I am not insisting that something can come about uncaused; I am only accepting that that is at least logically possible.

If there are things that can come into being uncaused, then this would undermine Aquinas' argument further.

I guess one response is that even quantum events are caused and that the cause has not been discovered yet, but it could just as well be that things can come about uncaused- indeed there does not seem to be any logical contradiction in allowing for that possibility.

Okay, but premise 1 and 2 do not allow for change to be just an illusion. If Aquinas went into that direction, then he would have refuted his own argument.

The issue is if eternalism is compatible with premise 1 of Aquinas' argument.

I don't think he could argue for eternalism and that change truly occurs.

I once watched a debate between Arif Ahmed and William lane Craig and Arif Ahmed said, in response to Craig's argument for a finite time, something akin to, "time existed for all time."

I am going to google it right now.
Edit: its at 29:20.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7vMl-CkCwA

Ahmed states, "at every time the universe existed and there was no time before the universe existed; there was no time in which God could have acted."

What do you make of this argument?

It seems like Ahmed wants to argue that time never began to exist, even if it does not extend back infinitely; therefore, it does not have a cause.

I see.

Craig wants to say that God is Plato's Good and that God's nature is X,Y,Z.

However, you say that

This replaces one word, whose meaning we are wondering about, by a list of words

Would you agree that simply stating that God = Goodness is a tautology and not an answer to the Euthyphro dilemma? Saying, "god = goodness" is really just saying god is god or X is X?

"Another response—given by Aristotle himself—is to point out that as we divide the distances run, we should also divide the total time taken: there is 1/2 the time for the final 1/2, a 1/4 of the time for the previous 1/4, an 1/8 of the time for the 1/8 of the run and so on. Thus each fractional distance has just the right fraction of the finite total time for Atalanta to complete it, and thus the distance can be completed in a finite time. Aristotle felt that this reply should satisfy Zeno, however he also realized (Physics, 263a15) that it could not be the end of the matter. For now we are saying that the time Atalanta takes to reach the bus stop is composed of an infinite number of finite pieces—…, 1/8, 1/4, and 1/2 of the total time—and isn’t that an infinite time?

Of course, one could again claim that some infinite sums have finite totals, and in particular that the sum of these pieces is 1× the total time, which is of course finite (and again a complete solution would demand a rigorous account of infinite summation, like Cauchy’s)."


Does this part of the article answer your objection?

I think there is an even greater problem with Zeno's (and Parmenides) argument against change.

The arguments that they give are supposed to be deductive arguments that demonstrate the impossibility of change, but pure reason alone cannot tell us what the actual state of affairs is. Pure reason alone can only tell us whether something is logically possible or impossible.

The question then is this: is there any logical contradiction in proposing that change occurs?

If there is no logical impossibility in proposing that change occurs, then no argument from pure reason alone could ever demonstrate the impossibility of change and Zeno and Parmenides have pursued a fool's errand.

Thus, the question of whether change occurs or not can only be proven empirically.

Imagine if in our scenario we used an infinitely small thing instead of a finitely small space ship.

The size of X distance and the time it takes to travel X distance is still finite.

Would this mean that the infinitely small thing takes an infinitely long time to travel a finite distance?
(since we have already assumed that the time taken to travel a finite distance is also finite, this seems false.)
Or would such an infinitely small thing have to travel at infinite speed to travel through a finite distance?

It would appear that in order to move from A to B, one would need to arrive at 1/2 the distance between them, and so on and so on — frank

Okay, consider this scenario:
1. So the distance between Mars and Earth is a finite distance of X feet.
2. The ship that we use to go there is a finite size of Y feet.
3. The time it takes to travel the finite distance of X feet is a finite amount of time.
4. The finite distance of X feet is infinitely divisible.
5. The time it takes to travel a finite distance of X feet is also infinitely divisible.
Therefore, the ship changing its location is impossible?

Isn't the mistake in interpreting 4. to mean that a finite size of X feet, since it is infinitely divisible, is also infinitely long if each part of the distance is decreasing and continuing to decrease infinitely small rate? Consider, that the time it takes to travel those smaller distances is also changing at the same rate.

Isn't this just confusing different kinds of infinity?

That identification would not tell us a single thing about what the good is. It would just identify the good with a thing/being. — Πετροκότσυφας

I have heard Craig respond to this that this objection confuses moral epistemology with moral ontology.
He says he is trying to give an account of why goodness exists and not what how we know what is good or bad.

How would you respond?

Nothing changes itself. — darthbarracuda

Briefly, if there is nothing outside the material universe, then there is nothing that can cause the universe to change. But it does change. Therefore there must be something in addition to the material universe. But the universe is the sum total of all matter, space and time. These three things depend on each other. Therefore this being outside the universe is outside matter, space and time. It is not a changing thing; it is the unchanging Source of change — darthbarracuda

I think that they mean the 3 following points:
1. If X changes, then X was caused to change by something that is not X.
2. If X changes or has the metaphysical ability to change, then X's metaphysical nature consists of potential to change.
3. All things that change possess a metaphysical nature that consists of potentiality and is static (unchanging) unless something that consists of a non-changing metaphysical nature (something without any potentials at all) causes their potential to be realized.

Thus, this argument seems to follow:
Premise 1. There are things that consist of potentiality and are having their potentialities realized.
Premise 2. Things that consists of potentiality cannot cause their own potentiality to be realized (aka: things cannot cause themselves to change).
Conclusion: Therefore, all things that consist of potentiality and are having their potentialities realized are caused to have their potentials realized by a thing without any potential in its own metaphysical nature.

Explanation of Premise 1: A baby has the potential to be fed and the baby is then fed; thus having its potential realized.

Explanation of Premise 2: So the person feeding the baby could cause the potential in the baby to be realized, but that person also has potentials of their own that need to be realized.

Explanation: Thus, something exists that is without any potentiality to be realized, in its metaphysical nature, which is what made those things, with potentiality in their metaphysical nature, realize their potentialities. If there are things with potentiality in their metaphysical nature, then there is a change causing thing without any changeability in its metaphysical nature

The first issue is if this argument relies on essentialism. I think that if essentialism is false, then this argument loses much of its grip since if essentialism is false, then there are no things with essences and if there are no things with essences, then there is no potentiality in those non-existent essences.

Next, there does not seem to be a real distinction between potentials that need to be realized and the thing that is the realizer of those potentials. The potential of the baby to be fed and the potential of the parent to be the feeder are satisfied when the baby is fed and when the parent does the feeding. There is no sequence of "potentiality of a thing" and "potentiality realized by potential realizer" since potential and potential realizer are interconnected. This makes me wonder if "potentiality" is only a linguistic illusion without any metaphysical connotation.

In any case, even if everything in the universe changed, the fundamental nature of the universe still remained unchanged. The fundamental nature of the universe is spatial and while the things in the universe changed, the spatial nature of the universe remains unchanged. Thus, space itself may be the unchanged changer.

This is just a review of the first argument, but I would like to know if anyone can help me understand if I got something wrong.

How do you look at the distinction between potentially infinite lines and actually infinite lines? Are they truly distinct?

Can you explain further?

Interesting. In the Stanford encylopedia, they mentioned that Aristotle tried to resolve the paradox by introducing potential infinites. They state:
"However, Aristotle did not make such a move. Instead he drew a sharp distinction between what he termed a ‘continuous’ line and a line divided into parts. Consider a simple division of a line into two: on the one hand there is the undivided line, and on the other the line with a mid-point selected as the boundary of the two halves. Aristotle claims that these are two distinct things: and that the latter is only ‘potentially’ derivable from the former. Next, Aristotle takes the common-sense view that time is like a geometric line, and considers the time it takes to complete the run. We can again distinguish the two cases: there is the continuous interval from start to finish, and there is the interval divided into Zeno’s infinity of half-runs. The former is ‘potentially infinite’ in the sense that it could be divided into the latter ‘actual infinity’. Here’s the crucial step: Aristotle thinks that since these intervals are geometrically distinct they must be physically distinct. But how could that be? He claims that the runner must do something at the end of each half-run to make it distinct from the next: she must stop, making the run itself discontinuous. (It’s not clear why some other action wouldn’t suffice to divide the interval.) Then Aristotle’s full answer to the paradox is that the question of whether the infinite series of runs is possible or not is ambiguous: the potentially infinite series of halves in a continuous run is possible, while an actual infinity of discontinuous half runs is not—Zeno does identify an impossibility, but it does not describe the usual way of running down tracks!"


Why do you think Aristotle invented potential infinite to get out of the paradox?

It looks like even Marx admits that his theory of history is flexible with historical facts (being able to accommodate any twist and turn in history) and Popper would consider that evidence of its unfalsifiability and thus its pseudoscientific nature.

I read a summary of it, but I haven't read the article yet. I know that Prof. Shoemaker is trying to defend the possibility that time could still pass and nothing changes. It looked like that was what you were arguing, right?

You guys mean something like this: https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil/content/jphil_1969_0066_0012_0363_0381

Time passes but without change?

Maybe this video illustrates Craig's view better:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKYeOUKwnxc

@2:17

Craig says, "God wills something because he is good. That is to say what Plato called 'The Good' just is the moral nature of God himself. God is, by nature, loving, kind, impartial, fair, just and so on. He is the paradigm of goodness and, therefore, 'the good' is not independent of God."

It seems to me like he thinks that God is goodness itself- that they are identical.

Can you explain what the theist does wrong then?

I should think a perfect God would be omnipotent with respect to his perfection, but that's exactly not being entirely omnipotent. — tim wood

I don't understand what you mean here. What do you mean when you say "God would be omnipotent with respect to his perfection, but that's exactly not being entirely omnipotent?"

It seems to me that's just God as perfect, and sweeps the idea of an omnipotent God under rug so you and I are not troubled by the thought of it. — tim wood

Don't theists argue that God is both perfect and omnipotent? Are those two things incompatible?

How is that different from a world where all thoughts that will ever be are already determined at the beginning of creation? — Echarmion

Well, under eternalism, those thoughts were not determined by anything. They simply exist eternally.
When one sets up a series of dominoes and tips over the first domino, we expect the last domino to fall over since, in our ordinary experience at least, there seem to a cause for every event that occurs to our knowledge. However, if eternalism is true, then whatever exists is itself eternal and never came, or goes, out of existence. In that case, the notion of cause and effect must carry a different meaning than the ordinary one we use or the notion of cause and effect must be doubted.

sense that it accurately represents the connections between events. — Echarmion

The issue is if one can say that x caused y in eternalism and it seems like one must argue that x and y eternally coexist, but are not the cause of each other. Supposed one looked at two locations of space, that eternally exist, it wouldn't make much sense to say that one location caused the other.

Why would this thought, with it's notions of causality and determinism, be more important than the thoughts which include decisions and thus free will? — Echarmion

If the metaphysics behind the b theory of time is correct, then any thought that exists eternally and never came into being or goes out of being. This is why it is so hard to see how one could argue that free will exists. I don't even think one can use the word determinism to describe such a state of affairs.

Causation would still be a valid way to determine the relation of events. — Echarmion

Can you explain what you mean?

The question is whether the self is also physical. — Echarmion

How does that affect the possibility of either determinism, indeterminacy, libertarian free will and compatiblism if all events exist tenselessly?

@ Luke, Please note that I don't intend to argue that eternalism is true, only that the reductio ad absurdum style argument you make does not succeed. Indeed, it may even be the case that eternalism is false, but not for the argument from experience that you make.

eternalists still need to account for the appearance or illusion of passage. How can time appear to pass if no time actually passes? — Luke

The argument you are making seems to follow this rationale:
Premise 1. I experience a changing state of affairs.
Premise 2. If I experience a changing state of affairs, then becoming is a real feature of the reality.
Premise 3: If becoming is a real feature of reality, then eternalism is false.
Conclusion: Therefore eternalism is false.

The eternalist will counter this experience based argument for the A theory of time with an analogy with space. You are only ever aware of one location in space and that is the one you experience, which we tend to call "right here." You experience your location in space, but you do not experience any other location in space or all locations of space. However, simply because you experience your location of space that does not mean that that location of space is the only location of space that exists. Indeed, I may never go to China or to Pluto or outside the milky way galaxy, but I don't assume that those locations are simply mental fictions. If someone asked, "if other locations in space exist, then why don't I experience them" it would be best to respond with "why would one assume that X exists only if one experiences X?"

Similarly, the eternalist will argue that experiences do not necessarily reveal the metaphysical reality of said experiences. When we say we experience the flow of time, it flows within the block universe; however, outside the block universe there is no flow of time. Consider the phrase "moving picture," when looking at old film rolls, from outside the film role, they seem static and unmoving and unchanging, but inside the film roll is the unstatic and changing movie.

Here is a link for more:
http://news.mit.edu/2015/book-brad-skow-does-time-pass-0128
http://web.mit.edu/bskow/www/research/experience.pdf
https://sci-hub.tw/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00784.x

I guess I am one of the few rightists on this place?

I don't have an opinion here. I am totally neutral.

Moral skeptics deny that anyone has moral knowledge, but we are not moral nihilists so we do not deny that morality exists. We simply are agnostic.

Moral realism is the position that morality is real. So yes.

I am a moral skeptic so I don't know. I think that most theists will argue that since humanity was bequeathed with a rational mind (made in God's image?) that they can think about morality without God, but that God is necessary for morality realism. They could argue that the grounding of morality rest's on God.

Here are some videos that you might enjoy, regarding this topic.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kEcqB9wW2Lw
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VptVYd7zENs

I am not familiar with all theistic moral theories, but I think that Richard Swinburne has argued that some moral statements - such as genocide is wrong - are necessary moral truths.

Don't quote me on that though because I am just going by memory.

Is something right because God says so (never mind figuring out what God “says” as this gets to religion), or does God say it is right because it is right (prior to Him saying so)? — Noah Te Stroete

The answer I hear from theists is that God is identical to Goodness.

You asked,

So logic is prior to God in your view. — Noah Te Stroete

and I think that theists reply that God's nature is logical.

Did I define omnipotence incorrectly?

Isn't stated that God's nature is logical?

God's omnipotence entails him being able to do anything logically possible.
So if you ask, "can God do X," then you must first examine whether X is logically coherent.
If X is logically coherent, then God should be able to do it.
If X is not logically coherent, then God should not be able to do it.

While this is true, what it says is merely that Eleatic monism and immobilism are false if you assume the opposite positions. You just assume plurality and and then you just assume locomotion. The things that the Eleatics deny. This amounts to "if Eleatism is false, then it's false", or, more correctly, it amounts to "if plurality and locomotion are true, then they're are true and, therefore, by consequence, Eleatism is false". — Πετροκότσυφας

I see. Well, I wasn't trying to say that Eleatism is false simply if we assume that mereological atomism is true.

What I am saying is that both wings of the dilemma, that the Megaric school offer, can still be true if mereological atomism were true; thus, if we granted them that from nothing nothing comes and that what IS never came into being, then their own metaphysical beliefs don't necessarily follow since mereological atomism can satisfy both those wings of the dilemma.

If it hasn't been already recommended, then try buying an intro to logic book. that is always a good first step.

are all things one substance—one man, one horse, or one soul—or quality and that one and the same—white or hot or something of the kind? These are all very different doctrines and all impossible to maintain.

This just seems like hasty thinking. Clearly, they will reject Aristotle's essentialism and so they can easily answer Aristotle's reductio ad absurdum.

We, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things that exist by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion—which is indeed made plain by induction". — Πετροκότσυφας

This too seems like a weak argument. The obvious reply would be to make an analogy with space. We are only aware and experience our present location and while we experience our present location in space we are not aware of and experience other locations in space; however, it does not follow that the only location of space that exists is the location we experience. The same can be said of time. The fact that we seem to experience change does not mean that change is a real feature of the world- at least not any more than our experience of our current location demonstrates that that location is more real than other locations in space. Eternalism would save the Megaric school from Aristotle's experience based argument.

they treat being as if it had just one meaning — Πετροκότσυφας

They sound like monists and Aristotle's disagreement can be seen to stem from his different metaphysical framework; I am guessing this is the real issue between the two?

Aristotle employs the actuality-potentiality pair, through which he defines change as "the fulfillment of what is potentially, as such". The unmusical man is potentially musical and the fulfillment of this potentiality counts as change (from being unmusical to being musical). — Πετροκότσυφας

The thing is how does introducing potentiality and actuality solve the issue of whether change is real or not?

To play devil's advocate, one could respond to Aristotle and say that X could potentially be in such and such way, since it is a logically possible state of affairs, and that X is actually in such and such way by virtue of X being a part of the real world. In this case, potentiality is nothing more than an acknowledgment that things could be different; Trump is actually president, but Hillary Clinton potentially could have been president. How is it that by pointing out that the actual state of affairs could have potentially been different demonstrate the change is a real feature of the world?

Aristotle provides a similar argument to the one you make. — Πετροκότσυφας

Well, I try to answer the dilemma by positing the possibility of mereological atomism and it seems like Aristotle answers it differently.