Right, they are distinct, which is exactly the point! Using your lingo, what a thing "does" (the way it's arranged) is just as real as what it "is" (the particles themselves). — Theorem

That does not follow at all; please google nominalism if you are confused about other possibilities.

Look, if you want to deny the reality of form, go ahead, but you're just unwittingly throwing out all of modern physics with it. Modern physics is just maths after all. — Theorem

Modern physics goes on fine without dubious metaphysics.

Yes, there are good reasons. We've been discussing them already. — Theorem

Your arguments fail since you conflate the is of identity with the is of prediction.

Your mangling Aristotle’s metaphysics through your misunderstanding. — Theorem

You are misinformed.

Aristotle would not have denied that entities such as hydrogen and oxygen atoms have their own causal powers. — Theorem

Aristotle would deny that matter, by itself, has causal power over forms; Aristotle would argue that the form of hydrogen actualizes the potential of matter. The hydrogen in the scientist's lab is not "matter" for Aristotle, but a hylomorphic compound!

It just that Aristotle had the good sense to realize that you can’t eliminate form from your ontology without courting absurdity. — Theorem

Question begging.

When Aristotle says that matter is the principle of potentiality he means something very specific. — Theorem

Agreed, as Aristotle interpreted matter and form, respectively, as potentiality and actuality. What a substance, the hylomorphic compound of form and matter, is is its actuality, but the substance has an ability to become its potentiality- for example, an actual caterpillar is a potential butterfly.

Hydrogen and oxygen are concrete, material particulars with their own causal powers. — Theorem

For Aristotle, hydrogen and oxygen are NOT "concrete, material particulars with their own causal powers." Aristotle believed that the essence of a thing was its substance and necessarily composed of matter and form; therefore, Aristotle would describe an atom, such as hydrogen and oxygen, as a hylomorphic compound of matter and form.

And yet, taken individually, hydrogen and oxygen atoms are only potentially a water molecule. That's what it means to say that they are the material cause of the water molecule. — Theorem

You want to identify the MATERIAL cause of the water molecule as hydrogen and oxygen atoms, but it is a FORM that makes something hydrogen and oxygen; indeed, it seems that all of what one would ordinarily consider as the properties of things are aspects of the form of the thing. Given this fact, what makes the cause "material?" Furthermore, you mention that atoms are potentially molecules, but surely what a thing is "potentially" depends on what it is ACTUALITY like and depends on the properties (or the aspects of the FORM) of the thing- again, I don't see what role matter plays here...

They play the role of matter with respect to the molecule H20 because something else is required in order for them to actualize a water molecule. — Theorem

Again, you just repeat yourself and you confuse the Aristotlean understanding of matter with a physicalist understanding of matter. No physicalist will agree with you that hydrogen and oxygen are just a piece of something like prime matter; that wouldn't make any sense...

The number and arrangement of atoms plays the role of formal cause with respect to the water molecule because the it is what the makes the molecule a water molecule as opposed to some other type of molecule. — Theorem

As stated already, what one might think of as the properties of a thing are aspects of the form of the thing. This really should show you that there is no way to ever tell when matter is present and when matter is not present- it just has to be asserted as the case. In truth, it appears that its forms all the way down to the most basic substances that make up reality.

The physical interaction between the atoms that leads to the actualization of the molecule plays the role of efficient cause, and the physical laws that govern the behavior of the atoms plays the role of final cause, reliably “directing” the interaction toward a particular outcome. — Theorem

Again, whatever one might think of as an efficient cause, say the electrons of hydrogen and oxygen, are themselves hylomorphic form/matter composites and it is the form of the electrons that determines what electrons are like; what a thing is potentially depends on what it is actually like so it depends on the properties (aspects of the form) of the thing. Your last point about the final cause is contingent on the truth of other parts of Aristotle's metaphysical framework, but that is the very thing in question and there little convincing reason to buy into Aristolean metaphysics.

Because denying it leads to absurdity. — Theorem

Aristotle's metaphysics is no help in avoiding absurdity.

Sorry, but you’re just wrong. Aristotle’s definition of matter and form are functional in nature. As such, something counts as matter or form based on the role it plays with respect to something else. We saw this with the H20 example above. Hydrogen and oxygen are matter with respect to H20 because when combined into a particular arrangement/structure they form H20. Hydrogen and oxygen are only potentially H20, they need to be arranged in a certain way to actually become H20. — Theorem

This is a nice sounding story.

This really shouldn’t be controversial and only seems controversial because you’re failing to distinguish between physics and metaphysics (as I mentioned in my first post). Matter and form are metaphysical principles, not empirical entities. To treat them as empirical concepts is to commit a basic category error. — Theorem

Not controversial? I am willing to bet that the majority of philosophers reject Aristotle's metaphysics and they clearly know that metaphysics can do well if it is empirically informed with science.

If the arrangement of the atoms was simply identical with the atoms themselves then all arrangements would be identical. — Theorem

Again, what matter does is not what matter is. Suppose that there is a Hydrogen atom and that the hydrogen atom combines with another Hydrogen atom so that h2 is produced, the word "arrangement" is just a linguistic tool to describe what physical reality is doing, but what physical reality does is not what physical reality is.

The number and arrangement of the particles just is the form of each element. The matter is the particles, the form is the way that they're arranged. The arrangement and the particles cannot be identical, as discussed above. — Theorem

This is how Aristotle may try to interpret modern sub-atomic particles and atoms, but he would argue that forms of carbon actualize the potential of matter and this is so because of Aristotle's metaphysical framework where matter is just potential that is only ever actualized by forms. The question is why subscribe to this metaphysical framework in the first place? The debate isn't whether Aristotle's metaphysical framework can be made compatible with modern physics, but whether we have a good reason to even accept it when there are more parsimonious alternatives available.

This is just a simple case of using the same words in different ways. Aristotle does not deny that material objects have intrinsic causal powers. In fact, this is exactly what he does claim. — Theorem

Whatever is in actuality has causal power over whatever is in potentiality. Substances that are composed of matter and form have causal power over potentialities. This is not at all like stating that physical reality has causal power since physicalism does not entail hypomorphic composites.

However, for Aristotle all material objects are hylemorphic compounds of matter and form. Matter doesn't exist in its own right. Form doesn't exist in its own right — Theorem

So we agree that Aristotle is not simply stating that matter has causal power.

Only material objects (i.e. substances) exist in their own right. — Theorem

What you just called "material objects" are hylomorphic composites, but "material objects" can be defined as anything that extends in space. A planet is a material object, Methane is a material object and so on.

To say that modern physics contradicts Aristotle's is just to misunderstand Aristotle's metaphysics. — Theorem

If you assume that H2O is a hylomorphic compound or that protons and Carbon atoms are hylomorphic compounds, then you would be correct to say that modern physics does not contradict Aristotle; however, this would be begging the question. What reason is there to suppose that a proton is a composite of form and "matter?" Assuming that Aristotle is correct, then whatever one imagines matter to be, it cannot be protons, or quarks or electrons or any fundamental particle or fundamental force, since those things are all composites of form and some nebulous thing called "matter." What informatively can be said of Aristotle's matter is that it is a "thing" that is impotent and exists as a potential for which forms actualize and exists in an asymmetric relationship with forms since matter does not act on forms, but forms do act on matter.

The difference between the modern view and Aristotle's view is that in the modern view, matter implicitly subsumes form (which is what talk of structure, properties and behavior relates to). Whereas Aristotle makes the distinction between matter and form explicit in his definition of substance. — Andrew M

The difference is that a substance is a composite of matter and form instead of reality being composed of just matter.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

On an Aristotelian view, an independent carbon atom is a hylomorphic substance and, as such, has identifiable characteristics and behavior. But note also that carbon is matter relative to a carbon-dioxide molecule, itself a hylomorphic substance that, in turn, has identifiable characteristics and behavior. — Andrew M

The problem is that few today argue that carbon is a composite of matter and form; instead, anything that extends in space is considered to be part of the physical world and is classified as matter. Additionally, few today will say that matter's potential is "actualized" by forms and that matter has no causal power of its own- this is why I referenced electric charges and chemical bonds as examples of how Aristotle got matter wrong.

So this statement:

So the same world is being described, but they are two different frameworks for understanding it. — Andrew M

is not correct since Aristotle suggests that "matter" is impotent and can only ever be under the influence of a form. There is an asymmetric relationship between form and matter that I can't imagine most physicalists subscribing to.

Science is a methodology. It accepts methodological naturalism and scientists go on and study the universe and try to develop parsimonious and natural explanations for whatever it is that they are interested in. If they develop true theories, then those scientific predictions that come from their theories are replicable; if not, then they need to start over again.

For science to be atheistic, it would have to commit itself to ontological naturalism.

I think that since science has been so successful in explaining the world, without supernatural forces, it ends up appearing as inherently atheistic, but if the world contained supernatural entities with causal powers, then scientists would have accepted their existence.

The real question is if there are supernatural realities. If not, then, inevitably, science will be atheistic since atheism and ontological naturalism are closely linked.

Insofar as modern science appeals to concepts such organization, arrangement, regularity and structure it is invoking formal causation. — Theorem

These words are only names for whatever is observed. They are all names of what matter is or does. You want to suggest that "arrangement," "regularity" and "structure" are not exhausted by matter and that these things must be evidence for something beyond matter and there is no reason for that conclusion.

It is part of what accounts for the difference between having H20 and just having two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. — Theorem

A carbon atom has in itself the kind of charge that attracts the charges of four hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom has in itself the kind of charge that attracts two hydrogen atoms; however, a Helium atom has no such charge that could attract hydrogen atoms and all this is inherent to matter and no "forms" are necessary to explain the behavioral differences between carbon atoms and oxygen atoms.

I'm saying that the concept of formal cause is implicit even within modern science despite the denial of those who don't really understand what it means. — Theorem

Aristotle describes matter as only possessing potential and it is the forms that actualize those potentials, but modern physics demonstrates that matter is not a hapless impotent part of reality, but an active participant in why matter behaves as it does; matter has causal powers that
determines how matter behaves.

I said you need to invoke the arrangement of the parts in order to explain the behavior of the whole. — Theorem

And I said that the arrangement of matter can be explained with matter and gave an example of charge attraction. Forms seem superfluous.

For example, the arrangement of H20 is unlike the arrangement of CH4 and the behaviors of a large collection of H20 or CH4 are also different, but this can be explained with modern physics and matter.

you also need the laws that describe how the particles arrange themselves upon interaction. — Theorem

Laws are descriptions of the regularities of nature; they are not prescriptive. They are not entities in themselves.

The particles arrangement is determined by the particles inherent physical nature. A particle with an electric charge will head towards a particle with an opposite charge and so on. This all can be explained with matter alone.

Matter cannot be eternal, Aristotle demonstrates this with the cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle thought that matter was eternal and that there was a prime mover that made matter change.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternity_of_the_world

In fact, since Aristotle assigned potentiality to matter that forms actualize, it is worth examining whether there is good empirical data to support that view of matter. Empirical data demonstrates that matter is not as impotent as Aristotle imagined and that matter itself determines the behavior of matter. Suppose that you have a scientist insert 4 protons into a carbon atom, the behavior of the new atom (Ne atom) is unreactive and will not form bonds that carbon atoms would have; this new behavior is determined by other parts of matter and not by forms.

Is matter eternal in the sense that it is timeless or is matter eternal in the sense that matter has always existed in the infinite past?

This is because the "whatness" of a thing is its form. — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't the "whatness" a thing's essence?

The shape, size, colour, etc., all the descriptive terms which we use to explain what a thing is, are referring to the thing's form. All that we see, and in anyway perceive of the thing is its form. So we do see a thing's form changing. — Metaphysician Undercover

All those things that we experience seem to be features of objects. If so, then what reason does Aristotle give that there are actual objects of which they are the features; given that there is nothing that can be said about matter in itself, then why not just say that features are all there is- the bundle theorists could explain our experience without leaving things unexplained. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory

Form makes matter behave a certain way. Atomic number is just a linguistic label for the number of protons in an atom, but are physical and so both should be considered matter.

I don't think so since forms make matter what it is.
In modern science, matter is not impotent and matter itself determines its behavior. Consider when a magnet attracts some metal only when the metal is magnetized, this is a change of matter's behavior using only matter.

I am having a hard time following Aristotle's philosophy so I would be grateful if you could help see where I go wrong in here. I decided to reply sentence by sentence so that you could pinpoint what I get wrong. Additionally, could you recommend me either videos or books on Aristotle that can help explain his thought to me? Thanks!

matter is the aspect of a thing which does not change when change occurs to a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

This tells me what matter does and not what matter is.

It is therefore the principle which provides for the reality of the temporal continuity of existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, this is what matter does in regard's to Aristotle's metaphysical framework; this doesn't tell me what matter is.

Imagine a changing thing. At one moment it is assumed to have a definite form, and at the next moment it is assume to have a slightly different definite form. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the form is not material, then why suppose that the form changes at all when time passes? We don't see how immaterial entities behave and we don't see how forms behave alone as Aristotle believed matter and form must exist together. Recall that the relationship between matter and form is asymmetrical, so when I see a kitten become a cat I should conclude that the form is responsible for this changing state of matter.

Strictly speaking, from a logic of formal identity, at the second moment it is not the same thing as it was at the first moment. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let us suppose that a toddler has a Rubik's cube in her hands and that the toddler messes with the Rubik's cube and alters the arrangement of the Rubik's cube, for a period of time. Because the arrangement of the matter at t2 is not identical to the arrangement of matter at t1, we should conclude that, after the toddler is tired of messing with the arrangement of the Rubik's cube, a new Rubik's cube is in the hands of the toddler,? Given that the substance of the Rubik's cube is a composite of form and matter and that the matter is the only thing that we see change, why should the Rubik's cube change its identity when it is being altered? Unless we start qualifying what it means for a substance's matter to be a substance's matter, why does the spatial arrangement of the Rubik's cube's "matter" determine whether the Rubik's cube is the same as it was before the toddler's manipulation?

The idea that it is logically necessary that these are two distinct things, provided fodder for sophistry and paradoxes of infinite regress — Metaphysician Undercover

Form and matter are not identical to each other so, in regards to each other, they are distinct things, but they both are part of a substance and make up the substance. However, from your previous sentence, it seems that Aristotle wanted to say that although a thing's matter changed, such as Theseus' ship, it does not mean that the thing itself was altered. Although it may be counter-intuitive to say that a thing does not persist as time passes, just because it sounds unintuitive to deny the identity of the ship, as it changes its matter, that does not sound like a good reason to conclude that the ship is the same ship. What other, hopefully, more rigorous argument does Aristotle give?

So Aristotle wanted a law of identity which would corroborate our observed experience, and allow that one and the same thing could have temporal extension despite the fact that changes occur to that thing during the time of its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, it looks like my suspicion was correct. It looks like Aristotle operates on the most naive form of experientialism. Why assume that our experience of the actual state of affairs is an accurate representation of the actual state of affairs?

So he posited "matter" as the underlying thing which does not change, providing for the observed temporal continuity of existence of a thing, — Metaphysician Undercover

When you say, "does not change" do you mean to say that matter does not come into or out of being or that matter is static? I have heard that Aristotle subscribed to a relational theory of time and if Aristotle really believed that matter did not change, then that would suggest that matter is timeless.

despite the fact that the thing's form is continually changing. — Metaphysician Undercover

If an apple is a substance, and a substance is a composite of matter and form, then I only experience a change in the substance's matter when I cut the apple in half with a knife. I don't experience a change in the substance's form.

Do you think modern physics has undermined the matter of Aristotle? I gave an example of how matter itself alter's the nature of matter (e.g. shoot protons into a carbon atom and you will get an atom with different behavior)?

MU is going to find you and eat you! — tim wood

Is MU an Aristotelian die hard or fanboy?

. If the τελος of a kitten is to become a cat, then the part of a kitten that is not yet a cat is matter - imperfect form - and the part that is cat is not matter, but cat. — tim wood

Why should matter have anything to do with whether a kitten has the potential to become a cat? Sure, matter may come along and be part of the cat substance, but matter only does what the form of the cat impels the matter to do.

Yes, I understand that Aristotle would say that an oak tree is a composite of form and matter and, while I think I have an understanding of what a form is, I still have a hard time understanding what matter is. Is there anything that distinguishes matter in the hylomorphic composite of a tree or that of gold? Or is there nothing about matter that distinguishes the matter in the substance of an apple or that of gold?

What can be said of the matter that isn't just, "well, it is part of a substance..." or "its the part of the substance that makes the form feel solid..."

Suppose that a sculptor uses his tools and creates a statue of himself.
The formal cause is the statue.
The final cause is whatever the sculptor had intended.
The efficient cause is the sculptor.
The material cause is the marble...

However, what makes the material cause "marble" is certainly another form- the form of marble! And whatever that is is made of another form and so on and so on!

I agree that we shouldn't waste time wondering why Aristotle's metaphysics seems empirically false, but I am still curious to know how Aristotle would answer that question.

because he has full access to the entire movie. — TheMadFool

I don't see how this helps libertarian free will.
God knows, changelessly and eternally, the actual state of affairs.
God knows, changelessly and eternally, that I eat pizza on my 20th birthday.
How could I ever do otherwise?

What you are saying is that what I eat on my 2nd birthday, what I eat on my 22nd birthday, what I I on my 82nd birthday and what I eat on my 122nd birthday are all equally real and are in the state of occurring. If that is all true, then it seems like I never had time to make a thought, choice, or action since all three exist already and God knows of them.

I don't think your analogy really works. Unlike physics (which can be explained with mathematical precision) libertarian free will thoughts cant be.

I agree that it is fallacious to say that If God knows X, then X is necessary or that God's knowledge causes X.
However, since God only knows the actual state of affairs, and that that includes every thought and action I do, then how could I ever make those thoughts and actions fail to happen?
How could I ever do otherwise?

Simply saying that those thoughts and action are contingent is not enough for those thoughts and actions to be said to have been brought about by libertarian free will.

The thing is that whatever theory of the mind you want, dualist or idealist, does not necessarily make libertarian free will more plausible.

What will make or break libertarian free will is the mechanics behind causation that rules over that immaterial mind.

https://www.amazon.com/Source-Book-Chinese-Philosophy/dp/0691019649

This book is pretty good if you want to read about chinese philosophy.

I also recommend some books on indian philosophy if you want to read more in non-western philosophy.

From what you write, it sounds too close to indeterminacy. Can you explain what you mean again?

Agent-causal theories sound indistinguishable from indeterminacy.
From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism_(metaphysics):
"Most events can be explained as the effects of prior events. When a tree falls, it does so because of the force of the wind, its own structural weakness, and so on. However, when a person performs a free act, agent causation theorists say that the action was not caused by any other events or states of affairs, but rather was caused by the agent. Agent causation is ontologically separate from event causation. The action was not uncaused, because the agent caused it. But the agent's causing it was not determined by the agent's character, desires, or past, since that would just be event causation.[25] As Chisholm explains it, humans have "a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing – or no one – causes us to cause those events to happen."[26]

So the agent causes a thought to occur in his mind.
But nothing within the agent causes the agent to do that.
The fact that the thought comes about seems to be without any kind of explanation.
Even determinists will accept that an agent causes thoughts to occur in his mind, but the question is why does the agent do that and here is where the libertarian free willer has no explanation. It just happens. Why does the agent do anything? It sounds similar to an event that occurs in a quantum vacuum.

"Philosophy’s second line of argument is based on a simple view of the highest good. She begins to put
it forward in III.10, a turning-point in the discussion, which is preceded by the most solemn poem of
the whole work (III m. 9), an invocation to God in terms borrowed from Plato’s Timaeus. Through a
number of arguments which draw out the consequences of the Neoplatonic assumptions which
Boethius accepts, Philosophy shows that the perfect good and perfect happiness are not merely in
God: they are God."
Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/boethius/#DiviPresContEter
Well, maybe Craig's answer reflects neo-Platonism?

It is hard to see how Plato's form of the Good could also be a personal being with libertarian free will. Why not say that Plato's form of the Good is not a personal being at all and dismiss theism?

I thought these videos were interesting so I linking them:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VptVYd7zENs

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iu2XbLPl_SY

They are relevant to the question of how God is related to Goodness and both are critical to there being a connection.

Height is a sex difference if no other variable but biology can explain why height differences between sexes occurs. Your question is flawed; there is no line that determines when a sex difference is a sex difference at all- there are only average differences that persists when environment is controlled for.

Google sexual dimorphism in the human species if you are serious.

believing that there are no sex differences and that apparent differences are due to socialization alone.

honestly, your hypothesis is unparisomious.

The alternative hypothesis that I presented is far more parsimonious and is able to explain why even transgenders exist.

I think the denial of biology is sparked by a fear that if there are biological forces at play in shaping human behavior that those behaviors are as good as static and no amount of social change could alter them.

Okay, so you are saying that while there may be average sex differences between men and women that individual men and women are not necessarily in line with those average differences?

If so, then we can agree.

I agree that some women are taller than some men, but I don't see how it follows that there can be no sexual dimorphic differences in the human species unless said differences are categorically distinct with no overlap between the sexes.

Can you explain your reasoning?

They just cannot be said to be sex difference, as they are not determined by a fact of sex categorisation, but by the facts of the bodies. Those bodies could be categorised in all sorts of different ways. — TheWillowOfDarkness

All that is necessary for there to be sex differences is for the human species to display average differences in sexually dimorphic traits. Men are, on average, taller than women, and this is a sex difference within the human species.

I think that society does have expectations between men and women and I can accept that those social standards are just social standards, but I don't think it makes any sense to deny what seems so obvious from an evolutionary standpoint. There are sex differences between men and women and this includes differences in regards to our brain.

People can feel they are different than their biological sex says they are, — Terrapin Station

I think this conflates genetics with brain structure.

One hypothesis for why there are transgenders is that there was something in the prenatal environment that leads to a brain structure that closely mirrors their gender identity. This means that one can accept those genetics reveals that one is biologically male or female, but those genetics themselves do not lead to one being male or female.

Money was on the extreme end of the blank slate theory; he truly thought that one's sense of being male or female was the product of social forces and social forces alone.

The fact that David resisted these social forces is evidence that our gender identities are rooted in our brain's structure.

P.S. I also think transgenders feel that they are born in the wrong body because of their brain structure as well. I am very skeptical of the social environment hypothesis.

People are distinguishing a difference between the facts of the body and the facts of how someone is categorised under a sex and gender. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This seems to equivocate how one knows X with what X actually is.

Suppose that I am categorized one way or other, and we agree that the "categorizing" is a sociological phenomenon, it still seems possible that sex differences between men and women exist and that these biological differences pertain to the brain structure of the species. If this is the case, then sex differences lead to behavioral differences (at least average differences) between the species.

Interesting comment. I think I have heard Bertrand Rusell make a similar point, but I can't remember where.

Yeah, I know he thinks God is changeless.

If something came into existence uncaused, then it wouldn't be an "effect."