especially when falsifiability fails to be able to yield any useful or clear answer.

No they're not. We have data and then determine what that data means. If you put sodium in water and it explodes you can reason that sodium and water create that reaction. — Darkneos

What you just stated is a description NOT an explanation nor is it how this would be explained regardless.

Where are the talk of atoms? Subatomic or atomic interactions? Fields of force? Quantum fields? Talk of little billiard balls or liquid wave functions?

I don't see those in the reaction as those are terms and stories meant to refer to something not in the description you just gave. They are meant to REFER to something UNSEEN and what is truly responsible for the reaction that took place. I was talking about EXPLANATIONS and not MERE DESCRIPTIONS.

Not language games and not what they do. — Darkneos

Then give me an example of how a scientist explains something using quantum mechanics that doesn't make use of math, descriptive language, or uses any form of metaphor/analogical speech. Go ahead, I'm waiting.

Not fiction. — Darkneos

Is the Rutherford model of an atom meant to be taken as how atoms actually are or merely a useful fiction?

Easily, we do it every day. Math is part of how we get the result but that's not all physics is. You're just making shit up that scientists don't do to try to justify that philosophy has some use when it's long been obsolete in navigating the world apart from ethics and morality. — Darkneos

Making it up!!

Read a scientific journal on the topic matter. . . a quick search got me this paper on hydrodynamic analogue modeling for gravitational modeling (https://arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/0511105). Clearly, a hydrodynamical analogy is much more amenable to investigate or wrap your head around than talking about the forest of pure math approaches to quantum gravity along with the unclear, vague, or esoteric language that accompanies it. This is a valid approach.

Here is an entire 452 page textbook collection of articles on analogue models just for understanding gravitational phenomenon or as it puts it 'analogue gravity phenomenology'. Which is a deeply rich text which can only speak for itself:

Reasoning by analogies is a natural inclination of the human brain that operates by associating new and unknown situations to a series of known and previously encountered situations. On the basis of these analogies, judgements and decisions are made: associations are the building blocks for predictive thought. It is therefore natural that analogue models are also a constant presence in the world of physics and an invaluable instrument in the progress of our knowledge of the world that surrounds us. It would be impossible to give a comprehensive list of these analogue models but a few recent and relevant examples are optical waveguide analogues of the relativistic Dirac equation (linking optics with quantum mechanics), photonic crystals (linking optical wave propagation in periodic lattices with electron propagation in metals) or, at a more profound level, the Anti-de Sitter/Conformal Field Theory correspondence (linking quantum systems in D dimensions to gravitational systems in D+1dimensions). The purpose of this book is to give a general overview and introduction to the world of analogue gravity: the simulation or recreation of certain phenomena that are usually attributed to the effects of gravity but that can be shown to naturally emerge in a variety of systems ranging from flowing liquids to nonlinear optics.

This isn't only limited to gravity as here is a huge plethora of quantum analogue models along with well needed discussions as to the place or importance of them. Happy reading!

No it doesn’t. Like I said we have data and it adds up. — Darkneos

To what, it adds up to what? That the mathematical model is predictively successful?

Wrong again. It’s not really the terms it’s just trying to translate the math to people speak. — Darkneos

So you are trying to find the right terms to interpret a mathematical model. Language games again.

It does, but in the case of QM you need a degree to understand it. — Darkneos

These mental tools do not need a degree for someone to fully analyze it or get it on first viewing.

When a scientist has constructed explanations of phenomena they make use of something other than purely descriptive or mathematical terms. They use an assortment of analogies to other phenomenon.

Usually going along the same lines as saying 'let us treat light as if it were a wave', 'imagine that the electron is small ball and the nucleus is a dense collection', or 'pretend that atoms in lattices are balls connected by springs'.

These are analogue modeling which is extremely prevalent and a fundamental fiction creating tool which physicists use all the time.

Analogy creation isn't always so clean nor is it unique among mathematical models. As multiple formal analogies into physical analogies can be created.

I'd say that is all that the majority of what a scientific interpretation of a theory is composed of.

How else would you explain to someone what a mathematical model even means when there are no familiar, direct, and meaningful concepts?

I don't really care because half of what they have to say isn't worth listening to. — Darkneos

Arrogance is showing a good peak here rivaling mine. Perhaps I should be the adult in the conversation here.

Or none of that. The whole "world beyond our senses" is just noise from philosophy. What we see is the world and based on the data we have there is no reason to think otherwise. Our senses are fallible but that's what science is for, and it have often shown our intuitions to be mistaken. — Darkneos

What are you even disagreeing with me on?

I'm not some esoteric solipsist or a poetic nonsense speaking idealist. I'm a pragmatist and a person who sees philosophy as ultimately conventionalized language games. That doesn't mean we shouldn't partake in it or that you don't ALREADY partake in it even if you say 'you don't'.

no that's not what physics is about. — Darkneos

If its not about manipulating nature, constructing predictive mathematical models, or making new observations then what else?

Are you talking about how physics is also meant to explain how things actually work beyond the math, observations, or practical engineering applications?

If its meant to explain why something occurs then your going to need a proper language and collection of metaphors to do so otherwise nobody will think you even understand what your even talking about. They may even consider it nonsense if you literally have no intuitive picture you can draw of how something works without resorting to esoteric cop outs such as 'nature is too strange' or 'nature doesn't need to make sense to us'.

We have non-philosophical science, it's done every day. — Darkneos

Yes, because you don't need to consider any questions or speculation about how the world actually works or what language one should use to talk about it if all you have is a 'shut up and calculate' mentality.

Interpretations aren't philosophical dumbass. We know how nature works based on the math and data, trying to put that into regular speak is the issue. — Darkneos

Oh we know how nature works we just can't put into the right words. . . so a language choice is required. . . its as if we need to have a discussion about what terms we use. . . you know. . . indulge in a language game of sorts.

Results and data...I would think that's obvious. Philosophy ultimately has nothing at the end of the day. I get that people suggest it has value here and how it teaches you how to think but all my experience with it just shows how pointless 80% of the discussions in it are.

The most worthless question I've heard is "Why is there something rather than nothing"? Who cares? There is something and that's all that matters. — Darkneos

Neither does science then if the problem is that IT DOESN'T have any coherent picture or as you put it, '. . . regular speak is the issue.'

If I ask you what these well supported or empirically adequate mathematical models of any phenomenon even mean or what they are getting at and you can't tell me because its 'difficult to put into words' then you have explained nothing to me. You have only given me a rather successful DESCRIPTION and not what I'd intuitively call an explanation.

IF YOU WANT to give me a proper language to actually yield an explanation, not a mere description, this requires making use of numerous conventional linguistic choices that are not going to always be as objectively clear as you desire.

Well no, philosophy isn’t required and just kicks up the data since philosophers don’t understand what’s going on. — Darkneos

Define understanding here as I'm curious if you have in mind what scientific philosophers have in mind when they say that we 'understand' something.

Stuff like this just reinforces my stance that science has advanced beyond philosophy in terms of explanations and knowledge. — Darkneos

In what sense?

Either science only deals in manipulating nature and observational results with NO speculation on the going on of the world beyond our senses therefore being rather explicitly tautological. That or it still indulges in speculative 'nonsense' separate from any observable foundations even conceivably and therefore it indulges in what I'd consider metaphysics.

Science is consensus, that’s how it works. It makes perfect sense which is right or wrong because one explains the data and the other doesn’t. — Darkneos

How does a mathematical model 'explain' the data? Given physics specifically is really only concerned with mathematically modeling nature and manipulating it to pre-desired or predicted outcomes.

A mathematical model fits to the data and possesses what others call empirical adequacy as regard counterfactual predictions but that's it. All these 'interpretations' talking about particle/wave duality, electrons, gluons, quantum fields, or spacetime are philosophical speculation at best or poetic nonsense at worst.

Ergo, if you wanted non-philosophical science it would be a rather bland one devoid of all speculation and only ever referencing a particular symbol on the black board or a reading on a detector. All other language would have to be interpreted as mental slight of hand to mean the same thing.

The problem with QM is that while the math and data are iron clad trying to explain it is tough. New discoveries might prove some interpretations and invalidate others, but until then it’s largely unknown. — Darkneos

If its unknown then what is it that science has over philosophy?

They are both in the same boat being unable to avoid pointless speculation as every popular science journal, documentary, or youtuber showcases on a daily basis.

But it’s not a purely subjective affair, that’s just stupid. It’s not up to you because you know nothing about the subject. Like…this has to be the dumbest take I’ve heard on the subject so far. — Darkneos

How does a mathematical model which accords with observations get an interpretation?

YOU SPECULATE ON HOW NATURE WORKS! That is why a SINGLE MATHEMATICAL model can have MULTIPLE inconsistent philosophical interpretations which can all agree on the same observations.

In fact, your perspective doesn't seem to be able to handle the simple situation in which the accepted observational status of a certain phenomenon and how its mathematically modeled is well 'understood' but the interpretation of it is therefore still left up to disagreement so potentially THOUSANDS can be created. Note that no future observations are going to bolster one over another because we are attempting to ascertain the meaning of the SAME model about what this implies about how reality works.

Interpretations are entirely subjective and largely pragmatic. YES, science indulges in such nonsense all the time from textbook to textbook as taught to new upcoming physicists on a yearly basis.

I kind of see the emotional part of it as providing an impetus to act and giving us a bearing kind of like a compass; we know there are many ways of acting, and that some are more correct than others, but without a sense of emotional growth or stimulation we are largely rudderless because it is the emotions that give the narratives that guide us salience in a human sense. So yes, I do think this process of becoming jaded often dilutes moral judgments/sensibilities. — ToothyMaw

If it provides both actionable will and direction then I'd presume it forms a core component of the way in which one views the moral strength/value of themselves.

Would you also agree that it forms a reflective measure of moral judgement of oneself in a holistic manner?

I.E. it's not just the case that we view moral injustices as rationally incongruent with how we believe we should act but that its also not uncommon to accompany this with a reflective emotional opinion. One of personal disgust or self-hatred while in cases of correct moral action one could possess happiness in having been coincident with oneself in action as well as belief as they fulfill the principles they hold dear.

So not only does 'jaded-ness' dilute moral judgements/sensibilities as you put it but it also removes critical self-parental reflection on whether one is as moral as they believe they are. To dull this mirror is to open oneself up to inconsistency and possess an ignorant moral god-complex.

I would say that sometimes it is a good thing to expose oneself to the realities of others to remind oneself just how awful or good things can be, but I don't think that an entity needs their emotions to be in flux all of the time to be truly moral. Not that you are saying that last part, but I have to qualify what I'm saying. Whether or not there is an emotional, moral ought compelling us to do such a thing is questionable, but I think an argument could be made. — ToothyMaw

Is mere exposure enough?

I'm not one to advocate for the more extreme approaches many poor souls have taken but there is a morbid discussion to have about internally rearing themselves into the empathetic/sympathetic person they desire to be. Sometimes coupled with emotional patterns of their own creation.

An example of such extremes are those who self-flagellate. Course, this is usually in the context of rather religious kinds but I can imagine there are others who indulge in such self-harming principles independent of religion in the desire to show to themselves above all that something carries such deep emotional weight.

Ten cent words, apathetic shrugs, actions which show no clear result, or adherence to transcendent moral principles might not be enough to say to oneself that 'I'm moral'. Sacrificing momentary physical comfort or showing an internal sense of self-shame may seem to some to fulfill this. Its a clear, objective, action that one can take that showcases something beyond mere adherence to moral principles in cases where the fulfillment of such moral desires would seem to be unreachable.

I don't understand what you mean. We are talking about science here. The whole point is to construct a picture if the world that makes sense and fits to what we observe. — Apustimelogist

Pictures of the world typically do not end up being testable or falsifiable. They are constructed after the fact to fit to the facts themselves as we intuitively see fit.

It's to yield a sense of what certain scientific philosophers have called 'understanding'. Not to be identified with knowledge or any truth-aptness.

If all you cared about was concordance with observations then science would devolve into bare observational statements and mathematical modeling. Nothing much else that wouldn't just be considered besides the observational facts would be highly speculative. I.E. philosophical or creative speculation.

Quantum interpretation is as fair game as any other part of science or knowledge in general. Are you going to make this comment to other fields of science? I doubt it. — Apustimelogist

Those other fields typically aren't complete black boxes.

I can give a picture of a virus, end of story. I can't of an electron without a tremendous amount of speculative holistic open-ended philosophical interpretation to even analyze the output of said detector.

Well yes but I mean in terms of a consensus on some kind of interpretation which makes sense to people within a scientific context. — Apustimelogist

There doesn't have to be a consensus because it makes no sense to ask which is 'right' or 'wrong'. Nor does it make sense to ask which is 'closer' to how it really is.

If you want some populist preference to be made clear on a purely subjective affair then sure but otherwise its still entirely up to you as it would be for every person on that ivory tower jury.

Not sure I agree. Someone might only think that because there is no consensus on quantum interpretation, but that doesn't necessarily mean a reasonable one cannot be found eventually and ways of visualizing it. — Apustimelogist

There are already ways of doing so. Documentaries and introductory textbooks make use of billiard balls moving in the void, vague fluid like depictions of collapsing wavefunctions, fluid animations to depict fields, or ball & spring models to talk about field excitations.

Don't wait for nature to approve your visualization as if nature ever will or that there will be consensus on said 'correct' visualization. You create whatever intuitive picture to talk about nature however you see fit for whatever reason. Nature is a black box and quibbling over the right visualization seems to forget that we have the all the freedom to come up with whatever we want for whatever purposes because its hidden from us.

Whether that be for aesthetic purposes, computational ones, symbolic understanding, practical applications, etc.

Is it? It's sometimes claimed that classical mechanics "works perfectly" for medium sized objects, and that problems only show up at very large or very small scales.

Except it doesn't. Right from the beginning gravity was an occult force acting at a distance, which in turn had to make "natural laws" active casual agents in the world "shoving the planets into their places like schoolboys" as Hegel puts it. The deficiencies of such a model of causation are well highlighted by Hume. Then electromagnetism added another occult force that didn't fit into the "everything is little billiard balls model." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Wasn't that just philosophical ambivalence or ignorance however? A lack of creativity on the possible analogue modeling that can be done on such subject matters because a 'billard ball model' of the universe was some strange dogma of the Classical ages?

Especially since admitting to action at a distance to gravity was not so much a grand philosophical conclusion but an implicit admittance that they creatively gave up or something similar to Newton's, "Hypotheses non fingo."

Nor could/has the mechanistic model, where the billiard ball is the paradigmatic example of all physical interactions, been able to explain life or consciousness, nor was it able to offer up theories of self-organization, except via a deficient view of organisms as simply intricate "clockwork." Nor, in it's classical forms, can it incorporate information and the successes of information theory. We have suggested a long hangover of "Cartesian anxiety," because the classical model required early modern thinkers to excise consciousness, ideas, and freedom from the "physical realm." — Count Timothy von Icarus

. . . or they just needed new analogies and metaphors which could still retain the age old or common folk intuitions we all possess.

There are tons of other rigid body analogies one could make regarding how we think creatively about the black box that is nature which doesn't have to pay lip service to Newton. Such as analogies to fluids, solids, changes of state of materials, computational analogies, balls & springs, etc.

Further, this mental or philosophical anguish over doing away with 'freedom' or consciousness with such useful fantasy is utterly misplaced. As if re-defining the word living to not include viruses suddenly vanishes them out of existence or implies they pose no medical risk that pragmatically minded medical professionals have to contend with.

It's all semantics. If you desired to create an ontological category that included mental thoughts among physical objects the same as the chair I'm sitting in while I'm writing this you've then technically changed nothing. They may both be physical objects by definition but they still have to remain in intuitively obvious or distinct sub-categories now. Call one ghostly physical objects and the other tangible physical objects or something.

I think the "anti-metaphysical movement's" greatest success has been to keep us stuck, frozen with a defunct 19th century metaphysics as the default, such that it becomes "common sense," to most through our education system. But surely it is cannot be "common sense" in any overarching sense, since it differs dramatically from the more organic-focused physics that dominated for two millennia prior to the creation of the classical model. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problem with actually making this more 'Mainstream' is that it has to incorporate itself into a successful economical or result based enterprise in manipulating nature for our ends. This I find difficult given the overly flowery or poetic language that 'pro-metaphysicalist' thinkers could be seen to fall prey to making those adherents of the current establishment lose their minds waiting for practical results of such thinking.

The basic idea is that particles move along trajectories where at any time they are always in a definite position. The caveat is that their motion is kind of random. Closest analogy in everyday experience is probably something like a dust particle bobbing about in a glass of water, the water molecules pushing it one direction then another. — Apustimelogist

Isn't this just a modern rendition of the notions that the early pre-Socratic atomists had?

I recall them talking about their atoms as constantly moving potentially in a randomized fashion aside from the perfectly deterministic collisions they had.

It's also a bit strange because Hossenfelder wants "common sense" interpretations of QM, and retro-causality actually achieves this by making the world both local and deterministic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would say it doesn't achieve that at all. Retro-causality or 'temporal action at a distance' is a part of a long history of taking the spatialized language we use to talk about time way beyond their metaphorical/psychological origins.

Thanks for providing some context and examples. I am not familiar with Philipp Frank's book, but I did read Trout's Scientific explanation and the sense of understanding paper. In it he critiques "the role of a subjective sense of understanding in explanation." In particular, he draws on a number of studies that reliably demonstrate psychological biases that result in unjustified confidence given to explanations. He does not develop an alternative, though he notes that on his part, he would defend an objectivist conception of good explanation: "What makes an explanation good concerns a property that it has independent of the psychology of the explainers..." — SophistiCat

I think your concerns are more pedagogical than epistemological. In the present context, the former is concerned with accessing, internalizing and operationalizing established science (such as the Second Law of thermodynamics). The latter is concerned with establishing criteria for what constitutes a good scientific explanation. Trout above is concerned with epistemology and has little to say about pedagogy, other than that the two should not be mixed up. — SophistiCat

Let me phrase it this way. If we are talking about things we regard as fictions and are only to be taken as fictions does it make intelligible sense to talk about a made up thing which is itself unimaginable? Should such a notion be used in intelligible presentations of our understanding of other notions or concepts?

Explanations usually are seen as some end result of a big dissertation and a sense of understanding can arise from this as a rather subjective but personal 'A Ha' sort of notion. To even have an explanation get off the ground and yield some sense of understanding to someone else of what it is that you are even talking about it needs to at least be. . . intelligible or conceivable.

My brief reading seems to take me this far in seeing explanation as some external presentable media, understanding as something tied to the psychological perspective of the viewer, and intelligibility forming the core psychological base here that allows for this. The Human mind DOES have a bias to certain ways of thinking about the world. . . some of those, however, could be core parts of how we present the world to ourselves regardless of any 'unjustifiability' and so it would be foolish to abandon WHOLE PARTS of our psychology.

You can call these psychologically fundamental parts of our brain make up that we are stuck with or a prior notions but then its probably just semantics at that point.

Inconceivability or intelligibility should hopefully be as a general a series of notions to discuss which transcend discussions related to realist/antirealism, knowledge/mere-belief, or truth-making/falsity. Perhaps these are more core notions to my quandary as Henk's book linked in the OP does present a section talking about the numerous disagreements early quantum physicists had about not so much the truthfulness but the 'intelligibility' of quantum theory.

So what makes an intelligible fiction? Should fictions be allowed into the conceptual machinery of scientific theorizing or explanation?

OK, that's interesting and I'll give it a read, but I am not sure how this relates to the topic. — SophistiCat

You mentioned something about giving neo-positivist names.

I can only hope that Trumps presidency will be merely a series of bad economic decisions for the country putting it further in debt but leaves us far from other on the boots conflicts or a country wide oppression of those who do not fall into his base.

A person close to me just brought up how they fear for themselves, being trans, as they questioned how hospitable the country will now be towards them given the rhetoric Trump spouts.

Who are these neo-positivist dogmatics? What are they actually saying? — SophistiCat

I'll give a few quotes from that book Understanding Scientific Understanding by Henk W. de Regt.

As regards the discussion of intelligibility there are many names covering a variety of topics. One of which is gravitation and a particular author by the name of Philipp Frank within the book Philosophy of Science: The Link between Science and Philosophy makes a point of arguing that intelligibility is merely psychological by product of familiarity,

. . . to give us back the feeling that we can understand the general scientific principles other than and better than by their observable results.

Its merely a mirage though and purely psychological without any empirical or practical merit. A byproduct so to speak. As the author Henk Regt writes,

. . . he regards the appeal to intelligibility as superfluous from a scientific point of view. Its only function is to relate science and common sense, and thereby to provide a kind of psychological comfort.

In the text a more recent example given is that of J.D. Trout who also places such colloquial senses of understanding as even, ". . . hampering scientific progress. . ."

I happened to find this further article which attempts to give a 'metaphysics' of neo-positivism and there are names within which you can find references to including Chalmers or Ladyman who have espoused neo-positivist views however they differ slightly. They will at core agree on some meta-ontological anti-realism or 'anti-metaphysics'/conventionalism but I'm not sure on the degree of importance to scientific experimental import. For example, a quote from a work by Ladyman and Ross talking about a form of neo-positivism going like this:

[N]o hypothesis that the approximately consensual current scientific picture
declares to be beyond our capacity to investigate should be taken seriously.
Second, any metaphysical hypothesis that is to be taken seriously should have
some identifiable bearing on the relationship between at least two relatively
specific hypotheses that are either regarded as confirmed by institutionally
bona fide current science or are regarded as motivated and in principle
confirmable by such science. (2007, p. 29)

Various labels are used including quietist, sometimes pragmatism, scientific anti-realist, or someone who is favor of a 'naturalized metaphysics'. All of these classes of individuals will put greater import on scientific theorizing as it is currently and dissuade metaphysical speculation as detrimental at worst or symptomatic of our psychology at best. The only salvageable neo-positivist approaches which don't entirely gut what we've been doing for centuries is in admitting to some pragmatic worth of what classical positivists would have easily handwaved away.

I'm sorry for summing it up too briefly in a few snide remarks previously. The options here have a wide variety of reach and aren't so easily summarized although their are commonalities.

Well, I don't know what kind of understanding you are after. Do you have a clear idea of what would satisfy you that you understand something? — SophistiCat

If someone tried to explain what the second law of thermodynamics is and how that connects to the problem of the arrow of time I think I'd be at rather a loss if observables weren't referenced. However, I could see how pointing to certain phenomena could obscure what it is exactly we are getting at and the mathematics are too abstract to assist us here.

This is where analogue modeling can come in but to serve as an intuitive vehicle which, through idealization, singles in better into what the conflict here is. Say, to explain it to me, they used the examples of a billiard ball gas in a vacuum without a boundary/container and a ball/spring model of a solid. It doesn't matter that these are unrealistic nor do questions of realism have to appear but such simple visual models get across the notion of the increase of entropy, the settling over time of the vibrations in the solid, or the dispersion of a classical gas displaying a truly irreversible process.

Something so abstract or generalized needs to be given some sense of physicality to be able to feel one has in some sense understood it. In what better sense can one feel they've understood nature than by making references to nature itself in analogous manners? What else are we going to point to in nature than to say it behaves similar to that other part over there!

Metaphors and analogies may help - or mislead - but I don't think they are necessary for understanding. We are capable of understanding scientific concepts on their own terms. — SophistiCat

Note that none of these philosophers talking about understanding/explanation in the sciences denies that you can define understanding/explanation regarding scientific concepts without metaphor/analogy. In fact, its rather vague as to how this is meant to be intended as modern day anti-realists and neo-positivists understand lots of scientific concepts through operational definitions, theoretical definitions, or reference to instrumental practice.

Unless, you meant understanding different from those notions above.

Its the type, not the kind, of explanation/understanding at contention here I'd say if we aren't going to quibble entirely over mere definitions.

Who actually says that? — SophistiCat

No one, I was making a caricature. Course, the founders of quantum mechanics were notorious for either abandoning any attempt at the intelligibility of the atomic or grew rather pessimistic at said notion.

However, its the explicit dogma of neo-positivist to discount anything that isn't either descriptive/observable language or theoretical abstraction/modeling as mere window dressing to further observable/theoretical statements. That, or if its untranslatable to discount it as irrelevant to the sciences.

This includes realist proclamations such as, "There is an electron!" That then report it as having certain specific properties or relations. It would sooner be proclaimed that 'electron' is synonymous with operations used to detect it, some instrumental practice, or a symbol on the black board than anything else.

So, therefore, every statement literally devolves into something tautological. "I observed an electron by this detector and it had these properties," means nothing up and above what was already clear to us. That we were performing an experiment, that it made detections, and we modeled it mathematically. THAT'S IT and we already understood all that! Further, anything more is either metaphysical nonsense or TOO VAGUE to be meaningful of anything. Right?

I think you overstate the limitations of our conceptual grasp. We are not locked into a fixed Kantian conceptual universe. Our minds have some flexibility and room for development, enabling us to comprehend formerly incomprehensible (or at least convince ourselves that we do so comprehend). — SophistiCat

Yeah, that is what the point and purpose of comparative thinking (metaphor/analogy) along with computational/concrete analogue models serve as their purpose. To bring understanding and serve as explanations.

However, this would then be at odds with neo-positivist inclinations which seem to paint themselves into a strange corner saying, "I can describe these things but despite that I don't understand anything here and cannot explain a single thing as well. Mostly, because I see any non-abstract or non-mathematical avenues of thought as mere pointless ventures leading us no where."

So which is it? Do we indulge in being a little speculatively comprehensible or throw it all in the garbage because its no unified objective mathematical field theory?

Struggles with interpreting new and unintuitive science are not that new. Neither is the retreat to the "shut up and calculate" quietist approach. — SophistiCat

I was just reading a book called Concepts of Force by Max Jammer which had a few passages talking about critical reflections on the notion of 'force'. A few by the renowned idealist Berkeley seem to be rather relevant here.

Force, gravity, attraction and similar terms are convenient for purposes of reasoning and for computations of motion and of moving bodies, but not for the understanding of the nature of motion itself.

Real efficient causes of the motion. . . of bodies do not in any way belong to the field of mechanics or of experimental science; nor can they throw any light on these.

. . . then all the famous theorems of mechanical philosophy which. . . make it possible to subject the world to human calculations, may be preserved; and at the same time,the study of the motion will be freed from a thousand pointless trivialities and subtleties, and from (meaningless) abstract ideas.

Despite the somewhat obscure notions that his idealist philosophy may throw in later; all of these statements would find themselves right at home, especially the last one, with the central doctrine of both positivists past as well as those who seek to resurrect it back to general acceptance.

The desire to 'do away with' all that 'abstract nonsense' and pointless speculation. The trend is astoundingly repetitive the farther back you go and the more numerous it becomes closer to the modern age.

Ever happened upon Sabine Hossenfelder's book Lost in Math? There might be some commonality between what you're asking and that book. — Wayfarer

I'm not exactly sure because a cursory examination of said book and some of the reviews summing it up seem to paint her as someone who is more desiring for a callback to scientific advancement or achievements of the past. Wherein physicists astound us with how mixing two bland and boring chemicals gives an astounding show of colors. To use experimental results as guides to solve all our philosophical worries. If only it were testable!

Which is not exactly what I intend or desire to go back to nor do I think we can. The anti-realisms of scientific philosophy have killed that and laid it bear so we are left with a rather personal choice which CANNOT BE DECIDED with experimental results or reference to useful mathematical models.

A choice of whether we dare to make intelligible assertions, speak in obscurantist tongues, or cut out our tongue in general and scribble forever more abstract symbolisms that always escape any sense of intelligibility.

So - is your question basically ‘what does it all mean’? — Wayfarer

Its not a question of meaningfulness but of even playing the game of making meaningful assertions which themselves don't give some immediate pragmatic results. Why play the game when no end goal is in sight?

If I had a machine that could pump out meaningful, experimentally under-determined, and intelligible philosophical statements/systems by the thousands is indulging in the debate or discussion around them a proper place of a rational individual, a modern philosopher, or a practicing physicist? Or should such speculation always be avoided with extreme prejudice?

I apologize for the late reply. I've been struck between college, work, family affairs', and basic needs to even begin to sufficiently read into or collect any of the vast literature understanding/explanation has given rise to.

However, in thinking about what I could say I think I sort of spotted what it is that I have an issue with.

In this modern age of philosophy it seems as if people are going in a direction of some naturalized metaphysics, a form of metaphysical conventionalism, or quietism about these issues. They have taken not a physical or metaphysical but a meta-metaphysical turn as people have re-emerged in other clothing to say many of the same things that scientifically minded skeptics and logical positivists of the past have had say about the pointlessness of metaphysical investigation. This time around without any of the same baggage that these prior groups sort of immediately possessed or fell subject to in critique.

An example I found awhile ago was a form of Carnapian conventionalism about your philosophy of choice but re-interpreted in terms of metaphor rather than the analytic/synthetic split which may in some sense avoid textbook proclamations of its incoherency.

It's not difficult, impossible, or even uncommon to motivate such a quietist mindset. In the same sense that a person can play 'skeptic' and ask 'why' repeatedly to your frustration. However, it seems too easy to say one has 'fixed' these issues by mere changes of symbolism, of axioms, or even in changing the meaning of certain concepts. That or by saying its 'subjective' would seem to motivate a rather swift and easy handwaving of it away. I'm suspicious that such conceptual problems don't actually ever go away and rather will re-appear once again only to be met with someone who has neglected the conceptual tools that would allow them to deal with it.

In everyday speech we emphasize the distinction between things 'outside' our mind and 'inside'. It might be extremely difficult to define what that even means but in an intuitive manner it just seems so obvious. Scientific world views resurrect a similar split under the moniker of realism/anti-realism and philosophy in general despite supposedly being about notions beyond science in some cases have such great debates over a similarly named divide. Further, into meta-philosophy such a distinction arises AGAIN except now its about the choice one has between philosophical conceptual systems of thought and you get many of the SAME usual suspects: Deflationism, forms of realism, and conventionalism.

On the one hand, as I see it, you are left with a camp that tries its utmost best on every level imaginable (everyday, the scientific, the philosophical, the meta-philosophical) to try and create a desert conceptual landscape filled with only the most obvious or limited number of conceptual tools needed to complete some purpose. A descending pragmatic and metaphilosophically pragmatic supremacy with, at least in principle, un-yielding desire for conceptual simplicity.

In short: Why even consider that if I can't even make some tangible use of it? To the fires I shall cast it.

The other approach could be one filled with dogmatism and authoritarianism about the SPECIFIC terms of their ONE philosophical approach. Something desirable as anyone whose ever entered for the first time into scientific or philosophical speculation has had such a similar desire as well. Clearly such an approach is dead or dying and usually falls prey to forms of self-defeating obscurantism to motivate their objective understanding of the world amidst the critiques of skeptics in centuries past.

We could, however, attempt to follow in the foot steps of what Arthur Fine calls the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) and sort of attempt to dissolve this rapid obsession that philosophy has had regarding the realism/anti-realism debate. Which is strange because the person advocating for this position sees it as opposed to the conventionalism or deflationists that other meta-philosophers have brought to the table. Clearly, on practical matters, realists and anti-realists never really disagreed at all for that matter. What would seem to then motivate the distinction? Perhaps, at the end of the rainbow of centuries of philosophical debate about said issues its merely the realization that to be a realist is merely to say with a stomp of a foot, "It's REALLY real, though!"

To express what they meant to say all along was merely, "I entertained this idea because I considered it so informative and attractive to my sensibilities. I think it should serve you well to."

In short once again: Perhaps its a goal and practical desire itself to entertain what may seem as impractical notions/concepts/conceptual systems of thought if not just because they 'may' give practical results. . . they may remain impractical. . . but because its the only way in which we motivate choices between new ways of thinking. Choice among these conceptual systems is subjective, YES, but clearly whatever system you hold to has rather grand and vast ramifications even to practical affairs. So its a subjectivity of choice that isn't so irrelevant as one would want to make it out to be.

_____________________________________________________________________________

The intelligibility, visualization, and form of language that we use to understand/explain/describe nature is merely another set of clothing for the above problem. Will any of such motivated approaches prove more practical in terms of technological development? Perhaps not.

Maybe they all provide easier traction for entrants into the discipline however. . . maybe such speculations allow for easy manipulations of abstract symbolisms or in making grand abstract connections which prove useful. . . are these all happy accidents and could be done without said tool? That could be. . . would you want to risk it for a few generations and only after a few centuries of spinning wheels go back to such fantasies because you were "wrong" on their generative practical "utility"?

This doesn't strike me as true at all. Special and general relativity are full of what you call "ideas of understanding, visualization, or explanation," e.g. space curved by mass. — T Clark

You are not wrong. There are many rather illustrative thought experiments that Einstein and others had or continue to construct which do serve a role in bringing about some sort of understanding through visualized mental experiments.

However, there is a lack of clarification about what exactly the references or type of understanding are being creating here. Are we understanding something about nature? Or merely the manner in which we mathematically model it? Are we referencing noumena or symbols on the black board?

Further, there is usually a lack of clarification about the metaphors being used. Space as a substance is a metaphor that treats a rather abstract concept of space by comparison to other substances. Space as a container is another such metaphor.

Such metaphors don't have to carry any ontological weight and perhaps they shouldn't. They are just manners of speaking which our mind has an obsession with partaking in despite the vexing frustration of physicists. They don't imply any grand philosophical consequences, they don't have to, but does that therefore mean they should be cast into the flames?

I don't think science or even physics in general is seen as "incoherent to our sensibilities." People call QM weird, but as far as I understand it, it's just the way things are. Maybe dispensing with metaphysics, i.e. visualization and explanation, is the right way to approach it. Why should we have to expect that the behavior of the universe at that scale has to be comprehensible in the same terms as baseballs and toothbrushes. — T Clark

Its actually completely irrelevant whether its comprehensible or not at those scales.

Whether we agree on how to determine this or not and what methods will achieve this.

We will continue to have a mind which treats it as meaningful. That nature can be understood on our terms and if that wasn't the case. . . then the majority of scientific practice is an insult to greater objective sensibility. A pathetic useless gesture in attempting to grasp a world that is un-graspable. A form of scientific mental nihilism.

You give a coherency to your understanding of something in whatever means possible NOT because nature is shown to be coherent but because being coherent is the only manner (through visualizations, analogies, metaphors, abstractions, etc) in which a rational person could understand it. I'm advocating then for a form of scientific existentialism perhaps. Except meaning in this comparison is replaced with explanatory approaches and the understanding they bring.

Further, the language of quantum mechanics are derivative of analogues, metaphors, and analogue modeling. The bias you hold about it as, 'just the way things are,' seems to forget where those philosophical certainties came from. . . the same place you just said you are dispensing with.

Where do you think quantum physicists got the language they are using to express its strangeness? Where did they abstract it from?

I have never heard this. I have heard science only deals with how things work, not why. That's not the same as your phrase and it makes sense to me in most situations. — T Clark

Descriptions serve this role of expressing how things take place because they do not go beyond observables or mathematical synonyms for said observables with logical connectives to link one to another. If you want to express or interpret it as 'how'/'why' instead of 'description'/'explanation' then go ahead.

Again, I don't understand the basis of this claim. — T Clark

Usually, examples of analogue models which are presented fall along the lines of billiard balls or old Aether vortices which have been forced out of the modern era by the great Einstein paradigm shift. They are seen as a part of the previous generation which we have passed and are 'long dead' figuratively speaking along with their progenitors who are literally dead.

@Nimish The disgusting, the unlawful, lazy, and immoral parts of ourselves seem to demand for judgement. . . punishment. . . retribution. Right? To abstract the deficient in ourselves into a being of equal reality to ourselves with whom we can wrap our hands around their throat. To flog their back and stone the irrationality out of their veins.

The truly virtuous aren't so if they let the criminals within themselves run free, right? So should that mean that we put on a show to ourselves? To prove to ourselves that we are in fact moral individuals?

If I judge myself with such internal vitriol and there is no one around to bear witness nor any ulterior motive in sight then have I become that pure altruistic soul who knows its moral law by heart?

Morals and the values we hold to aren't just mere statements but require actions as well as judgement in a constant social court of the public but also internally.

@javra I don't know what I'd consider science precisely but months of research to narrow in on such a definition would contain many references/citations from socialist views of science as well as anti-realist ones.

My 'objective' science would be rather boring and not filled with the sort of flair of black holes, time travel, or spacetime warping. Rather, statements about methodological practice, instrumental usage, and direct observer language with some poetic flair merely to make it more palatable to read.

Tell you what, I've repeatedly offered what I take valid empirical science to be. You, so far, have not offered any definition of what you take it to be - and examples of what "science says" do not come close to delineating what is and is not science. — javra

That is sort of why I've been speaking about it in a rather indirect manner and, if I haven't then its implied in previous replies, that the word 'science' is taken as not more than a label of notoriety. Sort of how the title of philosopher has been stretched into such a high colloquial usage with such vastness that its meaningfulness has been rather diluted.

The main issue I see is that whatever definition you come up with could be atomized into different purposes, methodologies, conceptual tools, and colloquial images of 'manifest science' that could be neither sufficient nor altogether necessary.

One can observe nature and yet not be considered a scientist. Someone can observe and manipulate nature according to pragmatic ends with a fallibilist mindset yet be declared a mere industrialist or engineer rather than a physicist. One can observe and speculate on nature but would be found to be a naturalist metaphysician and not a physicist simpliciter.So what is supposed to distinguish the person who uncovers nature as a scientist but is not so speculative while being distinguished from the mere pragmatic naturalist manipulator of it? Since those conceptual tools and practices can be used by ALL.

Perhaps, its their purpose? Then that makes it too subjective and tied in with socialized views of scientific work or progress which are rational analyses of what's been called science but shouldn't be included in its definition. A definition that shouldn't be subjective really in any degree or as distant as possible according to colloquial images of 'manifest science'.

This notion of science also restricts or serves to restrict what allowable language is used to talk about nature. Metaphorical, analogical, and indirect language may be pragmatically useful or common but perhaps it shouldn't be considered scientific given its subjective status. Therefore any talk of preons, the sub-atomic, atomic, and other such quantum weirdness or spacetime bending is to be seen as playful poetic language outside the purview of objective science. Objective science demands clear and directly meaningful statements of which symbolism combined with direct observable language without theoretical entities would suffice. I.E. realism in science is dead and anti-realism of a post-positivist /instrumentalist/operationalist/epistemological idealist sort rules.

I don't think you'd really say science was altogether that different or inconsistent with what is bolded above already but its common to speak highly of the consequences of theories or of the entities they postulate upon the external world. To talk about laws of nature or particle interactions which defy nature's causal connectiveness and connect distant parts of spacetime as a bent sheet. Should these diatribes be considered scientific or philosophical because of their poetic/metaphorical/analogical and indirect language?

I would say these postulations aren't merely 'possible of being disproven' which lends them more credence than an anti-realist would yield them. They aren't mere postulations a new test can upheave. . . THEY ARE MEANINGLESS because they aren't part of an objective direct observer language. Fallibilism yields them more credence as to their mind-independent meaningfulness as statements about the world. It tricks you into thinking they even have a truth value to be given in the first place even if that truth value is declared as 'unknown' or indeterminable. Rather we should join similar minded anti-realists as those fictionalists and declare such talk as no different in nature than the highest fantasy novels Human's have created.

Regardless of any objective untangling of the supremely successful social endeavor we call science any objective bullet point of a pure idea of science separate from that should learn from that mistake or solve it. Is there any meaningfulness to be given to analogical/metaphorical statements about the external world? Is objective science only an anti-realist one in a pragmatic or even non-pragmatic sort?

Further, I'm not confident however that one could separate an idea of science from its pragmatic usage or the purposes of acting 'scientists'. Not without creating some strange platonic science from no where and from which no one performs it nor could anyone be declared a part of it.

I don't want to be that individual but I have to point out a worry that this all brings. What if these sorts of deranged individuals (the shooter that was at that rally for example) suddenly realize they want to go for political fish who have more swing in making rapid changes to their local area. Lower officials, particularly state connected ones, who most definitely would not have the widest and vast protections that we would assume the president or previous presidents would possess. Regardless of any critique one may have on how this was handled regarding Trump and his security detail.

Is this looming, violent, and local anarchy on the horizon?

I can assume that any American citizen can only take so much 'collapse of the U.S.' and the almost stoic acknowledgement that high political affairs are 'outside our control'.

Yeah, I can’t believe he left after being shot. Crazy. — NOS4A2

Teddy didn't leave immediately and apparently he continued doing a speech for 50min WITH it having not grazed him but gone into his chest. Then accepted medical attention only after.

Trump. . . the TRUE American. . . pumped his fist and then shuffled off into safety shortly after.

@javra What distinguishes a mere experimentalist from a physicist to me isn't their proclivity to accord some precise description to nature whether in ordinary language or stated in abstract symbolisms but in going beyond it. To speculate on it in analogy pictorially and in language metaphorically while remaining honest about ones' intentions in doing so.

Perhaps the only distinguishing feature between the Aether's of Classical physics and the Aether models of modern physics then is that we don't take the latter as all that literal when pushed into an intellectual corner.

Nature isn't literally made of an elastic medium but it helps to think of it that way. Same with fluid and billiard ball models which assist us more than esoteric metaphorical statements or abstract symbolisms. Course, the latter two have their place as well.

Not sure how to best interpret the sarcasm in the first sentence. That spacetime bends is not fact, but theory. — javra

Its a lazy and quick interpretation riddled with metaphysical assertions that aren't made explicit that they are, analogue model usage that is stated as literal, and usually in ignorance of a long past of re-interpretations which make GR seem more similar to a mathematical model that has a thousand potential interpretations. . . not specifically one.

It is fact that this theory of relativity currently best accounts for all observables in the field - this to the best of our knowledge. — javra

Yes, a proper connection and interpretation made between qualitative ordinary language predictions with quantitative predictions from approximate/exact results of Einstein's field equations with a host of respectable experimentalist assumptions have gained it express support.

But then it is also fact that this same theory of relativity has to date not been satisfactorily combined with our best theories regarding QM - thereby logically demonstrating that something is amiss in either one of the two theories just mentioned or else with both. To affirm that spacetime bends is fact is then to deny what's just been here stated. — javra

That isn't the point I'm making.

You can have a successful ordinary language machine that takes in qualitative statements as initial starting data and then makes a qualitative prediction in combination with or in the absence of an equally successful quantitative mathematical/logical model. However, the interpretation of said Theory of Everything would number in hundreds before long and in the thousands as generations pass on by. Interpretations are neither unique nor are they ever determined. Rather they are always un-determined.

As to the mathematics, pure mathematics is notoriously indifferent to the observable world, conformant only to mathematical axioms and the logical implications of these. If the maths don't serve to best explain the observable world (or, as is the case with probability, as a tool for best appraising the validity of observable results) they are then worthless to the empirical sciences. Take Einstein's ToR for example; he had to invent an new mathematics to properly address the theory he held in mind - namely, the Einstein field equations. Here, the maths are not sacrosanct but, rather, part of the theorizing regarding the data so far accumulated. — javra

This is the same conclusion as those who have been long involved in the substantivalist/relationist debate where its sort of devolved into whether we formulate the math topologically speaking or emphasize spacetime points.

In the end, some think the emphasis on the math has lead the philosophizing astray. However, if the math and observations imply nothing different on the part of these interpretations then its almost as if I could roll a hundred sided die to determine which I should go with. A sense of objectivity goes out the window and so does the point to such discussions. Why not just become observation obsessed logical neo-positivists?

Sometimes, if not often, newly discerned observables will then make a difference as to which interpretations are to be culled from the list. At the very least narrowing down the valid possibilities as to what in fact is. — javra

Until you wait long enough and then those observable differences only negate one mathematical formalism of a certain interpretation but not another mathematical formalism.

Is spacetime curved or not? That statement isn't decided by a single observation or theory. Its a true/false statement that lives among numerous mathematical models that are all, in terms of observation or formalism, inconsistent with one another. Yet, these inconsistent models might all agree on "proper" interpretation that its true/false. When one dies a thousand others can live on.

To address commonly known examples, Newton's X, Y, and Z did not account for Mercury's movements as observation A. Einstein's X, Y, and Z does. Because of this, we acknowledge the Newton's physics (theory of the physical) is wrong, despite yet being relatively accurate for all intended purposes most of the time. — javra

No, you proved that Newton's mathematical model of gravitation was incomplete. . . not that Newtonian physics is wrong. As if Newtonian/Classical physics wasn't allowed to have alternative mathematical models to Newtonian gravitation or that a different mathematical model coming down from the newest paradigm shift couldn't also be considered Newtonian.

You'd need to precisely define what it means for a mathematical model to be Classical. For that matter you'd need to also clarify this for counterfactual ordinary language modeling as well. That or for any interpretation that may be yielded to a model.

Classical physics can be statistical and long before quantum mechanics there were people who speculated on 'atomic' time or randomness in nature. These concepts don't belong to quantum mechanics and in what sense would they now be non-Classical? Besides Classical/Newtonian merely standing for a vague historical period rather than a clear methodology or idea of theory creation. At least Milic Capek attempts to take on such a historical and interpretative weight as difficult as it is to clarify in what manner Classical is to be distinguished from Modern physics. Hint: Its not the math and if you dug hard enough you'd find Classical attempts at 'field' theories or randomness in nature.

A Classical model is showcased as incorrect. Not Classical physics. Did they disprove Newton's three laws in that test as well?

But I'll reaffirm that science (empirical science proper) was never ever a means of obtaining infallible knowledge or truths regarding what is. One of its greatest strengths is in culling possible explanations regarding what physically is in definitive - yet still technically fallible - manners. Take for example theories of life: there is no scientific manner to reintroduce the theory of Young Earth Creationism into scientific models of how life emerges and behaves - this exactly because it directly contradicts data (fossils and such) - although this is yet still not infallibly known (e.g., one can always bring in something like a Last Thursday-ist explanation of the data, as extremely non-credible as this alternative will be to both anti-YECs and YECs alike - its very logical standing, or better lack of, here tentatively overlooked). That stated, not all variations of Lamarckian interpretations of biological evolution have been falsified - this although Lamarckianism proper has. The Neo-Darwininan model we currently endorse would go through a paradigm-shift were any one of these Lamarckian possibilities valid (via further enquiry into epigenetics and the like) such that the will on the part of parents can in any way whatsoever effect the phenotype of offspring. Yet nothing even remotely adequate has been proposed in terms of any such Lamarckian-like possibility to serve as any significant threat to the Neo-Darwininan model we currently hold and hold onto to as valid representation of what is. This, however, does not make Neo-Darwinianism an established fact, though. And any potential scientific proposal to contest the currently predominant view will need to be a) empirically falsifiable and b) not falsified via any test to stand any chance of evidencing the hypothesis proposed. But if falsified, then that one particular hypothesis will then be definitively evidenced wrong. — javra

If that is all that science is then I'm fine with it. A giant list of counterfactual statements in ordinary language about if this happens, then such and such follows to handle qualitative predictions. Then some logical/mathematical modeling of a simple enough form to handle quantitative predictions.

However, any interpretation beyond the observables of this theory of everything will be doomed to indetermination. Asking questions about whether this caused that, whether spacetime is a thing, what fundamental particles there are, etc. These will remain grossly underdetermined and this will only get worse as time goes one. To a point where the first few pages of a text book will be how to use that counterfactual software on your computer and how to use that mathematical model while the other thousands of pages in hundreds of volumes will list re-interpretation after re-interpretation.

So, going back to the OP, because science has by now evidenced the strictly mechanistic model of the world to be erroneous, we should not "go back" to a Newtonian-physics-like understanding of the world - this, for example, no more than we as a society should go back to a Young Earth Creationist understanding of the world in general and hence of biology in particular. — javra

Then become a logical positivist.

Burn every example of analogue modeling including of GR such as this that you find. Remove all metaphorical language that isn't literalized and lose the mystery or fantastical nature of quantum mechanics. Finally, tell those metaphysicians to never leave their department as the unfalsifiable demands no concern with us as much as the observables do.

All that you have left is a listing of observations and trial/error mathematical modeling. No causation or laws of nature, no point to talk about what spacetime is, nor speculation on which 'particles' are fundamental. Only which curve on the screen follows which button press. . . in a statistical sense.

That is the point I'm trying to make. As if Classical physicists weren't also mathematicians and did statistics as much as quantum physicists currently perform or could in fact do. It would be strange to proclaim a mathematical tool as purely part of Modern physics or Classical physics and I think you would agree. There are also numerous philosophical ancestors to the concepts now being peddled which didn't start with Modern physics nor did they invent them. Further, analogue modeling seems to be making a come back where it was so popular as to its usefulness in Classical physics now people realize they can better understand the world or their models through its use. Its not so antiquated now!

Here is a physical analogue model of a droplet moving on a vibrating basin of water used to understand pilot wave theory. Here is a derivation of Einstein's field equations by mathematically treating it as a fluid with sinks or sources.

Here is an elastic analogue interpretation of Einstein's field equations as well. Funny enough this person actually is a young Earth creationist but we will put aside that strange point as it shouldn't imply anything wrong about his paper besides what results he showcases which can be critically examined separate from that. It is sad that this is the case but that is my own bias.

There is a central creativity to and creation or speculation that goes beyond the observables or the mathematics. Something, that is similar in nature to art interpretation, that isn't supposed to be considered objective.

Those in philosophical arm chairs don't do empirical science by so sitting in arm chairs. One has to be observing out in the field, as least a significant portion of the time, to engage in empirical sciences proper. A very big difference, to me at least. — javra

I don't think you understood and I didn't make it clear enough as it was a snide remark. I want to make the point that the intellectual methods used by both are similar; metaphysicians & theoretical scientists.

They both conduct semantical clarifications, language analysis, thought experiments, construct metaphorical stories, and give pictorial analogue explanations of the world to understand it better.

Unless one is to declare one a metaphysician if and only if they shut off their senses or declare one a scientist because they observe but do not speculate. I'm not sure I really see such a difference if one allows for a metaphysician to probe the world and a scientist to speculate heavily on in it in grandiosely open-ended manners.

As to the "re-interpretations" these again only occur when models/theories do not fit the data, hence requiring at least tweaking in the models/theories/interpretations yet endorsed so as to adequately account for the data. — javra

Re-interpretation is popularized as a demonic tool of pseudo-scientists when it only concerns whose predictive counterfactual models are to be considered simpler or not in their usefulness. As regards their observable consequences but re-interpretation is alive and well among science away from the purview of any observables.

In all facets of science it lies in wait for a curious mind to discover how prevalent it is and how easy it may be to choke oneself on plentiful creations of your own.

Take the fact that spacetime bends. . . oh I mean a strange interpretation that is held in varieties of competing positions of interpretation irrespective of the math under the heading of substantivalists. Then there are the relationists and emergentists who seek to say something different. . . about the same exact mathematics. Then there are the often ignored conventionalists about spacetime geometry who seek to dissolve all such debate as they were popular during and just before Einstein's time before being buried to history despite their current modern relevance. ALL of them don't have to imply anything different about the observations nor the math or the connections between them.

If you obsess over the math's role note that the field equations for GR can be reformulated in terms of torsion (Teleparallel GR) rather than curvature or in terms of metrical variations (Metric Teleparallel GR) which are exactly equivalent mathematical reformulations. A re-interpretation can then be given to GR as to it being a field theory in Teleparallel form bringing back that 'force' of gravity that Einstein apparently killed.

This can even be done in Classical physics under the heading of Newton-Cartan theory which is a 'curved' mathematical re-formulation of Newtonian gravity which makes the force of gravity 'disappear' into the 'spatio-temporal' curvature of 'spacetime'. Different math, different interpretations, but exactly the same observable consequences.

The only way out of this would be to divorce interpretation from math and some how argue all these conflicting interpretations (relationism/substantivalism/emergentism/conventionalism) are the same in some fashion. How that could be done is any ones' guess and would require some heavy handed semantical re-interpretation.

Yet these black boxes at the very least teeter on the non-scientific (irrespective of what the mass-hype might be). Its why the empirical sciences proper only deal with falsifiable hypotheses. As one easy to appraise illustrative example of this, science cannot address the "black box" of whether there is a small unicorn under your tabletop that turns invisible as soon as you look under - this precisely because this hypothesis is unfalsifiable [by any conceivable type of observation]. What does this have to do with physics and, more broadly, the empirical sciences in general? Same applies to myriad "theoretical entities of modern physics": e.g., M-theory, Many Worlds Interpretation, and so forth. Contrast this with something like the variable speed of light theory, which could be falsifiable where our technology to be advanced enough (last I looked into the matter). — javra

You bring up the variable speed of light hypothesis as if the conventionality of simultaneity/geometry doesn't already make that a moot point.

You can construct finite light speed theories that conflict with observations and others that don't. Just as you can do so for variable speed of light theories as long as you keep the observables fixed you can tweak anything you please. It becomes meaningless to say you 'tested' whether the speed of light is variable if you can always construct a theory which fits it or reformulates the math in a manner similar to teleparallel GR.

You showed a variable speed of light theory as inconsistent with observations. . . you didn't showcase that light speed isn't variable and in fact only showed that the prior understanding of it, if it is in fact actually variable, was incorrect.

If I came up with a falsifiable hypothesis about me being a brain in vat that is in fact falsified then that doesn't mean I'm not a brain in a vat. It only means that if I am a brain in a vat that it wouldn't function as I had previously thought.

The speed of light is just one of many other such examples of unfalsifiable proposals which is showcased as if its been proven or narrowed into the corner of truth. Even modern popularized scientific YouTube videos are now talking about the impossibility of measuring this speed let alone its 'constancy'. Poincare long before Einstein was already kicking around this idea of this impossibility over a hundred years ago!

Its the most extreme case of holism. You aren't testing the speed of light as much as you are testing some complicated assumptions about how you link everything together in the exact manner it is currently and there is no mind-independent manner as to which sub-hypothesis you modify/reject/accept.

Think of the Thomas Edison quote:

"I have not failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that won't work."

I somehow feel we yet hold significantly different understandings of what empirical science consists of. But I'm not currently sure of what these underlying differences might be. — javra

I regard science, at least the hard sciences, as plagued by irresolvable immense scientific holism (dependence on parts) and conventionalism. So much so that I find it maddening at this point but not something I feel I could easily give up given my fruitless internet searching for as long as I can remember.

For there to be modeling, or else interpretation, in the first place, there first needs (as in necessity) to be empirical data to be modeled, else interpreted. Yes, science engages in modeling via which interpretation of data occurs. But what I'm attempting to express first and foremost is that the empirical sciences proper, via its use of the scientific method, collects empirical data in as an objective manner as currently fathomable to us humans. — javra

On the one hand your claim that this collecting of empirical data is 'objective' might be riddled with holes if only you got rather more specific on the methods or social practice science uses to collect such data. Further, I don't think I disagree with this nor is this really that astounding a realization as if those in philosophical arm chairs aren't able to or in fact don't do the exact same. They can perform just as equally with as tenacious a spirit as these scientists the observational practices common to modern science just with other interpretative goals.

Models and interpretations that do not account for all data thereby accumulated - or worse, that logically contradict this data in total or in part - will be deemed falsified — javra

I don't think scientists actually think this way as there have been past disagreements that were resolved by further observation but usually by acceptable 're-interpretation' of the data to regard inconsistences as mere appearance. Contradiction with observation implies a bad functional connection between observables and theoretical postulations. It doesn't have to imply anything about the veracity/falsity of theoretical entities nor some conspiracy against our methods of observation. Nothing is tested, neither observation nor theory, but the glue which binds them and there a myriad number of ways to glue together the theoretical with observables.

As a crude example easy to gain accord upon, the theory that Earth is geometrically flat is one such model via which our communal empirical data can become interpreted. Or, more exotic, so too is the theory that planet Earth is hollow and inhabited by sapient beings in its core (which I have heard people address). These models are wrong, i.e. incorrect, only because they fail to account for all commonly shared or else commonly accessible empirical data and on occasion directly contradict it. — javra

I'm not sure I actually care about such models as their falsity is predicated on mutually contradictory observable postulations within the accessibility of falsification within everyday practical understandings of meaning, objectivity, truth, etc.

I'm more concerned with the truly unobservable on the smallest scales and the truly inaccessible such as the past or distant parts of our universe as all of these are plagued by deep unresolvable speculation. A place where falsification provides no relief and only underdetermination of theory remains.

Falsification is a beautiful tool when there are no black boxes. When there are only black boxes then it loses its relevance besides assisting those obsessed with epicycles.

Science (by which I here mean the scientific-method-utilizing empirical sciences) does not, and cannot, fail as our optimal means of obtaining unbiased empirical knowledge regarding what perceptually is. — javra

Science can collect 'observations' and data. Knowledge on the other hand requires a definition to be provided and a theory of meaning to be defended.

I for one am privy in favor to demoting knowledge in part to be the socially special sorts of beliefs we possess. Knowledge as merely a subset of belief of a privileged sort by some pragmatic/social means of justification.

Is there any major disagreement in what I've so far expressed as pertains to science? — javra

Only disagreement or dissension based in how vague its all presented.

I love The Seventh Seal, and several other Bergman films, but he's not your go-to director for sunny up-lift. — BC

Why not!?

Something about the conversation that the knight has with what he thought to be at first a nameless servant of the faith, really in fact death, struck a great cord with me. Especially when he say,

How can we have faith in those who believe when we can't have faith in ourselves? What is going to happen to those of us who want to believe but aren't able to? And what is to become of those who neither want to nor are capable of believing?

Showcasing such deepened worries about whether the ground of thought we lay upon is as certain to hold our weight as we entertain ourselves. A trouble I have had for months if not years now as I've bounced from one ideological attractor to another in pursuit of certainty only to step back in undecisive worry.

Why can't I kill God within me? Why does He live on in this painful and humiliating way even though I curse Him and want to tear Him out of my heart? Why, in spite of everything, is He a baffling reality that I can't shake off? Do you hear me?

A desperate barrage of questions about the desire for meaningful searching and why, if it cannot be satiated, does it remain.

I want knowledge, not faith, not suppositions, but knowledge. I want God to stretch out His hand towards me, reveal Himself and speak to me.

My most favorite line of all. I've even posted something similar somewhere on this forum. That desire for the unexpected and beautifully strange to muddy our mundane daily lives.

I don't know whether you are clinically depressed or are just doom-looping. If it's the latter, well... stop doing that. Depression gets tossed around too much. IS someone really clinically depressed, or are they lonely and angry? Tired? Isolated? Frustrated? Burdened with too many problems to deal with? Antidepressants will not help those sorts of things. — BC

I would say I've never been clinically depressed. . . melancholy for sure.

Just for reference, how old are you now? What kind of connections do you have with other people, at work and outside of work? Family? Friends? Romantic partner? — BC

I'm 23 and have a rather nonexistent collection of social relationships. Workaholic coworkers who are rightfully preoccupied with there own lives. Friends who I've ostracized or they have moved on. Family members who are stretched across countries now and those I have immediate access to are troubled in ways I cannot solve nor can a pouring out of my own troubles satiate their own.

So I have searched for acquaintances but have had no long reprieve between awkward work schedules, losing track of time until months roll by, or just finding such events as few to far between.

In the coming months I will have greater changes roll by which might change this or merely compound upon it.

You probably shouldn't be alone. It sounds as if you're in a state of mind that, if you can't think of a way to change it, you should get help with. At least support from someone you trust. — Vera Mont

Perhaps the way I wrote it created a false sense of worry and I apologize for that. I can assure you such existential worries of such intensity left me in my beginning twenties. I'm a bit lonely on my days off but nothing so morbid entertains my thoughts anymore.

@BC @Vera Mont I, again, appreciate the comments and advice you have given me. I just had a day off yesterday and nothing resulted despite my anticipation in so long. It dragged on and on as I sulked in maddening internal silence. As night continued on I decided to watch The Seventh Seal from 1958 and a video essay on it. I had never seen it but it seemed to encapsulate my existential worries.

The maddening nothingness that others attempt to intellectually obscure with manufactured certainty and the absurdness of continuing on. To play chess with death rather than give in to his beckoning call.

Excellent start to figuring things out. Looks as if you have a lot of re-evaluation and planning to do. You'll need your clearest head. I wish you all the luck! — Vera Mont

Your input is appreciated.

What you are expected to do, and most likely what you can, you must, you shall, and you will do (after you get it over with) is find a job; inhabit hopefully decent housing; pay your bills; gradually pay off loans; shop for groceries; do laundry; establish a short/medium/long term relationship; and more! It's called LIFE. Most people are reasonably happy doing this stuff a good share of the time. — BC

I already do those things. In the two year hiatus I've taken I got a job and worked up to being an assistant manager with a few assorted retirement/medical benefits. I've indulged in some high amount of spending as one does when they get a growing bank account but still can support myself and leave enough aside for a new car, medical emergencies, in case I get laid off for 2-3 months, food, car payments, insurance, etc.

Its nothing glamorous at times and perhaps I work too much to my own detriment.

Course, its the existential element that is not fulfilled. Philosophy and the uncovering of the wonders of this world via physics insights are meant to serve that purpose. . . or so I thought. Now even that has become neglected and dusty as I struggle to find any worth in its conventional or arbitrary pursuits. Meta-philosophy especially has ruined my view of it all and now I'm beginning to see every academic in a similar lights as the occasional raving lunatic on vixra.org. I reject these dissidents only out of laziness as I've found I lack much of any foundation or what foundation I possess is so mundane as to not spark the same fascination I possessed when I was younger.

So I've waited for an article on some journal, a post here, or some paragraph in the books I have in my possession to yield an excuse to feel the way I did before. To sort of return to a more blissful state of mind.