Comments

  • Carlo Rovelli against Mathematical Platonism
    A rainbow is not corporeal,Janus

    Corporeal definition - of the nature of the physical body; bodily.
    material; tangible:
    corporeal property.

    Rainbows comprise light refracted through water droplets. Nothing incorporeal about that.

    relations and functions are not corporeal,Janus

    Part of my point.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    Please explain what is wrong with this description then

    methodological naturalism is the attitude that science ought to investigate the world as if it were strictly independent of the observer. The picture is that of the behaviours of objects that are defined in terms of their primary attributes, those attributes being amenable to quantisation and measurable in terms common to all observers. Secondary attributes are assigned to the mind of the observer, so are not part of the objective domain. This attitude generally corresponds with the rise of modern scientific method. Methodological naturalism has been responsible for considerable advances in technology and science.Wayfarer
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    don't know about "ultimate facts" but naturalism, as I understand the concept, certainly entails negation of unconditional (i.e. supernatural, non-immanent, non-contingent) facts.180 Proof

    It certainly does not. They’re simply put to one side for the purpose of the hypothesis.
  • The role of observers in MWI
    There was a member here, active a couple years ago, I can't remember the name, but a self-proclaimed physicist who was big on this time reversal stuff.Metaphysician Undercover

    Maybe he’ll come back in the past. ;-)
  • Why being an existential animal matters
    There is something more I am trying to say,schopenhauer1

    Only that because we’re existential, we’re more than animal, as a couple of others have also noted.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    world (n.)
    Old English woruld, worold "human existence, the affairs of life," also "a long period of time," also "the human race, mankind, humanity," a word peculiar to Germanic languages (cognates: Old Saxon werold, Old Frisian warld, Dutch wereld, Old Norse verold, Old High German weralt, German Welt), with a literal sense of "age of man," from Proto-Germanic *weraldi-, a compound of *wer "man" (Old English wer, still in werewolf; see virile) + *ald "age" (from PIE root *al- (2) "to grow, nourish").
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    The skin, the boundary of the organism.

    What I’m arguing against is metaphysical naturalism,

    At first there is methodological naturalism - the attitude that science ought to investigate the world as if it were strictly independent of the observer. The picture is that of the behaviours of objects that are defined solely in terms of their primary attributes, those attributes being amenable to quantisation and being measurable in terms common to all observers. Secondary attributes are assigned to the mind of the observer, so are not part of the objective domain. This attitude generally corresponds with the rise of modern scientific method. Methodological naturalism has been responsible for considerable advances in technology and science.

    But when it morphs into metaphysical naturalism, is when this is taken to prove, or disprove, any ultimate facts about the world. For instance, that the world is ‘the outcome of the accidental collocations of atoms’ (Bertrand Russell) or that intentional activity is the consequence of the interaction of organic molecules (Daniel Dennett) or that God doesn’t exist (Richard Dawkins) or does (Intelligent Design). Within this picture (well except the last) the human is seen as a kind of a fluke outcome of a random process. This is where I point out that the human mind is what creates the world which it surveys. I’m not using that to argue for any kind of ‘mind at large’ or even any metaphysical counter-argument, simply the recognition of foundational nature of the mind.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    So you’re the only human being in existence - do I have that right?
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    The SEP entry on Idealism:

    1. something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and

    2. although the existence of something independent of the mind is conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of self-knowledge.

    The notion of idealism that I am defending is not quite the same as either of those. It is based on the constructive activities of the brain/mind - that the external world (which really is an external world) is a product of consciousness, insofar as it you were dead, or a rock, or a log of wood, there would be no such world. Here is where most will say ‘but the world will continue exist, even if the dead or rocks or logs are not aware of it.’ But I claim that the world that you will claim ‘continues to exist’ is just the world that is constructed by and in your mind that is the only world you’ll ever know. The incredulity you feel at this point is due to the idea that this seems to imply that the world ceases to exist outside your mind, whereas I’m claiming that this idea of the non-existence of the world is also a mental construction. Both existence and non-existence are conceptual constructions.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    It’s more that in current Western philosophy there’s a kind of unwritten rule that certain lines of argument are not considered as a matter of principle. When Thomas Nagel’s book Mind and Cosmos came out, which was critical of what it called neo-Darwinian materialism, some of his many critics said that he was giving ‘aid and comfort to creationists’, never mind that he himself frequently affirms that he is an atheist. There is the view that naturalism has to be the final court of appeal for philosophical claims.

    My view of the laws of nature is that science assumes that the Universe displays regularities which are called (for better or worse) ‘natural’ or ‘scientific’ laws (even while I also note quite a few articles questioning the entire idea.) And that while science discovers and relies on those laws, it doesn’t, nor should be required to, explain them. Science works on the level of contingent facts and material and efficient causes, and not metaphysical ultimates. In fact, I don’t think science as now construed is the least concerned with why anything exists, in any sense other than understanding its causal precedents. And why the universe has the laws it does is not itself a scientific question (and the claim that there might be ‘other universes with different laws’ has always struck me as otiose. )
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Reinforces my conviction that secular philosophy obtains to atheism as a matter of principle.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    I don’t know if you noticed this post but I’m trying to make the point that what has been previously designated (and disparaged) as ‘philosophical idealism’ is nowadays well known to cognitive science.

    University Vice Chancellor to Treasurer: ‘Hey the physics department is totally out of hand. Did you see how much they want for equipment this semester? Why can’t they be like the maths department? They only want paper, pencils and waste paper bins. Or philosophy. They don’t even want the bins.’
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    But his beliefs as to "why" the experience happened is like a blind man feeling around in the dark compared to the lights we have today.Philosophim

    I really don’t accept that. You’re talking about him as if he lived in Medieval Europe. He had a career spanning 50 years, which wasn’t even 100 years ago.

    I don't ascribe to "materialism", or "physicalism"Philosophim

    I had thought so based on such statements as

    One way to look at life is it is an internally self-sustaining chemical reaction. In a non-living reaction, the matter required to create the reaction eventually runs out on its own. Life seeks to sustain and extend its own balance of chemical reactions.Philosophim

    However on second reading, you’re differentiating life from chemistry, by saying that ‘life seeks to sustain and extend….’ So you’ve introduced the element of intentionality which I agree is necessary and which I don’t believe has any analogy in materialism.

    I mean, at its basic Wayfarer, why is your consciousness stuck in your head?Philosophim

    Don’t accept that it is. Conscious thought is an activity of the brain, but consciousness does indeed extend throughout your body and permeates all living things to one degree or another.


    That's an argument from false authority fallacyNickolasgaspar

    It wasn’t so much an appeal to authority, but the observation that a lot of people say that Chalmer’s work is pseudo-philosophy, without, I think, demonstrating an understanding of the rationale behind his ‘hard problem’ argument. And indeed, that single paper launched Chalmers into a career as an internationally-renowned and tenured philosopher, which says something.

    That points away from reductionism and suggests something emergent is necessary in understanding consciousness.Mark Nyquist

    This is where biosemiosis enters the picture. I’ve learned a lot about that from this forum.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    So if we have no access to anything not a perception, how could we ever differentiate between what we experience and what we don't....?Banno

    Berkeley knocks that out of the park in his Dialogues
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    What is it, if anything, in that quote that counts specifically agains realism?Banno

    Realism holds that the activities of the agent's mind have no bearing on the existence of the world, that these can be regarded as separable.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Dr. Penfield was practicing until 1960. That's before we had computers.Philosophim

    I don't see how the invention of computers has any bearing. The specifics of his claim haven't been shown to be incorrect, and the fact that it happened 50 years ago is not relevant. His main point is that his patients could clearly distinguish memories and sensations that were triggered by his instruments from their own volitional control. They would say 'you're doing that'. Penfield interpreted that to mean that their own awareness was separate to the reactions he was able to elicit by manipulation. That is why he tended towards a dualist view late in his career.

    "Using fMRI brain scans, these researchers were able to predict participants’ decisions as many as seven seconds before the subjects had consciously made the decisions.Philosophim

    That indicates that conscious awareness of an action lags the unconscious, autonomic processes that initiate the action. I don't see how it has any bearing on the question of the nature of intentionality, and whether intentional actions can be understood as causally dependent on physical processes, which is really the point at issue. The 'placebo effect' and many other aspects of psychosomatic medicine show a 'downward causative' effect from states of mind and beliefs to actual physiology. According to the 'bottom-up' ontology of materialism, this ought never to happen. (Hence the hackneyed saying 'mind over matter'.)

    As far as the overall efficacy of fMRI scans, this was one of the areas that was shown to be subject to the so-called 'replication crises' in the social sciences about ten years ago. See Do You Believe in God, or is that a Software Glitch

    The problem that is always going to undermine physicalism or materialism is that being has a dimension that no physical process has. A first-person experience has a dimension of feeling that can never be replicated in a third-person or objective description. It's a very hard point to articulate, as it is more an implicit reality than an objective phenomenon. That is what the argument about 'the hard problem of consciousness' seeks to illuminate, and from your analysis of it, I'm not persuaded you see the point.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    Only that you never seem to see the point of that passage whenever it's quoted.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Chalmers's why questions are pseudo philosophical questions (Sneaks in Intention and purpose in to nature).Nickolasgaspar

    Curious then that Chalmers is University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University, and an Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. Must have fooled a lot of important people!
  • Descartes' 'Ghost in the Machine' : To What Extent is it a 'Category Mistake' (Gilbert Ryle)?
    That is the basis of Ryle's idea of the category mistake. He argues that, 'the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter will be dissipated, but not dissipated by either of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of Matter by Mind, but in quite a different way'.Jack Cummins

    Ryle's criticism is valid in saying that Descartes' division of 'mind and matter' has absurd consequences by proposing 'res cogitans' as a literal 'thinking thing' with no extension - how then can it contact or interact with extended but mindless matter?

    But the downside of Ryle's criticism has been the tendency to dismiss the concept of mind altogether, which you see in its most extreme form in Daniel Dennett (who incidentally studied under Ryle at Oxford.) This has lead to the 'post-Cartesian' attitude prevalent in much English-speaking philosophy which tends toward materialist theories of mind, i.e. that mind is a product of brain, itself a product of evolutionary biology, itself a product of undirected physical laws, and so on.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    This is a scrapbook entry about how discoveries in cognitive science lend support to transcendental idealism.

    As understood by evolutionary biology, Homo Sapiens is the result of millions years of evolution. For all these thousands of millions of years, our sensory and intellectual abilities have been honed and shaped by the exigencies of survival, through various life-forms - fish, lizard, mammal, primate and so on - in such a way as to eventually give rise to the capabilities that we have today.

    Scientific disciplines such as cognitive and evolutionary psychology have revealed that conscious perception, while subjectively appearing to exist as a continuum, is actually composed of a heirarchical matrix of thousand, or millions, of interacting cellular transactions, commencing at the most basic level with the parasympathetic system which controls one’s respiration, digestion, and so on, up through various levels to culminate in that peculiarly human ability of rational thought (and realms beyond, although this is beyond the scope of current science.)

    Consciousness plays a central role in co-ordinating these diverse activities so as to give rise to the sense of continuity which we call ‘ourselves’ and the apparent coherence and unity of the external world. Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is in reality dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness many of which are below the threshhold of conscious awareness.

    When you perceive something - large, small, alive or inanimate, local or remote - there is considerable work involved in creating the object from the raw material of perception. Your eyes receive the sensory stimuli, your mind cognises the image in relation to all of the other stimuli impacting your senses at that moment – either acknowledging it, or ignoring it, depending on how busy you are; your memory will then compare it to other objects you have seen, from whence you will (hopefully) recall its name, and perhaps know something about it ('star', 'tree', 'frog', etc).

    In other words, the mind is *not* simply the passive recipient of sensory objects which exist irrespective of your perception of them (this is 'the myth of the given'). Rather consciousness is an active agent which constructs what we understand as reality on the basis of sensory input, but also on the basis of unconscious processes, memories, intentions, intuitions, prejudices, prior knowledge, and so on.

    Furthermore, and this is the philosophically interesting aspect of it, the neural systems by which the mind creates the consciousness of a unified whole remain unknown. As computer scientist Jerome Feldman shows in The Neural Binding Problem, Chalmer's 'hard problem' is recognised in scientific accounts of consciousness, insofar as there has been no neural mechanism identified which accounts for the unity of conscious experience. There are detailed accounts of all of the aspects of the brain which assimilate different aspects of perception (color, shape, movement and so on) but 'this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene. That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the Neural Binding Problem really is a scientific mystery at this time.'

    And that holistic, gestalt-generating ability of the mind to forge the 'subjective unity of experience' maps very well against Kant's 'transcendental apperception' - the process by which we become aware of the unity and coherence of our experiences and their integration into a single, integrated whole.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Generally surgeons will keep you awake and map your experiences when they stimulate certain areas of the brain. They literally alter your conscious subjective experience.Philosophim

    There was a Canadian neurosurgeon, Wilder Penfield, who was famous for conducting such tests, which he did over many years. He started out a convinced physicalist, but in the end he subscribed to a form of dualism. He noted that patients were always aware that the sensation, memory, etc., evoked by brain stimulation was done to them, but not by them. Penfield found that patients retained a “third person” perspective on mental events evoked by brain stimulation. This lead him to conclude that the patient's mind operated independently of cortical stimulation:

    The patient’s mind, which is considering the situation in such an aloof and critical manner, can only be something quite apart from neuronal reflex action. It is noteworthy that two streams of consciousness are flowing, the one driven by input from the environment, the other by an electrode delivering sixty pulses per second to the cortex. The fact that there should be no confusion in the conscious state suggests that, although the content of consciousness depends in large measure on neuronal activity, awareness itself does not. — The Mystery of the Mind, Wilder Penfield, p55
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    you're advocating various Eastern mystical traditions without making a case for how 'transcendental idealism' follows from or is consistent with them180 Proof

    The similarities between Kant's and Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism and the philosophies of the Upaniṣads and Buddhists texts is well known. As I already said, it is not too long a bow to draw between the 'unknown knower' of the Upaniṣad and Kant's 'transcendental apperception'. Both of them recognise the sense in which 'life is the creation of mind' - not the theistic sense of divine creation, but moment by moment, mind by mind.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Consciousness is neither the contents we being aware of information apprehend, nor the resulting qualia, but being aware of information.

    The way I put it is 'sentient consciousness is the capacity for experience. Rational sentient consciousness also includes the capacity for reason'.

    one can hardly anthropomorphize humans

    :clap: But today's naturalism tends on the contrary to animalise humans, to deny any essential distinction to being human (see Anything but Human.)

    Many argue that intentional being is too different from physical being to be reduced to it – a position performatively affirmed by eliminative materialists

    Perhaps you could comment on that a little further?

    Thus, natural science begins with a Fundamental Abstraction

    I see the origin of the fundamental abstraction in Galileo's mathematization of nature, combined with the separation of primary and secondary qualities. This is the point where the objects of physics proper came to be conceived solely in terms of attributes which could be successfully quantized - mass, velocity, force, and so on - whilst appearance and many other attributes were assigned to the observer, and thus relegated, in effect, to the subjective domain, with what is physically measurable being declared what is actually real - hence, modern physicalism, the veritable origin of what you're calling 'the standard model'.

    It is as absurd to reject replicable introspection because its token is private, as to reject Galileo’s observations because he made them in solitude.

    Here I differ. The point about Galileo's observations, and Newton's laws, is that they can be validated in the third person. In that vital sense, they're objective - the same for all who can observe them. Introspection, per se, has no such method of validation - this was the cause of the failure of the early psychological methods of Willhelm Wundt.

    Phenomenology introduces a disciplined method of the examination of the nature of experience, although I don't know whether it could be called 'introspective'.

    Self-knowledge - insight into the nature of one's mind - often comes, not through introspection, but through life events. Thinking about the nature of experience in the naive sense of awareness of one's own stream of thinking rarely gets you any further than self-absorption, while true self-awareness often requires something more than that, often appearing in the form of shock, loss, or dissappointment. Perhaps the term is 'soul-searching'. But I don't know if the anodyne term of 'introspection' really conveys that.

    For [Aristotle], form and ‘matter’ (ὕλη) are not things, but the foundations for two modes of conceptualization.

    Excellent - sums up an idea that has been in the back of my mind reading Aristotelian-Thomistic dualism for a long while. I've never studied either Aristotle or Aquinas in depth and at my stage in life, I'm not likely to, but I've come to see the 'A-T' school as representative of the 'perennial philosophy' in Western culture.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    But prey, continue.Banno

    Now there's a freudian slip for the ages.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    My point was idealism has not been constantly mainstreamTom Storm

    Idealism IS the mainstream. All else is degeneration. ('Footnotes to Plato' - remember?)

    So the poll is simply a reflection of the fact that we live in a degenerate age - something Plato would no doubt vigourously agree with. But then, Popper did call him an enemy of the open society.
  • Welcome Robot Overlords
    ChatGPT Question de Jour

    Q. What are some great movies about the theme of the main character getting self-knowledge or self-awareness through the story?


    A. There are many great movies that explore the theme of the main character gaining self-knowledge or self-awareness through the course of the story. Here are some examples:

    "The Matrix" (1999) - Neo, the main character, learns that his life is a simulation and he must break free from his programmed reality to become the hero of a rebellion.

    "The Truman Show" (1998) - Truman Burbank, the main character, discovers that his entire life has been a reality TV show and he must escape to find true freedom and purpose.

    "Groundhog Day" (1993) - Phil Connors, a weatherman, is forced to relive the same day over and over until he learns to become a better person and find fulfillment in life.

    "Fight Club" (1999) - The narrator, an insomniac, creates an alter ego named Tyler Durden to escape his mundane life but ultimately realizes the destructive consequences of his actions.

    "Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind" (2004) - Joel Barish, the main character, undergoes a procedure to erase his memories of his former lover but ultimately decides that the pain of loss is worth the joy of love.

    "The Social Network" (2010) - Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, learns the cost of success and the importance of relationships as he navigates the rise of his social media empire.

    "Into the Wild" (2007) - Christopher McCandless, a young man disillusioned with society, embarks on a journey of self-discovery in the wilderness but ultimately learns the value of human connection.

    "Good Will Hunting" (1997) - Will Hunting, a janitor at MIT, discovers his genius for mathematics and confronts his emotional demons with the help of a therapist.

    "The Shawshank Redemption" (1994) - Andy Dufresne, a prisoner, learns to navigate the harsh realities of prison life and finds hope and redemption through his friendship with fellow inmate Red.

    "Lost in Translation" (2003) - Bob Harris, a middle-aged actor, forms a bond with a young woman in Tokyo and learns to appreciate the beauty of life's fleeting moments.

    Now, I could have arrived at that through my own research and investigation.

    But not in 4 seconds.

    Incidentally, I haven't seen all those movies, but every one I've seen, I regard as a great movie. (On reflection, the only one I haven't seen is Fight Club. I bet it's a great movie. )
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    The hard problem really boils down to "What is it like to be another conscious being?"
    — Philosophim

    this doesn't seem quite correct.
    jgill

    +1. That is indeed not the point of the argument. The point of the argument about 'what it is like to be...' is to convey the fact of being a subject of experience. 'Being a subject of experience' is not something that can be captured in any objective description. So depicting it in terms of 'what it is like to be someone else' plainly misses the point of the argument.

    @Dfpolis - I've read most of the article. As I too am generally critical of physicalism and reductionism, then I'm onside with your general approach ('the enemy of the enemy is my friend ;-) ) - although there are a few specific points with which I will take issue, when I've spent a bit more time digesting it.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    As far as I'm concerned" ... i.e. a cop-out.180 Proof

    You asked a question:

    I just don't see how nonduality prioritizes "mind" "subject" "experience" over above "world"180 Proof

    I answered with a passage from a canonical text of Advaita non-dualism, saying that 'outside the atman, nothing has any sense'.

    What about that exchange is not clear?
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    I sort of, kind of, agree. But I've become acutely aware of how 'post-Cartesian' our worldview instinctively is. Descartes is where the modern 'mind-body' problem comes from - along with a constellation of early moderns, notably Galileo, Locke, Newton, and so on, the division of mind and matter, 'primary' and 'secondary' attributes, religion and science. I see being modern as itself a state of being, a station of consciousness, shaped by these influences. Learning how to be aware of that is a big part of philosophy IMO. This is not to say that modernity, or Enlightenment rationalism, or what have you, is 'bad' or 'wrong' - sure prefer it to many alternatives - but the problems it has are like it's shadow, in the Jungian sense.

    Also don't agree with the equivalence of materialism and idealism. Kastrup has a lot to say on that - materialism relies much more on abstractions than does idealism. Why? Because the concept of matter is itself an abstraction whereas the reality of first-person experience is apodictic. I don't have to copy in again that paragraph from Schopenhauer0 about how time and space only enter into reality through the brain.

    So - not just on and on, around and around. There's light at the end of the tunnel, and I'm seeing it ;-)
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    I know this and agree. But it's a blip.Tom Storm

    A blip could indicate incoming ordinance, so beware.

    I was going to add, idealism nowadays has rather counter-cultural implications. Kastrup is still considered by a lot of people a crank. Realism is - you know - hard-headed, real world, scientific, modern. Idealism sounds to closer to mysticism.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    But when did it start and what do we count as idealism?Tom Storm

    I think a fair case can be made for the ancestor of what was to become known later as 'idealism' in Greek philosophy - specifically Plato, of course, as the Ideas as fundamental constituents of being must be considered Ur-Idealism.

    In the history of ideas, I think there are some major philosophers who can count as idealist - one in particular being Duns Scottus Eriugena. A scholar by the name of Dermot Moran has published a book arguing that Eriugena's philosophy, which was a subtle synthesis of neo-Platonism and Christian doctrine, was a formative influence on later German-speaking philosophy and was clearly visible in the German idealists (ref). And I don't think it's controversial to say that the last really influential idealists were the German idealists - Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schelling, Fichte. The British idealists, like Bradley, were very much part of the same overall movement. (In my view, Hegelian philosophy kind of collapsed under the weight of its own verbiage - you could gather a room full of so-called experts on Kant and Hegel and none of them would agree. It lacked the experiential dimension that characterises Buddhist culture in the form of a continuous lineage of monastic practitioners.)

    Can you demonstrate that idealists are less individualist or materialistic?Tom Storm

    It's not a matter of individuals, people can profess one thing and do another altogether. But I'm a fan of various historiographic theories, like Oswald Spengler's, or Pitirim Sorokin - that cultures go through cyclical changes and have characteristic kinds of mentality. And I just don't think it can be disputed that secular western culture has a predominantly materialist attitude: not materialist in the sense of coveting material stuff, but as understanding the fundamental stuff of the world to be bodies in motion, governed by physical laws (which have now usurped the role previously assigned to divine commandments.)
  • Is seeing completely subjective?
    How does Mary describe the knowledge?TiredThinker

    I would imagine it would be simple to describe her experience to another person who is not colour-blind: 'I saw colours for the first time! Now I know what colours are!' And presumably her interlocutor would know just what she meant. But apropos of your OP, she could not, of course, convey that understanding to a blind person, who at best has an analogical understanding of what colour must mean.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    I think idealism as any kind of majority view died with the 19th Century. In the 'Golden Age' of American philosophy - C.S. Peirce, Joshua Royce, William James, Borden Parker Bowne - idealism, mainly adapted from European idealism, was assumed. In England with Russell and Moore's overthrow of idealism, and later Gilbert Ryle's long reign at Oxford - idealism was regarded as superseded. But there are always a few brave souls who carry the torch - I've noticed the books of Timothy Sprigge, who published A Vindication of Absolute Idealism in 1984. There's also a current German Professor, Sebastian Rodl, who defends absolute idealism in his book Self Consciousness and Objectivity (impenetrable to the casual reader, alas.) But the popularity of idealism is irrelevant as far as I'm concerned, the fact that it's a minority view can just as easily be ascribed to a deficiency of modern culture as to any deficiency of the basic principles. After all we live in an individualist, materially-oriented, technocratic culture, and will naturally adopt philosophies that support this milieu.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Doesn't this imply that matter is capable of intentional action?
    — Wayfarer

    At a sufficient level of organization, yes.
    Fooloso4

    But there must be some level of intention to reach a sufficient level of organisation in the first place. (I'll leave it there until I finish the article.)
  • Psychology of Philosophers
    Excellent. That's more or less the point I was labouring to make. You wouldn't see much of it in academic philosophy lectures, though.
  • Carlo Rovelli against Mathematical Platonism
    Born in 1932, that makes him 90 this year. When I found his book, I emailed him and got a nice reply - about July last year. His book has gone under the radar, because he's not known in philosophy or cog sci, so I don't think it received a lot of attention, which is a pity - deserves it.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    The theory is that matter is self-organizing.Fooloso4

    Doesn't this imply that matter is capable of intentional action?
  • How can an expression have meaning?
    Meaning is both embedded and embodied. It's embedded in our environment, embodied in language and gestures, interpreted on many levels from the cellular to the semantic. It's arguably the fundamental stuff of life, much more so than molecular structures. That's the rationale behind biosemiotics.
  • Carlo Rovelli against Mathematical Platonism
    Wasn't trying to single you out - It was just some remarks you made earlier in the thread . (Did I mention Charles Pinter to you before? You can find his website here https://charlespinter.com/ . He has many publications in mathematics and has recently published what I consider an excellent book, not strictly speaking on philosophy, but with many interesting philosophical implications, Mind and the Cosmic Order.)