But prey, continue. — Banno

Now there's a freudian slip for the ages.

freudian — Wayfarer

:wink: Maybe.

What about that exchange is not clear? — Wayfarer

We're talking past each other again. I've been taking issue with 'transcendental idealism' and you're advocating various Eastern mystical traditions without making a case for how 'transcendental idealism' follows from or is consistent with them. Citing topical literatures do not explicate your thinking on idealism, Wayfarer, only distracts (deliberately?) from directly addressing or refuting the issues with idealism I've raised. If we've gone as far in this discussion as you care to go, then just say so. I'm only interested in what you think, sir, and not with your sources or you interpreting them for me.

you're advocating various Eastern mystical traditions without making a case for how 'transcendental idealism' follows from or is consistent with them — 180 Proof

The similarities between Kant's and Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism and the philosophies of the Upaniṣads and Buddhists texts is well known. As I already said, it is not too long a bow to draw between the 'unknown knower' of the Upaniṣad and Kant's 'transcendental apperception'. Both of them recognise the sense in which 'life is the creation of mind' - not the theistic sense of divine creation, but moment by moment, mind by mind.

No thoughts of your own. Got it. I'm out, Wayf. :shade:

What I'm pointing out is that the claims of the idealists, such as Magee and Kant, are themselves delivered as "what actually is" about humans. — L'éléphant

“…. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite, in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general….”

“… This completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions à priori which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain, provided only that we are in possession of all these radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis…”

“… Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the building.…”

Nothing in Kantian tripartite critical philosophy asserts “what actually is” about humans, but is merely a domain-specific series of if-then logical syllogisms writ large, which at most, says what actually is about a speculative theory.
———

On the other hand, there are “….claims (….) delivered as “what actually is”.…”, serving as premises for the logical method following from them….

“…. That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience….”

….and this, with respect to his theory of knowledge alone, is not idealism in its strictest sense, insofar as external material reality is tacitly granted as a necessary condition.

but this is not idealism in its strictest sense, insofar as external material reality is tacitly granted as a necessary condition. — Mww

Idealism, even in its strict sense grants external reality, or else it would be reducible to solipsism. What a strict idealist (like Berkeley) would deny is that external reality is properly characterized as "material", insisting that it would be better characterized as "formal", or "ideal". This is why Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason proposes an idealism, by assigning to the proposed independent noumena the classification of "intelligible objects" rather than matter.

What happens to the various idealisms, how people get lost within, and cannot find their way because idealisms begin to look incoherent, is that it is necessary to posit something as a medium which separates the ideas of one mind from the ideas of another, or the intelligible objects of my mind from the intelligible objects of the external world. The simple solution is to posit something like matter as the medium of separation. But this results in dualism. It is this complexity of dualism, which idealism necessitates as a result of the separation between my ideas and other ideas, which deters people from idealism. Reality is just too difficult, complex, so they do not go down that road where idealism leads to dualism.

The lady doth protest too much, methinks. But prey, continue. — Banno

I'll wear all the hats I want, thank you very much. Baseball cap, sombrero, derby....I don't mind indulging in various metaphysical standpoints, some rooted heavily in Western canon, and by no means "not philosophy", especially on an online philosophy forum. How boring would it be to have just one view, and only the Banno view at that! :wink: Wittgenstein all over with a side of rote symbolic logic statements. I mine as well count numbers to infinity and call it a day.

You get no answers by ignoring the problem at hand. Most philosophers ignore the problem. Many probably don't even deal with it in their academic work, and thus default to it because that isn't their specialty. But honestly, I wouldn't care if they knew every theory out there regarding metaphysics/epistemology, and answered realism. It's just a person's opinion. Informed by other opinions. Arguments in philosophy are too open to measure "better" or worse. You can really only say "well-constructed" or not and then weigh the argument against other arguments. But guess who is doing the weighing? Not an objective god, but a person.

And yes, I protesteth so because you are trying to pull and tease an objective argument, by sneaking in the notion of "majority means right" which is the textbook definition of bandwagon fallacy.

Me: idealism not in its strictest sense….external material reality granted;
You: strict idealism….external reality is material, denied.

What’s the difference? Not strict idealism grants; strict idealism denies. We’re saying the same fargin’ thing!!
———

Why Kant proposes an idealism, and that of a particular kind…..is in dispute to the empiricists of the day.

In the idealism Kant proposes…..noumena are proposed, superficially, in that they represent what not to do; or technically, in that they represent what understanding is capable of if left unchecked by itself. They are, after the paint has dried, metaphysically insignificant.

Keep going. Say some more about me.

It's just a person's opinion. — schopenhauer1

If eight out of ten aeronautics engineers say the plane is unsafe, I won't fly in it. But perhaps schopenhauer1 would, after all, the engineers are just giving a personal opinion.

Most philosophers ignore the problem. — schopenhauer1

Restrict the philpapers results to metaphysicians in the target group of academic philosophers - 372 respondents - and the number who advocate idealism goes up to almost 7%! The number advocating realism rises to 84%.

Make of this what you will.

This is a scrapbook entry about how discoveries in cognitive science lend support to transcendental idealism.

As understood by evolutionary biology, Homo Sapiens is the result of millions years of evolution. For all these thousands of millions of years, our sensory and intellectual abilities have been honed and shaped by the exigencies of survival, through various life-forms - fish, lizard, mammal, primate and so on - in such a way as to eventually give rise to the capabilities that we have today.

Scientific disciplines such as cognitive and evolutionary psychology have revealed that conscious perception, while subjectively appearing to exist as a continuum, is actually composed of a heirarchical matrix of thousand, or millions, of interacting cellular transactions, commencing at the most basic level with the parasympathetic system which controls one’s respiration, digestion, and so on, up through various levels to culminate in that peculiarly human ability of rational thought (and realms beyond, although this is beyond the scope of current science.)

Consciousness plays a central role in co-ordinating these diverse activities so as to give rise to the sense of continuity which we call ‘ourselves’ and the apparent coherence and unity of the external world. Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is in reality dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness many of which are below the threshhold of conscious awareness.

When you perceive something - large, small, alive or inanimate, local or remote - there is considerable work involved in creating the object from the raw material of perception. Your eyes receive the sensory stimuli, your mind cognises the image in relation to all of the other stimuli impacting your senses at that moment – either acknowledging it, or ignoring it, depending on how busy you are; your memory will then compare it to other objects you have seen, from whence you will (hopefully) recall its name, and perhaps know something about it ('star', 'tree', 'frog', etc).

In other words, the mind is *not* simply the passive recipient of sensory objects which exist irrespective of your perception of them (this is 'the myth of the given'). Rather consciousness is an active agent which constructs what we understand as reality on the basis of sensory input, but also on the basis of unconscious processes, memories, intentions, intuitions, prejudices, prior knowledge, and so on.

Furthermore, and this is the philosophically interesting aspect of it, the neural systems by which the mind creates the consciousness of a unified whole remain unknown. As computer scientist Jerome Feldman shows in The Neural Binding Problem, Chalmer's 'hard problem' is recognised in scientific accounts of consciousness, insofar as there has been no neural mechanism identified which accounts for the unity of conscious experience. There are detailed accounts of all of the aspects of the brain which assimilate different aspects of perception (color, shape, movement and so on) but 'this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene. That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the Neural Binding Problem really is a scientific mystery at this time.'

And that holistic, gestalt-generating ability of the mind to forge the 'subjective unity of experience' maps very well against Kant's 'transcendental apperception' - the process by which we become aware of the unity and coherence of our experiences and their integration into a single, integrated whole.

It's not too difficult to give a minimalist account of what realism about the world might involve. It holds first off that there are things in the world, and secondly that these things have at least some properties that are not dependent on us.

So there being leaves on the trees involves there being leaves and trees, and the one being on the other, but need not involve someone interacting with the trees.

Of course, that we divide the world up into trees and leaves and use those particular words to talk about them, and that we believe or suspect or are certain that the leaves are on the trees, all involve someone. These are observations about us, not about the leaves on the trees. We might have never different leaves from trees, never investigated the ends of the branches to find the flattened green outgrowth from the stem of such vascular plants. But the trees would still have leaves, unobserved and unaccounted.

So realism is holding that there are things such as trees and that these have leaves and that their doing so is independent of anyone's beliefs, conceptual schemes, language or other such artefacts.

Now I do happen to think that this is pretty much right, as far as the stuff of our everyday acquaintance goes.

And it seems most folk concur. And showing that most folk concur is the point of this thread.

And of course, the popularity of this view does not in itself make us right. But it also does not make us wrong.

And I reckon this thread, now at six, will go to ten pages, easily.

Do you think there is any thing in the account you quote at length that is at odds with the account of realism I just gave?

Only that you never seem to see the point of that passage whenever it's quoted.

Only that you never seem to see the point of that passage whenever it's quoted. — Wayfarer

So it would seem. Care to try again?

What is it, if anything, in that quote that counts specifically agains realism? Because you are right, I'm not seeing it. Indeed, the quote as a whole seems to me to presuppose that we are part of a world that is independent of our accounts, and within which our accounts might evolve.

us — Banno

Idealism isn't necessarily about our (human) minds. It's about any minds. Minds other than human minds are invoked to account for object permanence.

Indeed, the quote as a whole seems to me to presuppose that we are part of a world that is independent of our accounts, and within which our accounts might evolve. — Banno

Again, that's not idealism. No idealist I'm aware of talks only about human minds. Not that I'm well read on it. Who are you thinking of?

Who are you thinking of? — bert1

Anyone you wish to include. I've given an account of what realism is, and it seems there is a supposition that realism is opposed to idealism, so if someone wants to give an account of what idealism is, I'm all ears.

that's not idealism — bert1

Telling us what idealism isn't doesn't seem a good away to proceed. The core of idealism seems to be something like that the ultimate foundation of the world is somehow mental. How's that pan out?

Working out what idealism might be seems to be a large part of the problem.

The core of idealism seems to be something like that the ultimate foundation of the world is somehow mental. How's that pan out? — Banno

Sure, that's fine. There's nothing about 'us' in that characterisation you just gave. Yet your criticisms of idealism, if I recall, usually do centre around objects not depending on humans for their existence.

your criticisms of idealism, if I recall, usually do centre around objects not depending on humans for their existence. — bert1

Yep.

OK, so even on your own conception of idealism, this criticism fails because idealists don't just believe in human minds.

Are you now going to say that the same skepticism about the external world from a human point of view must also apply to non-human minds as well, on pain of contradiction or special pleading or something?

EDIT: that's a perfectly good point to make, but you have to be explicit about it if you want to actually succeed in making an argument against idealism rather than an argument against, say solipsism, or human-mind-only idealism. Most Idealisms are not solipsism or humanocentric.

What is it, if anything, in that quote that counts specifically agains realism? — Banno

Realism holds that the activities of the agent's mind have no bearing on the existence of the world, that these can be regarded as separable.

Minds other than human minds are invoked to account for object permanence. — bert1

Cite evidence of "minds other than human minds" that does not beg the question of 'what is "mind"?' whether human or not. :chin:

A silly argument. Let "Humans" include aliens if you want. Or dogs. Whatever. As I said,

Anyone you wish to include. — Banno

But if you push the argument that the stuff around us does not exist unless a mind is involved, you are headed towards solipsism. Because other minds are a part of that stuff in the world.

Realism holds that the activities of the agent's mind have no bearing on the existence of the world, that these can be regarded as separable. — Wayfarer

Well, that's not quite right. See above.

Nor does it tell me what the quote has against realism.

A silly argument. Let "Humans" include aliens if you want. Or dogs. Whatever. As I said,
Anyone you wish to include. — Banno

We are talking at cross purposes, it may have been my fault. When I asked you who you were thinking of, I meant which idealist philosophers.

Also, when you said 'us' I assumed you meant human beings. You meant anything with a mind.

Is that all cleared up now?

The difference, at the extreme, used to be that realists thought that all there was, was physical, idealists, that all there was, was mental. Realism, over the course of the last century, pretty much overwhelmed idealism, to the point where even those who claim the name will often not disagree with the sort of definition of realism I gave above.

Originally conceived in the middle of the eighteenth century as a real alternative to materialistic and naturalistic perspectives, it may now become sublated and integrated into views about the nature of reality that ignore metaphysical oppositions or epistemological questions connected with the assumption of the priority of mind over matter or the other way round. Instead the focus may be shifting to establishing a “neutral” view according to which “anything goes” (Feyerabend) as long as it does not contradict or at least is not incompatible with our favored metaphysical, epistemological and scientific (both natural and social) methods and practices. — Paul Guyer, Idealism, SEP

So the difference between idealism and realism fades, and we move on.

Or not.

Whatever. I don't see a point to this conversation.

Cite evidence of "minds other than human minds" that does not beg the question of 'what is "mind"?' whether human or not. — 180 Proof

I'm not exactly sure what you are asking for, but I'll offer this. As other minds are not directly perceptible (I suggest) they have to be inferred, if we are to rationally think they exist (or maybe there are other methods to know, but I'm offering one here). We can make an analogy based on similarities with my behaviour, perhaps. So the behaviour of other creatures might count as evidence. Consider:

1) I yelp when stuck with a pin and run away from the pin-sticker (one half of the analogy)
2) I do this because I have a mind and find the pain unpleasant and want to get away from it (assumption - I know you think this is false)
3) The dog yelps when stuck with a pin and runs away from the pin-sticker (the other half or the analogy, this constitutes the evidence)
4) (Optionally list a whole load of other ways dogs and humans are similar, to support the similarity)
5) therefore, the dog yelps and runs away because it has a mind and it wants to get away from the pain

Within the context of that inference, does the dog's behaviour count as evidence? As evidence that does not beg the question of what is mind? (I haven't actually done this experiment, but I hope the dog's behaviour is sufficiently plausible. Maybe I should pick an example that actually happened instead of making one up.)

Whatever. I don't see a point to this conversation. — Banno

Righto. I haven't offended you have I? Just unsure of tone.

"By analogy?" Okay, no evidence. Got it.