We're talking past each other again. I've been taking issue with 'transcendental idealism' and you're advocating various Eastern mystical traditions without making a case for how 'transcendental idealism' follows from or is consistent with them. Citing topical literatures do not explicate your thinking on idealism, Wayfarer, only distracts (deliberately?) from directly addressing or refuting the issues with idealism I've raised. If we've gone as far in this discussion as you care to go, then just say so. I'm only interested in what you think, sir, and not with your sources or you interpreting them for me.What about that exchange is not clear? — Wayfarer
you're advocating various Eastern mystical traditions without making a case for how 'transcendental idealism' follows from or is consistent with them — 180 Proof
What I'm pointing out is that the claims of the idealists, such as Magee and Kant, are themselves delivered as "what actually is" about humans. — L'éléphant
but this is not idealism in its strictest sense, insofar as external material reality is tacitly granted as a necessary condition. — Mww
The lady doth protest too much, methinks. But prey, continue. — Banno
It's just a person's opinion. — schopenhauer1
Restrict the philpapers results to metaphysicians in the target group of academic philosophers - 372 respondents - and the number who advocate idealism goes up to almost 7%! The number advocating realism rises to 84%.Most philosophers ignore the problem. — schopenhauer1
As understood by evolutionary biology, Homo Sapiens is the result of millions years of evolution. For all these thousands of millions of years, our sensory and intellectual abilities have been honed and shaped by the exigencies of survival, through various life-forms - fish, lizard, mammal, primate and so on - in such a way as to eventually give rise to the capabilities that we have today.
Scientific disciplines such as cognitive and evolutionary psychology have revealed that conscious perception, while subjectively appearing to exist as a continuum, is actually composed of a heirarchical matrix of thousand, or millions, of interacting cellular transactions, commencing at the most basic level with the parasympathetic system which controls one’s respiration, digestion, and so on, up through various levels to culminate in that peculiarly human ability of rational thought (and realms beyond, although this is beyond the scope of current science.)
Consciousness plays a central role in co-ordinating these diverse activities so as to give rise to the sense of continuity which we call ‘ourselves’ and the apparent coherence and unity of the external world. Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is in reality dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness many of which are below the threshhold of conscious awareness.
When you perceive something - large, small, alive or inanimate, local or remote - there is considerable work involved in creating the object from the raw material of perception. Your eyes receive the sensory stimuli, your mind cognises the image in relation to all of the other stimuli impacting your senses at that moment – either acknowledging it, or ignoring it, depending on how busy you are; your memory will then compare it to other objects you have seen, from whence you will (hopefully) recall its name, and perhaps know something about it ('star', 'tree', 'frog', etc).
In other words, the mind is *not* simply the passive recipient of sensory objects which exist irrespective of your perception of them (this is 'the myth of the given'). Rather consciousness is an active agent which constructs what we understand as reality on the basis of sensory input, but also on the basis of unconscious processes, memories, intentions, intuitions, prejudices, prior knowledge, and so on.
Furthermore, and this is the philosophically interesting aspect of it, the neural systems by which the mind creates the consciousness of a unified whole remain unknown. As computer scientist Jerome Feldman shows in The Neural Binding Problem, Chalmer's 'hard problem' is recognised in scientific accounts of consciousness, insofar as there has been no neural mechanism identified which accounts for the unity of conscious experience. There are detailed accounts of all of the aspects of the brain which assimilate different aspects of perception (color, shape, movement and so on) but 'this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene. That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the Neural Binding Problem really is a scientific mystery at this time.'
Only that you never seem to see the point of that passage whenever it's quoted. — Wayfarer
us — Banno
Indeed, the quote as a whole seems to me to presuppose that we are part of a world that is independent of our accounts, and within which our accounts might evolve. — Banno
Who are you thinking of? — bert1
Telling us what idealism isn't doesn't seem a good away to proceed. The core of idealism seems to be something like that the ultimate foundation of the world is somehow mental. How's that pan out?that's not idealism — bert1
The core of idealism seems to be something like that the ultimate foundation of the world is somehow mental. How's that pan out? — Banno
Anyone you wish to include. — Banno
A silly argument. Let "Humans" include aliens if you want. Or dogs. Whatever. As I said,
Anyone you wish to include. — Banno
Originally conceived in the middle of the eighteenth century as a real alternative to materialistic and naturalistic perspectives, it may now become sublated and integrated into views about the nature of reality that ignore metaphysical oppositions or epistemological questions connected with the assumption of the priority of mind over matter or the other way round. Instead the focus may be shifting to establishing a “neutral” view according to which “anything goes” (Feyerabend) as long as it does not contradict or at least is not incompatible with our favored metaphysical, epistemological and scientific (both natural and social) methods and practices. — Paul Guyer, Idealism, SEP
Cite evidence of "minds other than human minds" that does not beg the question of 'what is "mind"?' whether human or not. — 180 Proof
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