You put yourself at the center of your considerations and start with the thinking. This is arbitrary and only works with logic. Why not start with things and follow along. — Wolfgang

I am starting with the experience of knowing, in which things and thinking are united. The Fundamental Abstraction takes this unity, divides it, and fixes on things to the exclusion of thought.

Read my post https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13876/mind-body-problem/p1 then you will know what I mean (or not).:zwinkern:

I recently published an article with the above title (https://jcer.com/index.php/jcj/article/view/1042/1035). Here is the abstract: — Dfpolis

I will try to break down every single claim in the OP(and some in your article) and ultimately try to explain why most of those "memes" in philosophy are either epistemically outdated or in direct conflict with our latest scientific understanding of the phenomenon.

Before starting the deconstruction I always find helpful to include the most popular general Definition of Consciousness in Cognitive Science so we can all be on the same page:

"Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self, which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) on the brain stem and cerebral cortex (Daube, 1986; Paus, 2000; Zeman, 2001; Gosseries et al., 2011). "
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3722571/

With the above description in mind and the tones of Neuroscientific publications found in the huge online data base (https://neurosciencenews.com/?s=how+the+brain), the conclusion that brain function is responsible for human behavior and thought processes is way more than an assumption.
Its an established epistemology, part of our Academic curriculum for more than 35 years.

Yet, in the years since David Chalmers distinguished the Hard Problem of Consciousness from the easy problems of neuroscience, no progress has been made toward a physical reduction of consciousness. — D. F. Polis

-That is only true for the advances in Philosophy. Almost all the breakthroughs made by relevant Scientific disciplines never make it in Neurophilosophy mainly because Philosophical frameworks that are based on the latest epistemology are part of Cognitive Science.

Now, Chalmers's attempt to identify the Hard problem of Consciousness had nothing to do with the actual Hard problems faced by the field. In fact, the set of questions where pseudo philosophical "why" questions.
I quote:

"The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (i.e., phenomenal consciousness, or mental states/events with phenomenal qualities or qualia).
1.Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience?
2.And why does a given physical process generate the specific experience it does
3.why an experience of red rather than green, for example? "
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Hard_problem_of_consciousness

Searching meaning in natural processes is a pseudo philosophical attempt to project Intention and purpose in nature (Agency) and create unsolvable questions. Proper questions capable to understand consciousness should begin with "how" and "what" , not why. (how some emerges, what is responsible for it etc).
For those who are interested in the real Hard Problems of Neuroscience, Anil Seth a professor of cognitive and computational neuroscience explains in extensive detail why Chalmers "why" questions fail to grasp the real difficulties of the puzzle and identifies the real hard problems he and his colleagues are facing mainly due to the complex of the systems they are dealing with.

https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-a-distraction-from-the-real-one
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/consciousness-deep-dive/202110/the-real-problem-consciousness

This, together with collateral shortcomings Chalmers missed, show that the SM is inadequate to experience. — D. F. Polis

- I will make some points now that include some ideas in your article. TO keep it short it will be presented in bullets and feel free to demand additional info.
1. Chalmers (as I already explained), failed to identify the real hard problems by misleading people in a conversation on purpose and intention which is fallacious when dealing with Nature.

2. The current Working Hypothesis (SM) is more than adequate to explain the phenomenon. It even allow us to make predictions and produce Technical Applications that can directly affect, alter or terminate the phenomenon. It establishes Strong Correlations between lower level system(brain function) and high level systems(Mental states and properties).

3. the Hard Problem doesn't reflect a failure of the reductive paradigm because this paradigm (tool of science)is not that RELEVANT to the methods we use to study Mental properties. Complexity Science and Scientific Emergence are the proper tools for the job.

4."Epistemological emergence occurs when the consequences of known principles cannot be
deduced. We often assume, but cannot prove, that system behavior is the result of isolated com-
ponent behavior"
-Thats not quite true. There is a general misconception about Strong Emergence in philosophy. First of all in science we don't "prove" frameworks, we falsify them and we accept them for their Descriptive and Predictive power. Strong Emergence is an observer relative term. Its describes a causal mechanism with unknown parameters that affect a system plus it accepts the properties of a phenomenon without asking "Why" they exist the way they do. All the Philosophical Hard Problem does is ask "why" this mechanism gives rise to that qualities. That is not a scientific or a Philosophical question.
(here is a great video that explains the different types of Emergence : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66p9qlpnzzY&t=)
In my opinion the whole "Hard Problem" objection is nothing more than an Argument from Ignorance and in many cases, from Personal Incredulity Fallacies.

I could go in depth challenging the rest of the claims in the paper but It seems like it tries to draw its validity from Chalmers' bad philosophy.
What I constantly see in philosophical discussion is the lack of references to the latest epistemology of the respected scientific fields.
The Ascending Reticular Activating System, the Central Lateral Thalamus and the latest Theories of Consciousness on Emotions as the driving force (Mark Solmes, founder of Neuropsychoanalysis) leave no room for a competing non naturalistic theory in Methodological Naturalism and in Philosophy in general. Those attempts to use Quantum Physics(metaphysics in essence) in an effort to debunk the natural ontology of a Biological Phenomenon are just wrong.
We might use the same tools (Complexity Science) to understand Consciousness and QM but that doesn't mean that our current Hypotheses on Quantum physics apply to a biological system.

The honest answer on things we currently can't explain is "We don't know yet". We shouldn't "lets suggest the existence of advanced entity/substance/agent" just because we either ignore the latest epistemology of science or because we can not answer a "why" question.

The current and most successful Scientific Paradigm doesn't accept made up entities as "carries" of the phenomenon in question. This is intellectual laziness. IT takes us back in bed with Aristotle. Are we going to resurrect Gods, Phlogiston, Miasma, Panacea, Orgone Energy all over again???
Of course not because this practice offers zero Epistemic Connectedness, Instrumental Value, Predictive power etc( all 9 aspects of the systematic nature of science listed by Paul Hoyningen - Systematicity, the Nature of Science ).

We don't have the evidence (yet) to use Supernatural Philosophy (reject the current Scientific paradigm of Methodological Naturalism) in our explanations just because we miss pieces from our puzzle. We can not go back assuming the existence of Advanced properties independent of low level mechanisms. This is what kept our epistemology from growing for centuries.

Before starting the deconstruction I always find helpful to include the most popular general Definition of Consciousness in Cognitive Science so we can all be on the same page: — Nickolasgaspar

That's your page, not Dfpolis' page! That's not the definition he's using! This is a discussion based on his concept, not yours.

Why do you say that?
The first part of my definition is descriptive. If he disagrees then he either refers to a different phenomenon or a specific sub characteristic of it.

From what I understand he is proposing a different ontology for the same phenomenon.(Consciousness). My attempt was to point to our current scientific ontological framework.

If he promotes a different ontological framework then his philosophy is problematic at best because a. his epistemology is not up to date and b. his Auxiliary philosophical principles governing his interpretarions are not Naturalistic(Methodological).

Is your objection about our different ontological frameworks when you say "That's not the definition he's using!"?
If yes then ..I already know that and this is the reason why I posted my objection in his thread...This is how conversations work...people projecting their critique on other people's opinions.
IF not then tell me what is your objection. What is his definition that I missed?

quote="Dfpolis;783488"]First, the laws of nature are not "outside." They are intrinsic -- coextensive with what they control.[/quote]

If they are coextensive with then they are not intrinsic to what they control.

The question is what is required to explain the facts of experience. — Dfpolis

The problem is, the ontological status of the laws of nature is not a question of experience.

Third, the question is: why do "things behave in an orderly way"? Surely, it is neither a coincidence nor because we describe them as doing so. Rather, it is because something makes them do so. The name given to that something is "the laws of nature." — Dfpolis

It is not as if things are chaotic and require something else that makes sure they do not misbehave. A rock does not become a hummingbird and fly away because "something" makes sure it doesn't happen.

Given your focus on Aristotle I am surprised that you import the notion of laws of nature. Joe Sachs translator and interpreter of Aristotle explains it this way:

Being is, first and last, living being. That is the meaning of Aristotle's claim that being is energeia, being-at-work, and always has the character of entelecheia, being-at-work-staying-itself. Everything that exists at all is or is part of some self-maintaining whole. (13)

But being-at-work is what Aristotle says the form is, and the potency, or straining toward being-at-work is the way he characterizes material. Finally, the end, or telos, of a natural thing is so inseparable from its being-at-work that Aristotle fuses the two names into one: entelecheia, being-at-work-staying-itself. (19) — The Battle of the Gods and the Giants

The Battle of the Gods and the Giants

A natural being, according to Aristotle, is not as it is because something else acts on it to hold it together and make it behave as it does.

am starting with the experience of knowing, in which things and thinking are united. The Fundamental Abstraction takes this unity, divides it, and fixes on things to the exclusion of thought. — Dfpolis

This is a familiar idea. A number of philosophers have expressed the same sentiment. Like Hegel?

One should consider the term reductionism in a differentiated way. Those who cannot imagine the mundane physiological activity producing consciousness, or seek some intermediate step, are quick to speak of reductionism. Such nonsensical themes as the serious problem of consciousness then arise from the rejection of it.

Now what is reductionism? This is legitimate in physics, because there you can always (at least mentally) reduce complexities to their individual parts.
Very different from all living things. This can only be explained as a structure, so from the outset it is not just more than the sum of its parts, it is something completely different from the sum. Central nervous systems are very different from protein synthesis. The term strong emergence is actually still too weak for this.

Emergence is not only a higher quantity, complexity or sophistication, but it brings new principles into play.
However, life is already emergent insofar as it can only be called life as a combination of individual parts and functions as such.

However, physics has no suitable categories for life that could explain the movement, change and development of a self-active system with its own will.
Here people like to ask whether physics should not have any justification in relation to life. Of course it has, but not by being able to explain the structure called life, but by exploring the relationships between the individual parts (biophysics).

That is, the question of how physiology creates consciousness is not a physical one.
And the question of how a single individual being feels, certainly not.

That is, the question of how physiology creates consciousness is not a physical one. — Wolfgang

What is it about physiology that is not physical?

The first part of my definition is descriptive. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, this bit is reasonably theory free, and can more or less serve as a definition (I'd leave out the arousal bit):

"Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self,... — Nickolasgaspar

...whereas this bit (whether it is true or not) is pure theory, even if it has become so accepted in the community you refer to as to be, for practical purposes, a definition:

....which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) on the brain stem and cerebral cortex (Daube, 1986; Paus, 2000; Zeman, 2001; Gosseries et al., 2011). "
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3722571/

This is a philosophy forum, not the community you are talking about. So we can't take this as definition here. This must be treated here as theory, to be shown, not assumed.

From what I understand he is proposing a different ontology for the same phenomenon.(Consciousness). My attempt was to point to our current scientific ontological framework. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, that's no problem. Your theory contradicts Dfpolis'.

If he promotes a different ontological framework then his philosophy is problematic at best because a. his epistemology is not up to date and b. his Auxiliary philosophical principles governing his interpretarions are not Naturalistic(Methodological).

OK, more work need to be done than just tell us we're out of date. We're unlikely to slap our foreheads and say "Whoops! Thanks Nikolasgaspar for correcting us. No more philosophy of mind. Problem solved."

Is your objection about our different ontological frameworks when you say "That's not the definition he's using!"?

Not at all, no. Once we have agreed on the subject matter we are talking about (consciousness) then the disagreement about the nature of it can begin. :)

IF not then tell me what is your objection. What is his definition that I missed?

I'm not sure if he's given one, I've only skimmed the paper so far. But it's the same definition that is talked about in any discussion of the hard problem. Something like "Consciousness is that by which X can have experiences" or something like that. I've tried to put that definition in an as theory-free way as I can.

While I do not agree with all of what he says, I agree with much of it. — Dfpolis

As I noted, I don't understand all of it, but there's something there. I've spent a lot of time thinking about reductionism, holism, emergence, and that constellation of ideas that includes them. I've got more work to do.

The way I put it is 'sentient consciousness is the capacity for experience. Rational sentient consciousness also includes the capacity for reason'. — Wayfarer

Seeing knowing in as an essential characteristic allows me to connect to a rich tradition of epistemological reflection and bring new unity to the issues. For example, the Aristotelian-Thomistic identity of the sensible object informing the senses with the senses being informed by the sensible object ties in nicely with Damasio's theory of the evolution of sensory representation. It also allows me to discuss the way in which the identity theory of mind is correct.

Perhaps you could comment on that a little further? — Wayfarer

Eliminative materialists show by performance that they recognize that consciousness cannot be reduced to physical operations. If physicalism is to work, they realize that consciousness must be eliminated. In Consciousness Explained Daniel Dennett even offers strong arguments against the reduction of consciousness. Then, he violates the scientific method by rejecting the data of consciousness instead of the falsified hypothesis of physicalism.

The point about Galileo's observations, and Newton's laws, is that they can be validated in the third person. — Wayfarer

So? What makes third person experience privileged? We still have the same subject as in first person experience, subject to the same range of errors. What makes observations scientific is not their 1st or 3rd person perspective, but their type-replicability, as you argue:

In that vital sense, they're objective - the same for all who can observe them. — Wayfarer

Introspection, per se, has no such method of validation - this was the cause of the failure of the early psychological methods of Willhelm Wundt. — Wayfarer

I do not know Wundt's work. I do know that the behaviorists criticized the analogous introspection of other species. We are not another species and so there is a method of validation, viz. other workers engaging in the same type of introspection, just as other physical scientists perform the same type (but not the same token) experiment.

It seems to me that you need to show why performing the same type of observation and getting the same result is not "scientific" -- and to do so without assuming, a priori, that only 3rd person perspectives are acceptable.

Phenomenology introduces a disciplined method of the examination of the nature of experience — Wayfarer

Does that mean that William James, Franz Brentano and other introspective psychologists were undisciplined? I would like you to explain, for I really do not understand, the methodological differences you see (as opposed to differences in philosophic or interpretative assumptions).

Self-knowledge - insight into the nature of one's mind - often comes, not through introspection, but through life events. — Wayfarer

I agree completely. New challenges reveal potentials (for good or ill) that might otherwise remain hidden.

But I don't know if the anodyne term of 'introspection' really conveys that. — Wayfarer

Of course, it does not. The reason, I think, is that introspection is a scientific method, aimed at discovering universal truths, and human beings are individuals who only imperfectly conform to our abstractions. To know one's self is to know one's individuality, and that is discovered in life-experience.

very easy, consciousness ist no physical but a philosophical category.

Read my post — Wolfgang

As one trained in mathematical physics, the use of equations in analogies grates on me. So, I have to put aside my distaste for the medium to find the message. Still, I largely agree with you.

You wrote: "From this point of view, it becomes obvious that thinking has nothing to do with any cognition of an 'objective' reality. It is nothing more than the (highly differentiated) process of perception of reality, which (for us and not in itself) has produced tools with which we are able to process nature in a highly complex way."
I almost agree. As I noted earlier in this thread, human knowing does not reveal objects exhaustively, as divine knowledge does. It reveals them as they relate to us. Still, it is objective, for it is informed by the object. Such knowledge can also be true, in the classical sense of adaequatio rei et intellectus -- for it can be adequate to our needs in relating to the objects we know.

"Since the philosophy of mind addresses consciousness as an entity in its own right, it fails to present it as an (emergent) consequence of life."
To me, emergence and consequence are radically opposed. Still, I see what you mean: that it is inevitable that life should lead to consciousness. Perhaps, but I see no reason that it should. Isn't that what "emergent" means -- that the consequence is unforeseeable?

consciousness ist no physical but a philosophical category. — Wolfgang

You claimed:

That is, the question of how physiology creates consciousness is not a physical one. — Wolfgang

Saying that consciousness is not physical avoids the question of how physiology creates consciousness.

Sure, this bit is reasonably theory free, and can more or less serve as a definition (I'd leave out the arousal bit):
"Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self,... — bert1

-You shouldn't because it describes an observable fact. A human being can NOT experience a Conscious state without the arousal of this specific brain area.

...whereas this bit (whether it is true or not) is pure theory, even if it has become so accepted in the community you refer to as to be, for practical purposes, a definition: — bert1

- Again I think you don't understand what "theory" means in science. Theory is the narrative that includes all our observations, available facts, math formulations etc etc. I guess you meant " just a Hypothesis. No, it isn't just a hypothesis. Its a description of a mechanism that renders its Necessary and Sufficient the for the phenomenon to emerge. Our Working Hypothesis comes later to explain how the content of an conscious experience emerges.

This is a philosophy forum, not the community you are talking about. So we can't take this as definition here. This must be treated here as theory, to be shown, not assumed. — bert1

-You have a misconception on what Philosophy is. Philosophy is our intellectual endeavors to produce wise claims from the best epistemology available to us. By saying "we can not accept the description provided by science" you render your Philosophy Pseudo philosophy!

OK, that's no problem. Your theory contradicts Dfpolis'. — bert1

When a philosophical Speculation is in direct conflict with a Scientific Description that renders the speculation pseudo philosophical by definition. (Aristotle's 6 main steps of Philosophy)

OK, more work need to be done than just tell us we're out of date. We're unlikely to slap our foreheads and say "Whoops! Thanks Nikolasgaspar for correcting us. No more philosophy of mind. Problem solved." — bert1

-Its your duty to be aware of the latest epistemology...not mine. No more Philosophy of mine on arbitrary epistemology and presumptions . That's the correct way to do meaningful Philosophy.

Not at all, no. Once we have agreed on the subject matter we are talking about (consciousness) then the disagreement about the nature of it can begin. — bert1

- The problem is that you haven't provided a definition on the subject matter.
If you adopt the definition of the OP, then you are using a fallacy from ignorance to point to a magical entity/substance.

Something like "Consciousness is that by which X can have experiences" or something like that. — bert1

-:"is that by which"??? ....seriously!? you are still doing philosophy by using definition that start "that by which"?????
What is this...that? You do understand by calling the phenomenon in question "that" you offer nothing to the discussion...

One should consider the term reductionism in a differentiated way. Those who cannot imagine the mundane physiological activity producing consciousness, or seek some intermediate step, are quick to speak of reductionism. Such nonsensical themes as the serious problem of consciousness then arise from the rejection of it. — Wolfgang

.
-The issue here is that the reductionistic approach is not the only tool available to Science so people shouldn't accuse Science for failing to solve the puzzle because of that "tool".

Sure reductionism is essential in understanding which parts of the brain are responsible for a specific property of the Mind (memory, vision,pattern recognition, symbolic thinking, meaning, intelligence etc etc etc) but in order to understand how all those properties merged (by Central Lateral Thalamus) to a conscious state with a specific concept we will needs a different set of tools.
So from what I understand accusing Science for being a failure due to Reductionism...that is just ignorant.

Now what is reductionism? This is legitimate in physics, because there you can always (at least mentally) reduce complexities to their individual parts.
Very different from all living things. This can only be explained as a structure, so from the outset it is not just more than the sum of its parts, it is something completely different from the sum. Central nervous systems are very different from protein synthesis. The term strong emergence is actually still too weak for this. — Wolfgang

-You can not study living things without including all the tools available to us. As I just explained we can reduce a system in order to identify function and use them to pin point where emergence occurs. Science is the systematic and methodical way to understand things and it would be an error to exclude a methodology , just because it can't go all the way.

The term strong emergence is actually still too weak for this. — Wolfgang

-Not really, again its an observer relative term which help us classify this emergent phenomenon based on its specific characteristics and qualities.

-

However, physics has no suitable categories for life that could explain the movement, change and development of a self-active system with its own will. — Wolfgang

-....and this is why when we study life we don't "do" physics....we do "biology".

-

Here people like to ask whether physics should not have any justification in relation to life. Of course it has, but not by being able to explain the structure called life, but by exploring the relationships between the individual parts (biophysics). — Wolfgang

-One very important thing is to ask the right questions independent if we like it or not. Again the process called life is explained by Biological disciplines, not physics.

-"

That is, the question of how physiology creates consciousness is not a physical one.
And the question of how a single individual being feels, certainly not. — Wolfgang

"
-It isn't physical? How do you know that and how can you demonstrate it? That is an unfounded declaration plus it excludes the only ontology we have ever verified to exist!!!!

Of course we can address the question of how a biological structure can produce conscious properties . And even if we haven't arrived to a final theory yet that shouldn't be used as an excuse to invent an imaginary ontology and present it as an answer.
ITs an argument of Ignorance at best. (just because we don't have an answer yet...thus magic?)

Again there are many frameworks on the test bench and there are huge breakthroughs constantly elevating our understanding about the human mind. The problem I see is with Philosophy is its insistence to latch on Philosophical worldviews instead of constructing new frameworks based on the latest epistemology.

Just observe this thread. I have posted a number of academic links which introduce new data in the discussion, but no one cares enough to update his misconceptions about what we know or don't know.

"Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self, which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) on the brain stem and cerebral cortex — Nickolasgaspar

Unfortunately, "consciousness" is an analogous term, and using this definition, when I define consciousness differently (as "awareness of intelligiblity"), is equivocation. If you want to criticize my work, then you must use technical terms as I use them. In saying this, I am not objecting to ypur definition in se, only to its equivocal use.

the conclusion that brain function is responsible for human behavior and thought processes is way more than an assumption. — Nickolasgaspar

Then you will have no problem in explaining how this hypothesis, which I am calling the Standard Model (SM), conforms to the facts I raised against it. Please note that I fully agree that rational thought requires proper brain function. So, that is not the issue. The issue is whether brain function alone is adequate.

Now, Chalmers's attempt to identify the Hard problem of Consciousness had nothing to do with the actual Hard problems faced by the field. — Nickolasgaspar

That may well be true. I do not know what neuroscientists consider hard, nor is that what I am addressing in my article. As I made clear from the beginning, I am addressing the problem Chalmers defined. That does not prevent you from discussing something else, as long as you recognize that in doing so you are not discussing my article or the problem it addresses. In saying that, I am not denigrating the importance of the problems neuroscientists consider hard -- they're just not my problem.

In defining the Hard Problem, you quote a reputable secondary source (Scholarpedia), but I quoted a primary source. So, I will stick with my characterization.

Searching meaning in natural processes is a pseudo philosophical attempt to project Intention and purpose in nature (Agency) and create unsolvable questions. Proper questions capable to understand consciousness should begin with "how" and "what" , not why. (how some emerges, what is responsible for it etc). — Nickolasgaspar

There are many senses of "why." Aristotle enumerates four. I suppose you mean "why" in the sense of some divine purpose. But, I did not ask or attempt to answer that question. The question I am asking is how we come to be aware of neurally encoded contents. So, I fail to see the point you are making.

Stepping back, you are more than welcome to answer the questions you choose to answer and ignore those you choose not to deal with. The same applies to me. However, if you wish to call something "pseudo philosophical" or claim that it "create unsolvable questions," some justification for your claims would be courteous. Also, since I solved the problems I raised, they are hardly "unsolvable."

The current Working Hypothesis (SM) is more than adequate to explain the phenomenon. It even allow us to make predictions and produce Technical Applications that can directly affect, alter or terminate the phenomenon. It establishes Strong Correlations between lower level system(brain function) and high level systems(Mental states and properties). — Nickolasgaspar

I have never denied that the SM is able to solve a wide range of problems. It definitely is. The case is very like that of Newtonian physics, which can also solve many problems. However, I enumerated a number of problems it could not solve. Will you not address those?

the Hard Problem doesn't reflect a failure of the reductive paradigm because this paradigm (tool of science)is not that RELEVANT to the methods we use to study Mental properties. Complexity Science and Scientific Emergence are the proper tools for the job. — Nickolasgaspar

Again, this does not criticize my work, because you are not saying that my analysis is wrong, or even that reduction is not involved. Rather, you want me to look at a different problem. Further, with respect to that different problem, you do not even claim that the named methods have made progress in explaining how awareness of contents comes to be. So, I fail to see the cogency of your objection.

"Epistemological emergence occurs when the consequences of known principles cannot be
deduced. We often assume, but cannot prove, that system behavior is the result of isolated com-
ponent behavior"
-Thats not quite true. — Nickolasgaspar

It is a definition, specifying how I choose to use words, and not a claim that could be true or false.

First of all in science we don't "prove" frameworks, we falsify them and we accept them for their Descriptive and Predictive power. — Nickolasgaspar

I agree. I did not say that science proved frameworks, but that we use their principles to deduce predictions. That is the essence of the hypothetico-deductive method.

Strong Emergence is an observer relative term. — Nickolasgaspar

It is also a term that I did not employ.

In my opinion the whole "Hard Problem" objection is nothing more than an Argument from Ignorance and in many cases, from Personal Incredulity Fallacies. — Nickolasgaspar

I am not sure how a problem, of any sort, can be a fallacy. It is just an issue that bothers someone, and seeks resolution. It may be based on a fallacy, and if it is, then exposing the fallacy solves it.

I could go in depth challenging the rest of the claims in the paper but It seems like it tries to draw its validity from Chalmers' bad philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar

If you read carefully, you would see that I criticized Chalmers' philosophy, rather than basing my argument on it.

The Ascending Reticular Activating System, the Central Lateral Thalamus and the latest Theories of Consciousness on Emotions as the driving force (Mark Solmes, founder of Neuropsychoanalysis) leave no room for a competing non naturalistic theory in Methodological Naturalism and in Philosophy in general. — Nickolasgaspar

Then you will have no difficulty in showing how my specific objections about reports of consciousness, one-to-many mappings from the physical to the intentional, and propositional attitudes, inter alia, are resolved by this theory -- or how neurally encoded intelligible contents become actually known. Despite the length of your response, you have made no attempt to resolve these critical issues.

because we can not answer a "why" question. — Nickolasgaspar

This is baloney. I am asking how questions. The SM offers no hint as to how these observed effects occur. In fact, it precludes them.

IT takes us back in bed with Aristotle. Are we going to resurrect Gods, Phlogiston, Miasma, Panacea, Orgone Energy all over again??? — Nickolasgaspar

Obviously, you have never read Aristotle, as he proposes none of these. That you would think he does shows deep prejudice. Instead of taking the time to learn, or at least remaining quiet when you do not know, you choose to slander. It is very disappointing. A scientific mind should be open to, and thirsty for, the facts.

We don't have the evidence (yet) to use Supernatural Philosophy (reject the current Scientific paradigm of Methodological Naturalism) in our explanations just because we miss pieces from our puzzle. — Nickolasgaspar

Nor am I suggesting that we do. I am suggesting that methodological naturalism does not restrict us to the third-person perspective of the Fundamental Abstraction. That you would think that considering first-person data is "supernatural" is alarming.

Thank you for the time you devoted to reading my work and the effort that went into your response.

Sorry, I just don't think you've grasped the distinction between definition and theory. You're not the only one, there's lots of people here who struggle with this. I grant that it's not always possible to clearly separate the two. But if your opening gambit in someone else's thread is to insist they change their central definition to something else, you've not engaged in dialogue, you've changed the subject of discussion.

"awareness of intelligiblity" — Dfpolis

That's interesting. Sorry I still haven't read your article in detail yet, but I'm curious on where you think this definition likes on the spectrum of theory to definition. How theory laden is this? Is this what people in general mean, when talking about the hard problem? Is this what Chalmers means, for example?

↪RogueAI
Are you saying mind is separate from brain or a relation of brain -> mind -> information? — Mark Nyquist

I'm an idealist, so I think the brain is a mental object. All that exists are minds [quote="Mark

Nyquist;783263"]Why not computer -> mind -> information?

How could a mind emerge from a collection of electronic switches? Why would we even consider that possibility? If you flip the right switches and run a current through them, you get the sensation of stubbing a toe? That sounds like magic.

Thank you. I wanted to connect all the points I made because they build one upon another. The reviewers had no problem with that, accepting the paper in 12 days. — Dfpolis

This is irrelevant. The acceptance of a paper does not mean it cannot be written better. You have proper citations, it fits the topic you are looking for, and it addresses a currently popular topic. But it is still a mess that loses its focus. I am quite certain you do not need many of these references to have gotten to your point.

There is more than enough evidence that consciousness results from a physical basis.
— Philosophim
There is no such evidence. There is lots of evidence that the contents of awareness depend on physical processing, but contents are not our awareness of contents (which is what subjective, not medical, consciousness is).

This is just wrong. https://opentextbc.ca/introductiontopsychology/chapter/5-2-altering-consciousness-with-psychoactive-drugs/ At a very basic level humanity has been using drugs for centuries to alter our state of consciousness. Drugs are a physical thing. We can measure how the physical introduction of drugs changes the brain.

Read this about open brain surgery. https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/awake-brain-surgery/about/pac-20384913#:~:text=Surgery%20while%20you're%20awake,control%20speech%20and%20other%20skills.&text=Awake%20brain%20surgery%2C%20also%20called,you%20are%20awake%20and%20alert.

Generally surgeons will keep you awake and map your experiences when they stimulate certain areas of the brain. They literally alter your conscious subjective experience.

You do not understand what the Hard Problem is. Chalmers said, "The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect." This is not a problem about the experience of others, but of subjectivity per se. To be a subject is to be one pole in the subject-object relation we call "knowing" -- the pole that is aware of the object's intelligibility. — Dfpolis

I mentioned "others" specifically to avoid the problem your claim runs into. The issue in monitoring other subjective experiences objectively is the fact that we don't know what the user is personally experiencing. If however you were to monitor your own brain state and record your subjective experience, you would be able to correlate the physical changes in your brain to your subjective experience. The problem again though, is that your information would not be able to be objectively compared to any other person's subjective experience because you cannot experience it.

This is not what emergence means.
— Philosophim
The point that contextualizes my definition is that "emergence" is ill-defined. You quote one definition, but there are others. I say what I mean by "emergence" to avoid confusion in what follows. We are all allowed to define our technical terms as we wish. — Dfpolis

Redefining words must be done with care as you then use a common word with a different meaning. No, we do not get to redefine as we wish if we want to be clear and ethical in our communication. If you do, generally it should be a tweak and not a completely new definition. Otherwise, It is a good way to hide points and sneak conflations in that would otherwise be more apparent to readers if you used a new word. I think that emergent is a common enough word that you should have attempted to cobble together a meaning that fit in with currently accepted definitions. Your definition as it is "the impossibility of deducing a phenomenon from fundamental principles, especially those of physics.", is not good. There are plenty of commonly known emergent properties that are not impossible to deduce from fundamental principles. This is too large of a divergence from the original intent of the word.

This is a different problem -- that of "immortality of the soul." It is one that natural science does not have the means to resolve — Dfpolis

Natural science has never found a soul, so it is not a problem to solve. It is like saying the "existence of unicorns" is a different problem. When you are making claims that consciousness is independent of the physical, you need to give evidence. So far all the evidence points to consciousness needing some type of physical medium to exist, and your paper has not shown otherwise.

And yet we find plants react to the world in a way that we consider to be conscious.
— Philosophim
This is equivocating on "consciousness". There is medical consciousness, which is a state of responsiveness, and this is seen, in an analogous way, in plants. That kind of consciousness need not entail subjectivity -- the awareness of the stimuli to which we are responding. You made the point earlier. We cannot know what it is like to be a bat or a plant, or even if it s "like" anything, instead of something purely mechanical -- devoid of an experiential aspect. — Dfpolis

Its not equivocation at all. You also now understand the hard problem. We can know that a being has all of the mechanical aspects of what we would identify with a conscious being. However, we can't know what that actual personal experience of being a conscious plant is. So of course the definition of a reductive consciousness cannot describe the personal subjective experience of the plant. It doesn't even try to.

If you believe that consciousness is only defined as, "Having a subjective experience," you are not using a reductive definition of consciousness, which is what you are supposedly railing against. Your denial that the plant might be "conscious", in the idea that we don't know if it has a subjective experience, is an agreement with my point. Its the hard problem. What we can do at this point is ascribe certain physical processes and responses of "beings" to what we would classify as "conscious". It does not require neurons, and it does not require that we know what the personal subjective experience of the being is.

Almost certainly AI will inevitably, if not somewhere already, be labeled as conscious.
— Philosophim
This non-fact is non-evidence. — Dfpolis

And I never claimed it to be a fact or evidence. I would think you would have looked into the debate of
consciousness in AI and this would not be a strange thing to mention.

If they are coextensive with then they are not intrinsic to what they control. — Fooloso4

How can what is intrinsic not be co-extensive with what it is intrinsic to? If it was in one place and time, and what it is intrinsic to were in another, it would not be intrinsic.

The problem is, the ontological status of the laws of nature is not a question of experience. — Fooloso4

On the contrary, they are discovered via or experience of nature, and they could not be if they did not exist as an aspect of nature.

It is not as if things are chaotic and require something else that makes sure they do not misbehave. A rock does not become a hummingbird and fly away because "something" makes sure it doesn't happen. — Fooloso4

If there were no laws operative in nature, anything could happen. In other words, there would be no difference between what was metaphysically possible (involving no contradiction) and what is physically possible (consistent with the laws of nature). It is metaphysically possible for a rock to become a humming bird, as there is no contradiction in being a at one time and b at another. Of course, this does not happen, as there are laws operative. Further, over time, and with difficulty, physicists have learned a great deal about what the laws actually are. For example, they are much closer to what Maxwell, Einstein and the quantum theorists proposed than what Newton thought.

Given your focus on Aristotle I am surprised that you import the notion of laws of nature. — Fooloso4

You should not be. I look in many places for insight. That is exactly what Aristotle did. In Plato's Academy, his nickname was "the reader," because he read whatever he could.

Similarly, metaphysical naturalists project nature onto an a priori model defined over a restricted conceptual space. With historical myopia, they tend to see dualism as the as the sole alternative to physicalism. — Dfpolis

That seems right to me. It really makes discussing a topic hard work. @Nickolasgaspar might be a case in point, assuming we want to bring back the Gods and the ether.

This is a familiar idea. A number of philosophers have expressed the same sentiment. Like Hegel? — frank

I'm pretty ignorant of 19th c. German philosophy.

I've got more work to do. — T Clark

I've found that being challenged helps me clarify my ideas.

Generally surgeons will keep you awake and map your experiences when they stimulate certain areas of the brain. They literally alter your conscious subjective experience. — Philosophim

There was a Canadian neurosurgeon, Wilder Penfield, who was famous for conducting such tests, which he did over many years. He started out a convinced physicalist, but in the end he subscribed to a form of dualism. He noted that patients were always aware that the sensation, memory, etc., evoked by brain stimulation was done to them, but not by them. Penfield found that patients retained a “third person” perspective on mental events evoked by brain stimulation. This lead him to conclude that the patient's mind operated independently of cortical stimulation:

The patient’s mind, which is considering the situation in such an aloof and critical manner, can only be something quite apart from neuronal reflex action. It is noteworthy that two streams of consciousness are flowing, the one driven by input from the environment, the other by an electrode delivering sixty pulses per second to the cortex. The fact that there should be no confusion in the conscious state suggests that, although the content of consciousness depends in large measure on neuronal activity, awareness itself does not. — The Mystery of the Mind, Wilder Penfield, p55

I'm curious on where you think this definition likes on the spectrum of theory to definition. How theory laden is this? Is this what people in general mean, when talking about the hard problem? Is this what Chalmers means, for example? — bert1

I think it is a distillation of experience. There are things that we could know, but do not (so they are intelligible), and when we come to know them when we turn our awareness to them.

This is theory in the sense of a reflective conclusion, but not in the sense of a hypothetical posit. There is nothing hypothetical about coming to know. We do it all the time. And, there is nothing hypothetical about intelligibility, as the things we come to know were capable of being known before we knew them.

What we know by abstracting from experience does not fit the "scientific" (hypothetico-deductive model). Instead of adding a hypothesis to a limited range of experience to generalize it, abstraction removes irrelevant elements. For example, we count apples and oranges and then realize that numbers only depend on the counting operation, not on what is counted.

I'm pretty sure that this is not what Chalmers would say.

This is a familiar idea. A number of philosophers have expressed the same sentiment. Like Hegel?
— frank
I'm pretty ignorant of 19th c. German philosophy. — Dfpolis

So you've never heard of the idea of starting with a unity that is subsequently divided into opposites?

I might personally be inclined to be a reductionist however that dead ends because everything in philosophy is in the category of mind. So pragmatism forces some form of dualism. Mind emerging from the matter of brains is the best I can do but there might be better ways. I'm always looking.

Computers certainly have a unique set of parameters compared with biology...much faster and they feel no pain.

This category error problem could use some sorting. The primary category is physical matter.
That expands to matter/brain, mind and continues branching for various subject matter.

I got sidetracked looking up amoebas as background for early/primitive life forms.
They are single cell, have no central nervous system and seem to be controlled by direct connection to their DNA. A completely different mechanism from our consciousness.

Sorry, I just don't think you've grasped the distinction between definition and theory. — bert1

-You are wrong. You are trying to make an argument from ambiguity by using lame or specific meanings on both concepts.

-" I grant that it's not always possible to clearly separate the two."
-Of course it is...you just need to define them before use .

-Strawman, I just posted the definition used by science .
My goal in providing this definition was to point out a practical need for labeling a far more fundamental property than that suggested "(us being aware of our ability to understand).
To be aware of stimuli (internal (other mental properties) and external) is far more basic.
Our ability to project meaning in our thoughts is just one more (secondary)property of the mind.

A label for that mental property already exists in Cognitive science (Intelligibility or Symbolic Language and Thinking).
i.e. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S0218127404009405

So once again Philosophers fail to identify and distinquish basic Mental Properties of the Mind.

That's interesting. Sorry I still haven't read your article in detail yet, but I'm curious on where you think this definition likes on the spectrum of theory to definition. How theory laden is this? Is this what people in general mean, when talking about the hard problem? Is this what Chalmers means, for example? — bert1

Again A theory is the narrative that glues together definitions, descriptive theoretical frameworks, mathematical formulations,Evidence etc. This is the scientific definition of a Theory and this is how I use it.
Now the text I quoted is a DEFINITION of what science identifies as consciousness and the second part points to the Necessary and Sufficient mechanism needed for a conscious state to emerge. (I also included a link of the paper where you can find the definition).
I don't know why this is so difficult for you.....

What people or Chalmers mean when they talk about the Hard problem doesn't have any value.
In order to be able to talk about the problems one needs to be educated on the latest epistemology. Chalmers's why questions are pseudo philosophical questions (Sneaks in Intention and purpose in to nature).